 Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'll just start with an opening statement. I want to thank you first for the opportunity to be here today and brief you on the recent incidents involving surface forces in the western Pacific, the comprehensive review that examined the systemic issues surrounding these incidents, and then review the corrective action. Before I begin, I must say that throughout this investigative process, our first and last thoughts have been with our fallen sailors and their families. I want to offer my deep condolences to those who lost a loved one and ensure them that they will always be part of the Navy family. A review of your Navy today shows that this morning there are 100 ships and 64,000 sailors and Navy civilians forward deployed. This includes three carrier strike groups and their embarked airwings, three amphibious readiness groups, and their embarked marine expeditionary units, six ballistic missile defense ships on station, 11 attack submarines, five SSBNs. The vast majority of these ships are conducting their missions, some of them extremely difficult, effectively and professionally, protecting America from attack, promoting our interests and prosperity, and advocating for the rules that govern the vast commons from the sea floor to space and in cyberspace. We do much of this work with our allies and partners, enhancing our combined capacity to contribute to maritime security and improve our lethality in warfighting at sea. In recent three-week period, for instance, we conducted over 19 exercises with our partners involving 30 partner nations. This is what you expect of your Navy. This is why we exist. The Navy's been run hard in the past 16 years of war and the pace is picking up, especially in the Pacific. A recent experience has shown that if we're not careful, we can become overstretched, overextended. And if we take our eye off the fundamentals, we become vulnerable to mistakes at all levels of command. In response to the series of incidents in the surface force in 2017, culminating in the collisions involving the USS Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain, the Navy conducted both independent investigations into the specific incidents to determine what happened on board, and also a comprehensive review to identify any systemic, causal, and contributing factors as to why these incidents occurred. Both of these efforts developed the actions needed to prevent them in future operations. I'll be clear, these accidents were preventable. The causes for the collisions included a failure to plan for safety, a failure to adhere to sound navigational practices, failure to execute basic watch-standing principles, failure to properly use available navigation tools, failure to respond deliberately and effectively when in extremists of collision, a loss of situational awareness and high traffic density, failure to follow the international rules of the road, and for John S. McCain insufficient knowledge and proficiency of the ship's steering system. We are a Navy that learns from our mistakes. U.S. Fleet Forces Commander Admiral Phil Davidson recently concluded a comprehensive review which was informed further by other mishaps going back 10 years. The comprehensive review team was made up of 34 uniformed and civilian personnel, and their backgrounds ranged from specialists in navigation to officers and civilians with extensive experience in a float leadership, underway operations, institutional training, equipment and systems research, development, acquisition, and ship maintenance. It also included civilian experts and military members from other Navy warfare communities and from other services. Multiple members also had substantial experience in conducting investigations and audits. Several distinguished individuals, a four-star retired general and flag officers from the Army, the Marine Corps, a Naval Aviator and a Naval Submariner, as well as the President of the Maryland Harbor Pilots Association, and an academic from MIT who were on the team to advise Admiral Davidson. And the comprehensive review found that over a sustained period of time, rising pressure to meet operational demands led those in command to rationalize declining standards, standards in fundamental seamanship and watch standing skills, teamwork, operational safety, assessment and the professional culture. This resulted in a reduction of operational safety margins. Further, the demand for ready and certified ships to support operations exceeded the quantity that could be supplied. Lacking an effective process to clearly define available supply and associated readiness, steadily increasing risks were not understood or appropriately mitigated as these ships were routinely assigned to high priority short notice tasking. This practice became the norm and resulted in situations where individuals and teams could no longer recognize that the processes in place to identify, communicate and assess readiness and risk were no longer working on ships or at headquarters. To address this, we have taken some immediate actions. These actions include restoring a deliberative scheduling process in the Seventh Fleet, conducting comprehensive ready for sea assessments for all Japan-based ships, establishing the Naval