 Preface to the Freedom of the Will. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Philip Nautis. The Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards. Preface. Many find fault with the calling professing Christians that differ one from another in some matters of opinion by distinct names, especially calling them by the names of particular men who've distinguished themselves as maintainers and promoters of those opinions as the calling some professing Christians are minions from Arminius, others Arians from Arius, others Sushinians from Sushinas and the like. They think it unjust in itself as it seems to suppose and suggest the persons marked out by these names received those doctrines when they entertained out of regard to and reliance on those men after whom they are named as though they made them their rule in the same manner as the followers of Christ are called Christians after his name whom they regard and depend upon as their great head and rule. Whereas this is an unjust and groundless imputation on those that go under the forementioned denominations. Thus they say, there's not the least ground to suppose that the chief divines who embrace the scheme of doctrine which is by many called Arminianism believe it the more because Arminius believed it. And that there's no reason to think any other than that they sincerely and impartially study the Holy Scriptures and inquire after the mind of Christ with as much judgment and sincerity as any of those that call them by these names that they seek after truth and are not careful whether they think exactly as Arminius did. Yea that in some things they actually differ from him. This practice is also esteemed actually injurious on this account. That it is supposed naturally to lead the multitude to imagine the difference between persons thus named and others to be greater than it is. Yea as though it were so great that they must be as it were another species of beings and they object against it as arising from an uncharitable narrow contracted spirit which they say commonly inclines persons to confine all that is good to themselves and their own party and to make wide distinction between themselves and others and stigmatize those that differ from them with odious names. They say moreover that the keeping up such a distinction of names has a direct tendency to uphold distance and disaffection and keep alive mutual hatred among Christians who ought also to be united in friendship and charity however they can't in all things think alike. I confess these things are very plausible and I will not deny that there are some unhappy consequences of this distinction of names and that men's infirmities and evil dispositions often make an ill improvement of it but yet I humbly conceive these objections are carried far beyond reason. The generality of mankind are disposed enough and a great deal too much to uncharitableness and to be censurious and bitter toward those that differ from them in religious opinions which evil temper of mind will take occasion to exert itself for many things in themselves innocent, useful and necessary but yet there is no necessity to suppose that distinguishing persons of different opinions by different names arises mainly from uncharitable spirit. It may arise from the disposition that there is mankind whom God has distinguished with an ability and inclination for speech to improve the benefit of language and the proper use and design of names given to things which they have often occasion to speak of or signify their minds about to express their ideas with ease and expedition without being encumbered with an obscure and difficult circumlocution and the thus distinguishing persons of different opinions in religious matters may not imply no one fur any more than that there is a difference and that the difference is such as we find we have often occasion to take notice of and make mention of whatever it be that gives the occasion this one's a name and tis always a defect in language in such cases to be obliged to make use of a description instead of a name thus we have often occasion to speak of those who are the descendants of an ancient inhabitants of France who were subjects or heads of the government of that land and spake the language peculiar to it the distinction from the descendants of the inhabitants of Spain who belonged to that community and therefore we find the great need of distinct names to signify these different source of people and the great convenience of these distinguishing words French and Spaniards by which the signification of our minds is quick and easy and our speech is delivered from the burden of a continual reiteration of diffuse descriptions which it must otherwise be embarrassed that the difference of opinions of those who in their general scheme of divinity agree with those two noted men Calvin and Arminius is the thing there is often occasion to speak of is what the practice of the latter itself confesses who are often in their discourses and writings taking notice of the supposed absurd pernicious opinions of the former sort and therefore the making use of different names in this case can't reasonably be objected against or condemned as a thing which must come from so bad a cause as they assign it is easy to be counted for without supposing it to arise from any other source than the exigence and natural tendency of the state of things considering the faculty and disposition God has given mankind the best things which they have frequent occasion to mention by certain distinguishing names it is an effect that is similar to what we see arise in innumerable cases which are parallel where the cause is not at all blame worthy nevertheless at first I had thoughts of carefully avoiding the use of the appellation Arminian in this treatise but I soon found I should be put to great difficulty and that my discourse would be so encumbered with an often repeated circumlocution instead of a name which would express the thing intended as well and better that I altered my purpose and therefore I must ask the excuse of such as are apt to be offended with the things of this nature that I have so freely used the term Arminian in the following discourse I profess it to be without any design to stigmatize persons of any sort with a name of approach or at all to make them appear more odious if when I had occasion to speak of those divines who are commonly called by this name I had instead of styling them Arminians called them these men as Dr. Whitby does Calvinistic divines it probably would not have been taken any better or thought to show a better temper or any good manners I have done as I would be done by in this manner however the term Calvinist is in these days among most a term of greater approach than the term Arminian yet I should not take it all amiss to be called a Calvinist or distinction's sake though I utterly disclaim a dependence on Calvin or believing in the doctrines which I hold because he believed and taught them and cannot just to be charged with believing in everything just as he taught but lest I really should be an occasion of injury to some persons I would here give notice that though I generally speak of that doctrine considering free will and moral agency which I oppose as an Arminian doctrine yet I would not be understood as asserting that every divine or author whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine was properly Arminian or one of that sort which is commonly called by that name some of them went far beyond the Arminians and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doctrine which these maintained thus for instance it would be very injurious if I should rank Arminian divines in general with authors such as Mr. Chubb I doubt not many of them have some of his doctrine in abhorrence though he agrees for the most part with Arminians in his notion of the freedom of the will and on the other hand though I suppose this notion to be a leading article in the Arminian scheme that which if pursued in its consequences will truly infer or naturally lead to all the rest yet I don't charge all that have held this doctrine with being Arminians for whatever may be the consequences of the doctrine really yet some that hold this doctrine may not own nor see the consequences and it would be unjust in many instances to charge every author with believing and maintaining all the real consequences of this avowed doctrines and I desire it may be particularly noted that though I have occasion in the following discourse often to mention the author of the book entitled an essay on the freedom of the will in God and the creature as holding that notion of freedom of will which I oppose yet I don't mean to call him an Arminian however in that doctrine he agrees with Arminians and departs from the current and general opinion of Calvinists if the author of that essay be the same as it is commonly ascribed to he doubtless was not one that ought to bear that name but however good a divine he was in many respects yet that particular Arminian doctrine which he maintained is never the better for being held by such a one nor is there less need of opposing it on that account but rather is there the more need of it as it will be likely to have the more pernicious influence for being taught by a divine of his name and character supposing the doctrine to be wrong and in itself to be of an ill tendency I have nothing further to say by way of preface but only to bespeak the reader's candor and calm attention to what I have written the subject is of importance as demand attention and the most thorough consideration of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves are the most important as religion is the great business for which we are all created and on which our happiness depends and as religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our maker and so has the foundation in God's nature and ours and in the relation that God and we stand into each other therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful in order to true religion but the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature the understanding and will both are very important yet the importance of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment and as much as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty and the grand question about the freedom of the will is the main point that belongs to the science of the will therefore I say the importance of the subject greatly demands the attention of Christians and