 It's the five o'clock block on global connections here on Think Tech, and we're talking with General Dan Figleaf, the figures in quotes, because that was his, I guess, his moniker when he flew F-16s as a fighter pilot in the Air Force. He's retired three-star. He was up at Camp Smith for a few years. He is very familiar with international affairs and international relations, and we are so delighted to have him on the show. He's written a ton of stuff on North Korea, and we really want to find out what he's thinking these days in the time of the transition to the Biden administration. Welcome to the show, Dan. Thanks, Jay. Always a pleasure to see you. Yeah, well, just a very exciting time, especially when you look at a kind of a rogue state, if I can use that term like North Korea, and figure out where we've been doing it right, where we've been doing it wrong, and what we have to do now in terms of the transition. It probably requires, it does, I think we agree, it requires our attention, doesn't it? I think it absolutely does require our attention, because at the current time it's pretty quiet on the North Korean front. There aren't the kind of the very high tensions that we saw, not just in 2018 when we had the false alarm missile alert, but really in the several years building up to that. We don't need to go back there, and in attention alone would be enough to perhaps heighten tensions as we transition to the next administration. So how has our foreign policy been? Can you kind of give the transition of it? We had foreign policy at the beginning with the Korean War, and then I lumped this up too much, and then prior to Trump, during Trump, and now after Trump. So can we talk about foreign policy with North Korea in the period between the end? I shouldn't say the end, because it never really ended. The end of the Korean War and the Trump administration, how did it go for us? How many days do we have to talk about this? I'll give you a summary of what I think is important given where we are now, and it was pure Cold War, generally no engagement with North Korea up until the 90s, and then there were some efforts to rein in the nuclear program. That was always the driving motivation that led to an agreement in the mid 90s called the agreed upon framework in most circles, where there was going to be the process of, in essence, providing financial and material incentives to North Korea to drop their nuclear program. And at the same time, do some other things, give them a light water reactor to help electrification the country, and some oil and establish liaison offices, and so on and so forth. And that agreement was in fact reached, I was thinking in the late 94, but forgive me, my dates aren't in front of me. The bottom line is that eventually fell apart, and it fell apart because North Korea cheated a bit, and we, the other parties that were involved didn't necessarily deliver what we said we'd deliver. It was an opportunity lost, but understandably, I think. During that same period, North Korea's economy as the Soviet Union dissolved, and they lost their financial support from Soviet Union, North Korea began a long steady descent into poverty and starvation, and in the late 90s into the early 2000s, severe starvation. So there were some attempts to engage based on trading relief food assistance for denuclearization. Well, that fell apart, and North Korea eventually withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, sometimes called the NPT, the Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation. That's a key point. If I'd ask our viewers to remember anything, it's how important the NPT is, and hopefully we'll come back to it. So then it became a period that was referred to as strategic patience, where in North Korea, it's a problem, but we'll just keep them at arms distance. We'll keep our relationship, our alliance with South Korea vibrant, we'll maintain our military presence, and we'll deter them from going to war, but we're not going to waste a lot of energy normalizing the relationship or doing anything else. And that was met by North Korea with a series of provocations then for criminations, then some engagement, and then an improvement, and then provocation. So it was a cycle of tensions that brought them to the point where they have a legitimate nuclear capability, nuclear weapons, and as seen in the period of this decade, an increased capability to deliver them. And that's where we were when President Trump referred to Kim Jong-un as a rocket man. And we saw a significant, I would say the tensions were there, but it was an exposure of the heightened tensions that led to the false alarm in January of 2018. The thing to remember about the false alarm is it was credible. It could have happened. Now, do we know if they could reach a why? Not sure. Some intelligence estimates say yes, some say no, but I was standing right where I am now doing this interview in my home office when I got a call from a relative who said, what's up with this missile alert? Well, it could have been. So from what drove that period was the Trump administration said we're going from strategic patience, which hadn't worked, and I think it's clear it hadn't, to maximum pressure. And they mobilized the world community to increase effective sanctions, and they put other pressure on North Korea. And so Kim Jong-un said, all right, we're done building our nuclear program. I understand where you're coming from. Let's meet. Summits one in Singapore and one in Hanoi, and some dialogue between the two countries, but not much progress. And it's kind of died out. So what will the Biden administration do? It's kind of freddered away. Where are we now? I mean, it's kind of interesting that it's a threat, but your tendency, our