Surface Group of Western Pacific, an independent body in Yokosuka, Japan that will keep their eye on readiness generation and standards for the Pacific Fleet commander. Using and using a near-miss program to understand and disseminate lessons learned and establishing policies for surface ships to routinely, actively transmit on their automatic identification system, a system that lets other ships in the area know what they're doing. We have other ongoing immediate actions focused on upgrading the training of navigation fundamentals, assessing operational demands against available resources, grading the baseline readiness of all Seventh Fleet cruisers and destroyers, optimizing the authority and accountability for readiness, implementing schedules that ensure everybody gets sufficient rest and baselining the force generation model for the Japan-based ships. We also have some midterm actions that are focused on developing the process to generate these sustainable ready forces starting with the Japan-based ships, reviewing the qualification standards, establishing comprehensive policies on managing fatigue, revising readiness assessment standards, aligning the operational requirements to available resources, and accelerating some of the electronic navigation system upgrades. We have additional longer-term actions. There's immediate actions, short-term and then mid-term and then long-term. Long-term actions include improving individual and team training skills with an emphasis on basic seamanship, navigation, and integrated bridge equipment, evaluating core officer and enlisted curricula with an emphasis on fundamentals, navigation skills. I got to say, though, that fundamental to all of this is how we prepare leaders for command, and we will deeply examine the way that we prepare officers for increasing leadership challenges, culminating in assumption of command with the capability and the confidence to form, train, and assess war-fighting teams on the bridge in the Combat Information Center in engineering and throughout their command. Our Navy, from the most junior sailor to the most senior commander, must value achieving and maintaining high operational and war-fighting standards of performance, and these standards must be embedded in our equipment, our individuals, our teams, and our fleets. And the Navy is absolutely committed to doing everything possible to prevent a tragic loss like this again. We should never allow an accident like this to take the lives of such magnificent young sailors and inflict such painful grief on their families, the Navy, and the nation. We must get this right, and we will. We own this, and we're moving out. Thank you for your time again, and I look forward to your questions. Admiral, would you say you can? Admiral, obviously this review was about the Seventh Fleet, but as you look across the Navy and its ships as a whole, don't some of these problems also exist perhaps in other AORs, and what are you doing to look at some of those and how do you replicate some of this across the other ships in your fleet, or is this just Seventh Fleet, and do you need more ships there? So to start, to get started, we had to contain the investigation, the scope of the investigation. And so we did concentrate on where we were seeing the problems, which is the cruiser and destroyers out in the Seventh Fleet. That's where we started, both with the incident investigations, obviously, and also with the comprehensive review. Now that we have that investigation complete, it's my intention, in fact, I just transmitted a message to all commanding officers, similar audience that I transmitted the operational pause message, for them to study this at all levels of command to figure out and determine where are they might be vulnerable to the findings in the comprehensive review and also to take a look at what of the recommended actions might apply to them. And I've asked them to put together a report to their superiors, and I'll see the consolidated results of that effort. Do you think it's likely that some of these problems exist in other areas? We have, the ultimate test for our effectiveness is combat operations. And as I pointed out, we have a four-deployed fleet, and over this year, in the not-too-distant past, and currently, right now, they are performing exquisitely in the highest degree of combat. And so we're going to go out with the sense that we want to look at everybody and find the vulnerabilities and plug them where they exist. Fibre? Well, you say that you and the Navy own the problem, and we understand, with all due respect to you, sir, at the pleasure of the President, you've described a series of ongoing, very comprehensive problems that underlie all of this. So the question is, why you, as CNO, why didn't you know about any of these problems? Because if you knew, you certainly would have fixed them. So how is it that you didn't know? And as Chief of Naval Operations, what response, while you've served at the pleasure, what responsibility as CNO do you bear on this with all due respect? Do you believe that you still have the confidence of the sailors and of Navy families? Should you remain as CNO? Arba, I think that there's no doubt, and I made clear from the very beginning, that as the CNO, I own this, and