 Hi, good afternoon. Welcome to New America. I'm thrilled to see this level of turnout for today's event on how Americans feel about democracy. And I'm just going to, I'm Mark Schmidt. I direct the political reform program here. I'm going to just, I mean, immediately turn this over to our panelists. But just to say, I think what's distinctive about this event was that we've had a lot of conversations about how Americans feel about democracy and sort of generalized thoughts about it. But what we have here today is two really rigorous examinations of public opinion about public attitudes about democracy. And we thought it would be really a really rich discussion to bring them both into the room and, you know, liven them up with some other discussion from people who are observing it as journalists, scholars, other perspectives. So one study is the voter study group, which has been supported by the Democracy Fund, and that my colleague Lee Drutman has been involved with, and Henry Olsen at the end of the panel. And the other is the Pew Research Center's study on attitudes about democracy. And, you know, for me, Pew Research Center has been kind of the gold standard about studying public attitudes for about as long as I can remember. So I'll just turn it, we'll start with a couple presentations. Firstly, Drutman, my colleague is a senior fellow in our program. Jocelyn Kiley, who is the Associate Director for U.S. Politics at the Pew Research Center. I'm not doing bios. I figure everybody has a super computer in your hand if you want to look up more about anybody. Perry next to Jocelyn is Vanessa Williamson, who is a fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution and has co-written important books about the Tea Party and also about Americans' attitudes about taxation. Perry Bacon Jr., who is a political writer at 538 and has been a fellow at New America. And Henry Olsen, who's a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center and was also a participant in the voter study group project. So I'll just turn it over to Lee, and I thank you again all for coming. So hopefully we'll have this PowerPoint presentation come up. This is the report. I think there are copies outside. And so we'll start with the good news because everyone loves a little bit of good news. This shows that the top line is the percentage of Americans who say we should have a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with Congress and elections. And actually, our analysis shows that that is actually down from where it's been. So that's good news, although there's a little bit of slight increase in the red line, which is support for Army rule. So that's the good news. The sort of discouraging news is we actually asked five statements in the survey on support for democracy, and only 15% or 54% of people gave the pro-democracy answer on all five questions. So support for democracy might not be super strong. Now, obviously there's a question of these polls being a snapshot in time, and if you wanted to take a broader historical lens at this, you might say, well, haven't Americans sort of always, hasn't there always been a sort of not super pro liberal democracy core of the American electorate? And yeah, that's true. In fact, after World War II, it was a sort of panic among social scientists after they wondered, could it happen here to it, then being the rise of Hitler? And they probed the attitudes of the American electorate and found that, yeah, maybe support for tolerance in liberal democracy was not that high. And in fact, I'll show you two slides to grasp from this report that actually would not have been surprising to the social scientists of the 50s and 60s. One is that having a rather traditionalist views of American identity are pretty highly correlated with not thinking government's such a great system, or not thinking democracy is such a great system and thinking a strong leader is pretty good. And also, a sense of there being disorder and chaos in the world uncertainty might lead you to not think a strong leader is particularly good, although it's not super correlated with support for democracy. So, again, there is a sense that this has always sort of been a persistent rumbling of anti-democratic sentiment in the broader American electorate. So, part of the question to ask is, well, what's different now? I mean, one has to do with the elites. In that you have, in the past, the American elites who run, lead both parties have always been beworks and teachers of American liberal democratic norms. And maybe it was, we got lucky. And then there's also the question of the party system itself, in which for a long time there was no party that was really the natural home for the country of attitudes that often cohere around authoritarianism. Now, one, I think, particularly interesting finding from our report is that when you break down by attitudes on economics and on social issues, that the highest support for democracy is those who hold consistently liberal attitudes. And the sort of weakest support for democracy and the strongest, those who are sort of off dimensions that they have, they sort of don't really have a party that represents them, or also in the middle. And these are people who tend to be sort of less attached to the party system, less educated overall. Another key finding that I think really jumps out is the fact that folks who were either Obama Trump voters or other Trump voters or just other, they didn't support either of the two major party candidates are most likely to support strong leadership, tend to be most disaffected with the political system. And I think this kind of challenge, it creates a challenging question about, like, what do we do about this broad anti-democratic sentiment that's out there? It's not, again, it's not the vast majority, but there is a significant percentage of the population who holds these views. And one idea as well, maybe this is about civic education and voter participation, and we just need to bring more people into this system. But then this creates a challenging question, which is, if we're asking for more engagement from people who feel unconnected to the parties and hold negative views of democracy, then there are some risks. One is that we bring in people who hold these, more people who hold these anti-democratic sentiments, which further increases the electoral power of an anti-system populist candidate who wants to blow it all up. Maybe that person is already Donald Trump. And the second is that, you know, or people just get more caught up in the two parties, which are deeply polarized. And then there's, I think, an even bigger challenge, which is, I think, one thing that we find in this data, and I think it also comes out in the Pew data, is that you're seeing more polarization between the parties on views of democracy as a system and basically to liberal democratic norms. And, you know, maybe Democrats gained tremendously among moderate Republicans in 2018 and 2020, and that leaves the Republican Party as the party of the Ted Cruz's and the Steve King's and the Roy Moore's and the Louis Gomert's, and then things, I think, start to get really contested. You know, so then the other question that you ask is, well, is there a way to shift the axis of political conflict back from a battle over the nature of American identity and its political institutions, and to more non-extessential normal politics over, you know, public policy and its implementation, the size of government, economics. And I think the answer is that that's really hard to do, given the way that current party system is aligned. But we have to think about ways so that to change the current status quo, so that being a Democrat or being a Republican is not wrapped up in these fundamental zero-sum questions about the basis of American democracy. So I'll leave it there. Great. Well, I think I'll talk a little bit about, I think in many ways, a complementary set of work that we've done at the Pew Research Center. So let's see. I think I may need some tech. There we go. All right. So we study some of these questions fairly regularly, and earlier this year we did a wide-ranging study on the public's attitudes about not just democracy and some of some of the kinds of questions that Lee asked about, but individual types of Democratic values. And so I'll start with some broad views here. As you can see, there's some criticism about the way democracy is functioning these days. So we have a majority of Americans saying that democracy is functioning at least somewhat well, but just 18% saying that it's functioning very well in the country today. And when we ask a different kind of question, which I consider a sort of high bar, thinking about the fundamental design and structure of American government, do you think there need to be significant changes or not? Six in 10 Americans say there need to be significant changes. So as I say, not exactly a low bar question. But what you can see here is that these attitudes do split bipartisan lines, that Republicans are less critical of the current state of democracy than Democrats. Still, they're not overwhelmingly positive, right? 30% of Republicans say that the democracy is functioning very well, and Republicans are divided on the question of whether fundamental changes need to happen or not. And I think it's also important to put this in context. These kinds of questions, even though we don't have a trend on this particular question, we ask these particular questions. We ask these for the first time this year. We do know that questions like this tend to reflect whether you're the in party or the out party. So Republicans are in power, Democrats are less satisfied with democracy, more likely to want to see structural changes. When we see questions about trusting government that do have long term trends, for instance, we see when when Republicans are in power, Republicans are more positive when Democrats are in power, Democrats are more positive. So I think just something to think about when we interpret these questions. But let's move on to some specifics. So one of the things that we did was we asked people about 23 separate kinds of political values that get at Democratic ideals. And you can see here that on all 23 of them, majorities said these things were very important for the US. But on only eight of 23 did the majority of Americans say that the US is even doing somewhat well when it comes to this particular value. So you can see that disconnect. And these are just a couple of illustrations of what it is, you know, what it is we asked about. So you can see, for instance, the first over over to the left, that the rights and freedoms of all people are respected. 