 Ond ydych chi'n gwybod, mae hynny'n bywch chi'n fawr eich oedol. Mae yna'r ddweudgo cyflogau 1 o un o'r un o'r Union Unid Genedlaeth Blynedig, ac rwy'n un o'r un o'r Llyfrgell yma'r Union Unid, o'r Ffranco-Germyn cwestiynau. ac yn y bwysig o'r renegosiad y Llywodraeth Llywodraeth. Rwy'n gweithio ar gyfer Dr Clare de Mesime o'r Ffranco-German Ysgrifennu ar y Degar P, yr Ysgrifennu Ysgrifennu Ysgrifennu, ac Dr Christine Putz oedd yr Ysgrifennu Ysgrifennu o'r union o'r Ysgrifennu Hainrych Berl. Rwy'n gweithio ar gyfer Dr Clare de Mesime o'r Ffranco-German Ysgrifennu ac yn drwy'n gyflwytu. Rwy'n gweithio ar gyfer Dr Clare de Mesime o'r union o'r Ffranco-German Ysgrifennu ac yn y bwysig o'r Ffranco-German Ysgrifennu, fyddwn i'r Llywodraeth. Mae'n fuddion o'i wneud at eich unig o'r gweithio yn ddechrau i'r Wyrdd Cymraeg Tyw Llywodraeth. Oh, right, okay. It was the trouble with the passport control. We are very glad to be with you today and to exchange with you on this topic. You know, today, yesterday, we have a European summit, so it's a big event. We are too, so believe it or not, our presentation is divided into two parts. First of all, Cristina will present the German and the French expectations regarding the future of Europe and the differences between both logics. After that, I'll go on to the consequences on this for the European integration in the next future. But before we start, I'd like to emphasise the paradox of the Franco-Germ cooperation in the current context. On the one hand, the Franco-Germ machine has been running at top speed since the formation of a new government in Berlin in spring 2018. There are lots of high-level meetings and many political resources are mobilised to achieve compromises on several European topics. In addition to that, and you said it, France and Germany want to finalise a new bilateral treaty, Traité de l'Élysée in French, in order to boost their cooperation. The last one, or the first and last one, was signed in 1963. Yet on the other hand, it's the paradox, agreements are sparse and they remain far from Macron's European ambitions. It's not just disappointing because the window of opportunity for new initiatives is now closing as the European elections approach. This paradox makes it difficult to understand the state of the relationship, to measure its quality. But before we talk about the outcomes, the compromises, we will speak about the differences. So, Christina, the floor. Thank you Claire for the introduction and thank you for the invitation. I would like to put forward the following questions. Why are agreements between Germany and France so difficult to achieve nowadays? And what are the underlying discrepancies? First of all, I want to question that agreements between France and Germany are more difficult to achieve nowadays than earlier. It's true that important reforms and integration steps in the past have been initiated by the Franco-German leader doing, leading dole, but they have ever been compromises and in most times largely negotiated. So Franco-German partnership has never been free of discrepancies. What I want to demonstrate is that the different priorities of today are shaped by underlying long-term motives in European politics of France and Germany. The discrepancies can be traced back to life motives of the European integration process at the very beginning. For France, there is a great need for symmetry whereas the most important German motive is the need for stability. Let me explain. For France, the main goal of European unification after the end of the Second World War was to satisfy its vital security need. The Schumann Plan of 1950, it's the basis of the European integration, is a classic and praise strategy. It aims to control the German Federal Republic, the new born Germany, Western Germany through its integration. Until today, French politics is still focused on controlling the German neighbor and maintaining a symmetry to him or to be more realistic not to let the gap become too large. The underlying motive is the fear of German dominance. Accordingly, French looked very closely to the German neighbor. Whenever Germany took steps that threatened French desire for symmetry, alarm beds were ringing in Paris and French reflexes were triggered. Control Germany by integration. In this sense, it's not surprising that French European politics is characterized by many initiatives in order to integrate the neighbor in common structures. France has repeatedly made proposals for economic and foreign policy integration. Also, the economic and monetary union adopted in 1992 was the French price for German unification. So, France strategy hasn't changed since. France is still the driving force for new integration steps. Regarding the proposition of Emmanuel Macron from this perspective can help to understand them better. What's about Germany? Whereas French European policies highly focus on Germany and driven by the desire for symmetry, Germany's need is economic stability. This need is also an expression of the German inflation trauma. I remember the hyperinflation