I won't dodge from that ownership. As we've studied similar catastrophes, incidents in the past, both in the Navy and outside the Navy, there is this slow degradation that happens. And what you end up is a process where you become a situation where deviancy becomes normalized. If you can't meet the, or you don't meet the standard, the absolute standards, you come up with a system of standards that you do meet. So we're aware of this, I do own it, we're taking firm corrective action, and we'll get this right. All due respect, I understand that, Admiral. The question, really professionally, is what responsibility is there in the sea with the Chief of Naval Operations for not knowing about all of these problems that led to the loss of so many lives. And again, I'm asking you how you feel about it. I feel responsible for this. And do you think you can remain with the confidence of the fleet of the sailors? I do. Admiral, thanks for your time on this. You mentioned sleep deprivation, you mentioned managing fatigue. Could you give a sense if sleep deprivation had anything to do with the two accidents, and then what are the Navy recommendations for sleep? Is it four hours? Is it five hours? So the fatigue did play a role in these incidents. And we've recently gone to, throughout the Navy now, the surface force recently made it mandatory to execute their at sea schedule with respect, paying respect to what we call a circadian rhythm, a 24-hour cycle, inside that cycle, getting six to eight hours within a 24-hour period. So that's how mandatory it is, six to eight hours at sea. You should be getting that type of sleep every 24-hour cycle. Hi, I'm Samuel Grun with the USNI News. When you read the comprehensive review, you see that there's institution of new organizations and institution of additional oversight. What wasn't readily apparent when you read it was, how do you say no to a combatant commander? Bob Work, former Deputy Secretary of Defense said earlier this week that the problem, particularly with the Navy, is a simple one. It's there are not enough ships to do the missions that are out there. So in 1999, there were 330-ish with 100 ships deployed. Now there's 276 with about 100 ships deployed. How do you tell those combatant commanders? And what responsibility do you all have to say no to them, and how do you do that? This is the responsibility and accountability that comes with command. It's fundamental in the nature of command that if you're not ready to execute the mission that you're assigned, you've got to make that clear. We have a number of examples, again, where that happens at every level of command. Admiral Davidson and I have those conversations. Admiral Swift and I have those conversations. That happens all the way down to unit-level commanders. When we fail to do that, we become vulnerable. We get assigned for missions for which we're not prepared. So we have to ensure that we create a climate. This is this idea of culture that's discussed in the Comprehensive Review that values these discussions and is open and listening to those commanders who are saying that I've been stretched to. You sort of talked about the culture. You can improve training. You can institute sleep cycles. Obviously, none of this would have been possible if there wasn't a culture of sort of ignoring some of the things that happened. How do you build a culture where people will start listening and sort of it takes decades for that to build out? How do you build that? I disagree that it takes decades. There are a number of examples where large organizations with forceful action can really get at this and turn very much more quickly than that. This is what it's going to take. A forceful effort by every level of command in the Navy. That's what we hope to catalyze through this Comprehensive Review and keeping our leaders in this discussion from the four-star level all the way down. Thank you. To get back to the culture question, you said that the high pace of operations led to a culture of accepting a lowered rate of readiness and lowered standards. Were you part of that culture? Did it get to a point where you felt pressure that you couldn't say no to something you needed to resource? I never felt those pressures. But were you part of that culture, sir? Well, I'm the chief of naval operations. And so just to Barbara's point, it's hard to escape that level of responsibility. We're all, everybody in the Navy is part of this, including leadership. I want to talk a little bit about training or a lack of training. It used to be in years past that an ensign would leave the service academy or ROTC, go up to Newport for surface warfare school, spend months, if not more than a year up there, learning how to drive a ship, going out on patrol craft, a lot of classroom time. In 2003, after decades, they changed that. They gave 21 CDs. They sent some of these ensigns out to ships and basically said, you'll learn how to do it on the job. That lasted for seven years. Admiral John Harvey, who ran the Atlantic Fleet, went to the Hill in 2010 and said, this was a mistake. This didn't work. So first of all, talk about the lack of training. And do you have dozens, if not scores of officers out there that simply don't know how to drive a ship because of that