 18 On the Blue Nile. The authority of the Caliphah and the strength of his army were forever broken on the 2nd of September, and the battle of Omderman is the natural climax of this tale of war. To those who fought, and still more to those who fell, in the subsequent actions the climax came somewhat later. After the victory the public interest was no longer centred in the Sudan. The last British battalion had been carried north of Aswan, the last press correspondent had hurried back to Cairo or London, but the military operations were by no means over. The enemy had been defeated, it remained to reconquer the territory. The dervishes of the provincial garrisons still preserved their allegiance to the Caliphah. Several strong Arab forces kept the field. Distant Kordafan and even more distant Darfur were as quite yet unaffected by the great battle at the confluence of the Niles. There were rumours of Europeans in the far south. The unquestioned command of the waterways which the Sardar enjoyed enabled the greater part of the Egyptian Sudan to be at once formally re-occupied. All towns or stations on the main rivers and their tributaries were at the mercy of the gun-boats. It was only necessary to send troops to occupy them and to hoist the British and Egyptian flags. Two expeditions were forthwith set up the white and blue Niles to establish garrisons and as far as possible to subdue the country. The first, under the personal command of the Sardar, left Amderman on the 8th of September and steamed up the white Nile towards Vashoda. The events which followed that momentous journey have already been related. The second expedition consisted of the gun-boats Sheikh and Hafir together with two companies and the brass band of the 10th Sudanese and a maxim battery, all under the command of General Hunter. Leaving Amderman on the 19th of September they started up the blue Nile to Abu Haraz. The rest of the 10th battalion followed as soon as other steamers were set free from the business of taking the British division to the Atabara and bringing supplies to Amderman. The progress of the expedition up the river resembled a triumphal procession. The people of the riparian villages assembled on the banks and partly from satisfaction at being relieved from the oppression of the Khalifa and the scourge of war, partly from fear, and partly from wonder, gave vent to loud and long-continued cheers. As the gun-boats advanced the inhabitants escorted them along the bank, the men dancing and waving their swords, and the women uttering shrill cries of welcome. The reception of the expedition when places of importance were passed and the crowd amounted to several thousands, is described as very stirring, and, we are told, such was the enthusiasm of the natives that they even broke up their houses to supply the gun-boats with wood for fuel. Whether this be true or not, I cannot tell, but it is in any case certain that the vessels were duly supplied, and that the expedition in its progress was well received by the Nigroid tribes, who had long resented the tyranny of the Arabs. On the 22nd of September a considerable part of the army of Azman-Digna, which had not been present at the Battle of Omderman, was found encamped on the Ghazira, a few miles north of Rafa'e. The shakes and emirs, on being summoned by General Hunter, surrendered, and a force of about two thousand men laid down their arms. Musa-Digna, a nephew of Azman and the commander of his forces, was put in irons and held prisoner. The rest, who were mostly from this Swahkan district, were given a safe conduct and told to return to their homes, and order they lost no time in obeying. The next day the general arrived at Wad Medina, where the dervish garrison, one thousand strong, had already surrendered to the gun-boat shake. These men, who were regular dervishes, were transported in sailing-boats to Omderman, and augmented the number of prisoners of war already collected. On the 29th of September General Hunter reached Rosaries, four hundred miles south of Khartoum, and the extreme limit of steam navigation on the Blue Nile. By the 3rd of October he had established garrisons of the 10th Sudanese in Rosaries, at Kharkoj, at Senar, the old seat of the government of the province, and at Wad Medina. Having also arranged for gun-boat patrolling, he returned to Omderman. But there was one dervish force which had no intention of surrendering to the invaders, and whose dispersal was not accomplished until three fierce and critical actions had been fought. Ahmed Fadil, a zealous and devoted adherent of the Khalifa, had been sent, after the defeat on the Atabara, to collect all the dervishes who could be spared from the Gadarif and Galabat provinces, and bring them to join the growing army at Omderman. The Amir had faithfully discharged his duty, and he was hurrying to his master's assistance with a strong and well-disciplined force of no fewer than 8,000 men when, while yet sixty miles from the city, he received the news of the stricken field. He immediately halted, and sought to hide the disaster from his soldiers by announcing that the Khalifa had been victorious, and no longer needed their assistance. He even explained the appearance of gun-boats upon the river by saying that these had run past the batteries at Omderman, and that the others were destroyed. The truth was not, however, long concealed, for a few days later two emissaries, dispatched by Slatin, arrived at the dervish camp, and announced the destruction of the Omderman army, the flight of the Khalifa, and the fall of the city. The messengers were authorized to offer Ahmed terms, but that implacable dervish flew into a rage, and having shot one, sent the other, covered with insults and stripes, to tell the Turks that he would fight to the bitter end. He then struck his camp, and marched back along the east bank of the Blue Nile, with the intention of crossing the river near its confluence with the Rahad, and so joining the Khalifa in Kordofan. His dervishes, however, did not view this project with satisfaction. Their families and women had been left with large stores of grain and ammunition in Gadarif, under a strong garrison of three thousand men. They urged their commander to return and collect these possessions. Ahmed at first refused, but when on arriving at the place of passage he found himself confronted with a gunboat, he resolved to make a virtue of necessity, and set out leisurely for Gadarif. On the 5th of September Colonel Parsons, in command of the forces at Kasala, heard through the Italian governor of Eritrea of the victory at Amderman. The next day official news arrived from England, and in conformity with previous instructions he set out on the 7th for Gadarif. It was known that Ahmed Fadil had marched towards Amderman. It was believed that Gadarif was only weakly held, and the opportunity of cutting the most powerful remaining dervish army from its base was too precious to be neglected. But the venture was desperate. The whole available strength of the Kasala garrison was mustard, with