 Today in Berlin, we launched a new report entitled Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean. And in a few moments, you're going to hear from six of the experts who are involved in contributing to this study. They're going to be speaking about four subjects. Firstly, they will discuss what kind of evidence and data are available to inform policy and programming in these countries. Secondly, we're going to hear about some new research which looks at some of the risks that migrants face during their journeys through different parts of Africa. Thirdly, we're going to discuss questions relating to migration and its impact on development. And lastly, we're going to look at some of the policy responses in the various countries along the central Mediterranean route to see how those countries have responded to some of the risks that migrants face, but also some of the opportunities that migration presents for those interested in promoting development. Thank you very much, Frank. So what I'm going to do in the next few minutes is I'll quickly run you through the various sections of the volume and highlight what are some of the key findings from each of the four sections. The report does not only showcase or represent what we as IOM know, and this was an incredible team effort involving about 50 different contributors across international organizations, civil society, migrant associations working north and south of the Mediterranean and covers mainly the period between January 2018 and December 2019 before COVID hit. So what we decided to do in spring and in the summer is include a dedicated chapter on the impact of COVID-19 on migration in western North Africa and across the Mediterranean and add also some related COVID adaptations throughout the volume. So the first section covers key migration trends. We have a discussion about the sources of data. Most of the content actually presented in this volume is based on data collected by IOM's displacement tracking matrix and our colleagues in the field and also by the mixed migration center. But we also have other sources of data, national statistics. There is a discussion also about the potential of new data sources such as Facebook data, for instance, to estimate stocks of international migrants in African countries and also open source data and what it can tell us potentially about future migration trends, particularly when it comes to asylum seeking movements to Europe. And that's where from our colleagues at EAS, the European Asylum Support Office. So what are some of the key findings? Well, actually if we look at migrant stocks, migration from Africa is relatively low, particularly in terms of immigration. We're talking about 1.6% of the total population in countries in west and north Africa. But also in terms of emigration, which is moderate but still relatively limited, in terms of reasons for migration, we have a discrepancy between the reasons given by migrants interviewed by our DTM colleagues and MMC colleagues in west and north Africa for the reasons to migrating with a prevalence of migrating for job opportunities, seeking better livelihood opportunities, joining family members and the reasons given by migrants as a rival after the Mediterranean crossing, which points to the fact that the reasons for migrating initially may have been different and the migrants find themselves in very vulnerable situations in countries of transit or first destination. We have also a section on risks, on risks related to migration in these regions, the individual as well as the contextual factors that explain the likelihood of being exposed to certain types of risks. And in terms of some of the key findings in this section, we have in particular that the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and some of the conditions on the journey really affect the exposure to specific types of risks and also the age and level of education and whether people are traveling with family members and duration of the journey are all factors that have an impact on exposure to risk. One of the key findings is also that we need to look at the complexity of migrant smuggling as a phenomenon. And while, yes, migrant smuggling is a crime against states, it is also and sometimes the only livelihood opportunity available to many communities in key countries in Africa and in response to a demand also for services by migrants wanting to cross borders and having no other possibilities or opportunities to do so for lack of safe and regular alternatives. And we also have a discussion of the risks posed by policies established by countries. For instance, the increased politicization of search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, the support provided by the EU to the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy with interceptions and returns to Libya are highly problematic because they expose migrants to arbitrary detention, deportation, abuse and human rights violations. The third section of the report focuses on migration and development. This section in particular deals with immigration and immigration and how they could contribute to or they do contribute to economic and human development. So we have some country perspectives. Again here, aspects of return and reintegration, sustainability of reintegration also and IM's work as part of the safety support and solutions program. And finally, the fourth section deals with migration governance and policy and programming responses. So we have a discussion here of the national, regional and trans-regional policy frameworks affecting migration in these regions. We have a discussion of diaspora policies which are on the rise and the inclusion of immigrants in the way countries think about their citizens and their citizens abroad and what it means to development. The fact that there is a parallel