 Question 57 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal Virtues, The Virtue of Justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 57 of Right in four articles. After considering prudence, we must in due sequence consider justice. The consideration of which will be fourfold. One of justice. Two of its parts. Three of the corresponding gift. Four of the precepts relating to justice. Four points will have to be considered about justice. First, right. Second, justice itself. Third, injustice. Fourth, judgment. Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry. First, whether right is the object of justice. Second, whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right. Third, whether the right of nations is the same as natural right. Fourth, whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species. First article. Whether right is the object of justice. Objection one. It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the jurist, Chelsus says in the digest. That right is the art of goodness and equality. Now, art is not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore, right is not the object of justice. Objection two. Further, law, according to Isidor in the etymologies 5.3, is a kind of right. Now, law is the object not of justice, but of prudence. Wherefore, the philosopher in Ethics 6.8 reckons, legislative, as one of the parts of prudence. Therefore, right is not the object of justice. Objection three. Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God. For Augustine says in On the Morals of the Catholic Church and On the Morals of the Manichaeans 15. that justice is love serving God alone, and consequently governing a right all things subject to man. Now, right, use, does not pertain to divine things, but only to human affairs. For Isidor says in his etymologies 5.2, that thus is the divine law, and use the human law. Therefore, right is not the object of justice. On the contrary, Isidor says in his etymologies 5.2, that use, right, is so called because it is just. Now, the just is the object of justice, for the philosopher declares in Ethics 5.1 that all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions. I answer that it is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies. Indeed, we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand, the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself. Accordingly, that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right, in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality. For instance, the payment of the wage do for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just as having the rectitude of justice when it is the term of an act of justice without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent. Whereas in the other virtues, nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason, justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as right. Hence, it is evident that right is the object of justice. Reply to Objection 1. It is usual for words to be distorted from their original significance, so as to mean something else. Thus the word medicine was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like manner, the word use, right, was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where justice is administered. Thus a man is said to appear in yore, translators note, in English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc. And yet further we say that even a man who has the office of exercising justice administers the use, even if his sentence be unjust. Reply to Objection 2. Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsmen, an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so to there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be expressed in writing, it is called a law, which according to Isidor, in his Etymologies 5.1 is a written decree, and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right. Reply to Objection 3. Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make him a perfectly just repayment. For this reason, the divine law is not properly called use, but fast. Because to it, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless, justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can by subjecting his mind to him entirely. Second article. Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right. Objection 1. It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is unchangeable and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore, there is no such thing as natural right. Objection 2. Further, a thing is called positive when it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just simply because it proceeds from the human will. Else a man's will could not be unjust. Since then the just and the right are the same, it seems that there is no positive right. Objection 3. Further, divine right is not natural right since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right since it is based not on human but on divine authority. Therefore, right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive. On the contrary, the philosopher says in Ethics 5.7 that political justice is partly natural and partly legal, that is, established by law. I answer that, as stated above in Article 1, the right, or the just, is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways. First, by its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value in return, and this is called natural right. In another way, a thing is adjusted or commenced to rate it to another person by agreement or by common consent when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways. First, by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals. Secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another person. Or when this is decreed by the prince who is placed in the people and acts in its stead. And this is called positive right. Reply to Objection 1. That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable must needs be such always and everywhere. But man's nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus, the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural equality. And if human nature were always right, this would always have to be observed. But since it happens sometimes that a man's will is unrighteous, there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited, as when a madman or an enemy of the common will demands the return of his weapons. Reply to Objection 2. The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not of itself contrary to natural justice. And it is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the philosopher says in Ethics 5.7 that in the case of the legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or another. It only matters when once it is laid down. If, however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it just. For instance, by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written in Isaiah 10.1, woe to them that make wicked laws. Reply to Objection 3. The divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice is hidden to man. And partly are made just by God's decree. Hence also divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as human right is. For the divine law commands certain things because they are good, and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden. 3rd Article Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right. Objection 1. It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree, save in that which is natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations. Since the jurist Ulpian in his digest says, the right of nations is that which is in use among all nations. Therefore the right of nations is the natural right. Objection 2. Further, slavery among men is natural. For some are naturally slaves according to the philosopher in Politics 1.2. Now slavery belongs to the right of nations as Isidore states in his etymologies 5.4. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. Objection 3. Further, right, as stated above in Article 2, is divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right since all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right. On the contrary Isidore says in his etymologies 5.4 that right is either natural or civil or right of nations. And consequently the right of nations is distinct from natural right. I answer that as stated above in Article 2. The natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two ways. First according as it is considered absolutely. Thus a male by his very nature is commensurate with the female to be get offspring by her. And a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally commensurate with another person. Not according as it is considered absolutely. But according to something resultant from it. For instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely it contains no reason why it should belong to one man more than to another. But if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation and the un molested use of the land it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man as the philosopher shows in Politics 2.2. Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a thing absolutely. Wherefore the right which we call natural is common to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense as the jurist says because the latter is common to all animals while the former is common to men only. On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it. It is proper to reason. Wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says whatever natural reason decrees among all men is observed by all equally and is called the right of nations. This suffices for the reply to the first objection. Reply to objection 2. Considered absolutely the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man is based not on natural reason but on some resultant utility in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser man and to the latter to be helped by the former as the philosopher states in politics 1-2. Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second way but not in the first. Reply to objection 3. Since natural reason dictates matters which are according to the right of nations as implying approximate equality it follows that they need no special institution for they are instituted by natural reason itself as stated by the authority quoted above. Fourth article. Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special species. Objection 1. It would seem that paternal right and right of dominion should not be distinguished as special species for it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his as Ambrose states in on the duties of the clergy 1-24. Now right is the object of justice as stated above in article 1. Therefore right belongs to each one equally and we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct species. Objection 2. Further. The law is an expression of what is just as stated above in article 1. Second reply. Now a law looks to the common good of a city or kingdom as stated above in the Paris Prima Secundae question 90 article 2. But not to the private good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for a special right of dominion or paternal right since the master and the father pertain to a household as stated in politics 1-2. Objection 3. Further. There are many other differences of degrees among men. For instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them. On the contrary the philosopher in ethics 5-6 distinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil right. I answer that right or just depends on commensuration with another person. Now another has a twofold signification. First it may denote something that is other simply as that which is altogether distinct. As for example two men neither of whom is subject to the other and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state. And between these according to the philosopher in ethics 5-6 there is the just simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something else. Not simply but is belonging in some way to that something else. And in this way as regards human affairs a son belongs to his father since he is part of him somewhat as stated in ethics 8-12 and a slave belongs to his master because he is his instrument as stated in politics 1-2. Confer as well ethics 8-11. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another simply and so between them there is not the just simply but a kind of just called paternal. In like manner neither is there the just simply between master and servant but that which is called dominative. A wife though she is something belonging to the husband since she stands related to him as to her own body as the apostle declares in Ephesians 5-28 is nevertheless more distinct from her husband than a son from his father from his master. For she is received into a kind of social life that of matrimony where for according to the philosopher in ethics 5-6 there is more scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and son or master and slave because as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the community of the household as stated in politics 1-2 and 5 it follows that between them there is domestic justice rather than civic. Reply to Objection 1 it belongs to justice to render to each one his right the distinction between individuals being presupposed for if a man gives himself his due this is not strictly called just and since what belongs to the son is his father's and what belongs to the slave is his master's it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of father to son or of master to slave. Reply to Objection 2 a son as such belongs to his father and a slave as such belongs to his master yet each considered as a man is something having separate existence and distinct from others hence in so far as each of them is a man there is justice towards them in a way and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father to his son and of a master to his slave but in so far as each is something belonging to another the perfect idea of right or just is wanting to them Reply to Objection 3 all other differences between one person and another in a state have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to its ruler where for there is just towards them in the perfect sense of justice this just however is distinguished according to various offices when we speak of military or magisterial or priestly right it is not as though such rights fell short of the simple right as when we speak of paternal right or right of dominion but for the reason that something proper is due to each class of person in respect of his particular office Question 58 Part 1 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde triates on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province Question 58 of justice in 12 articles Part 1 articles 1 through 6 we must now consider justice under this head there are 12 points of inquiry first what is justice second whether justice is always towards another third whether it is a virtue fourth whether it is in the