these thirteen hundred and fifty motley soldiers, untried, little disciplined, worn with weighting and wasted by disease, without cavalry, artillery or machine guns, and with only seven British officers including the doctor. Gadarif was taken, and having been taken, was held. After two long marches Colonel Parsons and his force arrived at El Fasher, on the right bank of the Atbara. Their advance, which had hitherto led them through a waterless desert, was now checked by a raging torrent. The river was in full flood, and a channel of deep water, broader than the Thames below London Bridge, and racing along at seven miles an hour, formed a serious obstacle. Since there were no boats the soldiers began forthwith to construct rafts from barrels that had been brought for the purpose. As soon as the first of these was completed it was sent on a trial trip. The result was not encouraging. The raft supported ten men, occupied five hours in the passage, was carried ten miles downstream, and came back for its second journey on the afternoon of the next day. It was evident that this means of transport was out of the question. The only chance of success, indeed, of safety, lay in the force reaching and taking Gadarov before the return of Ahmed Fadil. All depended upon speed, yet here was a hopeless delay. After prolonged discussion it was resolved to act on the suggestion of an Egyptian officer and endeavored to build boats. The work proved easier than was anticipated. The elastic wood of the Mimosa scrub supplied the frames, some tarpaulins, fortunately available, formed the outer covering. The Egyptian soldiers, who delighted in the work, succeeded in making daily from such materials one boat capable of carrying two tons, and in these ingenious contrivances the whole force crossed to the further bank. The camels, mules, and horses of the transport, their heads supported with inflated water-skins tied under their jowls, were made to swim across the river by the local Shukriya Arabs. Such was the skill of these tribesmen that only one camel and one mule were drowned during the operation. The passage was completed on the 16th, and the next day the advance was resumed along the west bank of the Atbara. At midday on the 18th Mugata was reached, and at dawn on the 20th the little force, having filled their water-skins, tightened their belts, and invoked the assistance of the various gods they worshipped, started off and marched all day in single file through the thick bush which lies between the Atbara and Gadarif. The column retired to rest peacefully during the night of the 21st, although within twelve miles of Gadarif. But at midnight startling news arrived. A deserter from the dervishes made his way into the camp and informed Colonel Parsons that the Amir Sa'adallah awaited him with thirty-five hundred men, two miles before the town. The situation was grave. A retreat through the broken country and thick bush in the face of a powerful and triumphant enemy seemed impossible. There was no alternative but to attack. Very early on the morning of the 22nd, the same day on which General Hunter on the Blue Nile was compelling Musa Digna and his followers to surrender, Colonel Parsons and the Qasala column set forth to march into Gadarif and to fight whatever force it might contain. For the first two hours the road lay through Dura plantations and high grass which rose above the heads even of men mounted on camels. But as the town was approached, the Dura ceased, and the troops emerged from the jungle on to an undulating moorland with occasional patches of rushes and withered grass. At half-past seven and about three miles from Gadarif the enemy's scouts were encountered. A few shots were fired. The soldiers pressed their march, and at eight o'clock had reached a small knoll from the top of which an extensive view was obtainable. The column halted, and Colonel Parsons and his officers ascended the eminence to Reconoiter. A most menacing spectacle confronted them. Firstly a mile away a strong force of dervishes was rapidly advancing to meet the invaders. Four lines of white figures rising out of the grass showed by their length the number and by their regularity the discipline of the enemy. The officers computed the strength of their antagonists at not fewer than four thousand. Subsequent investigation has shown that the Amir Sa'adala marched out of Gadarif with seventeen hundred riflemen, sixteen hundred spearmen, and three hundred horse. The swiftness of the dervish advance and the short space that intervened between the forces made it evident that a collision would take place within half an hour. The valley was rocky, and overgrown with grass and reeds, but to the right of the track there rose a high saddleback hill, the surface of which looked more open and which appeared to command the approaches from Gadarif. The troops knew nothing of the country. The dervishes understood it thoroughly. The high ground gave at least advantage of view. Colonel Parsons resolved to occupy it. Time was, however, very scanty. The order was given, and the column began to double across the valley towards the saddleback. The dervishes, perceiving the nature of the movement, hurried their advance in the hope of catching the troops on the move and perhaps of even seizing the hill itself. But they were too late. Colonel Parsons and his force reached the saddleback safely, and with a few minutes to spare climbed up and advanced along it in column in the direction of Gadarif, the Arab battalion leading, the sixteenth Egyptians next, and last of all the irregulars. The dervishes, seeing that the troops had already reached the hill and were moving along it towards the town, swung to their left and advanced to the attack. Thereupon at half-past eight the column wheeled into line to meet them, and standing in the long grass, which even on the summit of the hill was nearly breast-high, opened a heavy and destructive fire. The enemy, although suffering severe loss, continued to struggle bravely onward, replying vigorously to the musketry of the soldiers. At nine o'clock, while the frontal attack was still undecided, Colonel Parsons became aware that a strong force of dervishes had moved round the left rear and were about to attack the hospital and transport. He had once sent to warn Captain Fleming, R.A.M.C., who combined the duties of medical officer and commander of the baggage column, of the impending assault, and directed him to close up the camels and meet it. The Arab shakes, who in the absence of officers were acting as orderlies, had scarcely brought the news to Fleming when the dervish attack developed. The enemy, some three hundred strong, rushed with great determination upon the baggage, and the escort of one hundred twenty Arab irregulars at once broke and fled. The situation became desperate. But Ruthven, with thirty-four supplied Department Camelmen, hastened to meet the exultant enemy and protect the baggage column, and the transport was stubbornly defended. In spite of all their efforts, the rear of the baggage column was broken