especially of divines but as to my manner of handling the subject I will be far from presuming to say that it is such as demands the attention of the reader to what I have written I am ready to own that in this manner I depend on the reader's courtesy but only thus far I may have some color for putting in a claim that if the reader be disposed to pass his censure on what I have written I may be fully and patiently heard and well attended to before I'm condemned however this is what I would humbly ask of my readers together with the prayers of all sincere lovers of truth that I may have much of that spirit which Christ promised his disciples which guides into all truth and that the blessed and powerful influences of this spirit would make truth victorious in the world and of the preface part one section one of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain wherein are explained and stated various terms and things belonging to the subject of the ensuing discourse concerning the nature of the will it may possibly be thought that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the will this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it and so perhaps would be had not philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it but since it is so I think it may be of some use and will tend to the greatest clearness in the following discourse to say a few things concerning it and therefore I observe that the will without any metaphysical refining is plainly that by which the mind chooses anything the faculty of the will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing an act of the will is the same act of choosing or choice if anything there is a perfect definition of the will to say that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses I am content with it so I think that it is enough to say it is that by which the soul chooses for every act of the will whatsoever the mind chooses one thing rather than another it chooses something rather than the contrary existence of that thing so in every act of refusal the mind chooses the absence of the things refused the positive and the negative are felt before the mind for its choice and it chooses the negative and the minds making its choice in that case is properly the act of the will the will is determining between the two is a voluntary determining but that is the same thing as making a choice so that whatever names we call the act of the will by choosing refusing approving disapproving liking disliking embracing rejecting determining directing commanding forbidding inclining or being a verse of being pleased or displeased with all may be reduced to this understanding of choosing for the soul to act voluntarily is evermore to act electively Mr. Locke says the will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and in the forgoing page says the word preferring seems best to express the act of volition but adds not precisely for says he the one man would prefer flying to walking yet who can say he ever wills it but the instance he mentions does not prove that there's anything else than willing but merely preferring for it should be considered what is the next an immediate object of the will with respect to a man's walking or any other external action which is not being removed from one place to another on the earth or through the air there are remotor objects of preference but such or such an immediate exertion of himself the thing nextly chosen or preferred when a man wills to walk is not as being removed to such a place where he would be but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet etc in order to it and is willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment is nothing else but is choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment or his liking it better than the forbearance of it and God has so made and established the human nature the soul being united to a body in proper state that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body such an alteration instantaneously follows there is nothing else in the actions of my mind that I am conscious of while I walk but only my preferring or choosing through successive moments that there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions together with a concurring habitual expectation will be so having either found by experience that on such an immediate preference such sensations and emotions do actually instantaneously and constantly arise but it is not so in the case of flying though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer flying yet he does not choose or prefer incline or to desire under circumstances of view any immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it because he has no expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion and he does not prefer or inclined to any bodily exertion or effort under this apprehended circumstance of its being wholly in vain so that if we carefully distinguish the proper objects of the several acts of the will it will not appear by this and such like instances that there is any difference between volition and preference or that a man's choosing liking best or being best pleased with the thing are not the same with his willing that thing as they seem to be according to those general and more natural motions of men according to which language is formed thus an act of the will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus and a man doing as he wills and doing as he pleases are the same thing in common speech Mr. Locke says the will is perfectly distinguished from desire which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency that which are wills set us upon a man says he whom I deny may oblige me to use persuasions to another which at the same time I am speaking I may wish may not prevail on him in this case it is plain the will and desire run counter I do not suppose that the will and desire are words of precisely the same signification will seems to be a word of a more general signification extending to things present and absent desire respects something absent I may prefer my present situation and posture suppose sitting still or having my eyes open and so may will it but yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct that they can ever be properly said to encounter a man never in any instant wills anything contrary to his desires or desires anything contrary to his will the aforementioned instance which Mr. Locke produces does not prove that he ever does he may on some consideration or other will to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade another and still may desire that they may not persuade him but yet his will and desire does not run counter at all the thing which he wills the very same thing which he desires and he does not will a thing and desire the contrary in any particular in this instance it is not carefully observed what is the thing willed and what is the thing desired if it were it would be found that will and desire does not clash in the least the thing willed on some consideration is to utter such words and certainly the same consideration so influences him that he does not desire the contrary all things considered he chooses to utter such words and does not desire not utter them and so as the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired that the words though they tend to persuade should not be effectual to that end the will is not contrary to this he does not will that they should be effectual but rather he wills that they should not as he desires in order to prove that the will and desire may encounter it should be shown that they may be contrary one to another in the same thing or with respect the very same object of will or desire but here the objects are too and in each taken by themselves the will and desire agree and it is no wonder that they should not agree in different things however little distinguish they are in their nature the will may not agree with the will nor desire agree with the desire in different things as in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions a person may on some consideration desire to use persuasions and at the same time may desire they may not prevail but yet nobody will say that desire runs counter to desire or that this proves that the desire is perfectly a distinct thing from desire the like might be observed of the other instance Mr. Locke produces of a man's desiring to be eased of pain etc but not to dwell any longer on this whether desire and will and whether preference and volition be precisely the same things or no yet I trust it will be allowed by all that in every act of will there is an act of choice that in every act of volition there is a preference or prevailing inclination of the soul whereby the soul at that instance is out of a state of perfect indifference with respect to the direct object of the volition that every act or going forth of the will there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination one way rather than another and the soul had rather have to do one thing than another or than not to have to do that thing and that there where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing but a perfect continuing equilibrium and of part 1 section 1 part 1 section 2 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this Liberbox recording is in the public domain concerning the determination of the will by determining the will if the phrase be used with any meaning must be intended causing that the act of the will or choice should be thus not otherwise and the will is said to be determined when in consequence of some action or influence its choice is directed to and fixed upon a particular object as when we speak of the determination of motion we may mean causing the motion of the body to be such a way or in such direction rather than another to talk of the determination of the will supposes an effect which must have a cause if the will be determined there is a determiner this must be supposed to be intended even by them that say the will determines itself if it be so the will is both determiner and determined it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself and is the object of its own influence and action with respect to that grand inquiry what determines the will it will be very tedious and unnecessary at present to enumerate and examine all the various opinions which have been advanced concerning this matter nor is it needful that I should enter into a particular disquisition of all points debated in disputes