lack of training? And you talk about overextended, overstretch. You talk about sleep deprivation. You talk about rising pressure. But the report says that the commanding officer of one of these ships didn't know how to operate a console when there was a steering mishap. Now, he didn't know how to drive his ship. So what does that have to do with the sleep deprivation or being overstretched or rising pressure? This officer couldn't drive his ship. How do you explain that? No, you're exactly right. These are failures of command. And when you talk about training, just to your point, we've moved away from that system where we had a set of CDs and we did all that training on the job. We've reinstituted the basic division officer courses. We've reinstituted an advanced division officer course and have been making steady improvements to both the officer and enlisted training throughout. We've got more work to do here. The comprehensive review identifies several areas where we can do that. Then these ready for sea assessments are going around and doing that look, that grading to ensure that we get a solid look and an understanding of what the proficiency is at sea. And again, there are many, many examples of where our ships, their commanding officers, their crews are doing very well. But if it's not monitored on a continuous basis, these skills can atrophy very quickly. My question is, during that seven-year period where you had lax training, where you gave these people CDs, are you worried that there are too many officers out there in the fleet that simply don't know how to drive a ship? We're doing these ready for sea assessments to determine that exactly. I'm concerned enough that I support these ready for sea assessments. We're going to get a solid baseline of that readiness and proficiency. And what are the biggest mistakes your sailors made that led to these collisions? These were fundamental mistakes of ship driving. And so the basic responsibility to maintain situational awareness of the ships around you, to know the basics of the rules, of the nautical rules of the road, how to respond when you get into a crossing situation, the basics of understanding the ship control console was actually the operator who didn't know how to do it, not the commanding officer. Those are some pretty fundamental things. Do officers today have more training than the officers of 15 years ago aboard these ships? In some areas, yes. So they certainly have more training than they got when there was a box of compactus and on-the-job training. We have been re-instituting that training steadily. And in the comprehensive review, there is an appendix that lists exactly that journey that we've been on in training. And compared to 15 years ago, are you convinced that your officers aboard these ships have more training than 15 years ago? It's more than just about hours, right? It's about the quality of the training and overall, right? It's just that the hours is a false metric. And so this is exactly what the comprehensive review looked at. It identifies some areas we can beef that up, and we're moving out to do that. Patrick Tucker from Defense One, all the failures that you just described are very human failures. As you know, SPAWR is now looking at their testing, a unmanned ship that actually can follow rules of the world and has demonstrated great sort of safety potential. Did the committee that looked at this make any recommendations in terms of next-generation software, autonomy, things like that to reduce the cognitive load that's being placed on these human proven? We've done a lot of examination of that, sort of Navy-wide already, outside the scope of the comprehensive review. And so we'll continue that effort, independent of the comprehensive review. It's actually, it's making progress, and we're monitoring that closely. Hey, you didn't look at that in the context of this? You didn't look at that in the context of this? No, we're studying that outside the context of the review, sir. Well, you've used the word failure many times. You haven't used the word negligence. Was there negligence involved in either of these accidents? Yes. Well, by several people. I mean, we found that the commanding officers were at fault. The executive officers were at fault. There are some watch standards on the ships. And we've been pretty clear about identifying where there was fault and taking appropriate accountability actions up to and including the 7th Fleet Commander. And do you anticipate legal action against some of those guilty of negligence? I've assigned Admiral Frank Caldwell to be a consolidated disposition authority to take a comprehensive look at all of these and to make his recommendations with respect to any further action we may do. Admiral, you said that the vast majority of ships are operating safely and effectively. I mean, some of the findings here are pretty stunning. For example, the training continuum of surface warfare officers and candidates, quartermasters, and operation specialists, my humble rate, does not provide sufficient seamanship and navigational knowledge in advance of milestone assignments. So I mean, I guess the question is, how could you possibly know if the ships out there are operating training safely and effectively, especially