 Mae'n ei ffordd o gwbl cerdd. Foddلاu bod Inaethau'r hyn o'r eu chymgell yn gweld i'riliau dull yn gweld i'r hynny, ac mae'n gweld i ni bwynt ar y teimlad gwaith a'n mynd i fi'n meddwl a'n mynd i'ch mynd i'ch mynd i'ch hefyd. Fydden nhw'n hyn yn gweld i reallu ffyrdd o cyfrifredigol am gyfer y trefyn. Mae'n ffyrdd o ffrindig un mwylau gweithio cyfrifredigol. ph machen dda chi'n gwneud o'r ei ddechrau, That wider affordability crisis is generating. Just a skip back one, on this line, this is the historic line, showing the way that earnings and private rents up until about 2007 are actually telling to keep pretty close track of each other. Dare I say it, you can even say this is a market working because people's ability to pay is actually more or less tracking what they're being asked to pay. Unfortunately, that doesn't no longer work either. Mae'r prysgio masyf o'r sector cryfwyr o'r iawn arddangos cair. Bydd ymwneud yn cael cyfle a'r gwneud am arddangos, mae'r rhan o'r rhan o'r rhan o'r rhwng arniadau. Rydyn ni wedi bod yn ei ddi-byniad o'r llwytoedd a'r parysgol o'r rhwyng. 55% o gwaith o'r llwyddeithasol a'r plwyddau llwyddeithasol a'r llwyddeithasol yn y llwyddeithasol yn ddeunio i'r dreifio ar hyn o'r 35% o gwybod. A'r ffordd yw'r gweithio'r llwyddeithasol yn y llwyddeithasol yn y llwyddeithasol, fel y rhai oedd yn Llywodraeth, ac ydych chi'n ddweud o'r llwyddeithasol yn dda o'r 50% o'r llwyddeithasol. Ac, rwy'n meddwl, oedd yn gyflawni i'r rhan o'r rhain o'r cyflawni'n addysg ymlaen i'r cyflawni, oherwydd mae'r bwrdd yn dda'r cyflawni ac mae'r ddweud o'r ffordd o fewn i gael, efallai oherwydd o'r cyflawni o'r adeiladau, oherwydd mae'n falch yn dda'r cyflawni i'r adeiladau o'r cyflawni i'r ddweud i'r holl yn ei wneud, ac mae'n ddefnyddio un o'r gofyn o'r roedd i'r ddiweddolio. in the long run what this means is a catastrophic collapse in home ownership and a meteoric rise in the private rented sector. This is a projection so treat with caution but on current trends this is where we are headed in terms of the main tenures. The thick blue line is home ownership for those under 30 years old, fairly precipitous decline ..a rhoi ddaeth yn gyfyrdd fath. Enw i'r genesio'r genesio, y gwerth gŵr hefyd yn cael ei ddweud y gwerth gŵr-dweud.. ..y'r gŵr hefyd yn gallu rhoi'r hefyd yn cael ei ddweud. Cymreifio'n rwy'n cael eu gallu llwyntau iawn yn ddweud... ..y'r gwaith o hetau a'r gŵr hefyd yn iawn y ddechrau.. ..y'r gŵr hefyd yn gallu eu ddweud ar y ddweud y gŵr hefyd yn cael eu ddweud. ar y cyfnod o'r 45 ymlaen. Yn ymwneud y byd yma yma yma, y cyfnod o'r awrfyn yma yma, mae'n gweithio gael ymlaen o bobl 10 ymlaen. Cymru yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma yma. Felly, mae'n gweithio'r ymlaen sy'n cyfnod o'r 10 ymlaen yn y gallu. Mae yw'r cwmwynt yw'r ymlaen. Mae hynny'n cael ei wneud o'r hynod o'r thymlu. Because it actually gets into some fairly complicated distributional effects, all those people who are renting privately are effectively paying off the mortgages of people who already own homes. So that dynamic is meaning that over time more and more money is being taken from those who are working or in other words garing in income to channel into the mortgage repayments for a much smaller minority people who increasingly own all of the property. Mae mae eisteddam o'ch cy efficiently, which is rather fallen out of fashion, but we used to call it feudalism. On under feudalism, access to landed property was only accessible through inheritance. That is actually pretty much the way we are going now. What little analysis been done this, and unfortunately it is not enough, demonstrates that the few people who are able to access a mortgage, buy their very first home, first time buyers, half of them turn out not really to be first time buyers at all. Or getting up to half of them now. The people who owned a property once before have returned from abroad. The other half are increasingly people who are helped out by the Bank of Mum and Dad. In other words, inheritances once again become in the only way in which you can actually access property ownership. So that's a quick look at the tani accidents. Ieithaf, mae'r wych yn mynd i ddim yn bod yn ymdweud i'w sesio. Mae'r ffobl sydd yn bwysig, yn bwysig. Mae'r pwysig yn bwysig. Mae'r pwysig yn ymdweud, mae'n ymdweud. Mae'n eich ei ddod, mae'n rhaid i'r wefwyr yma, hon yw'r piwster cyrraff.com. Mae'r pwysig yn ymdweud â'r bwysig. Yr hyn oed, mae'n meddwl chi'n meddwl ei ddweud o'r historya llwyddiad. Mae'n gwybod i'r argynnu newydd ac mae'n gwybod i'r llwyddoch chi'n gweithio, ac mae'n cael ei ddweud o'r gwahan a'r gweithio'r celf gyrdd. Mae'n meddwl â'r busau yn ymddangos o'r prysau, ac