and cut up. The survivors escaped along the saddle-back. The British officers, with their small following, fell back towards the main body, hotly pressed by the enemy. At this moment Captain Ruthven observed one of his native officers, lying wounded on the ground, about to fall into the hands of the dervishes and perish miserably. He immediately went back, and, being a man of great physical strength, carried the body off in his arms. The enemy were, however, so close that he was three times compelled to set his burden down and defend himself with his revolver. Meanwhile, the retirement towards the main body continued and accelerated. Colonel Parsons and his force were now between two fires. The frontal attack was within two hundred yards. The rear attack, flushed with success, were hurrying impetuously forward. The defeat and consequent total destruction of the Kassala column appeared certain. But in the nick of time the dervish frontal attack, which had been suffering heavily from the fire of the troops, wavered. And when the Arab battalion and the sixteenth Egyptians advanced upon them to complete their discomfiture, they broke and fled. Colonel Parsons had once endeavored to meet the rear attack. The Arab battalion, whose valor was more admirable than their discipline, continued to pursue the beaten enemy down the hill, but the sixteenth Egyptians, on being called upon by their commanding officer, Captain McCarroll, faced steadily about in turn to encounter the fresh attack. The heavy fire of the regular battalion checked the dervish advance, and Captain Fleming, the rest of the dismounted Camelmen and Ruthven still carrying his native officer, found safety in their ranks. For his gallantry on this occasion Captain Ruthven has since received the Victoria Cross. A short, fierce musketry combat followed at a range of less than a hundred yards, at the end of which the assailants of the baggage convoy were completely repulsed. The action was now practically over, and success was won. The Arab battalion, and those of the irregulars that had rallied, advanced and drove the enemy before them towards Gadarov, until at ten o'clock, both their front and rear ranks having failed, the dervishes abandoned all resistance and a general rout ensued. No cavalry or artillery being available further pursuit was impossible. The town of Gadarov surrendered at noon. The dervish emir, Nur Angara, who with two hundred black riflemen and two brass guns had been left in command of the garrison, made haste to submit. The remainder of the dervishes, continuing their flight under the emir Sa'adallah, hurried to tell the tale of defeat to Ahmad Fadil. The casualties suffered by the Qasala column and the action were severe in proportion to their numbers and the duration of the fight. The seven British officers escaped untouched, but of the fourteen hundred soldiers and irregulars engaged, fifty-one were killed and eighty wounded, a total of one hundred thirty-one. The dervishes left five hundred dead on the field, including four emirs of rank. The victory had been won, the enemy were routed, and the town was taken. It had now to be defended. Colonel Parsons took possession of the principal buildings and began immediately to put them in a state of defense. This was fortunately uneasy matter. The position was good and adaptable. It consisted of three large enclosures capable of holding the entire force situated in echelon so as to protect each other by their fire, and with strong brick walls six feet high. All were at once set to work to clear the approaches, to level the mud houses without and to build ramparts or banquets within the walls. The three enclosures thus became three forts, and in the principal work the two captured brass guns were mounted in small bastions thrown out from the north and west corners. While the infantry were thus engaged, Ruth Fenn and his camelmen made daily reconnaissance of the surrounding country and eagerly looked for the first appearance of Amid Fadil. By great good fortune a convoy of ammunition from Mugata reached Gadarov on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh. At dawn the next day Ruth Fenn reported that the advance guard of Amid Fadil was approaching the town. The attack began at half-past eight. The dervishes who fought with their customary gallantry simultaneously assaulted the north, south, and west faces of the defences. Creeping forward through the high Dura they were able to get within three hundred yards of the enclosures. But the intervening space had been carefully cleared of cover and was swept by the musketry of the defenders. All attempts to cross this ground, even the most determined rushes, proved vain. While some made hopeless charges towards the walls, others crowded into a few straw shelters and mud huts which the troops had not found opportunity to remove, and thence maintained a ragged fire. After an hour's heavy fuselage the attack weakened and presently ceased altogether. At ten o'clock, however, strong reinforcements having come up, the dervishes made a second attempt. They were again repulsed, and at a quarter to eleven, after losing more than five hundred men and killed and wounded, Amid Fadil admitted his defeat and retired to a clump of palm trees two miles to the west of the town. The casualties among the defenders were five men killed, one British officer, Captain Dwyer, and thirteen men wounded. The dervishes remained for two days in the palm grove, and their leader repeatedly endeavored to induce them to renew the attack. But although they closely surrounded the enclosures and maintained a dropping fire, they refused to knock their heads against brick walls a third time, and on the first of October Amid Fadil was forced to retire to a more convenient camp eight miles to the southward. Here for the next three weeks he remained, savage and sulky, and the Kassala column were content to keep to their defences. A few convoys from Mugatta made their way into the forts under the cover of darkness, but for all practical purposes the blockade of the garrison was complete. Their losses in action had reduced their strength. They were not abundantly supplied with ammunition. The smell of the putrefying corpses which lay around the walls and in the Dura crop, together with the unhealthy climate and the filth of the town, was a fertile source of disease. A painful and racking fever afflicted all ranks, and at one time as many as 270 of the 400 regular soldiers were prostrated. The recurring night alarms added to the fatigues of the troops and the anxieties of the seven officers. The situation was indeed so unsatisfactory that Colonel Parsons was compelled to ask for assistance. Major General Rundle, who in the Sardar's absence held the chief command, immediately organized a relief expedition. The ninth, twelfth, and half of the thirteenth Sudanese, with three companies of the Camel Corps under Colonel Collinson, were at once sent from Omderman to the mouth of the Rahad River. The infantry were conveyed in steamers. The Camel Corps marched along the