since there doesn't seem to be, and the review finds, a good way of measuring the performance as these people go along in their careers. Right, right. A big conclusion of the comprehensive review is that we've got to beef up the assessment process across the board, both in individual and in team training and effectiveness, but in many cases, that assessment is going on right now. And so while we did focus on this area in the Seventh Fleet, there's assessments of readiness going on throughout the Navy, which give us a sense of that proficiency and that effectiveness. Admiral Becker. Yep. Hi, Eric. Hi, Eric, perfect. Just in reading through this and listening to it, it sounds like that the way this was going, these were accidents were almost kind of destined to happen to some ships out there. Would you say, as a fair statement, that this was an accident waiting to happen? Because the way things have been going all along? I would rephrase that. I would say that what happened was a gradual erosion of the margin to safety. And so when the system has that and you get this reduced margin to safety, you combine that with the stressful situation, then you're much more vulnerable. You're much more vulnerable to that. I'm going to go to Eric's. You've described a number of changes that are being put forth. But as you know, a few years ago in the Ballala Report, a lot of the same recommendations were put forward. There were also some of the same forms of recommendation that you've made now. Why is this iteration of problems that were first brought up years ago and going to be addressed this time? Why should people, the American public and the Navy community have confidence that in this iteration these problems are actually going to be addressed? And then the report goes on to describe a real fundamental problem in training, in leadership, in culture, and even the quality of the ships it talks about how there are some of the oldest ships in the fleet. In an AOR, where the US is dealing with a very real threat vis-a-vis North Korea, given that you've got a seventh fleet that hasn't mastered the fundamentals, what confidence should the American public have that seventh fleet can handle what is probably one of the highest risks from the US national security perspective? I'll tell you, these ships in the seventh fleet did not master the fundamentals. And we noticed some issues at headquarters that may have set them up for that. We're correcting that very quickly. But again, there are ships in the seventh fleet that are out there doing their job. Their ships are old since they've been built, but they're also been some of the most modernized ships as well. And so we have been consistently sending our most advanced capability out to the seventh fleet. Can I send a banal report, please? Admiral, thanks for your time. Dan Amal of Washington Post, wanted to ask you about transparency through all of this. Your report that you released yesterday kind of mentioned you trying to balance the legal concerns for the country along with trying to get information out about the McCain incident and the Fitzgerald incident. At the same time, the Navy is still withholding all documents requested through FOIA on the Lake Champlain collision. Can you explain that dichotomy and what will be happening there? I'll take a look into the request on the Lake Champlain incident. I wasn't familiar that that has been held up. There are legal concerns that have to be recognized and addressed. But it has been a pretty consistent thrust through this effort, including the release of the full comprehensive review, release of the descriptions of the Fitzgerald and McCain incidents to maintain that level of transparency. So I'll check on what we can release on the Lake Champlain. Thanks for a similar level of transparency with these other incidents. I'll tell you what, I will do that. The Lake Champlain will come up with a similar description of that incident that we put together for Fitzgerald and McCain. OK? Carly, bad voice of America, I just want to kind of follow up on Champlain. There are people that said more should have been done after the Champlain incident, after the Antietam incident in January that might could have prevented these two deadly incidents that occurred after. Why wasn't more done? Why wasn't an investigation or a more thorough investigation put in place before these happened? There were thorough investigations done of those two incidents. You just referred to them. And those incidents were shared on a more local level. This effort to instill this near-miss and lessons learned program will improve our ability to get those lessons out more broadly, more quickly, so we can prevent this in the future. Yeah? Yeah, hi, Admiral. James from Aviation Week, the nation spent billions of dollars on these ships to take out ballistic missiles. And over the past couple of years have intercepted no North Korean missiles during all that testing. Why haven't they done so? And with the fleet that you've got out there at the moment, could you do that if required by the president? The details of that capability are classified, as are the decisions that go into, so it's just inappropriate to discuss those sorts of things here. Yeah? Why wasn't the Lake Champlain CO relieved? Antietam runs aground in Tokyo Bay. That CO is relieved. Fitzgerald CO, Triad is relieved. McCain, Triad relieved. You guys won't not only release that report, but this guy changed command last month and you guys put out the Navy news press release. Each one of those cases is evaluated independently, consistent with this commitment. I'll get to that answer as well. Admiral? Yeah? The report said that the Japanese-based ships were adequately resourced with the exception of manning. And as much of this comprehensive review says that the issues were inherent impact fleet and seventh fleet, how much of that responsibility for manning, however, is a U.S.