will as its subject fifth whether it is a general virtue sixth whether as a general virtue it is essentially the same as every virtue seventh whether there is a particular justice eighth whether particular justice has a matter of its own ninth whether it is about passions or about operations only tenth whether the mean of justice is the real mean eleventh whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own twelfth whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues first article whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right objection one it would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right for according to the philosopher in ethics 5 1 justice is a habit which makes a man of being what is just and of being just in action and in attention now will denotes a power or also an act therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will objection to further rectitude of the will is not the will else if the will were its own rectitude it would follow that no will is unrighteous yet according to anselm in on truth 12 justice is rectitude therefore justice is not the will objection three further no will is perpetual save gods if therefore justice is a perpetual will in god alone will there be justice objection four further whatever is perpetual is constant since it is unchangeable therefore it is needless in defining justice to say that it is both perpetual and constant objection five further it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his own right therefore if justice gives each one his right it follows that it is in none but the sovereign which is absurd objection six further Augustine says in on the morals of the Catholic Church and on the morals of the Manichaeans 15 that justice is love serving god alone therefore it does not render to each one his right I answer that the aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood right for since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men as shall be shown further on in article two hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words rendering to each one his right since as Isidore says in his etymologies 10 a man is said to be just because he respects the rights of others where rights in Latin is use the root of justice translator's note now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous it requires to be voluntary stable and firm because the philosopher says in ethics 24 that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done knowingly secondly to be done by choice and for a due end thirdly to be done immovably now the first of these is included in the second since what is done through ignorance is involuntary according to ethics 3 1 hence the definition of justice mentions first the will in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary and mention is made afterwards of its constancy and perpetuity in order to indicate the firmness of the act accordingly this is a complete definition of justice save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit which takes its species from that act because habit implies relation to act and if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition he might say that justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will and this is the same definition as that given by the philosopher in ethics 5 5 who says that justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice reply to objection 1 will here denotes the act not the power and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts thus Augustine says in his commentary on the Gospel of John tracked 40 that faith is to believe what one sees not reply to objection 2 justice is the same as rectitude not essentially but causally for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will reply to objection 3 the will may be called perpetual in two ways first on the part of the will's act which endures forever and thus God's will alone is perpetual secondly on the part of the subject because to wit a man wills to do a certain thing always and this is a necessary condition of justice for it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases reply to objection 4 since perpetual does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will it is not superfluous to add constant for while the perpetual will denotes the purpose of observing justice always constant signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose reply to objection 5 a judge renders to each one what belongs to him by way of command and direction because a judge is the personification of justice and the sovereign is its guardian according to ethics 5 4 on the other hand a judge renders to each one what belongs to him by way of execution reply to objection 6 just as love of God includes love of our neighbor as stated above in question 25 article 1 so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due second article whether justice is always towards another objection 1 towards another for the apostle says in Romans 3 22 that the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another neither therefore does justice objection 2 further according to Augustine in on the morals of the Catholic church and on the morals of the Manachians 15 it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his authority over the things that are subject to him now the sensitive appetite is subject to man according to Genesis 47 where it is written the lust thereof notably of sin shall be under thee and thou shalt have dominion over it therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appetite so that justice is towards oneself objection 3 further the justice of God is eternal but nothing else is co-eternal with God therefore justice is not essentially towards another objection 4 further man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less with another now man's dealings are rectified by justice according to Proverbs 11 5 the justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others but also with ourselves on the contrary Tully says in on duties 17 that the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse now this implies relationship of one man to another therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others I answer that as stated above in question 57 article 1 since justice by its name implies equality it denotes essentially relation to another for a thing is equal not to itself but to another and for as much as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts as stated above in question 57 article 1 as well as in the par's prima secunde question 113 article 1 this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action now actions belong to supposites confer par's prima question 29 article 2 and holes and properly speaking not to parts and forms or powers for we do not say properly that the hand strikes but a man with his hand nor that heat makes a thing hot but fire by heat although such expressions may be employed metaphorically hence justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposites and consequently is only in one man towards another nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of actions such as the reason the irrational and the concupisable as though they were so many agents so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irrational and concupisable and these obey reason and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it hence the philosopher in ethics 511 calls this metaphorical justice reply to objection 1 the justice which faith works in us is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul as stated above in the Baras Prima Secunde question 113 article 1 where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly now this belongs to metaphorical justice which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself this suffices for the reply to the second objection reply to objection 3 God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose and it is chiefly in this that justice consists although it is not eternal as regards its effect since nothing is co-eternal with God reply to objection 4 man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues but his dealings with others need a special rectification not only in relation to the agent but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed hence about such dealings there is a special virtue and this is justice 3rd article whether justice is a virtue objection 1 it would seem that justice is not a virtue for it is written in Luke 17.10 when you have done all these things that are commanded you say we are unprofitable servants we have done that which we ought to do now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed for Ambrose says on the duties of the clergy 2.6 we look to a prophet that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness therefore to do what one ought to do is not a virtuous deed and yet it is an act of justice therefore justice is not a virtue objection 2 further that which is done of necessity is not meritorious but to render to a man what belongs to him as justice requires is of necessity therefore it is not meritorious yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit therefore justice is not a virtue objection 3 further every moral virtue is about matters of action now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft according to the philosopher in metaphysics 9 therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself it seems that justice is not a moral virtue on the contrary Gregory says in his commentary on Job 2.49 that the entire structure of good works is built on virtues notably temperance prudence fortitude and justice I answer that a human virtue is one which renders a human act and man himself good according to ethics 2.6 and this can be applied to justice for a man's act is made good through attaining the rule of reason the rule whereby human acts are regulated hence since justice regulates human operations it is evident that it renders man's operations good and as Tully declares in On Duties 1.7 good men are so called chiefly from their justice wherefore as he says again the lustre of virtue appears above all injustice reply to Objection 1 when a man does what he ought he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought but only abstains from doing him a harm he does however profit himself in so far as he does what he ought spontaneously and readily and this is to act virtuously hence it is written in wisdom that divine wisdom teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude which are such things as men that is virtuous men can have nothing more profitable in life reply to Objection 2 necessity is twofold one arises from constraint and this removes merit since it runs counter to the will the other arises from the obligation of a command or from the necessity of obtaining an end when to it a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing the latter necessity does not remove merit when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way it does however exclude the credit of supererogation according to 1st Corinthians 916 if I preach the gospel it is no glory to me for a necessity lieth upon me reply to Objection 3 justice is concerned about external things not by making them which pertains to art but by using them in our dealings with other men fourth article whether justice is in the will as it's subject Objection 1 you would seem that justice is not in the will as it's subject for justice is sometimes called truth but truth is not in the will but in the intellect therefore justice is not in the will as it's subject Objection 2 further justice is about our dealings with others now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another therefore justice is not in the will as it's subject but in the reason Objection 3 further justice is not an intellectual virtue since it is not directed to knowledge wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is rational by participation notably the irascible and the concupisable as the philosopher declares in ethics 113 therefore justice is not in the will as it's subject but in the irascible and concupisable on the contrary Anselm says in on truth 12 that justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake by answer that the subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power for we are not said to be just through knowing something right hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power but since we are said to be just through doing something right and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power justice must needs be in some appetitive power as it's subject now the appetite is twofold namely the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension and is divided into the irascible and the concupisable as stated in the first part question 81 article 2 again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another but this is proper to the reason therefore justice cannot be in the irascible concupisable as its subject but only in the will hence the philosopher in ethics 5 1 defines justice by an act of the will as may be seen above in article 1 reply to objection 1 since the will is the rational appetite when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its niness to the reason this imprint retains the name of truth and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth reply to objection 2 the will is born towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason therefore since the reason directs one thing in relation to another the will can will one thing in relation to another and this belongs to justice reply to objection 3 not only the irascible and concupisable parts are rational by participation but the entire appetitive faculty as stated in ethics 113 because all appetite is subject to reason now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty therefore it can be the subject of moral virtue fifth article whether justice is a general virtue objection 1 it would seem that justice is not a general virtue for justice is specified with the other virtues according to wisdom 8.7 she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude now the general is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same general therefore justice is not a general virtue objection 2 further as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue so are temperance and fortitude now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue objection 3 further justice is always towards others as stated above in article 2 but a sin committed against one's neighbor cannot be a general sin because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself therefore neither is justice a general virtue on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 5 1 that justice is every virtue I answer that justice as stated above in article 2 directs man in his relations with other men now this may happen in two ways first as regards his relation with individuals secondly as regards his relations with others in general as far as a man who serves a community serves all those who are included in that community accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses now it is evident that all who are included in a community stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole while a part as such belongs to a whole so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole it follows therefore that the good of any virtue whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself or in relation to certain other individual persons is referable to the common good to which justice directs so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice so far as it directs man to the common good it is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue and since it belongs to the law to direct the common good as stated above in the Pares Prima Secunde question 90 article 2 it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general is called legal justice because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good reply to objection 1 justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues not as a general but as a special virtue as we shall state further on in articles 7 and 12 reply to objection 2 temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite notably in the concupisable and irascible now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods even as the senses are cognitive of particulars on the other hand justice is in the intellect of appetite as its subject which can have the universal good as its object knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude reply to objection 3 things referable to oneself are referable to another especially in regard to the common good wherefor legal justice in so far as it directs to the common good may be called a general virtue and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin hence it is written in 1st John 3 4 that all sin is iniquity 6th article whether justice as a general virtue is essentially the same as all virtue objection 1 it would seem that justice as a general virtue is essentially the same as all virtue for the philosopher says in ethics 5 1 that virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue but differ in their mode of being now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue objection 2 further every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue now the aforesaid justice according to the philosopher in ethics 5 1 is not a part but the whole of virtue therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue objection 3 further the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to divine good now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end namely the common good of the multitude which transcends the good of one single individual therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue objection 4 further every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose but that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue that does not belong to general justice which directs to the common good and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 5.1 that many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others and in politics 3.2 that the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice whereby a man is directed to the common good therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general and it is possible to have one without the other I answer that a thing is said to be general in two ways first by predication thus animal is general in relation to man and horse and the like and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species and forms part of its definition secondly a thing is said to be general virtually thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects the sun for instance in relation to all bodies that are illumined or transmuted by its power and in this sense there is no need for that which is general to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general since cause and effect are not essentially the same now it is in the latter sense that according to what has been said in article 5 legal justice is said to be a general virtue in as much to wit as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end and this is to move all the other virtues by its command for just as charity may be called a general virtue insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the divine good so too is legal justice insofar as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good accordingly just as charity which regards the divine good as its proper object is a special virtue in respect of its essence so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence insofar as it regards the common good as its proper object and thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a master craft while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects however the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue insofar as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general speaking in this way legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue but differs there from logically and it is in this sense that the philosopher speaks wherefore the replies to the first and second objections are manifest reply to objection 3 this argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice reply to objection 4 every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes does not belong to that virtue considered strictly for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end consequently there must be a supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue which directs all the virtues to the common good and this virtue is legal justice end of question 58 part 1 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC question 58 part 2 of summa theologica secunda secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org summa theologica secunda secunde triities on the cardinal virtues the virtue of justice by St. Thomas Aquinas translated by the fathers of the English Dominican province question 58 of justice in 12 articles part 2 articles 7 through 12 7th article whether there is a particular besides a general justice objection 1 it would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice for there is nothing superfluous in the virtues as neither is there in nature now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men therefore there is no need for a particular justice objection 2 further the species of a virtue does not vary according to one and many but legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude has shown above in articles 5 and 6 therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual objection 3 further between the individual and the general public stands the household community consequently if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household and yet this is not the case therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice on the contrary Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew 5 6 blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice says by justice he signifies either the general virtue or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness I answer that as stated above in article 6 legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person accordingly just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself such as temperance and fortitude so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals reply to objection 1 legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others as regards the common good it does so immediately but as to the good of the individual it