bank, completing the whole distance of 130 miles in 56 hours. The blue-nile garrisons, with the exception of the post at Rosaris, were also concentrated. By the 8th of October the whole force was collected at Abu Haraz. Five hundred camels, which had marched from Omderman, and every available local beast of burden joined the transport of the column. On the ninth the twelfth Sudanese started up the Rahad River for Ain el-Owega. From this point the road leaves the river and strikes across the desert to Qadaraf, a distance of one hundred miles, and in the whole distance water is only found at the wells of El Cal. Owing to the scarcity of water it was necessary to carry a supply with the troops. The transport being insufficient to provide for the whole force, the march had to be made in two columns. The Camel Corps and the twelfth Sudanese, about twelve hundred strong, set forth under Colonel Collinson from Ain el-Owega on the seventeenth, and reached Qadaraf safely on the twenty-second. Warned of their arrival, Ahmed Fadil, having made a feeble night attack which was repulsed by the garrison with the lost to themselves of two Sudanese wounded, realized that he had now no chance of recapturing the town. Preparations were indeed made to attack him, but on the twenty-third of October, when a reconnaissance was made in the direction of his camp, the dervish force was seen moving off in a southerly direction, their retreat covered by a strong rearguard which was intended to perform the double duty of protecting the retirement and preventing desertion. The operations conducted by Colonel Parsons thus ended in complete success. Great difficulties were overcome, great perils were encountered, great results were obtained. But while we applaud the skill of the commander and the devotion of his subordinates, it is impossible not to criticize the rash and overconfident policy which sent such a weak and ill-equipped force on so hazardous an enterprise. The action of Qadaraf, as has been shown, was, through no fault of the officers or men of the expedition, within an ace of being a disaster. But there were other critical occasions when only the extraordinary good fortune which attended the force saved it from destruction. First, the column was not discovered until it reached Mugata. Secondly, it was not attacked in the thick bush. Thirdly, the dervishes gave battle in the open instead of remaining within their walls, whence the troops could not have driven them without artillery. And fourthly, the reserve ammunition arrived before the attack of Ahmad Fadil. After his defeat before Qadaraf, Ahmad Fadil reverted to his intention of joining the Khalifa in Qordafan, and he withdrew southwards towards the Dindur River with a following that still numbered more than five thousand. To pass the Nile in the face of the gun-boats appeared impossible. He did not, however, believe that steamers could navigate the higher reaches of the rivers, and in the hopes of finding a safe crossing-place he directed his march so as to strike the blue Nile south of Karqoj. Moving leisurely, and with frequent delays to pillage the inhabitants, he arrived on the Dindur, twenty-five miles to the east of Karqoj, on the seventh of November. Here he halted to Reconoiter. He had trusted in the Karqoj Rosari's reach being too shallow for the gun-boats, but he found two powerful vessels already patrolling it. Again frustrated, he turned southwards, meaning to cross above the Rosari's Qadaract, which was without doubt impassable to steamers. On the twenty-second of October, Colonel Lewis, with two companies of the Camel Corps and three squadrons of cavalry, started from Amdermen with the object of marching through the center of the Zira and of re-establishing the Egyptian authority. His progress was in every way successful. The inhabitants were submissive, and resigned themselves with scarcely a regret to orderly government. Very little lawlessness had followed the defeat of the Khalifa, and whatever plundering there had been was chiefly the work of the disbanded Irregulars who had fought at Amdermen under Major Wortley's command on the east bank of the Nile. In every village, shakes were appointed in the name of the Qadiv, and the officers of the cavalry column concerned themselves with many difficult disputes about land, crops, and women, all of which they settled to their satisfaction. Marching through Amwamra, Haluson, and Masalaimia, Colonel Lewis reached Karkoj on the seventh of November, almost at the same time that Ahmad Fadil arrived on the dinder. For the next six weeks, the movements of the two forces resembled a game of hide and seek. Ahmad Fadil, concealed in the dense forest and jungle of the east bank, raided the surrounding villages and worked his way gradually towards the Rosarius cataract. Colonel Lewis, perplexed by false and vague information, remained halted at Karkoj, dispatched vain reconnaisances in the hopes of obtaining reliable news, revolved deep schemes to cut off the raiding parties, or patrolled the river in the gun-boats. And meanwhile sickness fell upon his force. The malarial fever, which is everywhere prevalent on the blue Nile in the autumn, was now at its height. More than thirty percent of every garrison and every post were affected. The company-holding Rosarius were stricken to a man, and only the two British officers remained fit for duty. The cavalry force, which had marched through the Ghazira, suffered the most severely. One after another every British officer was stricken down and lay burning but helpless beneath the palm-leaf shelters, or tottered on to the friendly steamers that bore the worst cases north. Of the four hundred sixty men who composed the force, ten had died, and four hundred twenty were reported unfit for duty within a month of their arrival at Karkoj. During the end of November the Sheikh Bakir, who had deserted the dervishes after their retreat from Ghadarath, arrived at Karkoj with three hundred fifty irregulars. He claimed to have defeated his former chief many times, and produced a sack of heads as evidence of his success. His loyalty being thus placed beyond doubt, he was sent to keep contact with the dervishes, and encouraged to the greatest efforts by the permission to appropriate whatever spoils of war he could capture. Meanwhile Ahmed Fadil was working his way slowly southward along a deep core which runs almost parallel to the Blue Nile, and is perhaps twenty miles from it. As soon as the position of the dervish Amir was definitely known, Colonel Lewis moved his force, which had been strengthened by detachments of the Tenth Sudanese, from Karkoj to Rosaris. Here he remained for several days, with but little hope of obstructing the enemy's passage of the river. On the twentieth of December, however, full, though as was afterwards found not very accurate, information was received. It was reported that on the eighteenth Ahmed Fadil had reached the village of Dahila, about twenty miles south of the Rosaris post, that he himself had immediately crossed with his advance guard, and was