sort of development in terms of on the one hand a tightening and increasing tightening of external border controls in countries on the central Mediterranean route and at the same time a tendency to sort of highlight the free movement areas and expand the framework of rights and included in these free movement agreements in countries in these regions. And chapters in this section also include a discussion of public opinion on migration in countries in West and North Africa as well as IM's project to foster social cohesion and the impact of awareness raising campaigns on the risks of irregular migration which has also been part of this program funded by the UK Foreign Commonwealth Development Office. So we'll have more detailed presentations about some of the chapters in each of the four sections shortly so I will stop here. I wanted to really thank all the colleagues who worked really hard to make the publication possible and all the reviewers for their valuable feedback. Really big thanks. Thank you Frank and Martia for the introduction. This additive volume makes an important contribution to the evidence and research base that is being created under the auspices of the FCDO funded SSS2 program safety support and solutions which is currently in its second phase. Under this program IOM has been working together with other partners to identify and provide essential humanitarian services to migrants particularly vulnerable migrants travelling along the central Mediterranean route in whichever direction that they are moving whether it's south to north, north to south or inter-regionally. A fundamental aspect of this program has been building an evidence and research base to better understand and target our work better. And in that vein we have been documenting migration dynamics along the route through the displacement tracking matrix better understanding vulnerabilities through the mixed migration centres 4MI and supporting the vital collection of data around the lives of those that are so unnecessarily lost in the Mediterranean under the Missing Migrants project. We've also been building the capacities of governments and other migration stakeholders in the western Central Africa region and the MENA region to better utilise the data that they have at their disposal for more effective and relevant policy making. Under outcome 4 of the program we've been undertaking a large scale research project to understand better the decisions that migrants make and the influence if any that development interventions have such as the creation of livelihood opportunities on those decisions. This volume brings together some valuable insight on the complex relationship for example between migration and development and explores the interlinkages in countries along the central Mediterranean route. The SSS2 program has been about promoting partnership and sharing learning so that we can deliver services better to migrants and communities along the central Mediterranean route in that spirit the edited volume has not only brought in contributions from the other SSS2 partners but also key civil society actors and scholars and academics alike. What makes this volume particularly unique is the contributions by scholars from the global south and given the gender dynamics of migration and heightened vulnerabilities by female scholars. As we know there has been a deficit of empirical evidence on migration and related issues in western North Africa limiting the possibility of reaching a more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the migration dynamics at play and to inform effective policy making. I look forward to hearing contributions from colleagues who have contributed to the volume today and look forward to reading the edited volume. Thank you. The greater public and probably politicians remains largely misinformed about migration in North and West Africa. Media reports too often convey an implicit notion that African migration is massive, that migration is a predicament not a blessing that it must be contained not promoted etc etc. So what do we know? The first source of knowledge comes from population censuses and surveys African states have conducted in the last decade that deliver a picture of how many migrants they are originating in what countries and with what individual characteristics. Several features emerge. First, western and northern African states are neither original destination of huge migratory movement On the contrary, immigrants represent only 1.6% and immigrants 3.4% of their combined population which is below the world average of 3.5%. Second, there is considerable diversity in Africa. North African countries have been for decades major migrant-sending countries mostly to Europe. Migration is a dimension of the relationship between the migrant and Europe. On the other side, apart from Libya, these countries are not host to any sizable immigrant population. By contrast, West African countries are the same time origin and destination of mostly regional migration. Migration is for them an outstanding form of regional integration. Third, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya are major destinations for African migrants. With immigrants representing 25% of its resident population, twice as much as in an average new country, Côte d'Ivoire compares with leading countries of immigration in other continent. The situation in Libya is more confusing. Before 2011, the country was like the big oil-producing states of the Middle East, the major employer of migrant workers. At present, despite the political chaos, it still attracts several hundreds of thousands of foreign workers and also migrants in transit for Europe. Fourth, the vast majority of African migrants currently present in other African states are locally employed. They are not in transit for Europe. Fifth, analysis