84% of Americans say that that's very important for the country. Yet only 47% say that describes the country either very well or somewhat well. So again, not a particular high bar to say it describes the country somewhat well. You can see that same kind of disconnect on this question of whether elected officials face serious consequences when there is misconduct, right? And you see similar sized gaps when you ask people about whether the government is open and transparent or whether there's bipartisan cooperation or the tone of political debate is respectful or any number of other questions. You know, you do, as I say, there are eight of 23 where a majority say we are doing well. So here's one example that people are free to peacefully protest. So that's one that people say is important. And also people say, you know, describes the country very very or somewhat well. So there's not a disconnect over every single one of the values we ask about. But but for the majority of values there is. And I want to talk a little bit about this partisan divides. As Lee said, you know, this is all happening against a backdrop of increasing partisan polarization in the country today. And you see partisan divides even in these evaluations of how well the country is doing in terms of these democratic values. So I'll focus in on just a couple. This set up here are ones where Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say it describes the country well. And Democrats, you can see for the most part, a minority of Democrats say everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. The rights and freedoms of all are respected. That the views of those who are not in the majority are respected. Those are attitudes that that Democrats are less likely to hold than than Republicans. At the same time, one of the few areas where Republicans are more likely than Democrats to express criticism is around the news media in the political environment. So Democrats are not particularly positive in these evaluations of whether the news media favor a political party or not. This is something that I think majorities of both Democrats and Republicans don't think is something that describes the country well. But the critique is more widespread among Republicans than among Democrats. But I want to focus here for a moment on some of these in the center of this table here, just to show you that there are there is bipartisan agreement over a number of these democratic values. And the bipartisan agreement is that it doesn't really describe the country all that well these days. So again, some of the ones I listed before that the government is open and transparent, only about a quarter of both Republicans and Democrats say that describes the country well right now, that the tone of political debate is respectful, that money doesn't have a great influence in our political campaigns. The question about misconduct for elected officials, this question about whether people agree can agree on basic facts even when they disagree on politics. And that's something we see in other polling that we really do see that people are perceiving not just that we disagree on politics, but that we disagree on the facts. And again, here on whether the two parties can work together. So people tend to think of these as elements of a functioning democracy, and yet they don't see us living up to them right now. And I wanted to close out or talk a little bit more about this widespread negativity and cynicism and sort of how that forms a backdrop of these debates we're having about democracy. What I'm showing you here is the confidence that people express in different kinds of groups in American society. And you can see elected officials are all the way at the bottom here that just 25% say they have at least a fair amount of confidence in elected officials to act in the best interests of the public. But this finding isn't new to this moment, right? We've seen this before. We asked this question in about two years ago and we saw a similar finding. So there's a sense that there might be a sense among some that the negativity or the cynicism is unique to this particular moment. But I don't think that's entirely true. And here's another example of this. This is a nice long trend asked in the national election studies about whether the government is run by a few big interests who are looking out for themselves or for the benefit of all people. And you can see pretty clearly for the better part of the last two decades, three quarters of Americans have said that the government's run for the benefit of a few big interests. That dip is around September 11th when there was a little bit of a, we saw trusting government increase post September 11th. But it didn't take too long for the American public to move back in the direction of having a cynical view here. One of the other findings we have is that people are not just more cynical about government, they're also more cynical about their fellow citizens. So today you can see here that a majority of Americans now say they have not very much are no confidence in the wisdom of the American people to make good political decisions. But if you go back to the 1990s or 2007, the majority view or more people held the view that they had at least a good deal of confidence in their fellow citizens. So again, it's not specific to democracy, but I think it's an important part of the debate around democracy today. And then I'll just close with this, which again, might not seem like it's specifically about democracy. But it's a question we first asked in 2006 16 about whether you yourself feel like you're winning or losing in politics when it comes to the issues that matter these days. And the reason I include it is because you can see here that the majority of people think that they're losing. And it doesn't matter whether it matters a little bit if if you're actually winning, right. So in 2016, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to say they were winning in politics. Still, though, Democrats were about evenly divided. And today, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say they're winning. But still, Republicans are a little more likely to say they're losing than than winning. So why does this matter? I think it's because a kind of sense of agreement, a sense that democracy isn't working for you kind of pervades American sentiment about politics these days. And the survey that we did includes a lot more specific questions about, you know, how you'd feel about, say, increasing the size of the house or the Senate or certain kinds of other electoral college reform. And I think those are all important questions and interesting findings about about the public. But but I think it's also just important to understand when we talk about public opinion around democracy and democratic values, that it's against this broader backdrop. Thank the panelists again for a fascinating presentation and genuinely fascinating set of reports. I think it's it's so valuable to have data on a question that I think all of us and so many Americans have speculated on in recent years, you know, how Americans feel about the form of government that they have, how Americans feel about the way that our politics is unfolding. And so, you know, it's wonderful to have data to sort of address some of those speculations. And of course, I think longer, of course, on many of these questions, you want to see longer trend lines, right? And this is something that I think is in a way it's it's unique to this moment that we're asking these kinds of questions of Americans, I think it actually says something about our politics that we did not actually think it was worth asking this before. So I guess I think it's wonderful that we're we're moving in the direction of having a better sense of these sort of deep questions about Americans. I want to focus on just a couple of things. First of all, on the question of American cynicism or pessimism about their political institutions, I was torn on how to feel about that, because on the one hand, I thought it suggested a certain like clear-eyed concern. I think many political scientists, including myself, feel that there are some substantial challenges to our democratic processes in this country. And so seeing that reflected in the in the survey data, of course, there's a there's a way of looking at that as a as a positive phenomenon, kind of clear-eyed phenomenon, the part of American the American citizenry, at least the majority of it. But at the same time, of course, political scientists would also be able to tell you that pessimism or cynicism can often lead to apathy, right? So that people recognize there's a problem that doesn't actually necessarily spur them to try and solve it if they don't see it as a problem that's really capable of being addressed. So so I think that there's sort of two ways of reading that data that I'm not sure where I don't know if you got I'd love to hear you as thoughts about where you come down on that divide, just the two other things I thought in reading the reports. One, I thought it was fascinating that there's a very, very high percentage of Americans who think that substantial changes need to be made to our political procedures. But if you put before them any of the any of a wide array of political procedures