busily passing the women and children across the river on rafts. On the twenty-second, therefore, Colonel Lewis hurried the Sheikh Bakir up the West Bank to cut off their flocks and harass the dervishes who had already crossed the river. The irregular's accordingly departed, and on the next day news was brought that the dervish force was almost equally divided by the Blue Nile, half being on one bank and half on the other. At midday on the twenty-fourth the gun-boats Malik and Dahle arrived from Anderman with the detachment of two hundred more men of the tenth Sudanese under Major Ferguson, and thirty men of the ninth Sudanese under Captain Sir Henry Hill. With this addition the force at Colonel Lewis's disposal consisted of half the tenth Sudanese, a small detachment of the ninth Sudanese, two Maxim guns, and a doctor. Besides the regular troops there were also the band of irregular's under the Sheikh Bakir, numbering three hundred eighty men, one hundred men under the Sheikh of Rosaris, and a few other unclassified scallywags. Colonel Lewis determined to attack what part of Ahmed Fadil's force still remained on the east bank of the river, and on Christmas day, at five o'clock in the afternoon, he marched with every man he could muster in the direction of Dahila. Moving in single file along a track which led through a dense forest of thorny trees, the column reached Adu Zakoli, a village thought to be half, but really not one-third, of the way due to Dahila, at eleven o'clock on Christmas night. Here they bivouacked until three a.m. on the twenty-sixth, when the march was resumed in the same straggling order through the same tangled scrub. Daylight found them still several miles from the dervish position, and it was not until eight o'clock that the enemy's outposts were discovered. After a few shots the Arab picket fell back, and the advance guard, hurrying after them, emerged from the forest upon the open ground of the river bank, broken only by palms and patches of high grass. Into this space the whole column gradually debouched. Before them the blue Nile, shining in the early sunlight like a silver band, flowed swiftly, and beyond its nearest waters rose a long bare gravel island, crowned with clumps of sand-hills, to the shelter of which several hundred dervishes, surprised by the sudden arrival of the troops, were scampering. Beyond the island on the tall tree-clad cliff of the further bank, other minute figures moved and bustled. The discordant sound of horns and drums floating across the waters, and the unfurling of many bright flags, proclaimed the presence and the intention of the hostile force. The dervish position was well chosen, and of great defensive strength. A little to the north of Dahila the blue Nile bifurcates, one rapid but shallow stream flowing fairly straight under the east bank, another very deep stream running in a wide curve under the west bank, cutting into it so that it is precipitous. These two branches of the river enclose an island a mile and a quarter long by fourteen hundred yards wide, and on this island, surrounded by a natural moat of swiftly flowing water, was the dervish dem. The western side of the island rose into a line of low sand-hills covered with scrub and grass, with a steep reverse slope towards the foreshore of the river bank, and here, in this excellent cover, what eventually proved to be three quarters of the force of Amid Fadil, were drawn up. Backed against the deep arm of the river they had no choice, nor indeed any other wish, but to fight. Before them stretched a bare slope of heavy shingle, one thousand yards wide, over which their enemies must advance to the attack. Behind them the high precipitous west bank of the river, which rose in some places to a height of fifty feet, was lined with the three hundred riflemen who had already crossed, and from this secure position Amid Fadil and four of his Amirs were able to watch, assist, and direct the defence of the island. The force on the island was under the sole command of the Amir Sa'adala of Gadarif repute, but, besides his own followers, most of the men of the four other Amirs were concentrated there. The prospect was uninviting. Colonel Lewis discovered that he had absurdly underrated the strength and discipline of the dervish force. It had been continually reported that the defeats at Gadarif had demoralised them, and that their numbers did not exceed two thousand men. Moreover, he had marched to the attack in the belief that they were equally divided on both sides of the river. Retreat was, however, impossible. Strong as was the position of the enemy, formidable as was their strength, the direct assault was actually safer than a retirement through the nineteen miles of gloomy forest which lay between the adventurous column and Rosaries. The British officer immediately determined to engage. At nine o'clock the two maxims, which represented the artillery of the little force, came into action in good positions, while the tenth Sudanese and most of the irregulars lined the east bank. History and maxim fire was now opened at long range. The dervishes replied, and as the smoke of their rifles gradually revealed their position and their numbers, it soon became evident that no long-range fire could dislodge them. And Colonel Lewis resolved, in spite of the great disparity of force and disadvantage of ground, to attack them with a bayonet. Some time was spent in finding fords across the interposing arm of the river, and it was not until past ten o'clock that Bacchia's men crossed on to the island, and, supported by a company of the tenth Sudanese, advanced toward the enemy's right and took up a position at about eight hundred yards from their line, to cover the rest of the passage. Colonel Lewis now determined to turn the enemies left from the north, attack them in flank, and roll them into the deep part of the river. Under the tenth Sudanese, under Colonel Nason and Major Ferguson, he marched southwards along the river's edge, sheltering as far as possible under the curve of the bank from the fire, which now began to cause casualties. Having reached the position from which it was determined to deliver the attack, the battalion deployed into line, and, changing front half-left, advanced obliquely by alternate companies across the bare shingle towards the sandhills. As they advanced, a galling fire was opened upon the left flank by two hundred dervishes admirably placed on an all. Major Ferguson was detached with one company to dislodge them. The remaining four companies continued the attack. The dervish musketry now became intense. The whole front of the island position was lined with smoke, and behind it, on the high cliff of the west bank, a long half-circle of riflemen directed a second tier of converging bullets upon the four hundred charging men. The shingle jumped and stirred in all directions as it was struck. A hideous whistling filled the air. The Sudanese began to drop on all sides, just like the dervishes at Omderman, and the ground was soon dotted with the bodies of the killed and