 Okay, good afternoon and you're welcome. Delighted to see you all here for this IIE event, which is taking place both virtually and in person here at headquarters in North Great George Street. So welcome everybody. We're delighted to be joined this afternoon by Pat Cox, former president of the European Parliament and president of the Jean Monet Foundation, our distinguished guest to address us this afternoon. I don't think Pat needs too much of an introduction to too many of you. As I said, president of the Jean Monet Foundation. He's also, was also president of the European Parliament. We were talking about time and how quickly time goes by earlier. Distinguished president of the European Parliament. He is the leader of the European Parliament's needs assessment and implementation mission on parliamentary reform of the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine. He is present, was a president previously. I'm getting all the sort of timings mixed up here because I'm gonna go back over and tell you again because I've got a script, a very helpful script. It's sort of, I've mixed it up, but he was president of the European Parliament as I've told you, president of the ELDR group at that time in the European Parliament from 1998 to 2001 and president of the European Movement International from 2005 to 2011. Pat is gonna speak to us for about 20 minutes or so and then we'll have in our normal way, a Q and A session. If you're joining us here in the room, please raise your hand during the Q and A so that I see you and the microphone will be brought to you and you get an opportunity to ask a question. If you're joining us virtually and very welcome if you are, you'll be able to join the discussion using the Q and A function on Zoom, which at this stage you should know all about as they're on your screen. Do send in any questions that occur to you throughout the session and we'll come to them once Pat Cox has finished his presentation. We'd ask you, if you are asking your question to identify yourself and your affiliation if you have one and that's our convention here at the Institute. A reminder that today's presentation and the Q and A are all on the record and if you're given to doing so and you have your phone with you, do have it on silent, but you could use it to interact with Twitter and if you're doing that, the handle is at IEEA. So I'm delighted now formally to introduce our distinguished guest. As I said to him earlier, I felt a little bit odd welcoming him here to the Institute, given his long association with the Institute and the I suppose likelihood that he would have been welcoming me here rather than me welcoming him, but I'm delighted. So looking forward to Pat's presentations afternoon. Ladies and gentlemen, Pat Cox. So Alex, thank you very much indeed. It's great to be back at the Institute in two senses. One to have the privilege to be invited to address you today and secondly, to be physically back after all of the long absences of COVID. And thank you very much. And also, although you're here now several weeks, let me wish you and your new executive role every success in leading this Institute. Remind me when it's 20 minutes so that we leave space for some conversation. I prepared the text and perhaps the Institute may or may not in its wisdom eventually publish a piece. The last time I spoke in Ukraine here from this podium was in 2014, several months after the annexation of Crimea that was published by the Institute then and its conclusions is not that I'm a prophet but we're somewhat prophetic in the light of what has happened since, including in the light of things that Europe could have done, should have done and didn't do like reducing energy dependency on Russia instead of increasing it in the interim period. From my point of departure is to argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a point of inflection in global history and that it is the most momentous geopolitical event so far of the 21st century. I think it's been a huge wake-up call for everyone. I think the changes that proved elusive over decades for European Union or the Atlantic Alliance and so on crystallized into policy changes and reversals and reforms within days of Russia's aggression that would have been impossible to contemplate and were difficult to deliver for decades earlier. I'm reminded of that quote from Vladimir Lenin that there are decades when nothing happens and days when decades happen and those were such days. In the EU, for example, and especially in Germany, more strategic decisions were taken within several days of the invasion than in decades before. Nord Stream 2 was suspended, of course, before it was blown up, years of policy continuity, Randall Durkandel, the German change through trade policy was Russia under Angela Merkel, Gerhard Schroeder and their predecessors evaporated in the heat of the moment. Chancellor Schultz, three days after the invasion, committed Germany, henceforth, to spending 2% of its GDP on defense, although that's still awaiting its delivery. The EU broke long-standing taboos. It created a European peace facility from its own resources and made an initial offer of 500 million euros to provide weapons to Ukraine for its defense. 15 days into the war at a meeting in Versailles, the EU agreed collectively to phase out EU dependency on all Russian fossil fuels as soon as possible. Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO. A Danish referendum reversed its European security policy opt out from the Maastricht Treaty. Facilation was displaced by decisiveness. Complacency was displaced by urgency and division on things like sanctions was displaced by unity. Meanwhile, in Russia, the post-Soviet and post-Roman of glories have been manipulated to mold a narrative of patriotic nationalism, neo-imperial spheres of influence, and the restoration of a greater Russia, the Ruski Mir, the Russian world. Russian ideologues promote this dream, having Mother Russia at its heart and asserting a right to defend the interests of their co-ethnic Russians abroad, thus self-justifying interventions such as Georgia, Crimea, Donbass, and the war in Ukraine. Aggression abroad by Russia has been accompanied by repression at home. Putin's neo-imperial and neo-colonial instincts are applauded by a subservient, statist Russian commentariat. In Russia, the Kremlin dominates and controls the nation's deceitful war narrative. All independent media outlets have been closed, independent civil society has been banned. Western elites, NATO and the United States, and the big lie describing Ukraine's as neo-Nazis, are blamed for triggering Russia's war of aggression. The aggressive war of choice is presented to the domestic Russian audience as a victim's war of necessity. Russia, the aggressor is presented as the liberator. Russia, the warmonger is portrayed as the peacemaker. Russia, the despoiler of human rights is depicted as their guardian. Russia systematically is laying waste to Ukraine's civilian infrastructure while asserting it avoids civilian war targets. The war is not even called a war, but instead, as we know, is designated as a special military operation to call it by its names to risk imprisonment. Today is day 392 of the war. Last Saturday was the ninth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea and of Putin's covert hybrid war in support of Moscow-backed separatists in Donbass. To mark the event as we saw, Putin visited both Crimea and Mariupol. For most of the past decade, Putin's war against Ukraine slipped out of our headlines. It was there, but it was hidden in plain sight. It was punctuated by occasional desultory meetings of what was called the Normandy process, the leaders of France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia meeting, and also, of course, we had the Minsk protocols instigated by the OSCE with Russia and Ukraine. They contained, but they did not stop the fighting in Donbass. All changed utterly on the 24th of February last year when Russian troops and tanks poured over the borders of Ukraine in the North and the East with the aim, as we saw, to cut the leadership off effectively to decapitate the leadership and to replace it with a spare part Moscow-friendly elite. That failed, as we saw, and from August to November last year, there was an extraordinary reversal of fortune for Russia and the battlefield. Russia then mobilized more soldiers, unleashed the Wagner Private Militia in Donbass and resorted to all-out aerial bombardment of civilian infrastructure, in particular electricity and water. Today, there have been 15 rounds of statewide missile drone attacks across Ukraine, killing dozens of civilians, injuring thousands and wrecking key infrastructure. On November 11th last, we saw the significant expulsion of Russia from the liberated Kherson city, which liberated the West Bank of the Donipo River by the Ukrainians. Since there, the war has been conducted along the line of contact, stretching almost 1,000 kilometers. This is a really big country in eastern and southern Ukraine, with especially heavy war of attrition being waged in back months, now in its eighth month, and Volodar, both in the Donetsk Oblast, conducted through trench warfare and close combat, with a shocking loss of life, reminiscent of the worst features of Europe's early 20th century. After Shamref Render, we saw Russia annexing four Ukrainian oblasts last September, Luhansk Donetsk and Poritsian Kherson, without expressly defining their boundaries. These connect, as you know on the map, the annexed Crimea to Russia, through a very wide eastern and southern corridor. They've also cut off Ukraine from its territorial seawaters in the Sea of Azov, in the case of Mariupol, and also in the Black Sea, in the case of Crimea, and the eastern bank of the Kherson Oblast. The war in Ukraine is expected to intensify in the coming months. Putin's determination not to lose, suggests he's likely to continue to press for further territorial gains and consolidation. This is matched, as we know, by Ukraine's legitimate determination to recover lost territory and restore the full integrity of its own space, as it deploys in time to come better and more modern arms from Western allies. I think the duration of the war and its outcome are indeterminate at this point. It's hard to know all things considered, I would argue, but either side would be prepared to settle for as a win. If that win falls short of their own preferred definition of victory, or even if the war is winnable in any sense referred by either side. The UN General Assembly resolution on the eve of the first anniversary of the war was supported by 141 nations of the 193 member states. It called for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the principles of the UN Charter. It reaffirmed the commitment to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and territorial waters of Ukraine. It reiterated its demand to the Russian Federation immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within internationally recognized borders, and it called for a cessation of hostilities. In effect, it mirrored many key aspects of President Zelensky's 10-point peace plan. Underlining their no limits, or perhaps even defining their no limits friendship with Russia, the current three-day visit by Xi Jinping