-based function, either from y'all's office at OPDAV or Fleet Forces. That manning component that you indicated in the comprehensive review that was under resourced, how much of that is a pack fleet, seventh fleet responsibility, how much of that is a U.S.-based response? I think that there's responsibility for everybody in that regard. In terms of how that manning is assigned and then allocated, we realized this on our own before the incidents happened. And the manning fluctuates throughout the fleet. And there's always an effort to make sure that we are ensuring that, first and foremost, our at sea and our deployed forces amongst them are manned with the highest priority that we're filling those at sea gaps. We made some adjustments recently to readdress what has been a slight degradation and manning levels out in the Pacific. We're already starting to see the return on those. But that was put in place before these happened. It's a constant balancing and optimization effort that we strive to achieve. We had some inside defense. Could you give us an update on the initial cost estimate for repair? SecNAP said in September it was going to be about $600 million. That's what you were asking Congress for. Yeah, that's about right. And the John S. McCain is still on their way to Yacosca. And we'll get a better estimate when she gets there. Well, can I follow up on something you said about the commanding officer? You said he was aware how to operate the ship control system. But the report says... No, I didn't say that. Go ahead. The report says no one on watch on the McCain, including the commanding officer, was properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console. Right, I just want to make clear it was the operator there that misoperated that. The commanding officer, it wasn't any help in that regard. But including the commanding officer, it says, did not know how to correctly operate the ship control console. Is that good enough? That is not good enough. But again, that gets back to lack of knowledge, lack of training, doesn't it? Not you're over, you're not getting enough sleep or you're stretching or extended. That gets to the basic knowledge of how to drive your ship, doesn't it? That gets to the, yeah, exactly. The training and qualification standards that were resident on that ship were not right. Admiral? Yeah. We're hearing the McCain investigation. It said that, I believe, three of the officers on the bridge were from another ship, were not appropriately equipped in trained to operate. This goes to the question about the ship control console. And so what had happened there? I was going, first of all, how that happened and if that happens on other ships, that this is a systemic problem. Right, so what had happened specifically is that a couple of the operators on the bridge at the time of the collision, particularly the helm, were actually crew members from Antietam who were temporarily assigned to the John S. McCain. Now when that happens, when you get a watch stand, this is not unusual, right? Ships and maintenance will, it's not uncommon for them to, if they need to get their sailors at sea experience or qualifications and training, they'll assign their sailors to a ship that's going to sea and get some underway time. When that happens though, the requisite training and qualification for the systems that are on that receiving command have got to be in place to ensure that before they operate the equipment, they're trained, qualified and certified to do so. Accounting for any differences in equipment configurations between the two commands specifically. And that was a gap on John S. McCain. They did not go to any kind of rigorous steps to ensure that those watch standers from Antietam were qualified on the equipment on the John S. McCain and that ended up contributing to the confusion that led to the collision. Is that gun-damping, Edward? I'll just say that there was no rigor to the re-qualification standard. Admiral, pretty much the culture issues we talked about before. You know, you're an 05, 06 mid-level officer. You know, are you really going to tell your ISIC that your ship is not good to go when that could realistically lead to a blemish on your fit rep and affect your career? It shouldn't lead to... I didn't mean to interrupt you, but I did that when you were at the 05, 06 level. Whatever command you were at, did you ever tell your immediate ISIC that your boat or unit was not good to go? Yeah, absolutely. The alternative is to go to see unprepared or unsafe. All right, so you've got to do that. And what's that? You know, we're in the high-stakes