wounded. We did not, said an officer, dare to look back. But undaunted by fire and crossfire, the heroic black soldiers, demons who would not be denied, pressed forward without the slightest check or hesitation, and, increasing their pace to a swift run in their eagerness to close with the enemy, reached the first sandhills and found cover beneath them. A quarter of the battalion had already fallen and lay strewn on the shingle. The rapidity of their advance had exhausted the Sudanese, and Lewis ordered Nason to halt under cover of the sandhills for a few minutes, so that the soldiers might get their breath before the final effort. Thereupon the dervishes, seeing that the troops were no longer advancing, and believing that the attack was repulsed, resolved to clinch the matter. Ahmed Fadil from the west bank sounded the charge on drum and bugle, and with loud shouts of triumph and enthusiasm the whole force on the island rose from among the upper sandhills, and, waving their banners, advanced impetuously in counter-attack. But the tenth Sudanese, panting yet unconquerable, responded to the call of their two white officers, and, crowning the little dunes behind which they had sheltered, met the exalted enemy with a withering fire, and a responding shout. The range was short, and the fire effective. The astonished Arabs wavered and broke, and then the soldiers, nobly led, swept forward in a long scattered line and drove the enemy from one sandy ridge to another, drove them across the rolling and uneven ground, every fold of which contained dervishes, drove them steadily back over the sandhills, until all who were not killed or wounded were penned at the extreme southern end of the island, with the deep, unfortable arm of the river behind them, and the fierce black soldiers roused to fury by their losses in front. The Sheikh Bakir, with his men and the rest of the irregular, joined the victorious Sudanese, and from the cover of the sandhills, now in the hands of the troops, a terrible fire was opened upon the dervishes crowded together on the bare and narrow promontory and on the foreshore. Some tried to swim across the rushing river to their friends on the west bank. Many were drowned, among them Sa'adallah, who sank horse and man beneath the flood. Others took refuge from the fire by standing up to their necks in the stream. The greater part, however, escaped to a smaller island, a little further up the river. But the cover was bad, the deep water prevented further flight, and after being exposed for an hour and a half to the musketry of two companies, the survivors, three hundred strong, surrendered. By eleven thirty the whole island was in the possession of the troops. It was, however, still swept and commanded by the fire from the west bank. The company which had been detached to subdue the dervish rivalmen were themselves, pinned behind their scanty cover. Major Ferguson was severely wounded, and a third of his men were hit. To withdraw this company and the wounded was a matter of great difficulty, and it was necessary to carry the maxims across the river and bring them into action at four hundred yards. Firing ceased at last at three o'clock, and the victors were left to measure their losses and their achievement. There was neither time nor opportunity to count the enemies dead, but it is certain that at least five hundred Arabs were killed on the island. Seven one hundred and twenty-seven fighting men and several hundred women and children surrendered. Five hundred and seventy-six rifles, large quantities of ammunition, and a huge pile of spears and swords were captured. Ahmed Fadil, indeed, escaped with a numerous following across the Ghazira, but so disheartened were the dervishes by this crushing defeat that the whole force surrendered to the gunboat Matema at Reng, on the White Nile, on the twenty-second of January, and their leader was content to fly with scarcely a dozen followers to join the Khalifa. The casualties among the troops in the action amounted to forty-one killed and one hundred forty-five wounded, including Major Ferguson, and the tenth Sudanese, on whom the brunt of the fighting fell, suffered a loss of twenty-five non-commissioned officers and men killed, one British officer, six native officers, and one hundred seventeen non-commissioned officers and men wounded, out of a total strength of five hundred eleven. The rest of the loss was among the irregulars, four hundred ninety-five of whom took part in the engagement. END OF CHAPTER XIV By the operations described in the last chapter, the whole of the region's bordering on the Niles were cleared of hostile forces, dotted with military posts, and brought back to Egyptian authority. The Khalifa, however, still remained in Kordafan. After he had made good his escape from the battlefield of Omderman, Abdullah had hurried in the direction of El-Obaid, moving by the wells of Shat and Zeregia, which at that season of the year were full of water after the rains. At Abu-Sharay, having shaken off the pursuit of the friendlies, he halted, encamped, and busily set to work to reorganize his shattered forces. How far he succeeded in this will presently be apparent. In the beginning of November the general drying up of the country turned the wells at Abu-Sharay into pools of mud, and the Khalifa moved westward to Aghela. Here he was joined by the Amir El-Katem with the El-Obaid Garrison. This chief and his followers had never been engaged with the Turks, and were consequently fresh and valiant. Their arrival greatly encouraged the force which the Khalifa had rallied. A large dem was formed at Aghela, and here, since the water was plentiful during December, Abdullah abode quietly, sending his raiding parties far afield to collect grain and other supplies. As soon as the Sardar, who had returned from England, received the news of the success at Rosaries, he determined to make an attempt to capture the Khalifa, and on the 29th of December sent for Colonel Kitchener, to whom as the senior available officer he had decided to entrust this honourable enterprise. The Colonel was directed to take a small mixed force into Kartifan, and to reconnoitre the enemy's position. If possible, he was to attack and capture Abdullah, whose followers were believed not to exceed one thousand ill-armed men. The Kartifan field force, as its officers called it, was formed as follows. Commanding Colonel Kitchener. Assistant Adjunate General. Lieutenant Colonel Mitford. Deputy Assistant Adjunate General. Major Williams. The troops were composed of two squadrons of Egyptian cavalry, the Second Egyptians, the Fourteenth Sudanese, two Galloping Maxims, two Mule guns, and one company of the Camel Corps. Camel transport was drawn from the Atbarra and from the Blue Nile. The troops were conveyed by steamer to Duhem, and concentrated there during the first week in 1899. The camels were collected at Kawa, and although several of the convoys had to march as much as four hundred miles, the whole number had arrived by the tenth of January. The prime difficulty of the operation