of that question whether the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding it is sufficient my present purpose to say it is that motive which as it stands in the view of the mind is the strongest that determines the will but it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning in this by motive I mean the whole of that which moves excites or invites the mind to volition whether that be one thing singly or many things conjuntly many particular things make incur and unite their strength to induce the mind and when it is so all together are as it were one complex motive and when I speak of the strongest motive I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition whether that be the strength of one thing alone or of many together whatever is a motive in this sense must be something that is extent in the views or apprehension of the understanding or perceiving faculty nothing can induce the mind to willed or act anything any further it is perceived or is some way or other in the mind's view or what is wholly unperceived and perfectly out of the mind's view cannot affect the mind at all it is most evident that nothing is in the mind or reaches it or takes any hold of it any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of and I think it must also be allowed by all that everything that is properly called motive excitement or inducement to a perceiving willing agent has some sort and degree of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will previous to the effect or to the act the will excited this previous tendency of the motive is what I call strength of the motive that motive which has less degree previous advantage or tendency to move the will or that appears less inviting as it stands in the view of the mind is what I call a weaker motive on the contrary that which appears most inviting and has by what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice is what I call the strongest motive and in this sense I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest motive things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength Tennessee or advantage to move or excite its will for many things are pertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed the nature and circumstances of the mind that views and the degree and manner of its views perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration of but so much I think may be determined in general without room for controversy that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice is considered or viewed as good nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the soul in any further degree than it appears such for to say otherwise would be to say that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make to engage the mind to elect them some other way than by their appearing eligible to it which is absurd and therefore it must be true in some sense that the will always is as the greatest apparent good but only for the right understanding of this two things must be well and distinctly observed it must be observed in what sense I use the term good namely as good as the same import with agreeable to appear good to the mind as I use the phrase is the same as to appear agreeable or seem pleasing to the mind certainly appears inviting and eligible to the mind or tending to engage its inclination and choice considered as evil or disagreeable nor indeed as indifferent and neither agreeable nor disagreeable but if it tends to draw the inclination and move the will it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind and therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it which as it stands in the mind's view suits it best and pleases it most and in that sense the greatest apparent good to say otherwise is little if anything short of a direct and plain contradiction the word good in the sense includes in its signification the removal or avoiding of evil or of that which is disagreeable and easy it is agreeable and pleasing to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing and to have uneasiness removed so that here is inclined what Mr. Locke supposes determine the will for when he speaks of an easiness as determining the will he must understand as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the evolution or act of preference is the avoiding or removal of that uneasiness and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable when I say the will as as the greatest apparent good is or as I've explained it that volition has always for his object the thing which appears most agreeable it must be carefully observed to avoid confusion and needless objection that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the will of volition and not some object that the act of will has not an immediate but only an indirect and remote respect to many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen thus when a drunkard has his liquor before him and he has to choose whether to drink it or no the proper and immediate objects about which his present volition is conversant and between which his choice now decides are his own acts in drinking the liquor or letting it alone and this will certainly be done according to what in the present view of his mind taken in the whole of it is most agreeable to them if he chooses or wills to drink it and not to let it alone then this action that stands in the view of his mind with all that belongs to its appearance there is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone but the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely and between which his choice may determine more indirectly are the pleasant pleasure the man expects by drinking and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it and it appears that this future misery when it comes will be more disagreeable and unpleasant than refraining from drinking now would be but these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is nextly conversant about for the act of the will spoken of is concerning present drinking or for bearing to drink if it wills to drink the proper object of the act of his will and drinking on some account or other now appears most agreeable to him and suits him best if he chooses to refrain then refraining is the immediate object of his will and is most pleasing to him if in the choice he makes in the case he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage which he judges will be greater when it comes than a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance if on the contrary future advantages preferred then that appears most agreeable and suits him best and so still the present volition is as the greatest apparent good as present is I've rather chosen to express myself thus that the will always is as the greatest apparent good or as what appears most agreeable is then to say that the will is determined by the greatest apparent good or by what seems most agreeable because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind the minds preferring and choosing seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct if strict propriety of speech be insisted on it may more properly be said that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice is determined by that which appears most agreeable then the preference or choice itself but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object which causes it to appear most agreeable I say in or about the mind's view of the object what has influence to render an object in view agreeable is not only what appears in the object viewed but also the manner of the view and the state and circumstances of the mind that views particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind would be a matter of no small difficulty and might require a treatise by itself in is not necessary to my present purpose I shall therefore only mention some things in general one thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable is the apparent nature and circumstances of the object and there are various things of this sort that have a hand in rendering the object more or less agreeable that which appears in the object which renders it beautiful and pleasant or deformed and arcsome to the mind viewing it as in itself too the apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending to the object or the consequence of it such concomitance and consequences being viewed as circumstances of objects are to be considered as belonging to it and as it were parts of it as it stands in the mind's view as a proposed object of choice three the apparent stage of the pleasure or trouble that appears with respect to distance of time being either nearer or farther off it is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind to have pleasure speedily and disagreeable to have it delayed so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's view and all other things equal but only one is be held as near and the other are far off the nearer will hear most agreeable and so will be chosen because though the agreeableness of the objects is exactly equal as viewed in themselves yet not as viewed in their circumstances one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice as it stands in the mind's view is the manner of the view if the object be something which appears connected with future pleasure not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence but also the manner of the view especially in two respects one with respect to the degree of judgment or firmness of ascent with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future because it is more agreeable to have certain happiness than an uncertain one and a pleasure which is viewed as more probable all other things being equal is more agreeable to the mind than that which is viewed as less probable too with respect to the degree of the idea of the future pleasure with regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts either past present or future we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others that is our idea is much more clear lively and strong thus the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination or by contemplation of them when absent my idea of the sun when I look upon it is more vivid than when I only think of it our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit is usually stronger when we taste it than when we only imagine it and sometimes the idea we have of things by contemplation are much stronger and clearer than in other times thus a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the future pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves than at another now the degree or strength of the idea or sense that men have a future good or evil is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice or volition which the mind considers of and are presented for choice both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment and both equally certain and all other things are equal but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense of than of the other this has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind and move the will it is now more agreeable to the mind to take the pleasure it has a strong and lively sense of than that which it has only a faint idea of the view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it and it is agreeable to the mind to have an uneasiness removed and is appetite gratified and if several future enjoyments are presented together as competitors for the choice of the mind some of them judged to be greater and others less the mind also having a greater sense and more lively idea of the good of some of them and of others a less and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in some of these respects appear least so in others in this case all other things being equal the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good and the degree of the view or sense or liveliness of the idea the mind has of the good because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable and accordingly volition will be determined I might further observe the state of the mind that views a proposed object of choice is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object the particular temper which the mind has by nature or that has been introduced and established by education example custom or some other means or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion that object which appears agreeable to one does not so to another and the same object does not appear a like agreeable to the same person at different times it is most agreeable to some men to follow the reason and to others to follow their appetites to some men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination to gratify it others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites it is more disagreeable to some men than others to counteract a former resolution in these respects and many others which might be mentioned different things will be most agreeable to different persons and not only so but to the same persons at different times but possibly it is needless and improper to mention the frame and state of the mind as a distinct ground of the agreeableness of objects from the other to mention before the apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed and the manner of the view perhaps if we strictly consider the matter the different temper and state the mind as to the agreeableness of objects any other way than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed having a parent pleasure or pain attending them and as it occasions the manner of the view to be different causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness to be more or less lively however I think so much is certain that volition in no one instance that can be mentioned is otherwise than the greatest apparent goodness in the manner which has been explained the choice of the mind never departs from that which at that time and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind appears most agreeable and pleasing all things considered if the immediate objects the will are a man's own actions then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills if it be now most agreeable to him all things considered to walk then he now wills to walk if it be now upon the whole of what at present appears to him most agreeable to speak then he chooses to speak best to keep silence then he chooses to keep silence they were scarcely a planar and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind than that when men act voluntarily and do what they please then they do what suits them best or what is most agreeable to them to say that they do what they please but yet do not do what is agreeable to them is the same thing as to say they do what they please but do not act their pleasure and that is to say that they do what they please and yet do not do what they please it appears from these things that in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding but then the understanding must be taken in a large sense as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension and not merely what is called reason or judgment if by the dictate of understanding is meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person's happiness taking in the whole of his duration it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable all things being put together which pertain to the mind's present perceptions apprehensions or ideas in any respect although that dictate of reason when it takes place is one thing that is put into the scales and is to be considered as a thing that has concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the will and is one thing that is to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the will always follows either as having its influence added to other things or subducted from them when it concurs with other things then its weight is added to them as put into the same scale but when it is against them it is as a weight in the opposite scale where it resists the influence of other things yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight and so the act of the will is determined in opposition to it the things which I have said may I hope serve in some measure to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this section that is the will is always determined by the strongest motive or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition but whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the things wherein conflicts the strength of motives or not yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself which carries much of its own evidence with it and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse and the truth of it I hope will appear with great clearness before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty end of part one section two part one section three of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain concerning the meaning of the terms necessity impossibility inability etc and of contingence the words necessary impossible etc are abundantly used in controversies about free will and moral agency and therefore the sense in which they are used should be clearly understood here I might say that a thing is then said to be necessary when it must be and cannot be otherwise but this would not properly be a definition of necessity even if I explain the word must by the phrase there being a necessity the words must can and cannot need explication as much as the words necessary and impossible accepting that the former are words that in earliest life we more commonly use the word necessary as used in common which is a relative term and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing which opposition is overcome or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it that is necessary in the original improper sense of the word which is or will be not withstanding all supposable opposition to say that a thing is necessary is the same thing as to say that it is impossible it should not be but the word impossible is manifestly a relative term and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass which is insufficient for the effect as the word unable is relative and has relation to ability to endeavor which is insufficient also the word irresistible is relative and has always reference to resistance which is made or may be made to some force or power tending to an effect and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder the effect the common notion of necessity and impossibility implies something that demonstrates endeavor or desire here several things are to be noted one things are said to be necessary in general which or or will be not withstanding any supposable opposition from whatever quarter but things are said to be necessary to us which are or will be not withstanding these from us the same may be observed of the word impossible and other such like terms to these terms necessary impossible irresistible etc. more especially belong to controversies about liberty and moral agency as used in the latter of the two senses now mentioned these as necessary or impossible to us with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavor of ours three as the word necessity in its vulgar and common use is relative and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition so when we speak of anything as necessary to us it is with relation to some supposable opposition of our wills or some voluntary exertional to the contrary for we do not properly make opposition to an event any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it things are said to be what must be or necessarily are when they are or will be though we desire or endeavor the contrary or try to prevent or remove their existence but such opposition of ours always either consists in or implies opposition of our wills it is manifest that such like words and phrases as vulgarly used are understood in this manner the thing is said to be necessary when we cannot help it let us do what we will so anything is said to be impossible to us when we would do it or would have it brought to pass and endeavor it or at least maybe supposed to desire and seek it but all our desires and endeavors are or would be vain and that is said to be irresistible which overcomes all our opposition resistance and endeavor to the contrary and we are said to be unable to do a thing when our supposable desires and endeavors are insufficient we are accustomed in the common use of language thus to apply and understand these phrases we grow up with such a habit which by the daily use of these terms from our childhood becomes fixed and settled so that the idea of our relation to a supposed will desire and endeavor of ours is strongly connected with these terms whenever we hear the words used such ideas and these words are so associated that they unavoidably go together one suggests the other and never can be easily separated as long as we live and though we use the words as terms of art in another sense yet unless we are exceedingly