tendency, is to marginalize it and ignore it and think that it'll go away. But it's not going to go away. And we do have options to improve it. You've written a number of articles about those options. In one of them, you called yourself a peacenik. I think that's an interesting- I am. I did warn. I'm doing peace. Okay. You're still a peacenik, then. That's clear. I'm militant about peace with North Korea. And there are two reasons for that, Jay. The first is US and ally security, because they are a threat and something really bad could happen. And the other is the plight of the average North Korean person, man, woman, child, who has nothing to do with what the success of Kim governments have voiced on the world. All they do is suffer, and that suffering is immense, and it's still immense. And morally, I'm not good with that. I'd commend our viewers to read any of the books by North Korean escapies and refugees, but the book that really influenced me and made this an obsession with me is titled Nothing to Envy Ordinary Life in North Korea by Barbara Demek. It's a good, rapid read. It will haunt you. And it haunts me. So I care about my country and our security. I care about the security of our allies, but I also care about the plight of the North Korean people that will not be addressed until we move on from a war that ended 70 years ago-ish. You know, it's an interesting problem, and I think it has implications beyond North Korea. Here's a dictator interested in confirming and preserving his power, even at the expense of the quality of life of his people, doing everything to retain, brutally retain power, and it becomes incumbent on the United States. I mean, it has a moral power in the world to deal with him. And you've had several suggestions you've repeated in a number of those articles you've written, and I wonder- Repetition is the key to learning, Jay. Well, yes. In fact, I'd like to give you that in Latin. Repetitio mate studiorum. Repetition is the mother of study. There it is. So can we go through, you know, the suggestions you've made over the years, and I presume you make now? Yeah. Well, first of all, they're practical suggestions. You won't hear me make any political commentary on the policies of this or current or future administrations that are political in nature. I just would like to be practical about getting to a different place with regard to North Korea. And the most important practical consideration is continuing to keep denuclearization as the central focus of our policy. What we always talk about first and last, while practically accepting the fact that that ain't happening anytime soon, okay? Well, you know, I wanted to ask you about that. So here's the country that, you know, however they did it, and it's all kinds of interesting stories, I'm sure, and how they got up to this level of nuclear technology. But they have it. They have it. And they have the missiles, too. And so you say, well, we want you guys to stop doing that. We want you to, you know, denuclearize. Don't be a nuclear power anymore. But we, the United States, we will remain a nuclear power. And the countries we designate as nuclear powers, they can remain nuclear powers, but not you guys. There's something inherently unfair about that, isn't it? Why can't- Not at all. Go ahead. Not at all. Because of the treaty on nuclear non-polar operation. And at the time that treaty was being considered, the estimates for the 20 or more countries would become nuclear power powers within the next 10 years without the treaty. And so many countries signed the treaty, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea. Okay, so they bought into it. That's why it's not unfair. They agreed to it. Sometimes we agree to thinking things in hindsight that weren't a great idea. Why then is Kim Jong-un- Go ahead. Sorry. Yeah, let me finish with that because this is an important history. So since the ratification by most of the world of the NPT treaty, four countries have become nuclear powers. India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea. Why don't we, you know, we generally accept those three other ones but not North Korea. Why not? They didn't sign the treaty. Okay, so if we de facto say, okay, North Korea, you got nicks, we're cool with that. Let's figure out everything else. You then weaken and maybe even dismantle the important stabilizing force. Remember, they're predicting 20 within 10 years when the treaty was originated. So the treaty is too important to give them a pass. But practically, we have to realize that it's highly unlikely that would be an understatement. Kim Jong-un is going to wake up Christmas morning, you know, in the spirit of Christmas. I don't think I need my nukes anymore. It still has to remain our stated goal. And we have to be serious about it. But we have to put it as our stated long-term goal and do other practical things that improve the relationship, eventually hopefully normalize it, that could eventually get us to a place where that enuclearization of North Korea is possible. It's not possible right now. It still has to stay the goal. He's made a decision, I mean over years now, that it's really important for him to do this, even at the risk of being a rogue nation. Query, why? Why has he spent all his resources, you know, given that his country is starving on nuclear energy, nuclear weapons that really don't help him in terms of the real world? So the North Korean nuclear program started long before he was out of grade school in Switzerland. It started under his grandfather, became serious business under his father. But it was always a veiled threat. It was something could happen that they might have that they were working on. And then under his father, it materialized in some