 y risg a'r adeptu'r adeptu? No, it's... Oh, there. The one that says that, too. This one? Yeah. Okay, this... And is it possible to get a present of you on there? Yeah. But you want to have a present of your view for the... Oh, and not extended, okay. Sorry, just while we're setting up the presentation, I would just like to extend sincere apologies for my colleague, Adity McCurgy, who unfortunately can't join us today. Actually, just go to normal view on that one, that's fine. While we're getting this set up, I just want to reflect one last bit on that previous talk. You know, in the context of this workshop, you know, we are going to be talking about many, many forms of uncertainty from the global pathways, the global scenarios, into the climate models, the way we downscale the observational data sets that we blend for bias adjustment. We haven't even gotten into impacts modeling and things like that yet. But it's worth kind of tracking all of these things. And from the bottom line perspective, we are here to talk about impacts and management of risk. So at some level, all of those uncertainties, all of those distributions, if we can cross that with our own systems responses and figure out what is our actual management space, what is the risk that we are looking to manage. When you go across all of those different sources of uncertainty, you end up with a certain risk of a danger threshold being exceeded or a certain loss being achieved. So in the end, we have to ask ourselves, it's nothing that we can say from the front of the room, but what is the level of risk that you're able to manage and how does that cross statistically and on kind of raw values of exceedence thresholds and things like that? Okay, I think we've got to set up. Yeah, apologies for that. So, my name's Ylferia Paul Chansgr. I'm the science advisor to the Working Group 2 co-chairs and TSU. The presentation I'm going to give today will give an overview of some of the aspects that Working Group 2, which focuses on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, assesses in their report. We've had a very good presentation from my Working Group 1 colleagues to start with. You can see that the type of interaction that's already happening across the different working groups. I'd just like to say that, even though I'm giving this presentation, this is very much drawn on the entire Working Group 2 author team, so I thank them all and we actually have Arushka with us in the audience today, who will assist it with any questions. So you've heard a lot, so you heard in the first this morning about the processes for IPCC. So I won't go over those again, but I'll just reiterate that there's a number of reports that have been produced during the Six Assessment Cycle. If you haven't actually looked at any of these, they're all online. You can go to the IPCC website. I'll put the address there. You can download chapters. You can actually download figures if you need to use the figures. And there's also additional resources such as fact sheets, et cetera, that's available for you there. And just to set the context, the main, one of the key messages coming out the Working Group 2 report, and that was also taken through to the Synthesis report, is that the pace and scale of action so far and current plans are insufficient to tackle climate change. And I think Yuri's talked just before also highlighted this aspect. And the reason why we're here today is because providing robust evidence of climate change, of its adverse impacts and risks, and as well as assessment of adaptation mitigation options, is actually key for policy and decision makers. And this is particularly true at regional or system scales where often we might have information or data that's lacking. The other key message that came out of the Working Group 2 assessment, that was in contrast to the previous assessment report, is that the Working Group 2 really strongly recognises interdependence between climate, between ecosystems and biodiversity, and between human societies. These interactions, they're the basis for emerging risks from climate change and also interact with other non-climatic challenges. There's a current imbalance as well at the moment, so timely action is needed for a sustainable future, and we can no longer think in silos, but have to look across climate, biodiversity, human society and well-being to tackle the global challenges we face today. And the risk concept, which you can see in the middle of... Aha, this does work. You can see in the middle of this circle here, is actually central to the assessments. So, just going to start with impact. So my Working Group 1 colleagues have actually been through some of the methodologies that they use for attribution. You can find this figure in the cross Working Group box on attributions, so that's in Chapter 1 in Working Group 2, but it's also in the Working Group 1 report, assessment report. I'm not quite sure what chapter. And just want to highlight that when we talk to impact attribution, at the moment this is not always to anthropogenic climate change, but to climate change in general, so that's a sort of knowledge gap that needs to be addressed. And there are quantitative and qualitative approaches. So, for impact assessment, as well as the statistical approaches, bringing together large-scale meta-analyses and bringing together multiple lines of evidence. So bringing together qualitative information, information from experimental data, from conceptual understanding to strengthen attribution. And in order to do this, it's really critical to ensure appropriate framing, so to develop in Stage 3 the sort of hypotheses and possible causes, so bringing in understanding of other potential drivers of the change. For IPCC, you've heard that we really rely on published data, so please try and publish and make your studies available. And also, as well, sort of transparency in data, so again making data available. So this is from the Working Group 2, summary for policymakers. And the key message around this figure is that the impacts of climate change is growing and accumulating at global, continental and other regional scales. But there are gaps in knowledge. So the assessment here looks at... I've just picked part of this figure to show you, but the assessment here looks at water scarcity and food production, impacts on health and wellbeing, and impacts on city settlements and infrastructure at the end. And you can see the actual challenges