that have that have been sort of debated at one point or another, they are extremely unpopular. People do not want to readjust the apportionment of the Senate. People, you know, there are all these sorts of ideas that might address some of the inequities of our political system, and they are not, they don't go over well, and they don't go over well even after you give people more information about the inequity that it would address. And so I was thinking about that, and there are a couple of things I'd say about it. One, I think in general, people are better at judging outcomes than processes and tend to judge processes in terms of what they think it would do for the outcome. But political processes are often have counterintuitive implications. You know, there are all these efforts in American history to sort of reduce the power of political parties, and you find this actually can be quite anti-democratic to do this. It creates more elite power in certain ways. So because the impact of certain procedural changes can be counterintuitive, I think it's reasonable that people are suspicious of these changes. It also suggests that, you know, part of a long American tradition of sort of, you know, the civic religion, the idea that Americans are deeply invested in their form of government in a way that other countries are perhaps a little bit less sort of romantic about, right? So I think you can, there's a, you know, there's certain things I would personally choose to change about the way that our democracy is structured, but I do have a sympathy for that sort of romantic attachment to a very long-standing democratic form. Finally, the last thing I'd say is one reason you might not be seeing, I mean, people think that there should be big changes, but any big changes you present there are not really excited about. It might be really due to elite leadership or lack thereof. I think one thing that is well kind of definitional is that people who are in political power today won in the current system and therefore have relatively little incentive to attempt to change the rules. And so I think that, you know, for the kinds of reforms that have been put forward to really sink in and become something that a wide swath of the American public is aware of, you would need elite leadership sort of pushing those ideas forward and there's a pretty strong incentive for, at least, elected officials not to do that. The last thing I'll say is on attitudes and behavior and I think sometimes we tend to only look one way. We imagine that people have certain attitudes and there are for behave in certain ways. So you might think that, well, people are disenchanted with the political outcomes they receive and therefore they don't vote. But there are also ways in which your behavior shifts your attitudes, right? So we see this in all kinds of ways. Getting involved in a social movement actually makes you more committed to the cause. Many people who are activists in even really, you would think very deeply, felt causes like opposition to abortion came into the movement social sciences shown, not actually that opinionated on the subject. They got brought in through their church group, they got brought in through friends and over time of being politically active they became more engaged in that issue. So I think sometimes it's worth thinking about how we might broaden political engagement, broaden democratic experience for people, not just because one thing that happens when you have democratic experiences it changes your ideas about whether democracy can work. So it's just sort of to provide at least a little bit of an optimistic end point. I think that one way that we might reduce the sort of pessimism that we see in the system is giving more people an opportunity to participate in that system. Reading these reports and also because I work at 530 and we're very data obsessed, I looked up some more data because I was just curious about this. So I'll start here and Gallup collects what they call data on competence and institutions and they pull people into different institutions every year. And so I want to look at this briefly because it tells you some sense of like democracy in part comes institutions and I want to look at this and do a little bit comparison data. So they looked at confidence in institutions and I'm going to focus on the very little number meaning you're not very confident in this institution. So in 2008 26% of people had very little confidence in newspapers. That makes me very sad. But in 2018 38% do it. So that makes me even sadder. So let's show a newspaper. So the word is going down the military. On the other hand, very little 2008 7% of very little confidence. 7% in 2018 very little 5%. So the military has maintained public confidence. In other words, similarly, the presidency. So in 2008 41% of people say they have very little confidence. 2009 you're down to 19%. You can sort of figure out why 2016 33% of people have very little confidence. So they've lost support for rock about presumably in 2018 40% of people have very little confidence in the presidency. So Bush and so Bush is actually slightly more unpopular than Trump by that measure. But it tells you something about how people see the presidency. And now that's that let's support for the medical system is still supported. Banks actually have very little declines for banks even though you think differently. Television news in 2008 28% very little confidence in 2009 31% very little confidence in 2018 41% very little confidence in television news. So that's another decline. Interestingly, the police in 2008 10% had very little support for them. And in 2018 14%. So despite what you see in the news, the police have actually not lost a lot of public confidence. I'll look at some more polls on that, but I thought it was interesting finding news on the internet in 1999 2014 29% of people have very little confidence in 2017 42% of people have very little confidence. So again, I assume that's the Facebook and the fake news problem. A couple more organized religion 15% very little confidence in 2008 24% in 2018. So you've seen some decline. It's not surprising. Let's see a couple more that I wanted to Supreme Court has very similar levels of confidence. Congress very little confidence 38% in 2008 so very popular and then in 2018 46% very little confidence. So Congress sort of always been unpopular. Organized labor's numbers have not changed very much. Let's see if there's any other big business has not changed very much. Public schools have not changed very much. So that just gives you a sense of and we'll come back to this in a bit, I'm sure, but it gives us into like institutions. Our democracy is in part a bunch of institutions and there are a few that are in real decline. And the news media being a very important one that I care a lot about and I think is important to the country. But you're seeing this data among both Democrats and Republicans that they feel like the news media is not doing a particularly good job. The Republican number is really, really high with the Democratic numbers about 50 50 as well. That's something I think is worth thinking about as we think about how to fix our democracy. Well, usually I'm the data hound on any panel, but I know when I'm outclassed. So I'm going to throw you all a lifeline of story rather than more data and talk about what I think is at the back of our heads, which is not where are we now, but where could we be going? I think when you look at history, we have pretty clear patterns of when countries choose to reject or choose to move away from Democratic norms towards non Democratic norms. And they fall into roughly two camps. One is the danger that most of the post war order has been meant to protect against. And that is severe and crippling economic catastrophe that the Great Depression through many democracies in Europe into fascism or into other non Democratic regimes and much of the post war order was meant in the terms of their design of the designers to make sure that people had enough economic stake through the welfare state and through broadly shared economic growth that they never want to make that mistake again. But we still see that it happens in Venezuela. Chavez came to power after a nearly decade long depression brought on by low oil prices and an oil dependent economy. The same was true with Putin that between the economic dislocation of the fall of communism and record low oil prices, people were strong and nostalgic for a strong state and a strong leader and he was exactly what the Russian people wanted. Now we don't have that prospect today in the United States. What our concerns are about I think is the second issue which is the sort of issues where people feel completely unheard and unable to live a life of their own choosing in a regime that's come up in the past in religious wars or religious conflict that's come in the past with ideological conflict. And when Lee talks about can we move away from the questions of identity to the questions of economics that's really what you're talking about is that there's increasingly a tendency to see our politics as a quest over values and to see no middle ground that we either all have to live like coastal California or we all have to live like rural Alabama and anything in between doesn't make any sense. We've had this in our country before it's called the run up to the Civil War when you had to be either all slave or all free. There were people who tried to bring the country together and tried to create a different principle but they were unpersuasive at moving the people who were on the extremes who each of whom dominated one half of the country. So under our system that meant the middle was squeezed out. So what do I see for us going forward? Well with respect to the structural changes people can talk about I think one we need to have a structural change in the country that allows a middle to organize more effectively to have their voice heard. And that could be something