 Hello? Okay, great. So, I'm going to talk about income distribution, but functional, the functional income distribution, that is, the distribution of income between factors of production. And let me, oh, sorry, sorry, that's joint work with Andrés Davila now at Zurich, Manuel Fernández, at Los Andes and myself. So, there's a lot of recent literature about the decline of labor income share. There are like, I don't know, at least 10 papers I can recall now describing global decrease in labor income share. But this, this stylized fact has something beyond. In particular, when we talk about, for instance, direct technological change, we think about both labor-saving innovations and skilled bias innovations. So, the story, let's say, we will have to look not only at labor income share, but at raw labor income share, human capital income share. And when we go to the capital income, we may have to take a look at reproducible capital income share, namely physical capital and natural capital income share. So, this is what we do. We discuss how to measure factor income shares, taking into account these four factors of production. We propose a methodology to have these measures, and then we build a data set. As I was saying before, decoupling, then we see the evolution of all these shares, and we decouple this evolution, looking at prices, factor prices and average factor productivity. So, let me go to the paper. So, we build this data set for 55 countries for all the years between 1995 and 2015. Then we describe this data, and we highlight... So, we add two very important distinctions. The first one I already told you. We can talk about reproducible and not reproducible factors, but also we can see the evolution of these factor shares for high income and low and middle income countries in a separate way. And then finally, as I was saying before, we have this... We can decouple the evolution of factor shares. Finally, we suggest some possible explanations. So, let me go to the methodology. I will go very fast if someone wants to discuss in detail what we do, we can do it later. So, as I was telling you before, there are lots of papers describing the evolution of labor income shares. There are some papers where they build a panel. In general, there are small panels. Some of these panels separate physical capital from natural capital. Then we have this set of papers, the separate natural capital and physical capital. Then Sturgill, he builds a database with four factors, but you have small databases. In any case, what we do is we have the whole dynamics, and with all due respect, I think we have a better methodology than Sturgill. So, let me go fast. What we do... Sorry. No. No, so fast. Okay. So, what we do first is we compute total labor shares. This is a standard. We take the pen rule data tables and we follow the methodology of Gaolin, Bernanke, etc. This is quite standard. Then we split labor income between human capital and raw labor using set like an LAES data sets, but what we do is we run means and regressions for all countries and all years, and then we recover the constant in all of these regressions, and we assume this is the raw labor income. Then the remaining income is human capital income. We have, for data availability, we fill some gaps using, predicting using artificial intelligence. Then, to separate between physical capital and natural capital, we use the methodology of Casselian failure. What they do is there's this data set from the World Bank where they have natural capital, yes, natural capital for the whole set of countries, and what they do is they assume the return to investment of the two types of capital is the same, and then they compute natural capital income. We do exactly the same. Now, let's go to the results. This is the first result. Here we have total labor income. This is the global income. What we do is we weigh it by GDP. Here we have total labor income, and as in almost all the papers, we have this decline in labor income from 1995 to 2015. However, once we split human capital and raw labor share, what we see is that the decrease in labor income is completely driven by raw labor. Indeed, human capital income share is going up. It doesn't have a clear trend, but what we have is an increase in human capital share. So, first extremely important message, the decrease in labor income share is driven by raw labor income. Now, we can split this graph. We can see the graph for high-income countries and low and middle-income countries. So, if we see for high-income countries, it looks pretty much the same as the previous one. Yes, we have a decrease in labor income share, basically driven by a decrease in raw labor share, and an increase in human capital share. Let's see what happens when we see low and middle-income countries. The story is completely different. What we see is, first, a steep decrease in labor income share, and then a recover. So, at the end of the period, labor income share is basically the same as it was at the beginning of the period. And part of the decrease is driven by raw labor share, and part is driven by human capital share. First big difference. So, what we see here is driven, sorry, here, is driven by high-income countries. Now, if we take a look at not shares, but the income, again, we start from 1995, and we see that for high-income countries, total labor income goes up. You have this small decrease, which is the financial crisis, but it goes up, and the human capital income goes up. Bad is different when we talk about raw labor income. Raw labor income goes up until 2001, and then it's basically flat, with a small increase at the end of the period. When we talk about low and middle-income countries, there's a decrease by the beginning of the century. But in general, you have a positive trend for labor income, human capital income, and it's a little, let's say, the increase is smaller for raw labor, but again, we have an increase in raw labor income. So, you may be asking, how come you see this huge decrease in labor income share, what is going on? So, basically, you will see what is happening when we take a look at the income share of natural resources. Basically, let me go on. So, here we have capital factor shares. So, total capital share, physical capital share, and natural resources share for all countries. So, you have a small decrease of 2001, and then an increase until the end of the period. However, if you take a look at natural resources share, it goes a small decrease and then a small increase, and then it ends up in the same level. This movement is basically commodity prices. Here you have the boom, commodity prices boom, and then you have the reversal of the boom. It affects a little bit the sample. When you take a look at only at high income countries, it looks pretty much the same when you go to low and middle income countries, then the store is different. You