mae'n gweithio'r cyfrifwyr a'r gwahan a'r gweithio'r gweithio. Mae'n gobein, mae'n gobein a'r gweithio'r gweithio, mae'n gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio'r gweithio, a'r rhai o'r Ion Llywodraeth yn siarad. Is there a problem with house price booms? I mean, not if you read the Daily Mail, right? Rising house prices are surely an unalloyed good for everybody, because obviously everyone's a mortgage homeowner, apart from some riffraff that we don't care about, and surely all these people benefit from having their asset values going up so dramatically. And of course, it's pretty good for quite a lot of people. The majority of households are homeowners, right, in some form or other. Still, it's declining, but we're still at about two-thirds. So, in that case, in that sense, surely rising house prices are a good thing. Well, no, they're not. Firstly, rising house prices inevitably mean high debts. Very few of those people are able to buy those homes just with money they haven't had lying around. I mean, not many people have the quarter of a million pounds you need to buy home just in their back pocket, which means they're borrowing it. So, again, I'm sure I don't need to tell this room. We have a mounting debt crisis driven very largely by mortgage debts. We've talked about the affordability crisis and how effectively this is pricing out a whole generation of people. I talked a little bit about how private renting is effectively channeling wealth from those who are younger and earning to those who are asset rich but effectively sitting on assets. This is also true of the house price gain. Whenever there is a house price boom, effectively what that is doing is channeling money from those who are younger and poorer and working into the pockets of those who are effectively asset rich and sitting on a valuable asset. This is simply because house price growth is a zero-sum game. It's not like the productive economy where, if my business grows, that doesn't mean somebody else has to go out of business. GDP can grow. If I manage to employ 10 more people, that doesn't mean somewhere else 10 more people have to lose a job. There is real growth, that's a positive sum game. House prices are not like that because ultimately houses don't generate anything. They are actually rotting assets. They get worse over time. They require money to keep them up. They don't produce anything at all. So when house prices go up, that just means money has to come from somewhere else in the system to feed that inflation. Where does it come from? Well, it comes from other people who are trying to buy into the system and it comes crucially from debt. What that means is that effectively we are redistributing money very effectively through the housing system away from the poor towards the rich, away from the young towards the old and actually geographically as well away from poorer parts of the country to richer parts of the country. I also think this has a really pernicious effect on culture. You don't have to look at crap tele programmes. It's just how kind of damaging this house price obsessiveness is to our culture. But most importantly I think it actually generates this sense of un-earned wealth. Most people who have done well out of the housing boom have actually earned more by doing absolutely nothing and sitting on their assets than they have from actually going out to work. The last point I think is one that's made very rarely, but it should be stressed. We misallocate capital to a colossal extent in our economy. We're constantly bemoaning the fact that there's nothing to put into productive business. So why is it that the German engineering sector is so much stronger than ours? It's what? They put their money into companies that actually generate stuff and employ people rather than shoveling all of their available credit and capital into debt. What this means effectively is that not only do we over-invest in, under-invest in productive sectors, it actually means we have higher unemployment. Again there's lots of techy stuff behind this but it's been demonstrated through international studies that increasing home ownership and increasing dependence on house price wealth actually increases unemployment by two percentage points in comparison to other countries. Finally, it actually has very damaging impacts on supply. I won't go into this in any detail, but take my word for it. There's a complete perversity in the housing market that rising prices effectively mean you can't build any more homes. It's not like most markets where rising prices actually act as a signal to people to build more, they don't. Effectively, rising prices act as a