 Great, thanks so much. These are four very different presentations, so I'm not going to try to create a coherence across them, but just a few, I think maybe five very brief observations. And the first one is really starting this morning till now, it is clear that the pendulum has swung entirely to the local. Everybody's talking about local ownership, local involvement, empowering local actors, and I think Severi Nautisera is probably the most famous proponent of local engagement. It makes a very persuasive case, and I remember Simon Chesterman in the late 90s wrote a piece about Kosovo, maybe early 2000s, where he said, one of the big problems in the way the international community dealt with Kosovo is it turned things over, the UN turned things over too quickly to the locals in terms of the judiciary and other state institutions at a time when they weren't ready to, for example, try cases effectively or without some sort of bias in it. And it just struck me that there is a two-sided aspect to this kind of doubling down on the local. On the one hand, absolutely local communities have the ability to solve their own problems. Severi N's book, The Frontlines of Peace, shows that in great detail, but they're often also the communities that have just been fighting each other. And so I think one of the key questions that comes up is how do you empower local actors without also reifying some of those local dynamics? And kind of one of my embedded questions in that was Bethany's presentation. I was struck by how many times things were organized by ethnicity, ethnic armed groups, ethnic syllabi, ethnic communities teaching themselves. Is there a risk that supporting those types of organizing principles in a community might actually drive a negative type of dynamic in those countries, at the same time recognizing that they also do have the answers to their own questions. And that kind of comes to the second point, which is the role of the international community. And Andrea, I was struck by your point about the positive aspects of diversity and how they can build trust. I mean, I worked in Unimid and Darfur, and that was one of the first missions where the composition of the troops was explicitly laid out by the actors that created the mission. It was a mission with African character, where the host country could actually PNG European troops if he didn't think that they were sufficiently African. And certainly I wouldn't say that Unimid is currently considered one of the more effective missions because of that. But there was certainly a push there to say this is an African Union led regional type of mission, and the advantage there was you could get by sovereignty barriers. And so I think this issue of diversity is interesting. I'm not sure I'd be interested, Andrea, if part of the question has more to do with regional diversity and less to do with international diversity. Is it more if you have a conflict in West Africa? It works better to have West Africans dealing with it, or maybe worse. Maybe there are other kind of prerogatives there, or whether it really is a set of findings that having just diversity itself creates a better form of international engagement. And then I think the third one had to do with several of the presentations mentioned funding on certain points. And part of it, Louise, you mentioned this kind of positive aspect of flexible funding. Bethany, you talked about funding kind of ethnic based education process. And this idea that you can kind of build trust through quick delivery. Louise, that was one of your points, the kind of quick impact projects you could build trust. And but then what I hear from you, Sarah, is that there's a huge amount of elite capture when you start pouring money into situations, even when your intention is to have it decentralized and deal with vertical inequality. So I have a kind of a question that I may pose more as a statement in a second. But what's the right way to think about resource flows? And Andrea, maybe one of the questions to you would be, is part of the global south involvement in peacekeeping, as you described it, a way to have resource flowing more generally into the global south by reimbursing troops, sending a signal that the north-south dynamic is being addressed in that way, if not directly dealing with the country where the peacekeeping mission is sent. But I'd be interested to hear where people come out on the funding question. The second to last is really a lot of what you were talking about, Sarah, and a little bit the missions that you were covering, Andrea, and what my work covers is failure and unintended consequences. And the fact that we're now 22 years into Monusco and in the early 2000s, there were 12 armed groups and now there are roughly 100, were now many decades into a state building project in Afghanistan, which last year comprehensively failed. Somalia has billions spent on it annually and there has been very little progress towards the type of state institutions and kind of liberal models of the state that were envisaged when the international community first went in there. And Sarah, I was really struck by one of the points you pointed out here was this kind of hostage-taking by the executive and hostage-taking by elections. And I wonder if part of what the problem is, is there is a vision for what the end state should be when we go into some of these countries and the end, you can call it Denmark. That's often the country that's held up. And the problem is that when you try to turn Somalia into Denmark, there is a huge amount of distortion that happens. There's a huge amount of unintended