like ranked voting. That could be something like moving away from the electoral college and moving towards either a popular vote approving the national vote compact or approving some form of mandatory proportionality in the awards of electoral code. Each of which prevents minorities from using our binary first pass the post majority majoritarian system from gaining control and forcing a question a decision point that most people would not want to have. But I think the most important thing is for people to step back from the brink which is are the questions that we're fighting about are the questions that are so increasingly divisive on the cultural right and left really that divisive that it means threatening up the union. And if not then what we need to do is not so much move away towards economics. This is where I'd part company from Lee but rather talk about a new system of American identity where both sides can feel at least partial home. The sort of things that kept America together in the run up to the Civil War the sorts of compromises that allowed both sides to feel at home because otherwise what we'll have is a system of either continued intensification and continued conflict and that's ultimately going to mean the sort of withering support for a democracy where one side sees that democracy equals complete and total loss. We'll try to have a little bit of discussion here. And I mean I think one of the questions and Vanessa you brought this up is sort of this question about the role of elites in leading this. And I mean so one obvious retort to all this public opinion data as well isn't it elites who sort of drive the conversation? And I'm just kind of want to tease that out a little bit. I mean I think a lot of the criticisms of American politics are really a criticism of where elites in our party system are leading us. Is that fair do we think? Are elites trapped by public opinion? Are elites trapped by the party system? Why is nobody stepping back from the brink? Why is there no leadership that Henry says that we need? I guess I could speak a little bit about that. I do think that it's very important to recognize the level of disconnect. And I think this is especially true in the Republican Party between the sort of policy priorities of the party and the policy priorities of the base. And I think that that's a really striking divide particularly on the right in this time. What do you see that? Well I mean it's certainly true for instance I mean the sort of priorities at the base of the Republican Party have been and I saw this in my tea party work and have been since on questions of cultural attitudes, immigration, xenophobia and racism, sort of at the core motivating concerns in the Republican base. And at the top I think you've seen a willingness to use those concerns for electoral gain and then sort of policy priorities to some extent within certainly within the Trump administration on immigration but in Congress on tax reform which is was in no way a Republican-based priority. Something like 2% of Republicans thought that taxes needed to be reformed at the time the tax legislation was moving through and there's a great deal of data that suggests that the majority of Republicans did not think corporations should have their taxes go down. So there is an important sort of disconnect there that I think is worth thinking about when we're looking at political outcomes versus public attitudes and this is true across the board this is not just a Republican concern although I think it's particularly striking right now within the Republican Party. Policy outcomes are not particularly well explained by public attitudes as a rule and that you know you would like it to you know as there's some sort of a naive version of democracy where you're like well first most people think something and then politicians enact that well I mean we all know that's not true then you would you would have seen movement all sorts of things like background checks for guns an increase in the minimum wage there are all sorts of policies that have overwhelming popular support and don't move forward very quickly. So I think it's important to not look at our policy outcomes and reflect that naively back on to the American people and it's actually one of the reasons I think this data is so valuable because it actually looks at what people think it doesn't just look at our policy outcomes and then assume that that's what most people would prefer. I mean I think that you're right about the disconnect between the elite and the Republican base I think that's in part a large part why Trump won the nomination was that he was talking about concerns that people had that the elites wanted to ignore before I think that the elites in Washington maybe not even the elites in the Republican Party but the elites in this town are much more concerned with issues of tax reduction and deregulation than anybody in the Republican Party. I did a work the factions in the Republican Party where basically you could empirically prove that nominating process only about 10% of Republicans prioritize government reduction and tax reduction. But yet that always seems to be what people here want to do. And Donald Trump could very well been said to have been the person who ran against every single one of the party's orthodoxies and still managed to capture the party. I would say though that ultimately because we have a relatively transparent system that people's broad preferences although they're not specific policy preferences do break through and that's because we have open primary systems where elites can't control completely the nomination. You almost had Bernie Sanders taking out Hillary Clinton. You've had rogue candidates who influenced the party or parties very seriously even if they lose. Think Howard Dean running as the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party. Since then every Democrat has tried to track over to represent the Democratic wing of the Democratic Party even if imperfectly so from those people's perspective. So I'd be a little more confident in the ability over time of broad public sentiment to break through but ultimately it requires a political entrepreneur to see that like a Reagan in the 60s or a McGovern early in the 70s or in the sense Donald Trump who can see that and bring it to bear rather than it being something that the party bosses themselves see and then shift their party in the way that John Kennedy was where the party bosses said well we need to get the Catholics back from Eisenhower so let's put up a Catholic they could control it then. They can't now so now it needs some form of new elite to supplant an old elite. Where does that elite come from? Active political or active ambitious people where entrepreneurs usually come from people who have an idea and have access to the means to promote the idea and they cast the marketplace. Yeah I mean I would also I would also add here that I think some of these express preferences and Vanessa you are different than behavioral preferences either because the express preference doesn't perfectly capture the moment the full spectrum and I'm thinking about this in terms of no matter how many different ways you ask Americans if they'd like a third party if they'd like a moderate middle they're like yes absolutely I want that but you know dig just a little bit deeper right and they wanted in the abstract they don't want it in the specific right they when you ask people about compromises we have this finding on compromise you ask people do you want Republicans and Democrats to compromise yes I do want to see compromise in our we did a big study on polarization a couple of years ago that we you know when you ask people what compromise means we had we had a question where we said you know take a pie you know it's essentially a pie from zero to one hundred you know if Obama's compromising with Republicans you know how much should Obama get how much should Obama and the Democrats get how much of it and and you know Republicans said Republicans should get 60% and Democrats to get 40% I'm not I'm not saying but you find this disconnect and Democrats the same too right so compromise doesn't mean the same thing to to everyone and and that sort of anti or that sort of compromise means I get more is found more among the people who are most ideologically consistent most active in politics most all all of these things and all of that influences the political elites right they they you you have people who want who want to see changes but but you can't quite figure out what those changes are so so our ideals we have certain ideals about how democracy works but those ideals when they brought up against the reality of actually of the actual democratic process they there's there's a clash there and is it that we have we should have a more realistic view of the democratic process or that the democratic process should more closely reflect our ideals if I can jump in on this question of compromise for just a minute I mean one thing that's worth bearing in mind is that there are some things upon which we should not compromise you know and I think the example of slavery that you raised earlier was a very good one the the idea that what you know that the positive outcome for American democracy would have been additional compromise over slavery I think would not be a few held by a modern person right and so I think similarly in the modern time the idea of compromising over who counts as a citizen or who gets to vote these are not issues upon which there is a pie to be shared there is simply you believe in a breath of the American community or you do not and so I think that one of the really deeply worrying things about the contemporary moment is that the issues on the table are on some level issues that are beyond the question of democratic compromise because they are about the fundamental idea of democracy I know I think that's right but I also think even the questions that are not like that get pulled into that