to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, which by the way is their 40th face-to-face meeting, China has not condemned the invasion, has abstained in successive UN resolutions, and as we see is reported possibly to be considering supplying arms to Russia. In its 12-point peace plan, China is calling for a cessation of hostilities and a resumption of peace talks, but makes no appeal for a Russian withdrawal or makes no specific insistence on the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity. I say my belief is if China truly wishes to play a meaningful role between Russia and Ukraine, it will need to walk not only in the shadow of Vladimir Putin, but also will have to try to walk in the shoes of Ukraine on a pathway to a just and sustainable peace. At present, the possibility of commencing meaningful peace negotiations remains elusive. This is because no party to the conflict, neither the aggressor nor the defender is prepared for that at the moment. For both sides, I think elaborating a premature peace would carry significant risks. For Ukraine, the fundamental viability and sustainability of the state needs to be secured, but remains existentially threatened. For Putin, having launched a war of choice, his personal standing as political survival and that of his ruling elite are at stake. Russia's military factories reportedly are working three shifts round the clock. Its army continues to mobilize recruits, while Putin's territorial ambitions in Ukraine have been contained for the moment. He has never resiled from a stated goal of eradicating Ukraine's existence. Ukrainians, as we see, are showing extraordinary resilience and courage in fighting to secure their own freedom. Ukraine, of course, is relying on its allies to supply it with the capacity to prosecute its war of defense. And one thing we know about Vladimir Putin, he plays a long game. The Constitution was revised last year. It offers Putin the possibility to contest presidential elections for two more terms. In principle, in practice, maybe another thing that could seem in office until 2036, longer than Joseph Stalin was in power and longer than most of the Roman absars that preceded the Soviet Union. And if you play a long game, the kinds of things he might be hoping for are war fatigue among Ukraine's allies and resurgence of American isolationism in the hope of retaining his ill-gotten gains. When the fighting eventually stops as surely as well at some point, the empirical outcome of who holds what territory will be the de facto point of departure of any negotiation. Assuming he remains in power, negotiating with Putin will not be easy. He's a man, I think, well-captured by George Orwell's quote, war is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength. He's a slippery customer to deal with. And you can add to that the hurdle of the ICC prosecution, Putin is at risk of being arrested in any one of more than 120 states where he to set foot in them. And presumably, of course, all of this will be part of the difficult end game when it comes. The eventual cessation of hostilities will be complicated not just by issues of territory, de facto and de jure issues, but by binding security guarantees, war reparations, the role of sanctions policies in the future, asset freezes or confiscation of Russian assets, criminal accountability for aggression, torture and abuse of human rights, the return of deportees and the return of prisoners of war. Securing justice like securing the peace will not be easy. This long list that I mentioned is infused with politically sensitive complexity, not just for Ukraine, but also for its allies and in particular for the EU. Beyond the war, whenever and however it ends, looms the challenge of establishing a sustainable and just peace. Here I would argue the EU and Ukrainian strategic interests are closely aligned. Host war and isolated and impoverished Ukraine, trapped indefinitely in no man's land or caught in a frozen conflict between an anxious EU and a threatening Russia would be a constant source of instability. This is not in the interests of Ukraine and assuredly not in the interests of the EU and its frontline Eastern member states. I would argue that Ukraine's aspiration to join the European Union is an issue of strategic European Union importance and needs to be treated as such. As a matter of self preservation, the EU cannot afford to risk a threatening and volatile political vacuum on its Eastern flank, given Russia's consistently aggressive behavior in what it sees as its sphere of influence and its self justified right of intervention to protect Russian co-ethnics in what it calls its near abroad. This is a unique strategic challenge for Europe for which an appeal to pass precedent as regards the pace and nature of accession is I think of limited value. Uniquely at a time of war, Ukraine applied for and received EU candidate status in record time. It's an act of European solidarity, but a promise also to Ukrainians that their costly fight for freedom will not be in vain. There is a solemnity to this act that will need to transcend business as usual enlargement precedence. European Parliament correctly in my view has described Ukrainian membership of the EU as a geo-strategic investment. That investment will need to show meaningful and visible returns on the roads to full membership while seeking to minimize process driven political fatigue. There are eight countries that have applied for EU status membership. I'm going to deal just with Ukraine for the purposes of today. I propose to focus on that case because in many respects, it's the one happening in the most complicated