was the want of water. The caliph's position was nearly one hundred twenty-five miles from the river. The intervening country is, in the wet season, dotted with shallow lakes, but by January these are reduced to mud puddles and only occasional pools remain. All the water needed by the men, horses, and mules of the column must therefore be carried. The camels must go thirsty until one of the rare pools, the likely places for which were known to the native guides, might be found. Now the capacity of a camel for endurance without drinking is famous, but it has its limits. If he start having filled himself with water he can march for five days without refreshment. If he then have another long drink he can continue for five days more. But this strains his power to the extreme. He suffers acutely during the journey and probably dies at its end. In war, however, the miseries of animals cannot be considered. Their capacity for work alone concerns the commander. It was thought that, partly by the water carried in skins, partly by the drying up pools, and partly by the camel's power of endurance, it might be just possible for a force of about twelve hundred men to strike out one hundred twenty-five miles into the desert, to have three days to do their business in, and to come back to the Nile. This operation, which has been called the Scherkele Reconnaissance, occupied the Cortifan Field Force. The report of the route from Kohi was considered encouraging. At J.D. I. the old wells promised sufficient water to refill the skins, and within seven miles of the wells were two large pools at which the camels could be watered. The column, therefore, prepared for the journey. Nothing was neglected which could increase the water carried or diminish the number of drinkers. Only twelve cavalry were taken. The horses of the Maxim guns and the mules of the battery were reduced to the lowest possible number. Every person, animal, or thing not vitally necessary was remorselessly excluded. In order to lighten the loads and make room for more water, even the ammunition was limited to one hundred rounds per rifle. The daily consumption of water was restricted to one pint for men, six gallons for horses, and five for mules. To lessen the thirst caused by the heat Colonel Kitchener decided to march by night. An advance depot was formed at J.D. and food for two days accumulated there. Besides this each unit carried ten and the column transport seven days rations. Thus the force was supplied with food up till the ninth of February, and their radius of action, except as restricted by water, was nineteen days. This was further extended five days by the arrangement of a convoy, which was to set out on the thirtieth of January to meet them as they returned. The column, numbering sixteen hundred and four officers and men, and sixteen hundred twenty-four camels and other beasts of burden, started from Kohi at three p.m. on the twenty-third of January, having sent on a small advance party to the wells of J.D. twelve hours before. The country through which their root lay was of barren and miserable aspect. They had embarked on a sandy ocean with waves of thorny scrub and withered grass. From the occasional rocky ridges, which allowed a more extended view, this sterile jungle could be seen stretching indefinitely on all sides. Ten miles from the river all vestiges of animal life disappeared. The land was a desert, not the open desert of the northern Sudan, but one vast, unprofitable thicket, whose interlacing thorn bushes unable to yield the slightest nourishment to living creatures, could yet obstruct their path. Through this the straggling column, headed in the daylight by the red Egyptian flag, and at night by a lantern on a pole, wound its weary way, the advance guard cutting a path with axes and marking the track with strips of calico, the rear guard driving on the laggard camels and picking up the numerous loads which were cast. Three long marches brought them on the twenty-fifth to Jedid. The first detachment had already arrived, and it opened up the wells. None gave much water, all emitted a foul stench, and one was occupied by a poisonous serpent eight feet long, the sole inhabitant. The camels were sent to drink at the pool seven miles away, and it was hoped that some of the water skins could be refilled, but, after all, the green slime was thought unfit for human consumption, and they had to come back empty. The march was resumed on the twenty-sixth. The trees were now larger, the scrub became a forest, the sandy soil changed to a dark red colour, but otherwise the character of the country was unaltered. The column rested at Abu Rakhba. A few starving inhabitants who occupied the huts pointed out the grave of the Khalifa's father and the little straw house in which Abdullah was want to pray during his visits. Lately, they said, he had retired from Agayla to Shirkayla, but even from this latter place he had made frequent pilgrimages. At the end of the next march, which was made by day, the guides, whose memories had been refreshed by flogging, discovered a large pool of good water, and all drank deeply in thankful joy. A small but strong Zareba was built near this precious pool, and the reserved food and a few sick men were left with a small garrison under an Egyptian officer. The column resumed their journey. On the twenty-ninth they reached Agayla, and here, with feelings of astonishment scarcely less than Rabbids and Crusoe experienced at seeing the footprint in the sand, they came upon the Khalifa's abandoned camp. A wide space had been cleared of bush, and the trees, stripped of their smaller branches, presented an uncanny appearance. Beyond stood the encampment, a great multitude of yellow speargrass dwellings perfectly clean, neatly arranged in streets and squares, and stretching four miles. The aspect of this strange deserted town, rising, silent as a cemetery, out of the awful scrub, chilled everyone who saw it. Its size might indeed concern their leader. At the very lowest computation it had contained twenty thousand people. How many of these were fighting men? Certainly not fewer than eight or nine thousand. Yet the expedition had been sent on the assumption that there were scarcely one thousand warriors with the Khalifa. Observing every precaution of war, the column crawled forward, and the cavalry and camel corps, who covered the advance, soon came in contact with the enemy's scouts. Shots were exchanged, and the Arabs retreated. The column halted three miles to the east of this position and, forming a strong Zareba, passed the night in expectation of an attack. Nothing, however, happened, and a dawn Mitford was set out with some mounted friendlies to reconnoiter. At ten o'clock he returned, and his report confirmed the conclusions which had been drawn from the size of the Agele camp. Creeping forward to a good point of view, the officer had seen the dervish flags lining the crest of the hill. From their number, the breadth of front covered, and the numerous figures of men moving about them, he estimated not