in the 1920s and the current seary form of 1948 and translated into claims for budgetary discipline and strong rules. Saving money in Germany has become a moral virtue. So, Germany is seen for many partners as a disciplinarian. Since post for Germany was not allowed to have an own sovereign foreign and defence policy, Germans focused ambition on economy. After the German economic miracle in the 1950s, Germans saw themselves at the same time as a political dwarf and as an economic giant in Europe. Closely linked to this duality is the self-perception of being the paymaster of Europe. This paymaster thesis is often used as a complaint about too little political influence on European partners. In the political debates in Germany, the paymaster thesis is rejected by the argument that Germany profits in many ways of the European Union and that profits and costs are very well balanced. But the more powerful sceptical forces are in the German political debate as it is nowadays with the right-wing party AfD, the more likely is the paymaster role of Germany in the European decision-making processes. Regarding Germans' reactions on Macron's proposition from this perspective can also help to understand them better. How to explain the different priorities in dealing with the actual crisis? I would like to focus on three major discrepancies and look at the patterns of perception behind them. The first pattern of perception is pragmatic versus visionary. Traditionally, French leaders are seen by Germans as utopianists proposing large plans for European future to their partners. When Macron, as new French president, made propositions for further integration steps like a budget for the Eurozone or a common defence doctrine, German leaders react as so often with caution or even with subsistion. On the French side, such caution is generally seen as immobility and even as bad will. On the German side, such propositions often are seen as unclear, unrealistic and overall as expensive at the expense of the German budget. You can see behind these discrepancies at the one hand the aim to integrate Germany in common decision-making processes. And on the other hand, the fear of being abused as paymaster. Second pattern of perception, cohesion versus integration. Macron's priority is to make Europe stronger and more effective by further integration steps. A Europe of different speeds is seen as a good way to achieve further integration. Moreover, being reticent to French proposition, Germany put forward cohesion in the European Union as first priority. While France is concerned to move forward as far as possible, Germany is looking for smaller steps so that as many members as possible could be involved. Behind you can see the need for symmetry in the French case and the dissentiation from the Germans. Third pattern of perceptions, control versus solidarity. From the German perspective, more integration should provide the European Commission with more control over member states. Whereas from the French perspective, more integration means more solidarity and more common investments. The idea of a finance minister for the Eurozone demonstrates the two perspectives very well. According to the French logic, such a minister should be responsible for a common budget. This budget should enable the member states to make common investments and above all to help each other in case of financial problems. According to the German logic, a finance minister should control the economic and budgetary policy of the member states and call them to order if they do not comply with the European common rules. Common money should not be provided unconditionally by a budget for the Eurozone but by a European monetary fund which would impose reforms or even restructuring programmes in return for financial help. It is very clear all three patterns of perception combine the respective underlying basic motives of France and Germany. France has a certain nostalgia for the good oil core Europe which allowed France to stay geographically and politically in the centre of Europe and to be more in balance with Germany than in the euro of today. Germany searches its way how to fulfil the new role as central power within the European Union which has to guarantee cohesion. In this setting, partnership with France is an important but not the only component. To summarise, France and Germany have a clear continuity in their European policy. There is a high degree of past dependency in the priorities which are shaped by the basic motives. The understanding of these underlying motives leads not automatically to concrete common politics but help to a better understanding of the negotiation settings. How to know what is negotiable and what is not negotiable and where are the red lines. So this kind of empathy and understanding could be the first step to find solutions and compromises. Germany has the historical responsibility to recognise French vital security needs and has to be open for new integration steps. France, on the other hand, should comply with German claims for economic stability