of European data shows that most immigrants from Africa came by air with a visa. Those entered by sea with no visa are a minority. There is much more we would need to know but cannot find using national data. How many people are moving at any moment in time? In other words, how big are migratory flows that are not aware? Under what status? Using what means? Exposed to what risk? Etc. Data collected on the ground by IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix, DTM, and the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative for MI bring a crucial contribution to the quantitative and qualitative knowledge of mobility, displacement and migration model. From the many rounds of DTM Libya, one can extract detailed information about changes in migrant numbers from one round to the next by administrative region in the country, citizenship of the migrants, etc. No administrative system would provide this. Another kind of unique information comes from data for MI collects among smugglers about their incentives, their links to state and non-state actors, and the way they operate on the ground. Before listening to presentation by authors from DTM and for MI, I would like to highlight the characteristics of both systems of data collection. For obvious reasons of limited means, data collected by DTM and for MI cannot be representative of the whole migrant population. In particular, for lack of means to cover the entire territory, DTM and for MI operate in selected places, such as strategic transit hubs, points with the high concentration of displaced people, or busy border crossings. By doing so, they provide an incomplete picture, but at the same time they gather information about migrants, their experience, history and plans that no other system has. Another difference with state-run statistical systems is the use of respondents. Because the entire population of people on the move cannot be interviewed, they are too many. Selected individuals in the population or external informants respond on behalf of the migrants. Again, this provides access to a kind of qualitative information that no other statistical system collects. A particularly interesting kind of information collected at the ground is the reason why people migrate. Among migrants interviewed in Africa, job seeking, family and study are the main motivations, while fling conflict or persecution and searching international protection do not emerge as frequent causes. First, the need for protection is the most common motive declared by African migrants who arrive regularly in Europe after having crossed the Mediterranean Sea. The discrepancy between reasons given in Africa and those given once in Europe informs among other things on how plans may change during the journey due to conditions faced along the route. We have much more to say about what we already know about migration in Western North Africa, but my time is now exhausted. Thank you. I'd like to present for you the chapter contribution towards the first section of the edited volume on key migration trends. This is trends and evolving patterns along the central and western Mediterranean routes. We had two main questions we wanted to approach. The first one being what were major monthly trends and arrivals, specifically in this period between 2018 and the first half or January to June of 2019. And this is registered arrivals of migrants and refugees. And the second question that we wanted to address was are there signs of potential shift or re-rooting between two routes over time? And the specific routes that we were looking at were the central Mediterranean route, which is arrivals to Spain in the context of this chapter and also the central Mediterranean route, which was arrivals to Italy within the context of this chapter. So to give you a bit of background context in which the analysis of the survival data is taking place, we want to mark that 2015 marked the highest number of registered arrivals of migrants and refugees in comparison to subsequent years, which saw a declining trend. So just keep in mind that this is against the backdrop of our analysis of the declining trend up to the first half of 2019 in this chapter. Also for a bit more context, we'd like to make a note that the eastern Mediterranean route or the EMR was the most active of the three routes, specifically in this period under review in our chapter. However, we chose to focus on the WMR and the CMR specifically because some of that evidence or the signs of potential re-rooting among certain nationalities was more apparent over time between these two routes. And finally, as a last contextual note, we want to point out that between the start of 2017 and August 2019, over 90 percent of migration flows in Western Central Africa, WCA, were inter-regional or within the same country. And please just be aware that these data don't represent the total mobility patterns in two years. So when we talk about total monthly trends within possible changes over time within the specific period of review, the key note worth highlighting is that in contrast to 2017, the CMR shifted from being the more active route than the WMR by mid-2018. So to contextualize that, between the second half of 2018 and up to June 2019, overall migration trends along the CMR and the WMR show a higher number of rivals to Spain than to Italy in most months. And that is in comparison to 2017. Now as Marzia had pointed out in her introduction of launch, most of these contributions were contributed prior to much of the restrictions of COVID-19. So we'd just like to point out that trends after June 2019 have continued to evolve. And since the start of 2020, Italy now receives more rivals than Spain. And now just to quickly dig into those key findings of the second question that was raised in our chapter, any indications of potential re-reading