consequences and maybe the trajectory shouldn't be towards Denmark. Maybe it should be towards something else. But there's also a kind of schizophrenia because what you have is on the one hand you're talking about state building, extending state authority, building state institutions. That's what most of the countries are dealing with. But on the other side, you're talking about local state building. And often the locals and the national are not necessarily aligned. Most of the countries I've worked in are countries in a state of civil war, recent civil war. We're often the local communities. We're actually rising up against those state institutions. Mali's an example of that one. There's a kind of schizophrenia where we're trying to do both and. We're trying to pour huge resources into a state through the World Bank, through major donors and at the same time empower local actors. Is there a way to kind of square that into a coherent narrative? And this comes to kind of this point about final point, which is about flexibility. And Louise and Andrea both used the word. And one of the things I've noticed in my work is there's such a rigid structure for development and peace building programming. It's often a one to two year results based budget. I don't know, Bethany, if you deal with similar kind of pressures where there's kind of an activity, an output, and an outcome. And there's an assumption that one will lead naturally to the other. So you can have your hoped for outcome would be improved security. Your output might be police training. And your input would be some sort of capacity building funding for that. And certainly I think people like Rachel Kleinfeld have pointed out that there isn't such a linear progression when you're dealing with peace building. David mentioned the word spiraling towards peace. I think you often spiral away from it just as fast. And what my work usually focuses on is how complex systems evolve in nonlinear ways. And so one of the points, one of the ways I would maybe provoke some of this is are there ways to rethink peace building programming to be less about a kind of linear trajectory and more about testing a hypothesis? More about Louise when you're in Haiti or Colombia saying, we think that this community might evolve in a certain way with this input. And we're actually going to test it over a week or a few month period and then build your program around how that hypothesis works. Is there a similar thing you could do through education? Could peacekeeping be less of a one year mandate where you've got 16 pages of Monusco's kind of set of activities and more a hypothesis about how the situation in Congo might change? And I think that more iterative approach might also allow for more engagement with different forms of local peace building as well to test which ones work. There's also a tendency for us to create a kind of monolithic local. And for me, having worked in South Sudan, I can tell you that local conflict resolution in Boer looks very different than local conflict resolution in Yay, but the tools we employ in those two places are identical. So maybe something works well in Yay, it might not work in Boer, but we're still going to resource that in the same way. So I wonder if a more iterative approach to peace building at that local national level, and I wonder if part of the hypothesis is that the role for the UN is actually connecting the local and the national and less about engaging in one or the other. Is it more about, for example, dealing with parliamentary groups in a capital that represent ethnic groups in a periphery and finding a way to connect those when they tend to become disconnected, fractured or conflictual? That kind of more mediating shuttle diplomacy role for the UN might be a more fruitful one than that peacekeeping stabilization one. Those were my reflections. You can see I've embedded quite a few questions in there. And David, I could just turn it back to you, but I also just wanted to make one quick, maybe direct question about blind spots to Louise and Sarah. Louise, I liked your Venn diagram where territory was listed as one of the circles. And one of the things that we've found in our research is land and territory is often the thing that's left out of a UN mandate, left out of a mediation process, left out of a security council report discussing peace building needs. And I wonder what you think, whether you think Columbia actually looked harder at that blind spot than other places in the world, whether that's a model to think about dealing with land as a direct input to a peace building process. And Sarah, you mentioned a corruption blind spot. That's the other one that I've noticed is that very seldom does a UN peace building or peacekeeping mission have a direct input on corruption, in part because corruption is difficult to square with threats to international peace and security and the type of mandates that we see, but also because often it's the national actors that are doing a lot of the corruption, so it's a necessary blind spot. And I wonder how necessary is it? Is it possible to take corruption squarely on the nose? Or is it kind of a dirty deal that you just have to manage as you're moving on? Those would be my series of questions and reflections on those really excellent and provoking presentations. Thank you. Thank you, Adam. We have 14 minutes before we have to release you to coffee, so I'm going to move down the line and give you each two minutes to respond, if I can, and then we'll open it up to the audience. So, Louise, you're first up. Thank you, Adam, for such a great job at putting all these