circumspect we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner which will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses even when we pretend to use them as terms of art for it follows from what has been observed that when these terms necessary, impossible irresistible, unable, etc. are used in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed or can be supposed but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition will or endeavor they are then not used in their proper interpretation the reason is manifest in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition will or endeavor and therefore if any man uses these terms in such cases he either uses them nonsensically or in some new sense diverse from their original and proper meaning as for instance if anyone should affirm after this manner that it is necessary for a man or what must be that he should choose virtue rather than vice during the time that he prefers virtue to vice and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice so long as this choice continues such a one would use the terms must, irresistible, etc. with either perfect insignificance or in some new sense diverse from their common use which is with reference as has been observed to supposable opposition unwillingness and resistance whereas here the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing for the case supposed is that of being willing and choosing five it appears from what has been said that these terms necessary, impossible, etc. are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common and original signification for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world when there was no other being with regard to many of the dispossitions and acts of the divine being such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, etc. so they apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings where in all opposition of the will is excluded in the very supposition of the case metaphysical or philosophical necessity is nothing different from their certainty I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge but the certainty that is in things themselves which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them what is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical necessity namely that by which a thing cannot but be or whereby it cannot be otherwise fails of being a proper explanation of it on two accounts first the words can or cannot need explanation as much as the word necessity and the former may as well be explained by the latter as the latter by the former thus if anyone asked us what we mean when we say a thing cannot but be we might explain ourselves by saying it must necessarily be so as well as explain necessity by saying it is that by which a thing cannot but be and secondly this definition is liable to the aforementioned great inconvenience the words cannot or unable are properly relative and have relation to power exerted or that may be exerted in order to the thing spoken out to which as I have now observed the word necessity as used by philosophers has no reference philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true when there is such a connection then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary in a philosophical sense opposition or contrary effort be supposed or known when the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms the existence of anything either substance quality act or circumstance have a full and certain connection then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense and in this sense I use the word necessity in the following discourse when I refer to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty the subject and predicate ever proposition which affirms existence of something may have a full fixed and certain connections several ways one they may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves because it may imply a contradiction or gross absurdity to suppose them not connected thus many things are necessary in their own nature so the eternal existence of being generally considered is necessary in itself because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity to deny the existence of being in general or to say there was absolute and universal nothing and is as it were the sum of all contradictions as might be shown if this were a proper place for it so God's infinity and other attributes are necessary so it is necessary in its own nature that two and two should be four and it is necessary that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference should be equal it is necessary fit and suitable that men should do to others as they would that they should do to them so innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them are perfectly connected of themselves to the connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something maybe fixed and made certain because the existence of that thing is already come to pass and either now is or has been and so has as it were made sure of existence and therefore the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it may by this means be made certain and necessarily and unalterably true the past event has fixed and decided the matter as to its existence and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass has now become necessary it has become impossible it should be otherwise than true that such a thing has been three the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be may have a real and certain connection consequentially and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else that is necessary in one of the former respects as it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature over something which has already received and made sure of existence this necessity lies in or may be explained by the connection of two or more propositions one with another things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary are necessary themselves by a necessity of consequence and here it may be observed that all things which are future or which will her after begin to be which can be said to be necessary are necessary only in this last way their existence is not necessary in itself for if so they always would have existed nor as their existence become necessary by being already come to pass therefore the only way that anything that is to come to pass hereafter is or can be necessary is by connection with something that is necessary in its own nature or something that already is or has been so that the one being supposed the other certainly follows and this also is the only way that all things past accepting those which were from eternity could be necessary before they come to pass and therefore the only way in which any effect or event anything whatsoever that ever has had or will have a beginning has come into being necessarily or will hereafter necessarily exist and therefore this is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will it may be of some use in these controversies further to observe concerning metaphysical necessity that agreeable to the distinction before observed of necessity as vulgarly understood things that exist may be said to be necessary either with a general or a particular necessity the existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general necessity when all things considered there is a foundation for the certainty of their existence or when in the most general and universal view of things the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms its existence would appear with an infallible connection an event or the existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a particular necessity when nothing that can be taken into consideration in or about a person thing or time alters the case at all as to the certainty of an event or the existence of a thing or can be of any account at all in determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing so that it is all one as to that person or thing at least at that time as if the existence were necessary with a necessity that is most universal and absolute thus there are many things that happen to particular persons in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern at least at that time which whether they are necessary or not with regard to things in general yet are necessary to them and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair I shall vacation to apply this observation to particular instances in the following discourse whether the same things that are necessary with a particular necessity be not also necessary with a general necessity may be a matter of future consideration let that be as it will it alters not the case as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of necessity these things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and necessity as terms of art and as often used by metaphysicians and controversial writers in divinity in a sense diverse from and more extensive their original meaning in common language which was before explained what has been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and necessity may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms impossible and impossibility for there is no difference but only the latter are negative and the former positive impossibility is the same as negative necessity or necessity that a thing should not be and it is used as a term of art in a life diversity from the original and vulgar meaning with necessity the same may be observed concerning the words unable and inability it has been observed that these terms in their original and common use have relation to will and endeavor as supposable in the case and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavor but as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines especially writers on controversies about free will they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed as the words necessary impossible enable etc are used by polemic writers in a sense diverse from their common vocation the like has happened to the term contingent anything is said to be contingent or to come to pass by chance or accident in the original meaning of such words when its connection with its causes or antecedents according to the established course of things is not discerned and so is what we have no means of foreseeing and especially is anything said to be contingent or accidental with regard to us when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge and besides our design