that so so you can you know there are different types of issues but even things upon which like what should the marginal tax rate be become something upon which you have these you know well they become caught up in an unthinking partisan identity and partisanship is caught up in these fundamental questions of what does it mean to be an American citizen what is American identity and that and that's the and that's the core question becomes is there is there a way to to to make that not at the center of our politics and to and to and how much of of the confrontation over over that is is exacerbated by by putting at the center of our politics or are we just on an inevitable crash course between two very different values of what America should be in which case then if we really are in the 1850s oh again are we in the 1850s discussed that's the issue of the question because I like when you said and I agree with you that the goal should we need some kind of national identity I agree with you I I hear politicians try to discuss that like in 2004 I'd argue Barack Obama's speech was trying to get in that zone a lot of Jeb Bush's speech in 2016 were trying to get in that zone the mayor of Los Angeles Eric Garcetti is I'm running for president and he was interviewed by Vox and he said what Henry said five different ways national identity to divided and so on but I was thinking when Kamala Harris says abolish ice and you give this soup nuts of she's in a win that was kind of what I thought at the end is like I'm not sure I don't you someone's got to have a compelling vision of what a national identity sounds like and that's really hard and it's been really hard when the president sets so much of our policy vision this is incentives in a primary always start to run to the base that exists already Donald Trump's not showing good model I don't see Senator Warren or Bernie Sanders doing that either right now and so I'm not and I'm not sure I can articulate what a national identity sounds like and there's a Atlantic some more I'll be on the numbers after this with this Atlantic poll today jumped out of me too it's an Atlantic PPR survey that asked people America's becoming a majority non-white nation how do you feel about that 64% of people said that's good 31% said that's bad if 30% said then the poll to a pollster I'm guessing that number is higher than 31% in real life and so the fact that they're uncomfortable with a major a non-majority white nation and that number is probably in the 40s let's say in other words I think the goal should be to have a national identity I'm a little nervous about what a national identity sound how to create that in a country that's becoming less white less Christian more urban I'm not sure what that sounds like that's the core question he asked the right question I'm not sure what the right answer is yeah I think a lot of people don't know what the right answer is and that's part of why you increasingly find people trying to say this is the question one aspect is people have to feel that I think one reason why people would be scared of that change is because they don't know what place they have and when you listen to some people you wonder if you're an orthodox Christian do you have a place in the America as envisioned in this people of course the flip side is true on the left is when you listen to people like Roy Moore you think well I'm open to I'm not a don't believe that America Christianity is central to American identity do I have a place in your America but one of the problems I think is that a lot of people try and avoid answering the question while saying can't we all get along and what we know from history is that fails because as you said we've been trying it and it hasn't worked we've been trying it and it hasn't worked eight years of it and I would argue it didn't work very well yeah I think that's exactly and I don't claim to criticize him I don't think that project the way he framed it and Bush ran as a united or not a divider so we have 16 years of people who tried to create a new identity without actually expressing a new identity where people on the sides of the divisions could see themselves having a home so that means to answer Lee's question I think the likelihood is that we move into greater extremes which means a likelihood of more intense partisan conflict and real strains because what happens if you have a deep procession in the middle of all of this you know we know that that radicalizes people we're having this degree of division when we're basically at peace and relatively prosperous imagine what happens if neither of those two things still happen which I just think that it's easy to say we need a new identity it's harder to describe it but it has to be one that actually addresses the fears of the people involved and doesn't try and sweep it under the rug because otherwise the partisans of both sides will simply and the weak attached uniquely attached to each of those positions will say well that doesn't answer my questions it's you know it's just a patriotic ability you know one kind of example that always sticks in my mind is that it was I believe that the year 2000 Republican National Convention they opened with a prayer as do the Democrats and one of the days was opened by a prayer from an imam I think we can all agree that's unimaginable today and that was 16 years ago that's actually not that long 18 years ago it's actually not that long and so I don't know that you can get back as fast as you got away that may not work right it may be a Pandora's bots but it is really striking the extent to which the rhetoric of the Republican Party on non-Christian religious groups in this country has shifted enormously just enormously and in a genuinely short period of time to Perry's that pull the PRRI pulling I mean I guess is that that divide is also an incredibly partisan divide yeah yeah I can say that but yes and to Vanessa's point that the Republican Party of George Bush was a party that was trying to to straddle this division within the party but also trying to lead the party to be more broadly tolerant and the party of Donald Trump is a party that is trying to be intolerant and communicating that Republican identity is preserving America for white people and so I mean to the point of the Civil War and if there are any Civil War historians in the audience I apologize if I bastardize the history but the 1850s were an incredibly polarizing time where as the South felt more and more threatened and because of Westward expansion they hardened their views about how important slavery was and they began rationalizing slavery in a much more dug in way and so I mean most countries most UK many other countries that had slavery abolished it in a more peaceful progressive way maybe not entirely peaceful but the United Kingdom didn't fight a Civil War over it and also wasn't as deep a part of their economy but nonetheless that because of the way our hyperpartisan system is set up in two binary camps people are forced into one camp and then forced to subscribe to an entire program and get a sense of what does it mean to be a Republican or what does it mean to be a Democrat? So I mean I think that speaks to this I believe is a problem with our party system that there are only two choices and you have to go into one camp or the other but that to Vanessa's point they're into your worry and there are people who are not comfortable with structural they think there's something wrong with the system but when you when you start saying well would you support this change? Well, I don't know it seems a little radical but then to your other point I mean there's a sense well nobody's actually taking leadership on this and maybe if we had a conversation about our political system and how anti-democratic it is and that was a real live conversation and there wasn't this sort of blind veneration just because we've always done things this way we're gonna keep doing this to I mean to your point in the report right people are people are actually like a little okay with structural change now and I mean my sense of the Americans always thought we have the best system in the world democracy is American democracy but maybe that's not the case anymore and if so that opens up possibilities for change I don't know I mean I think one of the challenges is right like when we talk about the kinds of changes they many of them are ones that are in power elected officials or in some way and people don't want that right so and I think about this a lot like people love term limits political scientists hate term limits right term limits are terrible term limits are terrible right but it's one of the most popular when you ask the they so so part of one of the challenges is how do you convince how do you convince people like I'm thinking about the question and our so we asked a question a couple of questions in our survey about whether the allocation of Senate seats should change whether the size of the house should be increased decreased or stayed the same and there's some arguments that you know we asked the question in a couple of different ways been alluded to where we kind of make the argument the house was this size back when it was founded it represented X number of people per representative now that's that ratio is of course far different so there's far less represented should it should it be increased kept the same or decreased and there's as much appetite or close to as much appetite for decreasing the size of the house is for increasing because people don't like politicians I think this is my read into it right but but we know people don't like politicians and so when you say can we have more politicians that's probably not a really popular people want more constituent service right people want more constituent service but I'm just saying this is the uphill battle some of the reformers have in this respect but we've also I mean we've also not had a big conversation I mean this is still an idea that for most people