diverse presentations together. I'm quite impressed. So on the last question, I guess, on land in Colombia, I think that's definitely a very big issue. And actually, the municipality I was talking about, El Tarra, is actually like a forestal zone, so there is no way to have land ownership for a lot of projects, for ex-competence, for example, and I cannot say that we have the solution. I mean, for sure the UN mission is not mandated with resolving that, but even at the state level, I think it's still a blind spot, as you say, and definitely an issue that, if not resolved, is going to hamper the sustainability of the reintegration process as a whole. So I don't think Colombia has the answer yet. I think there's been some innovative ways of thinking about land ownership, for example, for collective or former combatants. You see the state actually buying land for collective projects and things like that in different parts of the country, but I do think it's still a very difficult issue in Colombia when you look at sustainability of project, most of the ex-competence, for example, have a productive project in a land that they just land, like it's not theirs, and so it's never really gonna be sustainable in that front. And so that's it on the land issue, and as of on flexibility in what you were saying and the role of the UN, I think what we've seen actually in our little piece of Colombia was exactly that, like how the UN or actually the political mission could play a role of an influencer, like putting actors together and what, and how this was really our comparative advantage as opposed to maybe other UN agencies who are more rigid actually mandates, and as you said, like result-based programming and stuff like that. We didn't really have that as a verification mission. It's not like we could, and that's a double-edged sword because it's not like we can measure that well or impact either because we're not asked to measure it, but I think that was definitely a role for the UN and for the political mission to influence different actors, to pull these actors together and provide the trust in a process so that others could join and actually develop for their initiatives. Thank you. Thank you, Louise. Thanks. Yeah, and likewise, I'm very impressed with how you've managed to pull everything together. And just, I guess to respond first in terms of the ethnicity, it is a very difficult and challenging term and one that is heavily debated. Even the term, when I started out with the ethnic basic education providers, that was a process to try to get an agreement over what to call these providers of education. And you had several that were in the camp that they should be called indigenous education providers rather than ethnic basic education providers. But again, it's all very challenging, particularly because the Burmese majority is also an ethnic group and is also indigenous to Myanmar. So again, with each of those terms, it is very charged. And particularly in the case of Myanmar as well, even when we talk about mother tongue-based multilingual education, there was a move by the Ministry of Education who, well, when we were trying to work on this national education strategic plan, the Ministry of Education wanted us to use the term ethnic language-based multilingual education rather than mother tongue-based multilingual education. And the ethnic basic education providers were very much against that, saying, well, then that's going to favor the eight dominant ethnic groups as opposed to all of the minority groups. So again, it gets really complicated and there's no easy answer, I think. But it is very much, so much a part of the identity of these different groups that I think on our side, what we really try to do is to celebrate that diversity and saying that we want to celebrate that there is that ethnic diversity and the linguistic diversity and actually say there are ways that we can, you know, the country will be stronger for that diversity. But yeah, I think, again, it is incredibly challenging and also challenging as we start to explore further around how do we make sure that we're not excluding the minority within the minority. And there's lots of issues related to that. I also wanted to touch in terms of the flexibility and the iterative approach that you mentioned. And I think that is, you know, really has been critical in terms of our work around having that flexibility. We do have a very flexible funding that has allowed us to be able to be responsive and to be able to jump on to different opportunities as they arise, but also recognize the fact that you have different readiness levels across the different groups and being able to take different approaches with each of the different groups has really been critical as well. Thanks. Thank you, Bethany, Andrea. So thanks. Excellent points and a lot of food for thought, but I'm going to say first, one point about is this positive effect about diversity only driven by regional, for instance, membership? No, it's not. And for the nerds like me sitting there, expert on statistics, I can tell you that, for instance, if we control for membership in same organization, actually the effect of diversity does not disappear. If we also look at our case studies can bring you one case study about, for instance, Lebanon, we had very interesting example how local initiative by the Indian peacekeepers organizing, for instance, training and some session on yoga classes with the locals were extremely important to then gather information and socialize. But also the difference between the Italian and the French in their patrolling, because the