and binding rules. Okay, with this knowledge and understanding, what should be the priorities of German-French partnership? That's what we will hear now from my colleague Claire, please. Thanks, Christina. Yes, I would like to come back to three important topics for the European Union and its future. The results reform, of course, migration and asylum, and defence and security. For the three topics, I will present the compromises made by Macron and Merkel during their meeting in Meyserberg last June. And I would put them in the European context, referring to the intra-European blockages. So let's start with the Eurozone reform. I don't have to tell you that Macron has a very ambitious project for the Eurozone, which is to create a Eurozone budget managed by Minister of Finance. You said it himself, monitored by Eurozone Parliament. And of course, such an idea is far from being commonly approved in Germany, and Christina talked about the reasons. And yet, in June, in Meyserberg, Germany, the two governments have not only agreed on a reform of the banking union, they also announced in Meyserberg that they want to create a budget for the Eurozone. So it was quite surprising when you consider Germany's traditional reluctance on this issue. And at first sight, I must say, the compromise could be, or this announce could be interpreted as a concession from Germany to France. But in fact, this compromise remains very vague since neither the amount nor the functioning of this budget has been specified. For Paris, it must be permanent and significant between 1 and 2% of the GDP in order to help states in difficulty and to finance common investments. If such a Eurozone budget ever comes out, I don't know if it will be the case, but if the German government will make sure that it is not a blank check and will insist that funds be aimed at specific and important, temporary limited projects, like infrastructures or digitalization. So you see, we have a kind of empty compromise, which means everything and it's opposite. What about the European context? In other parts of Europe, you know it, I think there is strong opposition to the project. Firstly, in several EU member states in Northern Europe, the so-called Hanseatic Leica and Ireland is part of it and the Netherlands has become the spokesperson, the unofficial spokesperson. And the argument of these countries is that the reinforcement of the Eurozone can only pass through the respect of the budgetary rules. Just please no more money transfers. In addition to that, there are a second opposition in Poland and in other central European countries, which fear that such a budget will entail a reduction of the European budget, from which they profit, of course. And that states that don't belong to the Eurozone, like Poland, will be sidelined from important EU decisions. Berlin, of course, is sensitive to this opposition and that's why it has accepted such a budget on condition that modalities are defined with the other member states of the Eurozone and of the EU. And since half of them are opposed to it, it's not likely to succeed. Let's go on to the second topic, migration and asylum policy, which is probably the field in which France and Germany are the closest, at least currently. Well, of course, Germany's decision to suspend the Dublin regulation in August 2015, followed by the arrival of more than one million refugees in the country, put the cooperation with France to a serious test, and not only with France. In this period, the two countries, France and Germany, had radically different interests and could therefore hardly reach an agreement. But from Eurozone 2015 onwards, controlling migration movements has become their common goal again. What has contributed to this change is, well, the threat of the AFD, the new far-right political party, the pressure of the CSU or CSU. I don't know how do you... CSU, yeah. CSU, okay. The question social union within the governmental majority and the dissatisfaction of a part of the population. From this moment on, both France and Germany have insisted on protecting the EU's external borders and on strengthening the operational capacities of front-ex, and they had a certain success in doing so. But with regard to the quotas for the distribution of refugees, Franco-German cooperation has had no impact. The idea was taken up by the European Commission, okay, but the four states of the Visegrad group are vehemently opposed to it. And in fact, the divide in the EU on this issue is so deep that Franco-German cooperation is not able to overcome it. In other words, is not able to play its role as a driving force in the EU. At the same time, both countries are seeking for middle- and long-term solutions for the whole EU. And as they announced in Mesaberg in June, they want to establish a European asylum system with a common asylum authority. The idea sounds interesting, sounds ambitious, but it would imply to have a distribution of refugees within the EU, which the states of Visegrad reject. So once again, it will be very difficult to achieve a successful