waters of seventh grade. I was in those high-stake waters. All right, so this is the culture issue where the can-do aspect of our Navy is something that we want to preserve. It's this bottom-up, effusive enthusiasm to get things done. People are going and getting tasks done. This is a positive in our Navy. When that turns around, it becomes the sense of sort of a must-do. I've got to go out at any cost. This is when it becomes toxic. This is the culture adjustment that we have to make where appropriate. We have to make it okay. We have to set the standards for going out and executing your missions. The commanding officers have to be absolutely blunt about whether they are meeting those standards or not. And if, for instance, a material failure or some kind of a training, a mistraining opportunity, you know, some adjustments have been made. And as I said, those conversations do happen. These are not things that never happen. It just wasn't happening regularly in the 7th Fleet. Are the cultures different between a submarine and a surface ship? There are, I would say, tribal differences. In our warfighting areas, submarineers' aviation, the special warfare, information warfare, you get the slightly different cultures for each of those different warfare specialties. And those things are healthy things. They contribute to overall naval power. When they start to, those differences lead to, I would say, you know, lack standards. This, that's completely inappropriate. Is the submarineer and a surface warfare officer as it goes to navigation? No. Sir, just to follow up on that point. If you're in the aviation and you're out of compliance with NATOPS procedures, you can say I'm out of compliance in NATOPS procedures if you're in a submarine and you're out of compliance with submap or whatever other operational conditions that you have. I can say I'm out of compliance in this rule. Right, we enable that conversation to happen. Where is that equivalency in the surface fleet? So there is some of that in the surface fleet and part of the recommendations and the comprehensive review are to reinforce that. So part of the review does talk about circadian rhythms and sleep and what I'm wondering is, are you looking to integrate the same kind of crew rest policies that the aviation community has into the surface warfare community? No, the fundamentals of it, the principles of it, yes. How they specifically execute it, each of the missions will give rise to differences in execution. But the fundamentals of making sure that before you go and you operate on watch or you operate equipment, you are sufficiently rested, those will be instilled. Admiral, do you need more ships in the 7th Fleet? Does this suggest to you that perhaps under man but also maybe you need additional various types of ships there? Absolutely, a part of this highlighted that there's a mismatch between the sustainable level of naval power that we can generate with the current assigned forces in the 7th Fleet and the mission set, the growing mission set that is emerging out there. And so if we are going to define that sustainable level of force generation at appropriate training and readiness standards, and there's a gap between that level of forces and what the missions that are out there that gap can really only be met by additional naval forces, more ships. We'll see what that, I mean, it's a dynamic number, right? Because the missions keep changing. What we are developing right now is, hey, with the currently assigned force, given maintenance and training and a certification requirements, what is that sustainable level of force generation? I don't know if I'm wrong on that because another alternative is to say no to Sam's point that if the ships aren't there, the way to fill the gap is not just more ships but to say no, that there's only so much we can do. And you were talking earlier about how you had said no in your career. Why are we not hearing about an announcement of some sort about reducing the demand given that you have such problems at a fundamental level, and you're trying to encourage a culture of saying we're not ready? The demand is defined by the security environment, right? And our ability to respond to that demand is defined by, throughout the joint force, not just the Navy, the quantity of ready forces to meet the demands of the security environment. When you have a gap between those two, that's risk, right? And so it's all part of that day-to-day assessment. Every commander has to wake up each day at their command level and say, what has changed in my security environment? What is my new risk posture and how am I going to accommodate or mitigate that risk? And at some point, it may get to the point where I can't. And at that point, you've got to say no, okay? At the beginning of the briefing, at the beginning of the briefing, you were mentioning about the size of the U.S. Navy and just the number of ships in general. But are these two incidents any kind of proof or indication that the U.S. fleet may have become too large to effectively manage or supervise? No. No, we've got command structures in place that allow that to proper oversight and command to exist. So it's not a question of being too large to command. Okay. Thank you all very much. All right.