French were doing night patrolling in highly armored vehicle, the Italian were doing daily patrolling walking. So these were very important factors to actually see the diversity within. I want to make a point about the flexibility. Fantastic. I'm going to push a bit. I don't think it should be just hypothesis. Base, it should be evidence base. I think we should really be able to base an evidence to replan and reorganize. My provocative thought about funding, I think that frankly we want to be careful on saying whether we have a problem with too much money in funding because the United Nations budget of peace operation was around $6.5 billion last year. Norway is spending $7 billion in their own defense. Russia, $70 billion. US, $800 billion. So we say that peacekeeping is clear that peace operation is somehow effective to stop the fighting and the killing, but we are spending very little. The last operation has been 2014. And yet we are failing actually to tackle many conflicts. Of the 200 conflicts since 1946, only one-third have been discussed in UN Security Council as a matter of possible deployment. And even one of these third has been discussed, only one out of two has a possible deployment of peacekeepers. So I think that one of the problems that maybe we want to rethink how to use the funding, but frankly, in terms of cost effectiveness, given the military budget that we are using at global level and how this is increasing and how is this making a world less safe, I would say I'm for more funding to the United Nations and peace operation. Thank you, Andrea, Sarah. So I wasn't going to lead with that, but I, sorry. I wasn't going to lead with that, but I fully agree with the, I mean, it's been said before, but UN peacekeeping, and I don't mean to kind of monopolize the discussion on UN peacekeeping specifically, but it is one of the best deals out there. I mean, you know, what you get for the amount of money that goes in is really quite incredible. And I think there's a tendency to use the UN as a scapegoat and say, you know, all this wasted money and no results. Well, you know, look at the amount of money that have been poured into other countries like Afghanistan and, you know, results. So I think I couldn't agree more with that, but I guess I wanted to say to your point about sort of unintended consequences. I think it's useful to think of kind of different types of unintended consequences. So I think on the one hand, there are those that we can maybe control for or at least control somewhat. So things like funding or bureaucracy or mandates, these are things that are within the power of the international community and within the power of donors and the UN to actually do something about. And then there are others that I think are, the part of the realization that just not all good things go together. You don't necessarily get stability and democracy and justice all together. Sometimes these things do exist in tension with one another. And so I think for those, it's more about awareness, good planning, understanding what the costs of certain courses of action are and the costs of certain choices. So that was sort of my comment on the unintended consequences. I don't think we can get rid of all of them, but those that we can, we should actually potentially be doing more about and the funding is a good example of that. Corruption is another one. And I think the point I'd like to make here is one that you sort of alluded to, which is that at least for the UN, it is a state-based organization. So for the UN that will always be something it has to deal with, whether it is about dealing with the local, whether it is about dealing with corruption. But that doesn't mean that these are insurmountable problems, we've got lots of other types of actors who are doing peace building. And so if there's better coordination and a kind of division of labor, so okay, the UN can't necessarily call out the government, but a bilateral donor government might be able to. So I think there again, it's about everybody getting together and trying to align what they're doing will lead to more effectiveness. And then I'm just mulling over this kind of hypothesis testing and the non-linear trajectory and the iterative approach. And again, I think generally we have a tendency to view peace building as something that we can start or enter into when there's some major shock or shift. So an election or a peace agreement. And those are key entry points. The problem is they don't come up that often. So that really restricts our kind of imagination about when and what we can do in our kind of creativity. And I think there needs to be a bigger realization about other entry points, other ways of sort of accessing conflicts in order to help. So trying to work more within political settlements and bargains, working within institutions, even if they aren't in the form that the UN might want them or that peace builders might want them. So it's starting to kind of open up what we think of as ways into trying to end conflict and build inclusive peace. But I will leave it there. Thank you so much, Sarah. I'm gonna stretch this right to the end. We can take probably one or two questions from the audience. I see a hand there. I'm not gonna waste any time. Maybe we could take the question there and then there on your way down. Thank you. Hi, thank you. Two quick questions. My name is Yvonne Gichawa. I work mostly on the Sahel and particularly on the Minusma. And I have a question for Sarah, another one for Andrea. For Sarah, I think Mali is a very interesting case these days with regards to the authoritarian shift of