of certain nationalities over time. Within our period under review, we did indeed find evidence of potential indications of this re-reading, observed among certain migrant and refugee nationalities to Italy and Spain. And this was particularly pronounced among the Mayan and Mongolian nationals. However, in the chapter itself, we also provide some discussion of this also being more pronounced among Senegalese and Ivorian nationals as well, noting that nationality is as declared by the migrants and refugees. Now again, re-during the context that in this time period under review, over 90% of these flows within WCA were inter-regional or within country. So the graph that you see on the slide is simply as an example of illustration for you so that you can possibly see in a visual way how this re-reading is somewhat evident between 2017 up to the first half of June 2019. But as I want to keep within my time limits, I'll quickly finish my portion with some closing messages. Just emphasizing that again, this was a very specific timeframe under review in our chapter. So a lot can still be said of ongoing evolutions and trends post June 2019 and certainly after the COVID-19 pandemic as we see that this COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted the mobility of migrants and refugees. So I encourage you to look at the resources on our various web platforms as well as the chapter on COVID-19 and the volume itself for more context there. And all of this is to say that what's really important to value is that analysis that's needed to inform humanitarian agencies and authorities to adopt better programming and context-specific analysis and just bearing in mind that mobility trends as I mentioned along the CMR and the WMR are frequently changing so do require constant monitoring. And thank you very much. I believe that's all of my time and I'm happy to pass on to my fellow presenters. Protection violations in Libya have been extensively documented by organizations like OHCHR, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and a recent MMC and UNHCR joint report launched just this summer provides an overview of the extent of violations that refugees and migrants face across Libya. But with this chapter, which is based on a more extended MMC study, we wanted to examine what determines vulnerability and what are the characteristics of refugees and migrants or strategies that they're undertaking that might be making them more vulnerable to protection violations and abuses. And when I say protection violations I'm including sexual or physical abuse, robbery, kidnapping, detention, and even death. This study draws on more than 5,600 surveys collected by MMC with refugees and migrants in Libya through our global data collection project operation called 4MI, discussed extensively so far. Surveys were collected by enumerators who are refugees and migrants and have unique access to people on the move. And for our chapter on smuggling along the CMR, we used data for more than 300 interviews. So to build our model for what determines protection, we draw a lot on the vulnerability work already carried out by our IOM colleagues. And this allowed us to test a number of hypotheses about gender, age, how one interacted with smugglers in determining vulnerability. So we'll split up these findings into three areas. Factors or characteristics that are associated with greater vulnerability. Factors or measures that seem to mitigate vulnerability and where we didn't see evidence of any impact. So first, in terms of factors that increased vulnerability, we found in our sample that refugees and migrants from Chad, Eritrea, and Nigerians were particularly vulnerable to protection abuses in Libya. We also found that women were more vulnerable to sexual abuse, but for all other protection violations men appeared more vulnerable. Younger respondents were more vulnerable. And those refugees and migrants who worked along the route to finance the journey versus those who used digital means to secure money or carried the cash that they need were more vulnerable. And as well as the way that they paid smugglers. So paying smugglers through work seemed to make our respondents more vulnerable. This is as opposed to working out a payment modality with your smuggler where you would pay upon safe arrival or paying half at departure and another half on arrival. That seemed to be a strategy that actually mitigated the vulnerability of our respondents. And accessing money through digital money transfer to finance the various steps of the journey was another mitigation measure. And where we didn't see any evidence in respect to religion or carrying cash. So to bring in some of our insights from the smuggling chapter we found that more than two thirds of the people that we spoke to in Libya and a half in West Africa reported using a smuggler on their journey. And refugees and migrants in North Africa were more often encouraged to move by a smuggler than those in West Africa who were more often encouraged to move by friends or family. And that smugglers in Libya are among the perpetrators of protection violations. And in West Africa 9% of protection abuses were or contributed were perpetrated by smugglers. So to close now with the few seconds I have left based on these two chapters we've come up with a few key recommendations. So first for programming the importance of using a roots-based approach to develop and implement protection programming. So moving out of this single country focus consider options for digital cash programming and devise information campaigns along the route on safer option options and practices and make information shareable on social media because elsewhere in our forum I data we see how important social media and the internet is for obtaining information about the journey. For policy engaging local civil