does so immediately where for there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual reply to objection 2 the common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the many and the few but also under a formal aspect for the aspect of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good even as the aspect of whole differs from that of part where for the philosopher says in politics 1-1 that they are wrong who maintain that the state and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically reply to objection 3 the household community according to the philosopher in politics 1-2 differs in respect of a three-fold fellowship namely of husband and wife father and son master and slave in each of which one person is as it were part of the other where for between such persons there is not justice simply but a species of justice notably domestic justice as stated in ethics 5-6 8th article whether particular justice has a special matter 1-1 it would seem that particular justice has no special matter because a gloss on genesis 2-14 the 4th river is Euphrates says Euphrates signifies fruitful nor is it stated through what country it flows because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul now this would not be the case if justice had a special matter since every special matter belongs to a special power therefore particular justice has no special matter objection 2 further Augustine says in his 83 questions question 61 that the soul has four virtues whereby in this life it lives spiritually notably temperance prudence, fortitude and justice and he says that the 4th is justice which pervades all the virtues therefore particular justice which is one of the four cardinal virtues has no special matter objection 3 further justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life therefore the matter of justice is general and not special on the contrary the philosopher reckons in ethics 5.2 particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life I answer that whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue this is defined in reference to right reason according to the philosopher in ethics 2.6 now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul but also external actions and also those external things of which man can make use and yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another that the relation of one man to another is to be considered whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man's rectitude in himself consequently since justice is directed to others it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue but only about external actions and things under a certain special aspect of the object insofar as one man is related to another through them reply to objection 1 it is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul where it resides as in its subject and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul not directly but by a kind of diffusion reply to objection 2 as stated above in the parts Prima Secunde question 61 articles 3 and 4 the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways first as special virtues each having a determinate matter secondly as certain general modes of virtue in this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted for he says that prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures fortitude is strength of mind and bearing with passing trials justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues that is to say principle of the entire order between one man and another reply to objection 3 a man's internal passions which are a part of moral matter are not in themselves directed to another man which belongs to the specific nature of justice yet their effects that is external actions are capable of being directed to another man consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general ninth article whether justice is about the passions objection 1 you would seem that justice is about the passions for the philosopher says in ethics 2 3 that moral virtue is about pleasure and pain now pleasure or delight and pain are passions is stated above in the parts prima secunde question 23 article 4 question 31 article 1 and question 35 article 1 when we were treating of the passions therefore justice being a moral virtue is about the passions objection 2 further justice is the means of rectifying a man's operations in relation to another man now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations thus sexual lust leads to adultery and over much love of money leads to theft therefore justice must needs be about the passions objection 3 further as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice now legal justice is about the passions else it would not extend to all the virtues some of which are evidently about the passions therefore justice is about the passions on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 5 1 that justice is about operations I answer that the true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source first from the subject of justice that is from the will whose movements or acts are not passions as stated above in the parts prima secunde question 22 article 3 as well as question 59 article 4 for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions hence justice is not about the passions as are temperance and fortitude which are in the irascible and concupisable parts secondly on the part of the matter because justice is about man's relations with another and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions therefore justice is not about the passions reply to objection 1 not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter since fortitude is about fear and daring but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain as to ends to be acquired for as the philosopher says in ethics 7 11 pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil and that a good and in this way too they belong to justice since a man is not just unless he rejoiced in just actions according to ethics 1 8 reply to objection 2 external operations are as it were between external things which are their matter and internal passions which are their origin now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these without there being a defect in the other thus a man may steal another's property not through the desire to have the thing but through the will to hurt the man or vice versa a man may covet another's property without wishing to steal it accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things belongs to justice but in so far as they arise from the passions it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions hence justice hinders theft of another's property in so far as stealing is contrary to the equality contained in external things while liberality hinders it as resulting from a moderate desire for wealth since however external operations take their species not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects it follows that external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues reply to objection 3 the common good is the end of each individual member of a community just as the good of the whole is the end of each part on the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or another in himself than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations in so far to it as the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person the actions of a temperate person and the actions of a gentle person according to ethics 5 5 10th article whether the mean of justice