the government. My impression right now is that Mali is following a trajectory that makes it increasingly inimical to Minusma's operations. And Minusma is in a situation where it cannot absolutely do anything for the reasons that you said because Minusma as a UN peacekeeping mission is very pro-state. And so what happens in these situations where we are clearly into a stalemate where Mali can stop Minusma from doing almost anything it is supposed to do? And for Andrea, again, Minusma is an interesting case with respect to diversity. It's been interpreted very much Minusma as the return of some European countries to peacekeeping and notably the Dutch. And there's been some qualitative research lately showing that the return of Europeans and the Dutch in particular and the distribution of roles within the institutions within Minusma has created some sort of structural imbalances between contingents from the Global South and the Europeans who have very high standards with regard to medical evacuation. For example, we see that right now the Germans are reconsidering their involvement because they don't have the protection that they used to have since the departure of the French. So there's almost some sort of even systemic racism, arguably, within Minusma right now. And so how does that connect with your argument, which seems very, very positive about diversity within the peacekeeping mission? Thanks. Thank you for those questions. We're gonna collect one more question over there and I'm looking for other hands. And we have one more hand in the back and then we'll go to our panelists. Please, go ahead. Great, thank you so much. Omar McDomb, London School of Economics. Thank you for coming and just sharing the work that from your very different worlds. I very much appreciate it and thank you, Adam. That was also quite a breathtaking set of insights impacting to a very short space of time. A question for Bethany and a question for Andrea. So Bethany, I'm a researcher, so forgive this question because I have great respect for people who are on the front lines and in the trenches during real peacebuilding work. But I did want to pick up on Adam's comment about the risk of doing harm and making sure that your interventions go the way that you wish them. And the question I had was to do with the issue of integration in ethnically divided societies such as Myanmar. The debate that we have in the global north is usually one between assimilationist policies and multiculturalist policies. And anybody who's been an observer of that debate will know that largely the multiculturalist debate is dying with not dead at this point. And the issue there has been largely because the celebration of these ethnic differences which I suppose the promotion of mother-based education you're involved in in Myanmar, that that actually hurts integration. So I wondered where you sat or what you thought about this issue in the context of Myanmar specifically. Assimilationist policies which are aimed to eliminate differences in the interests of building a national identity versus more multiculturalist policies which emphasize the ethnic differences. Andrea, I'm going to be less gentle with you since you're a fellow researcher. So I'm going to ask the question of just selection bias in your results which I'm certain that you've anticipated. So for those cases where you do find that there is diversity that leads to greater effectiveness, is it not possible that those missions which attract, those missions which are more dangerous are likely to attract countries that are not willing to provide soldiers that are combat hardened. So you're simply getting a selection bias effect in the results. Excellent questions, thank you. And we'll take one last set of questions from the middle and the back and then we'll turn to our panelists. Actually, my question has been asked already, so thank you. Fantastic, great. All right, colleagues, Andrea, do you want to go first? Sure, so thank you for the question about Mali. So actually Kara Rufa has done a lot of qualitative work and she's also over here. I think you're putting your finger on one issue that maybe actually, in fact, in our chapter when we discuss Mali, there are issues but the statistical indicator, it doesn't maybe picking that up because most of the peacekeepers are coming from the global south. So what you're showing is that actually, I'm not saying outlier, but some trends in few mission where there have been some peacekeepers from the global north. In fact, there is some literature that is showing that the diversity, it matters and helps in terms of norms, religious and linguistic, but maybe if there is large socioeconomic diversity, can create problems and I have something also with Vincenzo Bove about that. Omar, yes, this is a big issue, is a big question. One story is that actually on the diversity within blue helmets, the heterogeneity is not predicted by the level of violence. So that would be an important problem. However, we take with a pinch of salt the variation with the leadership because actually that is much trickier to make a point the leadership does not change with the variation of violence. Vincenzo Bove recently has published more work on that and tried to find some way to find some identification. I have to say and I have to admit that this is something that partially we address, but also we wanna make the point that we think that as researcher, we wanna push an issue that is the composition and even though we've not resolved completely all the possible endogeneity issue, this agenda actually has been opened up and smarter colleague than me