block on anyone building more homes is the way that the land market operates, but you'll be glad to know I won't inflict that upon you. What are the solutions? Firstly, we do need to build more homes. Nothing I've said here should make you think we don't. We absolutely need more homes, but not because that will bring down prices because it won't. We need to build more homes because we haven't got enough. No, we're near enough. We're building less than half of what we need every year. Well, there's a lot of crap at the moment about the planning system being the problem, as though the reason housing development fell off a cliff three years ago was because the planning system had suddenly seized up. It's not. There's perfectly good reasons for a strong planning system. In fact, I'd argue you need a stronger one. The real question is actually on the demand side. It's not about supply. The reason the house prices go up so much is all about demand. This is Kate Barker who was commissioned by the last government to do this major study into all this, and she looked at the housing system in great detail and had enormous support, which is very comprehensive. She had all of half a side on the demand side of the equation. She identified four things. One, a cultural preference for home ownership. Again, I think you've probably relabeled that as a screaming obsession, but she also identified a more responsive and competitive lending market, which, again, I think is a bit euphemistic for the way that our mortgage lending industry has behaved over the last 20 years. The knowledge that housing is a good investment, this is effectively the speculative cycle kicking in here. People are prepared to invest in housing because they expect it to go up in the future. Therefore, more people are investing in it, therefore it does go up in the future, and thus the spiral starts. Finally, and most importantly for me, we've actually massively subsidized home ownership and have done it for many years since the 1960s. Successive governments have taken the choices to remove taxation on house price wealth because we used to tax it, we don't anymore, and actually start subsidizing it through mortgage interest relief first and then various forms of subsidized owner occupation at the moment, which I won't go through in any detail because I'm running out of time, but, again, take my word for it, successive governments for 40 years have made the policy choice that we will subsidize home ownership above all else, and that's still reflected now. This graph is from a shelter study that actually shows the effects of housing taxation, tax breaks rather, because the blue lines, the subsidies that go into social housing, which are the pink lines, and the housing benefit that goes to those in the private rented sector by income group. What this effectively shows you is that we subsidize people at the bottom end of the income scale in there through the housing system quite a lot because they're poor and they need housing benefit and social housing, but we also subsidize people at the top an awful lot by giving them fat tax breaks on their unearned wealth. Those in the middle, most people, get pretty badly squeezed in this system. So if you wonder why we have a polarized housing market in this country, it's this. We've made the policy choices. These are all political choices that we choose to put all the money there and there, not in the middle. Well, that's what you get. So just to end up, going back to this classic graph, there's a reason this starts in 1975, and there's a reason why all of these graphs always start in about 1975. It's because before then, there weren't house price booms and busts. They just didn't exist. Houses tended to go up. House prices tended to go up pretty steadily in line with inflation, in line with earnings. It was a pretty boring industry. It didn't do much. It started about then for two simple reasons. Firstly, the tax stuff that I mentioned, it was during the 60s that we removed all the taxation on housing wealth and started subsidizing it. And secondly, because in the early 70s, the banking industry was deregulated, and vast amounts of mortgage credit started to flood into the housing system. So, again, these are policy choices. We have this kind of rather sick sense that it's inevitable that the housing system is just like that. It'll always be like that. It's not like this elsewhere. Every single one of these booms and busts has been driven by a very conscious and deliberate set of policy choices that we as a country really need to face up to if we're ever actually going to get to the bottom of these simple problems in our housing market. Thank you.