nuclear tests and some missile tests. But if you look at the investment under Kim since he came into power in 2011, December 2011, it was an extraordinary order of magnitude increase in the practical efforts to achieve a credible nuclear and delivery capability and go from veiled threat to real threat. And he did that. And then he suddenly stopped in the face of maximum pressure. And I think that the pressure gets part of the credit, the sanctions in particular, and I was not optimistic about how effective sanctions would be turned out to be for a while, quite effective. And so he stopped, I think, because of the sanctions, but also because he broke the bank in my estimation, spending on this dramatic increase in tests and achieved the desired goal he had the world's attention that was seen as a credible threat. And so he said, we're done. This is before the proposal to meet with President Trump, et cetera. They weren't done. Missiles are difficult. Nukes are even more difficult. But we don't need them to restart. So at the end of the day, isn't this a kind of a global negotiating threat, in other words? He wants something. Now you can say that he wants security against the tax by South Korea and the United States. That could be fabricated. He wants something more, recognition. They say he wants attention. What does he really want, do you think? Well, I'm not going to pretend to be able to read Kim Jong-un's mind. But the external threat to North Korea is the foundational myth for the legitimacy of the government internally. So as it currently is, he needs a boogeyman. And he will use it, they have used not just the U.S., but Japan, China. Whoever the boogeyman of the day is fine with the North Korean leadership. But it's generally the U.S. Wolf bastards, as they call us when they're really men, and our South Korean puppets who are anything but puppets. But that's the characterization. So he needs that existential threat for legitimacy internally. You could think that he wanted the nuclear weapons to leverage aid, industry, trade, but that's not working. Things are still not good. There's some expansion of sort of limited market economy internally, but that's not working. Why? What's the reason for that's not working? Because the veiled threat was tolerable, the unveiled threat, the real threat of nuclear tech is not tolerable. So the sanctions and other pressure have held up reasonably well. The global pandemic isn't helping anybody trade and economy-wise. And so that's another factor. But we need to make sure he doesn't find an alternative that makes him think going back to nuclear tests, missile tests, threats against South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. is going to be productive. So that was the first of several points of engagement. That may be constructive engagement, I guess you'd say, for us to deal better with him now in view of the way he's conducting himself currently. What are the other points? Well, I think we have to find areas where progress can be made, because the progress the long-term goal of denuclearization is going to be glacial in terms of pace. It's going to be very slowly. So where can we make progress? We can make progress by pursuing another fairly long-term goal. But as you said, the war is technically not over. And it's not a sound basis for peace when every article about North Korea starts with the tagline, technically still at war. That's not helpful. And you don't get past the war, and you mentioned the antipathy of the North Korean people towards the United States unless you do some reconciliation. And the way to do that is do the hard work of getting to a real peace treaty and ending the war. That's not easy, and it's not without risk. We can't be certain that North Korea, even though they say they want the war to end, would accept an end that are anywhere within the bounds of acceptable firms and conditions. But we have to pursue it, because it's technically still at war. It's not a good starting point. Secondly, we need to formalize our avenues of communication with North Korea. And back to the agreed upon nuclear framework and some of the proposals out of Singapore, there's long been discussion about liaison offices, small diplomatic missions in each capital, Pyongyang and Washington, DC. Why not? Why wouldn't we do that? And yeah, it's not easy, and it wouldn't be an embassy, and it's not formal diplomatic relations, but you'd have someone there. Again, now the risk, risk of a propaganda victory for Kim Jong-un, but why would you not establish some avenue of communication and get to know each other? Right now, we go through the ups and downs of our policy and the connections that we have through South Korea, the Republic of Korea, and directly, but those are very fragile, and there's no continuity to them. Diplomatic presence in each capital couldn't help. There's another area that I feel very strongly, Jay, that is a fertile field, and it's not always well received by folks who are conversant in North Korea policy and more broadly US policy, but I'm convinced it could be a game changer. North Korea got hosed in regard to their maritime boundaries on their west coast after the war. The armistice set bad conditions, and those were further exacerbated by some decisions of the Armistice Commission under this armistice, which was US-led, and their maritime boundaries in that part of the country, that part of the LOC or East China Sea, depending on what you're here to call it, are an aberration under current US or current international norms. The United States, even though we have not ratified the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, is the global leader in maintaining a rule of law at sea. These boundaries are outside the law. North