have the movements in natural resources share is huge here, and it's driven a whole reallocation of factors income along the period. So, you have first a decrease, then the boom, and then the end of the boom comes with a decrease in natural resources share. With total capital and physical capital, you see physical capital first goes up, then goes down, and ends up in the same level. Now, that's capital income. It's basically for the three types of, for total capital, physical capital, natural resources, basically the same. Again, you have this decrease in the middle of the crisis, and this is the story for low and middle income economies. You first have this decrease, and then a huge increase coinciding with the commodity prices boom. Okay. Now, that's the data set. Of course, we have 55 countries for data for all the countries all the years, so you can take a look at each one of the countries. But we can decompose the movements. Do I have the time? Okay. So, this is any factor share. You have here, R is the price of the share, F is the factor, and Y is GDP. So, that's the factors income share. So, we can decompose the increase in the factor share. You have the change in the factor price minus the change in the average factor productivity. When I say average factor productivity is as opposed to marginal factors productivity. Okay. In general, people talk about factor productivity, but we prefer to talk about average factor productivity to distinguish with marginal factor productivity. So, we do this for all the factors, and this is what we find. So, here we have for high income countries, that's the total labor share, and what we see is that average labor productivity goes above factor prices. Here, we can interpret this in two ways. One is like a political way or institutional way or bargaining way, which is, look, firms are getting a higher part of the production of each worker, and this, for this reason, we have this redistribution from workers to firms. The other way is, you know, you have robotization, we have biotechnology change, and firms need less workers, and for this reason, factor prices are going, wages are going below average labor productivity. Now, when we analyze the same numbers for low and middle income countries, what we see is, again, first a huge decrease, and then a recovery, but you know, in any case, what we see is that compared to 1995, in general, average labor productivity is above average wage. So, it's like during these years, we have either a change in bargaining power in favor of firms or some type of labor-saving innovations. Again, they can look at the whole story, you end up with basically the same labor income share. We can move to human capital. In human capital, it goes the other way around. You see that the share of human capital ends up being higher than at the beginning, and it means, basically, that the average productivity is growing less than the price of human capital. Basically, the return to investment in human capital. When we go to low and middle income countries, we have basically, the story is different. You have average human capital productivity above wages. Again, for low labor share, what you see for high income countries, a huge decrease in low labor shares. In other words, average low labor productivity is above low labor prices. For low and middle income countries, you have basically the same thing, but the difference ends up disappearing in the long run. When we talk about capital and the physical capital, you see that at the end of the period, the physical capital share is higher, so it seems that indeed capital is getting a bigger part of the share, of the pie. Again, it's explained because you have return to capital above capital productivity. Now, when you go to low and middle income countries, this is not the case. You begin with the same story, like the return is higher than the average productivity, but then this different disappears and there's no increase in the long run in capital income share. Okay. With natural resources, basically it's flat, the behavior of natural resources income share for rich economies, but when we talk about middle income, here you see the commodity cycle. First, average productivity is above capital return, but then you have this huge increase in prices. The return to investment in natural capital is higher now than a natural resources share, and you have these years with a big increase in natural returns share. Then the boom comes to an end and you end up with a slightly lower natural resources share. That's the story. Possible explanations. Of course, this is like an invitation to write new papers using this database, but here you have an interesting dynamic with two global shocks. You have the natural resource boom, which explains basically the movements in natural resource share that may explain, and you have the international financial crisis that puts some noise into the behavior of shares. You may have a story of factors saving innovations in rich economies, and it makes sense. Rich economies are more abundant in reproducible factors, so they have more incentives to invest in labor-saving innovations, and you see they are also more abundant in human capital, so they have more incentives to implement biased innovations. The long-run story is consistent with factors saving innovations. In low- and middle-income economies, you don't see this in the long run. Now, you may also have a story of international trade, because the HRL model will predict exactly the same regarding factor shares if you think that high-income economies are trading with low- and middle-income economies. You can also think about a story of evolution of market power basically with an increase in market power for capital-intensive economies, firms, etc. Here, I didn't show this, but there's a very interesting fact. It seems to be convergence in factor shares. When we have the whole sample and we draw convergence graphs, it seems that we have convergence. I think there's a beautiful paper as well there. This convergence could be, if you believe the story of factor-saving innovations and there's technological transfers, you may have a story there. You may also think about labor market institutions. I will not go deeper there. So, big conclusions. There are heterogeneities in two dimensions. First, the movements in reproducible and non-reproducible factor shares are completely different. The story of the decreasing labor income share is the story of the decreasing raw labor income share. Second, the story of the behavior is different in middle- and low-income economies and in high-income economies. Okay, this is repetition, but the most important message here is that we provide a new factor shares that Data said, which I think provides new understanding of tools for new ways of understanding the movements in factor shares. That's it. Thank you very much.