conditions ever. As pointed out by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, when she referred to Ukraine's status as candidate, there is, she said, no rigid timeline. It's a merit-based process. And with so many states in the enlargement frame, she added it's up to the candidate country how far and how fast they reach the goals that are being set. This is correct, but I add one additional observation that to start the enlargement negotiation, to agree the negotiating mandate, to close the negotiating chapter and to agree an accession treaty that requires unanimity of every member state. And so in addition to the candidate state, there's a whole load of other players who have a whole load of other agendas that can impact the timing no matter what other set of considerations are available. As regards EU engagement, Ukraine is not starting from zero. Exceeding to the EU has popular support in Ukraine, currently reported at 92%. It was in the high 60s before the war. This is already in constitutional expression in the Ukrainian constitution and it is a political priority of Ukraine which has been accentuated and not diminished by the war. Post-President Yanukovych, Ukraine signed an association agreement and a deep and comprehensive free trade area agreement with the EU. And as a result, they've been gradually approximating significant parts of EU law already with Europe's EU, a key communitaire. Now withstanding the pressures of the war, I expect that Ukraine will do everything it can to pass the seven tests that have been set for it before any negotiation would happen. If they don't, of course, the blame is on themselves. But I would expect an early fulfilment of these conditions as a strategic national priority by Ukraine. And if that happens, I believe there will be great pressure to begin the process of the negotiating mandate and the first chapters already late this year. When negotiations start, it should in my view be possible to deliver and identify pragmatic milestones, potential early wins along the way to full membership. I can develop those later. For EU veterans, one thing we know about enlargement, they always raised a debate about EU deepening and EU enlargening. So one of the questions is, is the EU itself ready for this? Let me go through a few things very quickly. Based on its internationally recognised border, Crimea is a very large country. Next to European Russia, it's the largest land mass for any state in Europe. It is larger than Sweden. It's twice the size of Italy and one in three quarters the size of Germany. Its agricultural output as a share of its national income is a multiple of the EU average. Its GDP per capita is only about a quarter of that of Poland. In summary, taking just those three observations, it's big, it is a large agricultural sector, it's relatively poor. These three observations alone have big implications for the scale and allocation of the EU budget in areas such as the common agricultural policy and cohesion fund expenditure. I'm assuming for my paper today that the post-war reconstruction costs would not be on the EU budget but would be paid by various pledges and donations. If that wasn't the case, of course the EU budget issue would be even more acute than I mentioned earlier. But experience teaches us about EU budget making is straightforward. If you pay, you don't want to put more in. If you get money out, you don't want someone else taking it from you and it makes it all a bit complicated and all of that stuff needs to be resolved. This is not beyond the ability of people to do it but is the EU ready in budget returns right now? I'd say the answer is no, it can be done but it would need to be done. As regards the conference of the future of Europe, this institute and various others in Ireland hosted various events around that and it came up with lots of recommendations. All I want to say is that after many months when the council reviewed it, they said that they thought some of the suggestions of very, very limited number might require treaty change. European Parliament has enumerated what those might be, particularly in the areas of sanctions policy, passerelle clauses moving from unanimity to qualified majority and clauses about how you activate emergencies. I think right now, one thing we all have an interest in is a matter of common concern to make sure that a future EU with more member states and a more complicated geopolitical structure is actually capable of making decisions and avoiding gridlock. And so this is an area again that I think needs to be addressed. I would say this to conclude on that element. If one contemplates the shockwaves and insecurity that could emanate from instability in Ukraine and if one truly sees accession to the EU as an anchor of future peace with stability, then I think politically the EU needs to draw a lesson from Mario Draghi's three words that save the euro, whatever it takes. Ukraine's systemic transformation from a deep post-Soviet state dominated by self-serving elites to an open modern society and democracy is the work of a generation. The revolution of dignity at Maidan in 2014 marked the decisive point of transition. This war, I believe, marks a total rupture of Ukraine's Soviet past. Any residual Ukrainian nostalgia for old days and old ways has now been expunged. One of the features of the post-Soviet space I won't develop at length here, but I've written about it is elite impunity, insiderism, oligarchy cartels and lots of corruption. Clearly there's a whole lot of stuff there that needs to be addressed. I believe Ukraine is undergoing a deep transformation and I believe in seeking EU membership. It's