is oh I haven't thought about that yeah so people's first reaction is I don't know well I keep the status quo but we could have a much broader conversation but you know politicians that get elected system worship them but you know I mean people people don't like their politicians and you say well terminus well you know or I am my view is maybe tournaments are a bad idea we should have elections problem is that in in in about 75 to 80 percent of the seats if you win you're basically the incumbent into the foreseeable future because most elections are not competitive this is the ultimate sign word a think tank event is that after yesterday we are all adamantly term limits are now our terrible we should not have term it's thinking about yesterday a little bit but anyway to make a more serious plan I want a question for you yeah so imagine if Hilary Clinton wins in 2016 does that mean the culture the identity war is resolved because it seems like the Democrats have wanted or imagine if Marco Ruby or Ben Carson wins and therefore the presidency therefore it seems like the identity war has a different feel to it at least do you think that it may have a little different intensity but on the right one of the reasons Donald Trump wins and has people who don't like Trump see this as the flight 93 election I think the the issue on the left that I would pose is on most of the cultural war issues over the last 40 years you have either one or our winning the question is what are the terms of the peace that you're willing to offer the right does not believe that you intend to offer any terms of peace and I think the winners in the cultural war need to think about what would Mandela do that what and I say that rather seriously you know which is that when the fear of white South Africans is always going to be if we turn political power over they're going to come and take our homes and kill our and what he basically did was say we're going to take political power and you're going to have equal rights and we're not going to insert revenge upon you and over time of course that has meant that political power and wealth to some degree has moved away from whites to black so what's the terms of the peace what do orthodox religious people who have been fighting you tooth and nail every step of the way what role do they have in your new america do they get anything and if the answer is no they don't because that's a violation of right you should expect them to fight fight bitterly and fight to the very end and Sun Sue said in the art of war you always should leave a path for retreat for your enemy worth thinking about the ways in which the religious the commit political commitments of religious people have shifted a great deal but we have always had very very religious people in this country so it's worthwhile to remember that this is a country that of course is founded upon religious extremists so my own hair you know and and so religion has always played this key role and in the lives of many americans but once upon a time the way that we thought we protected that was by ensuring that the state stayed out of it and that all that that you know the that congress would neither implement religion nor ban one and so I think that you know when we think about what religious communities in America have sought from government that's actually shifted a great deal since the 60s and 70s so I think it's worth remembering that the position that we're at today in terms of the very high levels of political engagement in the conservative right although I guess it's declined to some extent in recent years but you know certainly since the Reagan era very high levels of political engagement by the Christian right is actually not necessarily like other piece with all the history of it so it's very interesting to think about how the the political and religious lines have shifted I think over time it's certainly the political engagement of people on our on religious grounds started in the 1970s really in response to not necessarily the legislative victories of divorce and abortion and decriminalization of in some California of same-sex behavior but the judicial approach you know row versus Wade and then the fear that that was going to continue led them to say well you know we represent a majority we can reverse this but I think if today you were going to ask what I want I don't think that most people on the religious right want to advance a theocratic agenda what they would ideally like is a return to the America of the 40s and 50s where government was out of religion but broadly Christian norms governed the sort of interrelation between the sexes that we have back now they've lost that I think most people recognize that then the question is again I'll turn it back what do they retain you know for example if you run a Christian college and your theology tells you that marriage you know that same-sex behavior sinful and that marriage between same-sex couples is sinful and you're sued by same-sex couples who have come together in your college do you have a religious exemption to your policies or to the law of the state that you're in so that you don't have to allow them to live in the same the same living quarters that heterosexual married couples would live in what about people who are talking about traditional gender norms they have a right to remove their children from sex ed curricula that they think are offensive I can tell you by talking with people on the religious right they're very afraid that the answer is going to be no you can't do that no you can't do that no you can't do that and the question is when you're afraid you draw the line very far to the point where they can't express who they are in the America that the cultural left wants and so my question of the cultural left is what can they say in the world that you want to create how do they feel part of that or is the answer really you as stark as it was with slavery which was you must lose completely and you must lose immediately if that's the case you should expect war I mean you should expect political war is this although some of my friends on the right say that you know since they are all the ones that are armed that they need to worry about war are political institutions making making this to this fight more intractable than it has to be someone I do you think that the sort of electoral system that we have encourages encourages a bipartisanship that then allows for what would be called agency capture the minorities create you know basically Donald Trump comes and become uses a hostile challenge to take over the institution and then uses the power of the institution to rally soft believers in a what do you care more about never Trump versus never Hillary and the same would be true I'm there's plenty of people in the Democratic Party would prefer not to go to the strong progressive wing but the Kamala Harris were to or somebody that strong progressive wing wants were to win they would rally around because the alternative is worse so to some extent that encouragement toward a pure bipartisan since system allows for agency capture and hence an intensification of our challenges I agree other thoughts should we open up to questions I mean in general I think institutions are you know the the two parties and the way their structure are causing more division necessary but when I when the question is framed that way usually I say if we had like you know the Donald Trump Party the John Huntsman Party the Hillary Clinton Party and the Barney Sanders Party and we had a coalition government of the Hillary's and the Huntsman's that would probably be a better way to go I don't think on that question there's much compromise though I'm not totally sure on the question you just raised interesting question I don't know the answer every if all politics is about identity which is increasingly the case I'm not sure yeah there's much room to compromise there I think you're right I'm not sure what the I think there's so the surrender will be eventually be requested will be that it'll be total I agree yeah but but are we are we putting that identity conflict at the center of the politics because that's that that's that's who's running the the that's who's captured the two parties and that's really the thing that divides the parties the most right now and that's how the parties are distinguishing themselves and rallying their bases I mean I think the thing I would say is that in if you go if you went to political science conferences in the last two years the people who study latin america are like it does not look good for you guys because the presidential system and ethnically defined parties is not the way to go if you want stability so maybe they're feeling better this year I look forward to checking in the funny thing about the american presidency is is constitutionally it's much weaker than than latin american presidencies but that's not how what I would say is look we have an example of a presidential system that is undergoing a current experiment to see whether or not they can reform themselves that's france and it required a third party a new party and it required a leader who actually recognizes the demand for change as opposed to trying to pretend that demands for change don't exist and we don't know whether macron is going to be successful or not but he did navigate a presidential system uh... created a new party that took this affected members from the center left the center of the center right and it's basically a bold experiment to see whether or not that can succeed in a system that that's not that dissimilar from around move to the questions sorry do you have anyone no let's open it up for questions okay let's open up for questions and how about the lady in the right there yeah uh... yeah you my question is basically that i hear a lot of talk about partisan divides and things like that and my biggest question is knowing how america was created by rich white straight men isn't the conversation more so about