that are trying maybe to challenge my results and show that the reason reverse causality but so far it seems that diversity still matters at least within the blue helmets. Thank you very much. Bethany, you had a question as well. Thanks very much for that question and I think it's a very pertinent question. The short answer is that I would sit on the multicultural side of that answer but I think what I wanna emphasize is some of the work that we've been doing is on mother tongue based multilingual education and I think that's really critical in this because what we're talking about is actually it's supporting the learning, using mother tongue, especially at the initiation in the early years and research has shown that that is you have the best learning outcomes with the use of the language that children are most comfortable in at the start of school. But then there's a transition. As you go through the school system, you're transitioning into the second language and into a third language. And so it's not mother tongue to the exclusion of the Burmese majority language. It's actually saying we'll start with the first language, we add another language and then we add on a third language or even a fourth. I mean, some parts of Myanmar, they speak eight, nine languages. So I think it is a really, it's one of the key grievances. So again, coming back to that do no harm principles, for those ethnic groups that have been in conflict for decades, one of their core areas of grievances has not been the respect for their language and their culture. And I think being able to promote that, being able to support that learning in a way that allows for that diversity to come through and ultimately the better learning outcomes for children. And I think that's where it comes in around drawing on global research and evidence from a diverse range of countries to be able to say, actually, we do think this is going to deliver better results for children in the long run. But of course, again, there are additional challenges within that, particularly around those minorities, within the minorities. And so with 121 different languages, it's, yeah, there's a long way to go and potential I suppose for doing harm, particularly for those minorities that we have to be very aware of and very conscious towards. Thank you so much. Sarah, you have the final word. Great, thank you. Thank you for the question about Mali. Very, very relevant example. I sort of wish we could expand our report as in part two to include some other countries. So, I mean, it's not the only place where we've seen the leverage of the UN just absolutely plummet over time. And I think there's a few sort of steps to think through. So the first is, are there other sources of leverage the UN can identify to use over the incumbent government? The answer may be yes, the answer may be no. I think we could probably think a little more creatively than we do, but in general, I think that's step number one. I think the next thing is to think more broadly, are there other constellations of peace building that would work better? I mean, there is a tendency to think, oh, UN peacekeeping operation, it's not always the right thing. So, starting to think, well, is this what we really should be doing? And that leads to a kind of question that I think is harder for the UN, which is when to know that it's doing more harm than good? I mean, if there is still some good, some protection of civilians, then fine. But at a certain point, has that tilted to the side of harm? And in those cases, can the UN say, okay, we've failed, this is not working, we need to stop? Now, I think that is a difficult step to take. Donors don't like to see no return on their investment and so on, but this is complicated stuff. You're not gonna get a return on your investment every time. And I just think that points to a sort of bigger, harder question, which is not just for the UN, but for all actors in peace building, which is, sometimes we may have to take very difficult decisions about not intervening and not going in, because it's not the right thing. And resources are limited. We could always do more, but there will be times when what we've done was probably wrong right from the beginning. So I think there needs to be more thinking about what it is to fail, what do we do when we fail, but also then, what is success? Who gets to define success? Who gets to say that it has been successful? So that's a sort of broad point to end on, but I think if you go through those steps and find you have no leverage left, then you do need to be quite honest with yourself about whether you're actually creating more damage than doing good. Thank you so much, Sarah. It's a very difficult panel to summarize, and I won't, and we're already 10 minutes over, so thank you all for your patience. Thank you all for sharing your insights. I think throughout the day today, we've heard so much about productive investments, looking for those productive investments in the peace building sector. And I think we certainly haven't solved the question. You've just suggested that perhaps we need to be thinking about investments in a completely different way, but I think we have identified some levers that didn't get much discussion earlier in the day, be it small, really productive investments or focusing on diversity, be it linguistic, cultural, or educational. And I think those are important levers that should get more oxygen in this conversation. So thank you for raising those points. Thank you for spending your time with us. Thank you, audience, for your questions and for your attention. Excellent. Thank you.