outcome on this topic. Third and last issue, defence and security. Well, you know it, it's not new. In this field, France and Germany don't share the same vision, but they are willing to cooperate, or at least to better cooperate. The reason for this is of course international instability and the uncertainties about the transatlantic partnerships in Trump's election. In a European Union after Brexit, France is to be deprived of a major partner in security issues. And at the same time, there is a new discourse in Berlin. You certainly, or you maybe, you may remember the Beattent speech of Merkel last year. She said that Europeans must now take their destiny into their own hands. And France is the partner best equipped to cooperate with Germany on these issues. Not only because it claims traditional leadership on diplomacy and security issues, but also because the two states have a long history of cooperation on these matters. For example, on the peace process in Ukraine or in the Iran nuclear deal. So much for the good news. You certainly want to know the bad news. The bad news Paris and Berlin don't have the same priorities. From a French perspective, the key issue is remains terrorism. So France mainly looks south to Africa and to the Middle East. Germany in turn tends to look east. In addition from these geographical priorities also derive different preferences for defence policy. While defence in the south for France is about crisis management, a potential Russian threat requires measures to strengthen collective territorial defence for Germany. Last point about priorities, France put defence traditionally in an EU framework, l'Europe de la défense for French speaking people here, while Germany primarily bets on NATO. And these different priorities make operational cooperation between France and Germany difficult. Very difficult. The best example for that remains the discussion about PESCO, the so-called Permanent Structured Corporation, which was activated in the wake of Brexit. Both countries played a decisive role in it, but with different ambitions. France wanted to use PESCO in order to make the EU a more effective security actor, with a clear focus on operations. Berlin in turn insisted on the necessity of an inclusive PESCO. Inclusion is very important for the thinking of Europe in Germany. Germany wanted PESCO to have as many EU members participating as possible. In addition to that, Germany put priority on capabilities instead of on operations like France. In the end, the French are frustrated and have launched a new initiative called European Intervention Initiative, in order to develop closer defence cooperation outside the European Union. As a result, European defence is nowadays lacking ambitious Franco-Germ leadership, and without it it will be impossible to get things moving in this field. To conclude, what is the state of the Franco-Germ relationship? First, there is a significant gap between the discourse on friendship, for example with the preparation of a new Elysée Treaty on the one hand, and the outcomes of the bilateral cooperation on the other hand. This gap creates frustration in France but also in Germany, and this gap puts Macron in difficulty because he promised a lot about and for Europe. In my opinion, the search for harmony is a trap for the Franco-German cooperation because it doesn't make it possible to find real compromises. Therefore, I think both countries must stop fleeing conflicts and return to a mode of what I call productive antagonism, so to build real compromises. And to do this, they must accept their differences. Secondly, I hope I'm not too long. Secondly, the European context has changed of course. Even France and Germany make compromises. They are no longer able to convince their partners. Not only because the EU has become bigger and more complex, that's clear, but also because there are several dividing lines within the EU itself. Visegrat, et cetera, or the Hanseatech League. These developments have effects on the Franco-German tandem's capacity to generate consensus and even more on its ability to be a motor for European integration. In this context, France and Germany must rethink the way they include their European partners in order to fulfil their primary function to reach compromises. Thirdly, with the campaign to the European elections next year, while the campaign has begun or will soon begin, in this context, Franco-German cooperation will be even more complicated. Emmanuel Macron is seeking to form a progressive alliance that will compete with the Conservative parties and therefore with Merkel's Conservative CDU. In other words, until the elections, Macron and Merkel will be partners and competitors. The window of opportunity for Franco-German initiatives in Europe is now closing. I guess the elections won't just be a little break. After that, it will take time to find a new momentum. I hope I'm not too pessimistic and of course I'm glad. We are glad to know your opinion, to know your view about the Franco-German cooperation. Just to clarify things, I'm still hopeful.