Korea got hosed. The US and South Korea should advocate strongly for a normalization of their maritime boundaries. Would that help? North Korea would, but here's a concept, it would be the right thing to do, and it would reinforce our credibility globally, and in particular with the claimants in the South China Sea is the United States doing what they say, walking the park. It's not an easy process, but it is a doable process, and we don't have days, so I won't talk about how that could work, but it could work. It would be a game changer in, I think, in the US-North Korea relationship, and very difficult to turn against us internally. So those are some of the key areas that I think we could take practical steps that would not be limited by denuclearization while we're not giving up on denuclearization. We're just doing what can be done now. Now, at the same time, we have to do this in partnership with South Korea, our allies, and the country that has the most to gain or lose on the peninsula. So we need to maintain that relationship. I think we need to re-look at the burden-sharing discussion that happened under the Trump administration that puts some strain on the relationship, and we need to continue doing military exercises with South Korea. North Korea doesn't like them, but the reason we're doing them goes back to the start of the Korean War and is a necessary deterrent to adventurers in Baek-in Jong-un. In your articles, one thing that was fascinating to me was the examination of how the United States, after the Vietnam War, was able to achieve a completely friendly, open, productive relationship with Vietnam, which exists today. It's impressive and it's heartwarming in its own way. We have both sides, not every single human being, but both sides. It's a heartwarming, I have chicken skin. I'm thinking about it. Yeah, I cite that in many cases. I think our most important bilateral relationship in the modern world is with Vietnam, actually, for two reasons. We got to get over it. We got to move on. And neither of these reasons are about China. The other reason is the exemplar it provides, because really bad things happened in the Vietnam War on both sides. And it took 20 plus years to get to the point we're at today, of formal diplomatic relations. It was hard work. There were disagreements. There are still disagreements between the two countries, but it's a mature, healthy relationship that is better for both countries. So when my friends from Nama country in northeast Asia say, well, you don't understand. Yes, I do understand. Well, it's really hard. It's really hard. Let's do it. I don't care that it's really hard. Security and peace are really hard. And as I said, I'm a peacenik. I've done war. War is relatively easy. Peace takes hard, practical work. And it takes a determined focus. I know we were running out of time, Jay. I would love to come back and talk about, if you and your viewers will tolerate, about the evolution of the US-Vietnam relationship. Because as I said, I think it's important in those two key ways, but in many other ways. I totally agree. And I want to do that. Before we close, though, I do want to mention the news today that China has provided vaccines. It has three vaccine companies working and it has provided, it has vaccinated Kim Jong-un and his family and his ruling cadre around him, some number of people. And not the rest of the country, but at least Kim Jong-un and his friends. And I want to get your handle on what does that mean? What does it demonstrate in terms of the relationship? It demonstrates a practical approach by China to maintaining stability at low cost with North Korea. They, they're not going to protect all the North Korean people. There's no, there's no kindness in this, but instability like Kim Jong-un and his circle becoming ill with COVID would not be good for China. It's a problem they don't need, but they're not going to fix the North Korea problem. They might participate in the fixing of it eventually, but they're pretty happy with the status quo. And to me, the status quo is intolerable from a U.S. perspective. These issues are really challenging, you know, that they require an understanding of so many variables, so many changing dynamics in so many ways. It, it must be fascinating to have had your career and to have examined these professionally and now to be able to stand back and examine them as a, as a, as a commentator. I envy you that possibility because these are the most difficult challenges you could imagine. Am I right? They are difficult, but they're a lot more difficult if we don't try. So the, the joy for me is trying. Does my, do my papers or articles or this discussion make a difference? I don't know, but when I go to sleep at night and think about starving North Korean people suffering under a very oppressive government, at least I can sleep knowing I tried. That's great to hear. I really appreciate that. Let me, let me say too, that the photograph behind you is the Yellow River. Yeah. China looking into North Korea, Dandong. You don't want to cross that river anytime soon. I did. You did? Oh, you took a trip? I won't say how close I got to North Korea on that trip last, last year. And you, and you found in North Korea, the people are friendly and warm. A lot of people. I didn't get in to engage with any North Korean people in, in North Korea. I did in China and their products of their environment, but they're still people. Yes. That's the bottom line. Well, thank you so much, General. It's great to talk to you. I do want to come back and we'll, we'll set something up soon and we'll drill down on, on Vietnam and other similar issues in the world to explore. So I really appreciate this discussion. Thank you so much. Thank you. Aloha.