and scope but the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection end of part one section three part one section four of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards is in the public domain of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inability that necessity which has been explained consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition as intelligent beings are the subjects of it is distinguished into moral and natural necessity I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction but shall only explain how these two sorts of necessity are understood as the terms are sometimes used and as they are used in the following discourse the phrase moral necessity is used variously sometimes it is used for a necessity of moral obligation so we say a man is under necessity when he is under bonds of duty and conscience from which he cannot be discharged again the word necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest sometimes by moral necessity is meant that apparent connection of things which is the ground of moral evidence and so is distinguished from absolute necessity or that sure connection of things that is a foundation for infallible certainty in this sense moral necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind in their conduct and behavior in the world as they would consult their own safety and interest and treat others properly as members of society and sometimes by moral necessity is meant that necessity of connection and consequence which arises from such moral causes as the strength of inclination or motives and the connection which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions and it is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity in the following discourse I mean such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes as distinguished from what are called moral causes such as habits and dispositions of the heart and moral motives and inducements thus men placed in certain circumstances are the subjects of particular sensations by necessity they feel pain when their bodies are wounded they see the objects presented before them in a clear light when their eyes are opened so they are sent to the truth of certain propositions as soon as the terms are understood as that two and two make four that black is not white that two parallel lines can never cross one another so by a natural necessity men's bodies move downwards when there is nothing to support them but here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of necessity one moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity that is the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause whether the will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination or not if that matter should be controverted yet I suppose none will deny but that in some cases a previous bias an inclination or the motive presented may be so powerful that the act of the will may be certainly and indisulably connected there with when motives or previous bias are very strong all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them and if they were yet stronger the difficulty would be still greater and therefore if more were still added to their strength to a certain degree it would make the difficulty so great that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it for this plain reason because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties yet that power is not infinite and so goes not beyond certain limits if a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty be increased to thirty or and hundred or a thousand degrees and his strength not also increased his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty as therefore it must be allowed that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral causes and effects so this only is what I call by the name of moral necessity to when I use this distinction of moral and natural necessity I would not be understood to suppose that if anything come to pass by the former kind of necessity the nature of things is not concerned in it as well as in the latter I do not mean to determine that when a moral habit or motive is so strong that the act of the will infallibly follows this is not owing to the nature of things but natural moral are the terms by which these two kinds of necessity have usually been called and they must be distinguished by some names for there is a difference between them that is very important in its consequences this difference however does not lie so much in the nature of the connection as in the two terms connected the cause with which the effect is connected is of a particular kind these that which is of a moral nature either some previous habitual disposition or some motive exhibited to the understanding and the effect is also of a particular kind being likewise of a moral nature consisting in some inclination or volition of those soul or voluntary action I suppose that necessity which is called natural indistinction from moral necessity is so called because mere nature as the word is vulgarly used is concerned without anything of choice the word nature is often used in opposition to choice not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice but probably because we first get our notion of nature from that obvious course of events which we observe in many things where our choice has no concern and especially in the material world in very many parts of it we easily perceive to be in a settled course the stated order and manner of succession being very apparent but where we do not readily discern the rule and connection though there be a connection according to an established law truly taking place we signify the manner of event by some other name even in many things which are seen in the material and sentiment world which do not obviously come to pass according to any settled course men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature but by such names as accident chance contingence etc so men make a distinction between nature and choice as if they were completely and universally distinct whereas I suppose none will deny but that choice in many cases from nature as truly as other events but the connection between acts of choice and their causes according to established laws is not so obvious and we observe that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action different from that established order of things which is most obvious and seen especially in corporeal things the choice also often interposes interrupts and alters the chain of events in these external objects and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do if let alone hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature and properly set in opposition to it names being commonly given to things according to what is most obvious and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research it must be observed that in what has been explained as signified by the name of moral necessity the word necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word for as was observed before such terms necessary impossible irresistible etc in common speech and their most proper sense are always relative having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor that is insufficient but no such opposition or contrary will and endeavor is supposable in the case of moral necessity which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resisted for it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself in its present act or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time and therefore the very case suppose never admits of any trial whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this necessity what has been said natural and moral necessity may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral inability we are said to be naturally unable to do a thing when we cannot do it if we will because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will either in the faculty of understanding constitution of body or external objects moral inability consists not in any of these things but either in the want of inclination or the strength of a contrary inclination or the want of sufficient motives and view to induce and excite the act of the will or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary or both these may be resolved into one and it may be said in one word that moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination for when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing through a defective motives or prevalence of contrary motives it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination or the prevalence of a contrary inclination in such circumstances and under the influence of such views to give some instances of this moral inability a woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave a child of great love and duty to his parents may be thus unable to kill his father a very lascivious man in case of certain opportunities and temptations and in the absence of such and such restraints may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust a drunkard under such and such circumstances may be unable to forbear taking strong drink a very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy or to desire his prosperity yay some may be so under the power of a vile disposition that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection a strong habit of virtue and a great degree of holiness may cause a moral inability to love wickedness in general and may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things or to choose a wicked in preference to a virtuous light and on the other hand a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy being or to choose and cleave to him as his chief could here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral inability these of that which is general and habitual and that which is particular and occasional by a general and habitual moral inability I mean an inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that kind through a fixed and habitual inclination or an habitual and stated defect or want of a certain kind of inclination thus very ill natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence as another who is full of good nature commonly exerts and the man whose heart is habitually void of gratitude may be unable to exert grateful acts through that stated defect of a grateful inclination by particular and occasional moral inability I mean an inability of the