that were looked at underneath each of these headings. So the assessment drew on the published literature and looked at the impacts for these variables, for different regions, so the continental regions here, but also for some other regionalisations at the bottom, for example, for mountain regions or for the Arctic. And through an assessment process, so you heard earlier this morning about assessing the literature and looking at the sort of confidence within the literature. The authors produced this impact assessment and you can see that overwhelmingly most of the impacts are actually increasing adverse impacts. Although there are cases where actually some increasing adverse and positive impacts are noted within a region, but there are still data gaps. So, for example, if we look at animal and livestock health and productivity at the global scale, and these global assessment is very much based on large-scale studies or meta-analyses, et cetera, that this level of research is still missing here, but if we look at the regional scales, you can see that there is, in some places, there is sort of medium to high confidence of impacts. So, we heard this morning that every small increase in warming will result in increased risks. And the Working Group II assessment outlined some of those risks, so the exposure of populations to heat waves will continue to increase with additional warming. At approximately two Celsius regions relying on snowmelt could experience declines in water. We know that climate change will undermine food security. At two degrees Celsius, by 2050, people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central South America and small islands are likely to experience food shortages leading to malnutrition. And there's risks for the billions of, the billion people living in low-line cities and other settlements on the coasts. So here, this gives you a sort of global overview, but if you have a look within Working Group II report, we have very extensive regional focus, including in the regional chapters and the regional cross-chatt papers. In addition, the report highlights the risks coming from simultaneous extreme events that can compound risks. So when multiple events happen at the same time, they compound overall risk and they're more difficult to manage. And this figure here shows an example of how heat and drought combine to cause reductions in crop yields made worse by reduced productivity because workers are suffering from heat stress and the reduced yields leads to reductions in household incomes, increased food prices locally and potentially at a global scale. So climate risks do not respect national boundaries and weather-related extremes are creating shocks to global trade. So coming back to our risk concept. So this is a risk concept from the fifth assessment report that was also used to some degree by Working Group II in the sixth assessment report. And it shows that risk is determined by interactions between hazard exposure and vulnerability. And the arrows that you can see here, oops, that one, the arrows you can see here represent actions to reduce either the hazard vulnerability or exposure and thereby impact the level of risk or realise risk, which in this case is impacts. So in AR6, we actually advanced the risk concept somewhat as well. So this figure here can be found in our chapter one and also in the synthesis report and that the nature of climate risk also involves risks from the responses themselves. So when I say risks from responses themselves, so you can see here that we now have this fourth propeller that's been added to the risk concept. And this includes the possibility of responses, so adaptation and mitigation responses, not achieving their intended objectives, having trade-offs, having adverse side effects for other societal objectives, maybe generating a new approach maybe generating novel hazards or unexpected side effects. And the nature of risk also includes residual impacts that will occur even with ambitious actions given limits to adaptation. So risk itself depends on a combination of many factors, but to communicate risk, we also use this visualisation that shows the relationship between warming levels and risk. And we call this the burning embers diagram. So on the left here you can see a burning ember and you can see it's called that because it has different colours going up the side and these are plotted against temperature as you'll see in the following slides, sorry, not temperature, global warming level. And each of the colours responds to the level of added risk assessed under climate change. So we go from undictectable, which is the white, so the impacts and risks are undetectable up to very high, where there's very in the purple here. And the assessment looks at the level, the global warming level over which risk transitions between these different categories and you will see that there's confidence levels assigned to the risk. There is a process to put the burning embers together that's based on an assessment of the knowledge that's in the literature. It also brings in an expert elicitation process and then visualising the outcomes of it all. And on Thursday morning, I believe you're going to have a session about visualising risk through burning embers. So the Working Group 2 report showed that risks are increasing with every increment of global warming. This is actually the figure that went through to the synthesis report and that risks differ by system. So on the left here we have land-based systems, on the right we have ocean-based systems and each of these embers has a narrative behind it and a narrative that describes how the risk changes with the global warming level. And you can see, if we look at the first one here, on the risk of wildfire damage, you can see that around one degrees, there's an increase in the fire season and as we get into the higher levels, the number of additional people that are exposed greatly increases. On the right-hand side for the warm water corals, so based on the best available knowledge and scientific evidence, we can see that around 1.5 coral reefs are expected to decline by a further 70% to 90% and actually at two degrees that decline is expected to be more than 99%. What was new in AR6 was we also carried out burning embers at regional levels. So I've just shown you a selection of them here, but you can find these in the summary for policymakers and also throughout the sectoral and regional chapters. So I've