how the system is made in this in that by those certain types of people and how the argument is really about people who want the american freedom that they created for that small demographic and the tension between these two groups or these two like separate people like or do you feel like this divide is more irreconcilable than than like partisanship arguments things like that jump in on that for a minute i mean i think that it's i you know it's such a it's such a good point to remind us of the the ways in which identity was baked into our constitution right like the like i always say you know like if we're gonna talk about identity politics let's remember the three fifths clause one of the purest examples of identity politics that has ever existed but so i think you're exactly right to see and i know it's sort of we've already heard it you and i were both already talking about the moment we're in now is an echo of an ongoing series of battles over who gets to be american and it has not been a straight shot by any stretch of the imagination i think that you know reverend barber refers to the period we're in as a time that requires a a third reconstruction right there was the original reconstruction post civil war that that ends in collapse there's a second reconstruction in the period of civil rights and that today is the time for a third reconstruction and i think that you know that i'm certain that historians you know would feel uncomfortable with with sort of seeing these rhymes in history but i do think that it is a very valuable way of thinking about the contemporary moment and the challenges we face yeah and i think more broadly i mean the constitution as written is not a is does not hold up today's to today's standards of democracy as an extremely democratic document the most analysis would say that the constitution you know it was it was an experiment at its time when monarchy was the standard and this was a little bit more democracy but not nearly what we've come to expect and we've had growing pains as a country as we've tried to expand the franchise and tried to to to bring in more diverse voices i mean it's really the understanding of politics that the founders had was that it was really a consensus oriented thing they didn't like parties they didn't want to have parties and they thought that you could you could separate power and the government wasn't going to do a whole lot and only it would achieve things through consensus now what do you what do you do in a society in which there's on a lot of important complex issues there's not a lot of consensus you need to have political fights and you need to to have much more democracy in the constitution is at odds with with our expectations of what democracy is I think and that creates a real challenge that is a through line through American politics and American political reform let's try to get another voice from the back there yeah so yeah it comes necessarily and then like regardless of Bernie Sanders actual politics his campaign I think was revolutionary in the sense that it garnered a lot of direct democratic participation for the first time and I think that would also be very possible amongst conservatives and since then you know we've seen people like Alexandria Acasio-Cortez in her grassroots campaign so do you think these sort of grassroots campaigns on both sides could do a lot to rejuvenate democracy in the country Lee do you want to talk about the Bartels book? Yeah the Gillens and Page although actually yes although it's fine I was at a conference at Northwestern were on the Gillens and Page book and Larry Bartels who you reference who was also done some work in this area gave a really interesting presentation where he looked at public opinion and policy outcomes across all Western democracies and so it was not just the US but it was actually all Western democracies in which public opinion had no relationship to policy outcomes which suggests that there's something maybe democracy is not as democratic as we think it is so I mean certainly I think money in politics matters I've done a lot of work on money in politics I think it clearly limits the range of politicians who can who can move forward in our political system although you know the things the ease of of of internet fundraising may tip the scales a little bit I don't know you know on the is this is this the birth of a new civic movement I mean maybe I think these things tend to go in in waves there's it's nothing it's nothing particularly new I think we've seen periods of of more or less engagement as people have been more or less excited in the democratic process so I don't see it as being anything revolutionary just as another iteration of this cyclical engagement and maybe we have another generation in the 2020s I think we'll actually look a lot like the 1960s it would be my prediction I mean the one one thing I would add is is which which I think is just I think you're one of the ways in which you're you're hitting on something is that that I think money in politics contributes a lot to the the negative perceptions about politics right so so you know one of the things I think to thinking about the democratic primary you know what's interesting is the policy positions or political values of people who voted for Clinton and Sanders and the primaries were really not all that different right so what what was that about and I think that it was the positioning as an outsider and and all that and to some degree you know that was also part of Trump's appeal right that he was outside the political system and that he his he wasn't going to be influenced by people's money in the way that your ordinary politician would be influenced by people's money I'm just saying these are these are appeal that the public finds finds appealing right so that doesn't for all the reasons we've you know we've just talked about it doesn't necessarily mean we're headed into a world of no money in politics there are a lot of reasons that money maintains a place in the political system but but it's one of the things that Americans hate about the political system is is the existence of money so I would say you name three people who I think are innovating Bernie Sanders Acacia Cortes and one other person I mean but we'll probably end up with a congress next year of 500 people elected with lots of big money contributions and lots of donors that are not an abroad spread and we'll have like 35 who are likely the other way and that'll that'll affect like it's still galling to me that he a lot of Democrats voted for the Dodd-Frank rollback I'm very surprised that if you asked their voters I don't think most of them were for that but I think it goes to power of the money in politics particularly in the banks of a lot of money Yeah Earlier in the program you talked a lot about the extreme discontent that the American people not only have for political figures in the government but also for private corporations do you think that private corporations can help strengthen democracy or at least help the public perception of democracy is that possible and should they an interesting question that I I don't have a strong I could see the pros and the cons of that so I I guess I might leave it to my fellow panelists to jump in there Well, no I mean I think we're interesting we're entering in a really interesting period in which we have these really mega corporations that are in many ways more important powerful than some governments and that there is the emergence of a sort of new type of corporate statesmen a Bill Gates a Jeff Bezos a Warren Buffett who are who are trying to say well maybe we'll try to solve some public problems if government doesn't you know I I think there are real problems with that because the the accountability mechanisms are very different when corporations solve public problems but you know I think in the absence of of government trying to solve problems corporations will try to solve problems and those will create new problems and which Bill will demand government solutions and then maybe we'll have a reinvigoration of government yeah I think that that public problems require public solutions I think that you know I mean you know Carnegie and some other very rich folks of previous eras have lovely buildings and nice institutions but I don't think that sort of gilded aid politics is something that most Americans will look back on as an era of you know democratic enlightenment that we should really try and re-achieve there's some evidence that a lot of young people in the crowd there's some evidence that millennials do not support capitalism at the levels that older people do and I think we're in an interesting campaign about this one thing Senator Sanders is doing is he repeatedly tweets and highlights how Disney pays its employees and boy I should have started there but you know so I work at 538 with his own by Disney so he's like he's like definitely trying to he's talking about how Amazon pays his workers he's definitely trying to sort of not only like attack attack how these big capitalist companies work but also to in some ways suggest that maybe their journalists are co-opted in therefore not covering those issues while they're going to see more attacks on the sort of capitalist system and the big corporations in 2020 that you've seen in previous elections yeah yeah you had your hand yeah green shirt woman yes green shirt woman yes hi so earlier towards the beginning of the panel presentations there was this mention of democratic experiences and kind of ending on like a more positive note talking about how people should be given this opportunity now more to participate politically and so I guess my question is in the context of voter suppression laws like in states like North Carolina and Texas how are people supposed to participate more when there are laws kind of not allowing them to do yeah if I can I guess I raised the point earlier so I'd be happy to talk more about it I mean I think it is this is the big