will or heart to a particular act through the effect of present motives or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding on this occasion if it be so that the will is always determined by the strongest motive then it must always have an inability in this latter sense to act otherwise than it does it not being possible in any case that the will should at present go against the motive which has now all things considered the greatest advantage to induce it the former of these kinds of moral inability is most commonly called by the name of inability because the word in its most proper and original signification has respect to some stated defect and this especially obtains the name of inability also upon another account because as before observed the word inability in its original and most common use is a relative term and has respect to will and endeavor as supposable in the case insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit than others that arise only from transient occasions and causes indeed will and endeavor against or diverse from present acts of the will are in no case supposable whether those acts be occasional or habitual for that would be to suppose the will at present to be otherwise than at present it is but yet there may be will and endeavor against future acts of the will or volitions that are likely to take place as viewed at a distance it is no contradiction to suppose that the acts of the will at one time may be against the acts of the will at another time and there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will but such desires and endeavors are in many cases rendered insufficient in vain through fixedness of habit when the occasion returns the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition in this respect a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit but it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts as are only occasional and transient because the occasion or transient cause before seen may often easily be prevented or avoided on this account the moral inability that attends fixed habits especially obtains the name of inability and then as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself and do it in vain in the case of strong habits so reason may resist present acts of the will and its resistance be insufficient and this is more commonly the case also when the acts arise from strong habit but it must be observed concerning moral inability in each kind of it that the word inability is used to in a sense very diverse from its original import the word signifies only a natural inability in the proper use of it and is applied to such cases only where in a present will or inclination to the thing with respect to which a person is said to be unable is supposable it cannot be truly said according to the ordinary use of language that a malicious man let him be never so malicious cannot hold his hand from striking or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness or that a drunk let his appetite be never so strong cannot keep the cup from his mouth in the street this propriety of speech a man has a thing in his power if he has it in his choice or at his election and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing when he can do it if he will it is improperly said that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will in which would be easily performed if the act of the will were present and if it be improperly said that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will it is in some respect more improperly said that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves because it is more evidently false with respect to these that he cannot if he will for to say so in the downright contradiction it is to say he cannot will if he does will and in this case not only is it true that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will but the very willing is the doing when once he has willed the thing is performed and nothing else remains to be done therefore in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability is not just because the thing wanting is not a being able but a being willing there are faculties of mind and a capacity of nature and everything else sufficient but a disposition nothing is wanting but a will end of part one section four part one section five of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain concerning the notion of liberty and of moral agency the plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty in common speech is the power opportunity or advantage that anyone has to do as he pleases or in other words is being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills and the contrary to liberty whatever name we call that by is a persons being hindered or unable to conduct as he will or being necessitated to do otherwise if this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word liberty in the ordinary use of language as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk and is unprejudiced will deny then it will follow that in propriety of speech neither liberty nor its contrary can properly be ascribed to any being or thing but that has such a faculty power or property as is called will for that which is possessed of no will cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it and therefore to talk of liberty or the contrary as belonging to the very will itself is not to speak good sense if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original improper signification of words for the will itself is not an agent that has a will the power of choosing itself has not a power of choosing that which has the power of volition is the man or the soul and not the power of volition itself and he that has the liberty of doing according to his will is the agent who is possessed of the will and not the will which he is possessed of we say with propriety that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and liberty of flying to be free is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful or zealous but these qualities are the properties of persons and not the properties of properties there are two things contrary to what is called liberty in common speech one is constraint otherwise called force compulsion and co-action which is a persons being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will the other is restraint which is being hindered and not having power to do according to his will but that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things I need say unless on this head Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth with so great clearness in his essay on the human understanding but one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called liberty namely that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will or according to his choice is all that is meant by it without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause of that choice or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition or whether it happened without a cause whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing or not connected let the person come by his choice anyhow yet he is able and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will the man is perfectly free according to the primary and common notion of freedom what has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by liberty according to the common notions of mankind and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word but the word is used by Armenians, Pelagians and others who oppose the Calvinists as an entirely different signification these several things belong to their notion of liberty one that it consists in a self determining power in the will or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself and its own acts whereby it determines its own volitions so as not to be dependent in its determinations on any cause without itself nor determined by anything prior to its own acts the difference belongs to liberty in their notion of it or that the mind previous to the active volition be in equilibrium three contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it not in the common acceptation of the word as that has been already explained but as opposed to all necessity or any fixed in certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence there is the essence of liberty so much to consist in these things that unless the will of man be free in this sense he has no real freedom how much so ever he may be at liberty to act according to his will a moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality in which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense virtuous or vicious commendable or faulty a moral agency belongs a moral faculty or sense of moral good and evil or of such a thing as dessert or worthiness of praise or blame reward or punishments and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives exhibited to the view of understanding and reason to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty the sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit but it is not a moral agent its action though good is not virtuous or meritorious fire that breaks out in a city and consumes great part of it is very mischievous in its operation but is not a moral agent what it does is not faulty or sinful or deserving of any punishment the brew creatures are not moral agents the actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant others are very hurtful yet seeing they have no moral faculty or sense of dessert and do not act from choice guided by understanding or with the capacity of reasoning and reflecting but only from instinct and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do as moral agents are for their faults or good deeds here it may be noted that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral agency of a ruler and a subject I call it circumstantial because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements by which they are capable of being influenced arising from the difference of circumstances a ruler acting in that capacity only is not capable of being influenced by a moral law and its sanctions of threatenings and promises rewards and punishments as the subject is though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil and therefore the moral agency of the supreme being who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures and never as a subject differs in that respect from the moral agency of created intelligent beings God's actions