is the real mean objection 1 you would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean for the generic nature remains entire in each species now moral virtue is defined in ethics 2 6 to be an elective habit which observes the mean fixed in our regard by reason therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean objection 2 further in things that are good simply there is neither excess nor defect and consequently neither is there a mean as is clearly the case with the virtues according to ethics 2 6 now justice is about things that are good simply as stated in ethics 5 therefore justice does not observe the real mean objection 3 further the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons since what is too much for one is too little for another according to ethics 2 6 now this is also the case in justice for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual therefore justice also observes not the real but the rational mean on the contrary the philosopher says in ethics 2 6 and in 5 4 that the mean of justice is to be taken according to arithmetical proportion so that it is the real mean I answer that as stated above in article 9 as well as in the Parse Prima Secunde question 59 article 4 the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions insofar as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard on the other hand the matter of justice is external operation insofar as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person where for the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person now equality is the real mean between greater and less as stated in metaphysics 10 where for justice observes the real mean reply to objection 1 this real mean is also the rational mean where for justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue reply to objection 2 we may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways first a thing may be good in every way thus the virtues are good and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely that is in its nature although it may become evil through its being abused such are riches and honors and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean as regards men who can use them well or ill and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply reply to objection 3 the injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person where for each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity eleventh article whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own objection 1 it would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own for Augustine in On the Trinity 14.9 ascribes to justice the act of suckering the needy now in suckering the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own objection 2 further Tully says in On Duties 17 that beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality belongs to justice now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one's own not of what is his therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own objection 3 further it belongs to justice not only to distribute things dually but also to repress injurious actions such as murder, adultery and so forth but the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own on the contrary Ambrose says in On the duties of the clergy 124 it is justice that renders to each one what is his and claims not another's property it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity I answer that as stated above in articles 8 and 10 the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice now each man's own is that which is due to him according to the equality of proportion therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own reply to objection one since justice is a cardinal virtue other secondary virtues such as mercy liberality and the like and with it as we shall state further on in question 80 article one wherefor to succor the needy which belongs to mercy or pity and to be liberally beneficent which pertains to liberality are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principle virtue this suffices for the reply to the second objection reply to objection three as the philosopher states in ethics five four in matters of justice the name of profit is extended to whatever is excessive and whatever is deficient is called loss the reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised involuntary interchanges of things such as buying and selling wherein those expressions are properly employed and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice the same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own twelfth article whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues objection one you would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues because it belongs to justice to render each one what is his whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own and this is more virtuous therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice objection two further nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues according to ethics four three therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice objection three further virtue is about that which is difficult and good as stated in ethics two three but fortitude is about more difficult things than justices since it is about dangers of death according to ethics three six therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice on the contrary tally says in on duties one seven justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man I answer that if we speak of legal justice it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person in this sense the philosopher declares in ethics five one that the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star but even if we speak of particular justice it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons the first reason may be taken from the subject because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul notably the rational appetite or will whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite where unto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues the second reason is taken from the object because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the soul good of the virtuous person himself whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another so that justice is somewhat the good of another person as stated in ethics five one hence the philosopher says in rhetoric one nine the greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others for this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just since bravery is useful to others in warfare and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace reply to objection one although the liberal man gives of his own yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue while the just man gives to another what is his through consideration of the common good moreover justice is observed towards all whereas liberality cannot extend to all again liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice whereby one renders to each man what is his reply to objection two when magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter's goodness and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue reply to objection three although fortitude is about the most difficult things it is not about the best for it is only useful in warfare whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace as stated above end of question 58 read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert LC