given you three examples here from Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe. And you can see that the burning ember risk assessment was done for a variety, so the risk to food production from crops, fisheries and livestock in Africa, biodiversity and ecosystems in Africa and the delayed impacts of sea level rise in the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, we weren't able to produce burning embers for all of the regional chapters and sectors and this is very much due to a lack of literature at the moment, but there are key risks identified for each of them. So although we didn't have burning embers for the small islands, at the same time, you can see the assessment of the key risks for the small island region, which includes economic decline and livelihood failure from fisheries, agriculture, tourism and biodiversity loss. So, as well as producing visualisations of risk, the working group 2 report also included projections of impacts and you can find many of these in the working group 2 atlas, so here I'm showing risk of species loss, so this is examples of impacts without additional adaptation and we'll come back to this as a session on Wednesday about biodiversity, so we'll come back to some of these issues then. So, coming on to adaptation, there are options that we can take to reduce risks to people and nature that was suddenly highlighted in the working group 2 report and this is taken from the Special Report on Ocean and Cryosphere in a changing climate, so this uses the three propeller risk concept and you can see for each of these propellers here, there's actions to reduce hazards, to reduce vulnerability and to reduce exposure. This is actually for climate risk at the coasts, I can see that's a bit covered there, but you can see that there's examples of actions that can be taken to reduce hazards, vulnerability and exposure and thereby impact risk, but at the same time there's acknowledgement of limits to adaptation, whether they be ecological or technological or other limits to adaptation. This is another example that originated also in the Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere, but is also in the Synthesis Report and the Summary for Policymakers and this is risk to coastal geographies with sea level rise and what's new here is that for each of these geographies, so there's four geographies at the bottom here, that the Burning Ember Risk Assessment was done with moderate, no or moderate adaptation responses and then with the maximum potential response. In order to put this together, this was based on a limited number of real-world case studies where they were actually well covered by the peer-reviewed literature. So as an example for Arctic communities, these embers are based on studies from five Arctic communities where there is considerable information available in the peer-reviewed literature and the hazards that were considered here include flooding, erosion and salinisation. An exposure and vulnerability was assessed by, for example, density of assets on the coast or the density of people on the coast. So this gives an example of how risk can be reduced through adaptation. But there are limits to adaptation, so the Working Group 2 report stresses that even effective adaptation cannot prevent all losses and damages. Above 1.5 degrees, some natural solutions may no longer work. We've already, earlier in the presentation, I talked about the challenges for freshwater supply on islands and mountains, through severe infrastructure damage, unavoidable sea level rise and also the risk of irreversible changes. For example, species extinctions. Once a species is gone, that species is definitely gone. But the Working Group 2 report also looks at ways to accelerate adaptation. So how do we accelerate and sustain adaptations, so political commitment and follow-through? But critically enhancing knowledge of impacts and risks and adaptation feasibility and effectiveness improves responses and monitoring and evaluation of adaptation measures. I believe during the week there's going to be some sessions focused on some of the sectoral challenges where you'll discuss impacts and adaptation. Finally, we have incremental adaptation versus transformational adaptation. Incremental adaptation being that that maintains the essence and or integrity of a process, so small changes, so sort of changes that result in smaller steps, and sometimes incremental adaptation can accrue to result in transformational adaptation, but transformational adaptation, given urgency, is the adaptation that changes fundamental attributes. Again, this is a sort of emerging knowledge base, but in our Working Group 16, we have a table here that looks at the different dimensions of adaptation and the transformative potential of that adaptation. So, for example, if we look at speed, low transformative potential when adaptations implemented slowly, but high when changes considered rapid for the given context. I'd just like to follow up with also the concept of climate resilient development. This brings together reduced climate risks through adaptation, reduced greenhouse gases through mitigation, enhanced biodiversity, and achieving the sustainable development goals. You can see on the right here that we have two sets of worlds, a sort of preferred world and a non-preferred world, and the actions that are needed to achieve those. This is what we call climate resilient development, and this is the figure from the synthesis report, but this is conceptually shows the climate resilient development pathways. It considers conditions that enable, conditions that constrain, and the outcomes from those pathways. The challenge now is to consider how to shift action to the higher level pathways, and at the moment this is very conceptual, so how to quantify some of this knowledge. Just looking to AR7, this is just speculation from myself, but certainly more integrating knowledge from different methodologies, so reinforcing the collaborations, the cross working group collaborations, and bringing in social sciences, humanities and views from businesses, consistent scenario-based impact and risk analysis across scales, understanding where the hard limits are, compounding risk, climate feedbacks, understanding of enablers and barriers and effectiveness for adaptation, and how to move from incremental to transformational adaptation, and throughout all of this to consider equity and justice. Thank you. Thank you. Question.