inviting the EU and its institutions into a deeper and long-lasting relationship. We need to give credit to Ukraine when it does things correctly and we need to be willing to criticize it when there are things that are left undone and need to be addressed. But I do expect that Ukraine will do whatever it takes and the question is will the European Union as a counterpart do the same? I think the greater the clarity and commitment that we offer in Ukraine, the greater the leverage we have in its modernization and reform process post-war. Last June, Zelensky published a national recovery plan. I've written about it, I won't go into the details, but the EU is suffused in it. It's everywhere in terms of things that need to be done and so on. In Ukraine, and I'm coming towards an end, when the war ends, the individual and societal, post-traumatic, physical and psychological consequences are of course going to be enormous. Ukraine will require massive assistance in reconstruction, starting with basics like homes, hospital, schools and essential infrastructure. I believe it needs and deserves high levels of external support, willingly given, but with strict conditionality to avoid a reversion to older forms of elite corruption with impunity. The inevitable creeping centralization of power and of official communications and that is evident as I look at Ukraine today will of course in peacetime, needs to yield to open and accountable governance, pluralistic politics and strong independent political judicial and media checks and balances. Acceleration of the implementation of the deep and comprehensive free trade area agreement, further integration into the EU single market and early deepening of transport and energy links commend themselves as low-hanging fruit for early progress. We know from past experience that an abiding challenge for candidate states and newly exceeding states is their limited administrative and absorption capacities. I would suggest that the call to establish an Eastern Partnership Academy for Public Administration deserves support. I think early twinning arrangements and this includes our country and our public service and our know-how of personnel and territories should be encouraged between member states and Ukraine. EU resources need to be dedicated to assisting the development of quality national programs for the adoption of the IKIN. Basically, you've got to download a massive amount of EU law. It's complicated, it's enormous in scale and people need to be helped to work the way through that extraordinary large amount of download and digestion. And last but not least, I would say our elected representatives must explain, explain, explain because in the end, communicating the strategic necessity for the EU and also for the Ukraine to proceed down this road, it's essential to inform the public and prepare national public opinions for what lies ahead. In my short paper, I've argued that Ukraine's aspiration to join the European Union is a matter of strategic EU significance and should be treated as such. In terms of self-preservation, the EU cannot afford to risk a political vacuum on its Eastern flank, that this is a unique enlargement for which an appeal to pass precedent as regards pace and the nature of accession is of limited value. That I don't see staged integration or fast-track integration as mutually exclusive, or complementary, but I would commend whatever it takes and approach. A balance, of course, has to be struck between Ukraine's determination to get in early and the EU's imperative needs to get it right. This leads me to suggest that Ukraine's ambition to join EU has some parallels with another recent unprecedented EU event, namely Brexit. There, the EU 27, the three institutions, Parliament, Commission and Council stood together, agreed on what mattered most, and acted in concert with coherence and consistency. This proved to be remarkably effective. This is not a suggestion aimed at the creation of an artificial enlargement timetable, but rather one that recognizes the desirability within the EU of building a mutual trust and understanding essential to realizing this most complex and unprecedented challenge. There are different emphases evident already between what some observers in the past called old and new Europe. Mutual distruster in comprehension would offer no way forward. With Brexit, no institution abandoned its prerogatives, but all acted in common cause and in the common interest to an agreed set of common timetables. Given the stakes and complexity involved, does Ukrainian EU membership not also suggest the need for a special and coherent political and inter-institutional response? When he chose to invade Ukraine 12 months ago, Vladimir Putin underestimated the courage and resolve of Ukrainians to defend their freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity. He misread the willingness and capacity of Ukraine's allies to assist in that task. Paradoxically, Putin has become Ukraine's most potent, unifying force in forging the birth of a new Ukraine whose independence will have been earned not just through the referendum of 1991, but also through the appalling blood sacrifice, death and destruction now being endured by its people today. European Union is a union of voluntary engagement, not a Europe delivered from the barrel of a Russian neo-imperial gong. This is the choice and dream of Ukrainians to be part of a family of EU nations and states. In response to their nightmare of today, I believe we must help to deliver that dream for all their sakes, but for all our sakes also. So thank you for the invitation, for your attention. Slava, Ukraine.