society actors and Libyan authorities to promote a domestic legal framework for refugees and migrants that focuses on protection irrespective of legal status. And the fact that smugglers have different profiles which warrants a more nuanced policy approach that moves beyond criminalization and the distinction between people on the move and their smugglers is less clear cut than the way it's often portrayed in public discourse and anti-smuggling policies and of course expanding research and data collection on refugee and migrant protection in Libya especially with respect to designing longitudinal studies. Thank you very much and I will now pass it off to Lara. In my five minutes I'd like to share what we have been doing at DTM in Europe and in particular what we have been doing monitoring flows and arrivals and updating profiles to those reaching Italy, Greece, Spain and other European countries over the past five years. And overall what we wanted to do was to look at individual risk factors and contextual conditions at origin in transit countries in a destination that might have determined higher or lower levels of vulnerability along the journey for these migrants and in particular I wanted to understand whether there are different characteristics associated to different routes for migrants which are the most prevailing factors associated with vulnerability to a selected set of experiences of abuse, violence and exploitation. As you see in the next slide overall a share between 66 and 77% of respondents each year has answered yes one of four indicators that we have included in the survey specifically so individual experiences of forced work having been held against will having been work without payment and having been offered an arranged marriage. Overall what we found is that age and sex affect the probability of experiences of abuse with younger and male respondents being more vulnerable to experiences of unpaid or forced work and have been held against will. And also we saw that the vulnerability of migrants to this set of indicators has increased over time so between 2016 and 2018 and especially for those travelling through Libya against all the others that didn't pass through that country and for those originating in western Africa and the eastern of Africa compared to other regions of origin. I think that the analysis that we have been doing provide us with many suggestions on how to best deal with the central Mediterranean routes and manage immigration along that route and complementing what I just said regular migration channels are not available for many prospective migrants from Africa and elsewhere to Europe of course looking at the Mediterranean more specifically we are lacking a comprehensive mechanism of search and rescue and desert medication at the European level which is putting more risks on the shoulders of those crossing the Mediterranean and also there is clearly more room for a comprehensive protection system for those reaching Italy at the end or other European countries who are all survivors of these dangerous routes for programming aspects of course we need to and looking again to Europe because we covered more what happens before Europe maybe we need to be very specific in distinguishing the risk associated with men, women and children in terms of abuse and exploitation, violence and trafficking of course and we need to have a route-based approach understanding the differences that different routes entail and a human rights-based approach because there are many that are still falling through the cracks of the existing protection system in European countries in general and for research avenues in the future of course there is a lot of possibilities to connect micro level studies as ours on both sides of the Mediterranean and maybe more interesting is even the possibility to connect this micro level evidence with policy changes in Europe in departure countries and in transit countries because this can allow us as humanitarian actors to understand how the changes are happening along these routes and how the needs also of the migrants are changing and how different groups might become more or less vulnerable while travelling towards Europe I stop here but I'm happy to reply to more questions maybe in the end, thank you Good afternoon, I present to you our presentation on migration across West Africa, development-related aspects Myself, Peter Porte, Mary Sontrana, and then Cynthia Ruppi Tegu Part of migration is felt at different levels that no matter the level of development countries in West Africa could reach, there are citizens who also migrate although their motives to volume and impact may differ the net benefit of migration in our view is positive if it's well managed the institution of tech wars in the adoption of these protocols on free movement of persons have indeed facilitated the development of these amongst member states so the key question with us is what are the linkages between migration and development in the West African sub-region we use data source, we use World Bank and UN agencies data so key tenets of our presentation are the issue of brain drain, brain gain transnational linkages in return migration and development, migration associations and development, migrants contribute to development now let me tend to brain gain, brain drain, etc the negative perception of migration which stems from the features of brain drain has been again following contemporary migration within the West African region due to its transnational nature West African migration and AIDS migrants contribute their power skills to the development of the home country either on temporary or permanent return basis migrants certainly establish businesses in their home country, they create jobs for the left behind family we have shown in the chat revetances and high supplementing