fight in a really fundamental way right about who gets to participate because that is the fight what that democracy is about and you know I just this spring ran a voter registration experiment in Texas there are exceptionally strict rules about voter registration in Texas that are extraordinarily effective at excluding people from voting North Carolina is another good example of that but I mean if you but if you look at a place like North Carolina there has also been an striking amount of political organizing to try and reverse some of those trends now you know that organizing could have gone into something else so it's not I wouldn't say that this is the you know if you could choose to pitch the battle elsewhere quite we wouldn't you but I think that you know this that voting is not the full extent of democratic participation and that the fight to extend voting rights more broadly I think brings many people into politics even when those rights are being challenged and brings them into politics often in a very deep way there's my optimistic spin for the day look at the way it was over there it was over there I don't know I'll just be a little it's been interesting to watch political science try to try to try to to kind of estimate the effect of of voter suppression laws and one of the funny things is that there are a number of political scientists who say you know we look at this and we don't really see much of an effect on these voter suppression laws in turnout actually doesn't seem to make much of a difference now well that's kind of puzzling because it cuts against our intuitions and you know part of what's what's powering that is well these are populations that don't really vote at all anyway now you know maybe they vote and the laws may affect fewer people that than we think they do now in a close election even just a few people really matter so these laws really matter but it does speak to this broader point that even among people who can vote like a lot of them don't young people do not vote most of them can vote there's nothing that makes it hard for them to vote except you know a lot of there's a lot there's automatic voter registration in a lot of places automatic voter registration does not move the needle at all since the 1960s it's become much easier to vote in this country many more people are registered and voting part and voting participation is more or less flat so so there's something else going on here also which is that people are not excited about politics most elections are not competitive people feel like the parties don't speak to them there are there are broader issues here too I mean it's not to say that that that these laws are not inherently discriminatory and and anti-democratic but it's just that there are a lot of bigger bigger issues here about why people are disenchanted in our from our system and I will just also say what I think we all know about voter turnout the voter turnout is highest to the higher up the ticket you get right so it's highest in presidential elections and then in like gubernatorial congressional elections and really low with local elections those are the elections that like really are affecting your life on a door someone's life on a day-to-day basis so there's a big possibility for people to become more and yet and yet they and yet people don't turn out on a very negative note if you read the news in North Carolina the Republicans do not believe a legitimate outcome is a Democrat's winning and I think we should say that about North Carolina specifically it is like very it is hard to look at that without concluding that they do not believe a Democratic victory is legitimate in the glasses there yeah two two things one is I would definitely disagree with you because the reason people don't turn out is because even in state in Democratic states they make it hard for people so that you know they have multiple primaries in New York and they do that so I think that I do think that voting chain electoral form could have a huge effect when they implement rig choice voting in Maine turn out one up 10 percent so I think I think part of the turnout problem is because voting sucks and you know you have choices and and so there's like there there's things that feed each other there so I would I would argue with that the other thing I want to talk about and I think this kind of maybe ties into it is you guys were discussing the idea of a national identity and I'm curious one what you think previous national identities were that held us together the the closest thing I can maybe come up with was like Reagan and like good guys versus bad guys and I if that's what you're talking about me and you know I don't yeah it feels hoping because that that is lost but I'm curious as to sort of how to bring maybe expanding voting expanding participation and sort of really listening to everyone into it and also something that Trump uses effectively as comedy and and how how that maybe will you know whether you see that playing a role in the sort of the transformation or the forging of a new identity and I also think this is going to be our final question because we're at times so I think when you go back and read the Federalist Papers one of the things the author of the first Federalist paper starts with is it's wonderful that by chance we're all united in the similar religion in a similar national heritage and so forth and that at the beginning the fact that they were all largely English derived or what British derived Protestants was meant that they didn't have to and once they won the identity battle Republican or royalist and hardcore royalists left the country and went to Canada or Bahamas or something like that we did have a national identity I think with immigration that was another question that did you have to be descended in some way from that original stock and we created an identity that allowed for immigrants to be equally as American Lincoln has a wonderful discussion of that in one of his speeches I think of P and Peoria during 1858 about how people who are have no dissent can see the battles of the founders as their own battles even though their forefathers weren't here and I think that's really the question that we're facing again you know which is that there has been a default broad Christian background to America's identity that's no longer the case and the question is what takes its place and can't be one you know I think a lot of people particularly when the religious rights started to organize in the 70s wanted to say that's an irreducible part of our identity we want to roll it back that's failed so then the question is how do you much like you had to make room for many different people from many different faiths and identities that were not present at the founding how do you make room for people in our new cultural diversity doesn't mean it's easy but we've done it before you said the Cold War League is though your own oh I was just something that brought us together for a period of time World War II we know that like national identity gets better when there's an external force we need an us versus them just to therapy them as overseas and I think even even at the founding what was our national identity that we weren't that we weren't written that we weren't you know there was an external there that was so I think those kinds of national that's that's when national identity coherent national identity tends to we know even experimentally right like one way to reduce partisan polarization is to is to focus on like during the Olympics we know that like partisan polarization sometimes you can see left that left expression of that on Facebook or things like that so that's not really an answer to your question but but I think you know it's so it's hard to kind of manufacture a national I think that goes back to one of the early early questions it's hard but I guess have we had national identity in a form that included non-christians women and blacks in meaningful ways probably not so the examples we gave were not particularly good ones for that so out the study California do Californians have an identity and what does that sound like it might be worth thinking about that question because it is a very multi-linked multi-cultural multi-religious or multi- you get I'm trying to make here so I think it's worth I guess New York City has an identity right I guess I'd be curious to find out what people would say if you ask them but it's like a question where I'm going to think about this question more because we haven't answered it well on this past hard question I think there's a these be a better answer to this question well I'm even thinking we ask a question about whether like openness to people from around the world is a defining characteristic of American of what the nation is and a large number of clear majority of Americans say yes but there's a big person divide on that right so Democrats really think that that's a defining characteristic of our national identity and Republicans are more divided on that so so I think even then these like you can kind of come up with a concept the question is how do you come up with a concept that everyone kind of agrees on so well I will say we had to talk about attitudes and sport for democracy and we wound up focusing on divides over identity which I think is quite telling that that is a real challenge to democracy and so any any you want to say anything Vanessa oh well I'm on the spot yes very I guess I would say this James Baldwin writes famously that it is our job to achieve our country and in any emergency quote James Baldwin you'll be alright and that to me I think is the great question right how do we look honestly at our past and the ways in which we fail to achieve the ideals that we have often stated as our founding principles and how do we find an identity that will look forward and actually achieve those goals I think that is the great question James Baldwin for the win oh always yes all right thank you nice to have you on us