and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor have moral qualifications and are morally good in the highest degree here most perfectly holy and righteous and we must conceive of him as influenced in the highest degree by that which above all others is properly a moral inducement these the moral good which he sees in such and such things and therefore he is in the most proper sense a moral agent the source of all moral ability and agency the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good though by reason of his being supreme over all it is not possible he should be under the influence of law or command promises or threatenings rewards or punishments councils or warnings the essential qualities of a moral agent are in God in the greatest possible perfection such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit by which some things are praised where the others deserving of blame and punishment and also a moral understanding and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praise worthy and here and does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man which we read of Genesis one twenty six twenty seven and chapter nine six by which God distinguished man from the beast bees and those faculties and principles of nature whereby he is capable of moral agency image of God whereas the spiritual and moral image wherein man was made at first consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed end of part one section five part two section one of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards the sleeper box recording is in the public domain part two wherein it is considered whether there is or can be any sort of freedom of will as that wherein Armenians place the essence of the liberty of all moral agents and whether any such thing ever was or can be conceived of section one showing the manifest inconsistence of the Armenian notion of liberty of will consisting in the will self determining power having taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed concerning the meaning of the principle terms and phrases made use of controversies concerning human liberty and particularly observed what liberty is according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind and what it is as understood and maintained by Armenians I proceed to consider the Armenian notion of the freedom of the will and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency or in order anyone's being capable of virtue or vice and properly the subject of command or counsel praise or blame promises or threatenings rewards or punishments or whether that which has been described as the thing meant by liberty in common speech be not sufficient and the only liberty which makes or can make anyone a moral agent and so properly the subject of these things in this part I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable as that freedom of will which Armenians insist on and shall inquire whether any such sort of liberty be necessary to moral agency etc in the next part and first of all I shall consider the notion of a self determining power in the will wherein according to the Armenians does most essentially consist the will's freedom and shall particularly inquire whether it be not plainly absurd and a manifest inconsistence to suppose that the will itself determines all the free acts of the will here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such ways of speaking as the will determining itself because actions are to be ascribed to agents and not properly to the powers of agents which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes and much confusion as Mr. Locke observes but I shall suppose that the Armenians when they speak of the will's determining itself do by the will mean the soul willing I shall take it for granted that when they speak of the will as the determiner they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of doing or acting voluntarily I shall suppose this to be their meaning because nothing else can be meant without the grossest and plainest absurdity in all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of acting or doing such things we mean that the agents which have these powers of acting do them in the exercise of those powers when we say valor fights courageously we mean the man who is under the influence of valor fights courageously when we say love seeks the object loved we mean the person loving seeks that object when we say the understanding discerns we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty so when it is said the will decides or determines the meaning the exercise of a power of willing and choosing or the soul acting voluntarily determines therefore if the will determines all its own free acts the soul determines them in the exercise of a power of willing and choosing or which is the same thing it determines them of choice it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts the will determines the will then choice orders and determines the choice and acts of choice are subject to the decision and follow the conduct of other acts of choice and therefore if the will determines all its own free acts then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice choosing that act and if that preceding act of the will be also a free act then the will is self determined that is this in like manner is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses or which is the same thing it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the will choosing that which brings us directly to a contradiction for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first act in the whole train directing and determining the rest before the first free act of the will or else we must come at last to an act of the will determining the consequent acts wherein the will is not self determined and so is not a free act in this notion of freedom but if the first act in the train determining and fixing the rest be not free none of them all can be free as is manifest at first view but shall be demonstrated presently the mind governs the members of the body and determines their emotions does also govern itself and determines its own actions it doubtless determines them the same way even by antecedent volitions the will determines which way the hands and feet shall move by an act of choice and there is no other way of the wills determining directing or commanding anything at all whatsoever the will commands it commands by an act of the will and if it has itself under its command and determines itself in its own actions it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command so that if the freedom of the will consists in this that it has itself in its own actions under its command and direction and its own volitions are determined by itself it will follow that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition directing and commanding that and if that directing volition be also free in that also the will is determined that is to say that directing volition is determined by another going before that and so until we come to the first volition in the whole series and if that first volition be free and the will itself determined in it then that is determined by another volition preceding that which is a contradiction because by the volition it can have none before it to direct or determine it being the first in the train but if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the will then that act is not determined by the will and so is not free in the Armenian notion of freedom which consists in the will's self-determination and if that first act of the will which determines and fixes the subsequent acts be not free none of the following acts which are determined by it can be free if we suppose there are five acts in the train the fifth and last determined by the fourth and the fourth by the third the third by the second and the second by the first if the first is not determined by the will and so not free then none of them are truly determined by the will that is that each of them are as they are and not otherwise is not first going to the will but to the determination of the first in the series which is not dependent on the will and is that which the will has no hand in determining and this being that which decides what the rest shall be and determines their existence therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the will the case is just the same if instead of a chain of five acts of the will we should suppose a succession of ten or an hundred or ten thousand if the first act be not free being determined by something out of the will and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself and that the next and so on none of them are free but all originally depend on and are determined by some cause out of the will and so all freedom in the case is excluded and no act of the will can be free according to this notion of freedom if we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links so connected that if the first link moves it will move the next and that the next and so the whole chain must be determined to motion and in the direction of its motion by the motion of the first link and that is moved by something else in this case though all the links but one are moved by other parts of the same chain yet it appears that the motion of no one nor the direction of its motion is from any self moving or self determining power in the chain any more than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain if the will be not free in the first act which causes the next then neither is it free in the next which is caused by that first act for though indeed the will caused it yet it did not cause it freely because the preceding act by which it was caused was not free and again if the will be not free in the second act so neither can it be in the third which is caused by that because in like manner that third was determined by an act of the will that was not free and so we may go on to the next act and from that to the next and how long so ever the succession of acts is it is all one if the first on which the whole chain depends in which determines all the rest be not a free act the will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act and therefore the will is no more free in determining them then if it did not cause them at all thus this Armenian notion of liberty of the will persisting in the will's self determination is repugnant to itself and shuts itself wholly out of the world end of part two section one