household income they are invested in accommodation and education among others more than half of West African countries represent at least 5% of their gross domestic products as we can see in terms of migrant associations and development, we notice that West African migrants form associations along the lines of their profession, their religion and ethnicity among others these associations can be found in the USA, Canada, UK, Netherlands Germany, to be seen by a few these associations contribute infrastructure development such as schools, hospitals in their home country they also support new and arrived migrants to integrate into the host country migrants help in developing their home country businesses creating employment and many others they also help to contribute to cultural diversity in the host country so you can see in the chat some local food items sold in international markets in conclusion migration within and outside of Africa subregion brings enormous benefit to both the home and the host countries especially if it is world managed therefore we recommend that government in their subregions harmonize migration policies across their region to maximize its benefits while reducing the cost of migration be it regular or irregular we also encourage governments on the SDG indicators 10 and 17 respectively to increase the volume of remittances by reducing the cost of remittances we also recommend that increased education awareness on the dangers of irregular migration and they need to promote regular migration which needs to development thank you very much most states in west and north Africa and in Europe are part of the movement areas however, borders remain important in this presentation we are going to look at how to answer towards lifting into regional border controls and towards tightening external border controls have existed in the last years and how they have influenced regional and transregional migration governance in west and north Africa and in Europe most states in these three regions are part of the movement areas in the economic community of west African states the protocol on free movement of persons on the right of residence and the establishment has been adopted already in 1979 and has free movement policies were later mainstreamed in other policies of the region such as the common approach of migration of the ECHOROS in the European Union as well the free movement of persons was already enshrined in the treaty of Rome and has later been mainstreamed also by the treaty of Maastricht and by the Schengen Agreement in west Africa and in Europe free movement policies have contributed to facilitate mobility within regions which is much more prevalent than mobility between regions they have also testified to a political recognition that this mobility is essential for social and economic integration and for development in north Africa free movement was foreseen by the treaty establishing the Arab Maghreb Union but related policies have yet to be adopted at the continental level as well will to extend the free movement policies exist and it has been present in the work of the African Union since the beginning years ago in 2018 it has gained momentum with the adoption of the protocol on free movement of persons and the right of residents and establishment however national borders remain important in fact divergent interests at the national level have rendered it sometimes difficult to advance on the implementation of free movement policies and to agree on migration governance in free movement areas these national differences have been partially related to social economic divergences between member states and to different migration related interests that have been linked to different aspects such as demographic trends different migration and remittances flows labour market needs or geographical locations the impact can be seen in north Africa for example where and as we already mentioned they have hindered or slowed down the progress on free movement policies and their adoptions in the ECOWAS they have so far hindered the full implementation of the protocol of 79 and in the European Union they have rendered it difficult for member states to agree on migration governance within the union and they have led member states to progressively increase their efforts on immigration control at the external border of the union these simultaneous trends towards lifting inter-regional border controls have led to inter-regional dependencies immigration policy negotiations in particular we see that migration governance in west and north Africa has been increasingly influenced by policy negotiations inside the European Union this has taken place both directly from inter-regional policy negotiations but also indirectly as what is negotiated within one region can contribute to shift the focus of the negotiations between two or more regions we also see that trans-regional policy negotiations as well have not been always easy as here as well we can see that there are different national and regional interests and different competencies on migration, development and security we are now reaching the conclusion of this very short presentation and maybe we can move to the next slide we have seen that the progressive adoption and implementation of the movement policies has taken place in parallel with a maintained importance of national borders in some cases also with a trend towards tackling external border controls this has influenced the negotiation of regional and trans-regional migration governance in west and north Africa and in Europe the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic can be expected to have an impact on these policy negotiations at regional and trans-regional level as well because they may also contribute to reshape national migration-related interests to conclude here in the slide you also see the link to the chapter for download, thank you migration governance understood as a well-defined set of rules, principles and decision-making procedures that apply to immigrants and immigrants is recent in most of Africa on the other side as soon as independent states were born in the 1960s a number of questions called for the definition of policies that became building blocks of what we now consider to be migration policies the first question is who belongs to the national frameworks of rights and duties and who does not defining nationals was a funding act for all nations all north and west African states adopted a principle of nationality transmission by descent a son or daughter of a national is a national with the passing of time, members of migrants grew and states had to make decisions on issues such as the right to nationality in virtue of one's place of birth naturalization in the course of one's life citizenship etc they brought very diverse responses to that question besides defining nationals states had to decide what rights and duties non-nationals on their territory would be granted thereby doing what we call today integration policies the earliest immigration policy was could be were declaring in 1963 land belongs the second question is how do states engage with their citizens abroad making expatriate nationals the resource for their country of origin emerged as a common principle of diaspora policies designed by African states as early as the 1990s institutions linking expatriates and African states institutions linking expatriates and their country of origin were established special programs to attract migrant remittances and foreign direct investment were designed the third question is how to organize national communities abroad maintaining the sense of belonging to their nation of origin among members of the diaspora became a challenge with the rise of second generation migrants in particular those originating from the mega revenue states of origin took several measures from fostering cultural links through language courses and religious education delivered to children of migrants in Europe to recognizing political rights to non-resident nationals including the right to elect and in certain cases the right to be elected is how to deal with irregular migration in parallel with a force to incorporate expatriate nationals into citizenry African states have built up instruments to remove and document it for nationals from their territory again this is an old concern laws on entry and stay passed soon after independence all for so punishments for foreign nationals with unlawful status later on when irregular migration and cross-border smuggling gave momentum in the early 2000 African states define new categories of offenses and tighten the fight against smuggling and trafficking in human beings in 2003 Morocco became the first country to introduce a specific law against irregular migration penalizing not only migrants with an irregular status entering or living in the country but also undocumented migrants exiting the country and those facilitating irregular migration in the same period several European states started to rely on third countries to stop undocumented migrants before they reached a European border negotiating the admission of migrants with an irregular status became part of broader cooperation agreements between African and European states many other questions would call responses resorting to migration policies but I won't take much more of your time indeed Canary Islands which actually are not Mediterranean roots so it's the western Atlantic but we covered that area and we try to grasp news on data and on arrivals there from colleagues that are in Taiyum Spain and indeed there has been an increase of arrivals from Moroccan coasts but also from Mauritania because we have been seeing different types of boats reaching the Canary Islands and up until now it's around 4,000 migrants arrived to Canary Islands this year which makes this like 30% of total arrivals for Spain this year and it's indeed a bit more than it was last year in 2018 it's not completely new because there have been past periods looking at the past decade or 20 years ago that this kind of route has been used more and we are looking at trends there and also the nationalities that arrive to the Canaries instead of traveling from Morocco to Spain by sea in the Mediterranean, thank you so we have another question about what consideration was given to having a sensitive approach to data presentation the classic debate on invasion areas or maps and the impact of those on negative perceptions of migrants and alternatives I can say and perhaps also my co-editors would like to say something about this issue is the entire aim of the volume that is moving away from portraying African migration as predominantly a phenomenon of African migration to Europe and showing what is happening within Africa, within regions in Africa and all the related aspects, the risk development and governance aspects and the salient features of migration within this region so it's exactly because of that the safety support and solutions program is focusing on what is happening in countries on the route so yes obviously the program also had this part in the Central Mediterranean route and what happens across the Mediterranean and that is part obviously of African migration but it's just a small part of a much larger story that we hope has been conveyed all the contributions that we have including contributions from our colleagues working in the field and experts from the countries and regions covered by this volume and the last thing I'm going to say about this is that we also have a chapter on perceptions of migrants and migration in Africa which is usually not really a topic that we talk about yes there is a dearth of data but there are also African barometer surveys covering this topic and so we try to address what do people think about migration in these countries and then the big other topic would be what do people think about emigration maybe that hasn't really been addressed by existing surveys and we also have a chapter on projects implemented by IOM and other colleagues in the field to foster social cohesion in our chapter we make sure not to include graphs with errors we opt instead for the option of including circles which represents better in terms of proportion and overall data in terms of yes proportions and shares which we feel is a much better approach as it's a more descriptive approach which is indicative of conclusions and findings but not presenting conclusions in and of themselves or conclusive statements and if you do look at our displacement.iom.int website as well as the migration.iom.int and agenda colleagues I know that your platform is similar we do not opt to use maps with errors we do opt to use the maps with spheres instead so I hope it's just a very quick and concise answer of course the map is completely misleading and it is written in the volume itself when you feature arrows starting from the Gulf of Guinea crossing the whole of West Africa to Libya and then crossing the Mediterranean this does not go into any real migration of course there are routes in Africa but these routes are traveled from South to North but also from North to South these routes are separate segments of a number of diverse flows within Africa which have absolutely nothing to do with crossing with no passport so we pay a lot of attention to this in the volume and I'm pretty sure that if we did a mistake on this please let us know clearly we try to show that African migration is much more complex than the simplistic view that a number of media try to convey of the invasion of Europe etc so we pay much attention to the data not to the invented data a reference has been made today to the safety, support and solutions to program SSS2, when it was first designed SSS2 was a 75 million pounds multi-sector, multi-country humanitarian program in West and North Africa that provides protection support for people on the move together with a range of research and data and evidence components recent funding reductions have lowered the overall amount but the scope and the goal of the work remains the same it goes without saying that FCDO's partners are crucial to the implementation of our humanitarian strategy and our program work and I was very happy to see that Tauhid mentioned the importance of partnerships in his opening remarks IOM is the only partner working across all SSS2 outcomes and all focus countries which highlights their importance as a partner we're also very fortunate to be able to draw on the expertise that exists within the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre GIMDAC as part of that support we're proud to have supported GIMDAC on specific projects over the last number of years and in particular on the work that has gone into this edited volume FCDO also funds data collection and analysis and research carried out by NGO partners such as the Danish Refugee Council and its Mixed Migration Centre and we're very pleased to see the coordination that has occurred between IOM and MMC in particular under outcome 3 of SSS2 we are looking to enhance the understanding of key actors so here I'm talking about national and international humanitarian organizations governments and donors of who moves and where they move as well as the vulnerabilities and protection concerns of people on the move this information should then feed into humanitarian decision making in order to make people's journeys safer the edited volume should therefore be an excellent tool to achieve this end the breadth of topics covered in the volume is impressive enough in itself and we've heard some of the detail from the speakers today it was great to hear ILA mention the root-based approach, something which is the cornerstone of SSS2 the topics that are covered show the complexity of migration issues and the multi-pronged approach that migration actors must be cognizant of the topics cover some more obvious but important areas such as data management and use migration policy and programming and the inherent risks people on the move face but I believe its investigations into the development considerations of migration in particular are crucial it shows that migration issues are not short term and that humanitarian actors need to take a broader view when supporting people on the move coming from a donor's perspective finally I'd like to touch on two areas that I believe are important for the edited volume and that is its impact and the sustainability of interventions that it examines with regard to impact we are aware that research, excuse me we are aware that partners working under outcome 3 of SSS2 face challenges in measuring the impact of data and evidence programming indeed we have funded MMC to look at this exact issue and they produced a paper earlier this year called evidence-based operational responses to mixed migration challenges and best practice I would encourage all implementing partners on this webinar to use research such as the edited volume to inform both your existing programs and future funding applications evidence-based work is hugely important to FCDO and to other donors too finally regarding the sustainability of SSS2 and projects such as the edited volume we hope that through our SSS2 funding and the championing of the root-based approach we have created a solid foundation from which to build we hope this will lead to the continuation of this work and that it will be built upon to ensure that people on the move in North and West Africa continue to receive high quality support and assistance