fewer than two thousand Arab riflemen in the front line. How many more were in reserve it was impossible to say. The position was, moreover, of great strength, being surrounded by deep ravines and pools of water. The news was startling. The small force were one hundred twenty-five miles from their base, behind them lay an almost waterless country, and in front was a powerful enemy. An informal council of war was held. The Sardar had distinctly ordered that, whatever happened, there was to be no waiting. The troops were either to attack or retire. Colonel Kitchener decided to retire. The decision having been taken, the next step was to get beyond the enemy's reach as quickly as possible, and the force began their retreat on the same night. The homeward march was not less long and trying than the advance, and neither hopes of distinction nor glamour of excitement cheered the weary soldiers. As they toiled gloomily back towards the Nile, the horror of the accursed land grew upon all. Hideous spectacles of human misery were added to the desolation of the hot, thorny scrub and stinking pools of mud. The starving inhabitants had been lured from their holes and corners by the outward passage of the troops, and hoped to snatch some food from the field of battle. Disappointed, they now approached the camps at night in twos and threes, making piteous entreaties for any kind of nourishment. Their appeals were perforce unregarded, not an ounce of spare food remained. Towards the end of the journey the camels, terribly strained by their privation of water, began to die, and it was evident that the force would have no time to spare. One young camel, though not apparently exhausted, refused to proceed, and even when a fire was lighted round him, remained stubborn and motionless, so that, after being terribly scorched, he had to be shot. Others fell and died all along the route. Their deaths brought some relief to the starving inhabitants, for as each animal was left behind, the officers, looking back, might see first one, then another furtive figure emerge from the bush and pounce on the body like a vulture. And in many cases before life was extinct the famished natives were devouring the flesh. On the 5th of February the column reached Kohi, and the cortifan field force, having overcome many difficulties and suffered many hardships, was broken up, unsuccessful through no fall of its commander, its officers, or its men. For nearly a year no further operations were undertaken against the Khalifa, and he remained all through the spring and summer of 1899 Supreme and Cortifan, reorganizing his adherents and plundering the country, a chronic danger to the new government, a curse to the local inhabitants, and a most serious element of unrest. The barren and almost waterless regions into which he had withdrawn presented very difficult obstacles to any military expedition. And although powerful forces were still concentrated at Khartoum, the dry season and the uncertain whereabouts of the enemy prevented action. But towards the end of August, trustworthy information was received by the Intelligence Department, through the agency of friendly tribesmen, that the Khalifa, with all his army, was encamped at Jébuld-Gadir, that same mountain in southern Cortifan to which nearly twenty years before he and the Mahdi had retreated after the flight from Abba Island. Here among old memories, which his presence revived, he became at once a center of fanaticism. Night after night he slept upon the Mahdi's stone, and day after day tales of his dreams were carried by secret emissaries, not only throughout the western Sudan, but into the Ghazira and even to Khartoum. And now, his position being definite and his action highly dangerous, it was decided to move against him. On the thirteenth of October, the first Sudanese battalion was dispatched and steamers from Khartoum, and by the nineteenth of force of some seven thousand men, well equipped with camel transport, was concentrated at Khakha, a village on the White Nile not far north of Fashota. The distance from here to Jébuld-Gadir was about eighty miles, and as for the first fifty no water existed, the whole supply had to be carried in tanks. Sir Reginald Wingate, who was in command of the infantry, reached Fungor, thirty miles from the enemy's position, with the two leading battalions, the Ninth and Tenth Sudanese, on the twenty-third of October, only to find news that the Khalifa had left his camp at Jébuld-Gadir on the eighteenth, and had receded indefinitely into the desert. The cast having failed, and further progress involving a multiplication of difficulties, Lord Kitchener, who was at Khakha, stopped the operations, and the whole of the troops returned to Khartoum, which they reached in much vexation and disappointment on the first of November. It was at first universally believed that the Khalifa's intention was to retire to an almost inaccessible distance, to El Obied, or Southern Darfur, and the officers of the Egyptian army passed an unhappy fortnight reading the Lady Smith telegrams and accusing their evil fortune which kept them so far from the scene of action. But soon strange rumours began to run about the bazaars of Omderman, of buried weapons and whispers of revolt. For a few days a vague feeling of unrest pervaded the native city, and then suddenly on the twelfth of November came precise and surprising news. The Khalifa was not retreating to the south or to the west, but advancing northward with Omderman, not El Obied, as his object. Emboldened by the spectacle of two successive expeditions retreating abortive, and by, who shall say what wild exaggerated tales of disasters to the Turks far beyond the limits of the Abdulla had resolved to stake all that yet remained to him in one last desperate attempt to recapture his former capital. And so, upon the twelfth of November, his advance guard, under the emir Amad Fidel, struck the Nile opposite Abba Island and audaciously fired volleys of musketry at the Gumbolt Sultan which was patrolling the river. The name of Abba Island may perhaps carry the reader back to the very beginning of this story. Here, eighteen years before, the Mahdi had lived and prayed after his quarrel with the haughty Sheikh. Here Abdulla had joined him. Here the flag of the revolt had been set up, and the first defeat had been inflicted upon the Egyptian troops. And here, too, still dwelt. Dwells, indeed, to this day. One of those same brothers who had pursued through all the vicissitudes and convulsions which had shaken the Sudan, his humble industry of building wooden boats. It is surely a curious instance of the occasional symmetry of history that final destruction should have befallen the last remains of the modest movement so close to the scene of its origin. The news which had reached cartoons set all wheels in motion. The ninth and thirteenth Sudanese battalions were mobilized on the thirteenth of November, and dispatched at once to Abba Island under Colonel Lewis. Kitchener hurried south from Cairo, and arrived in Khartoum on the eighteenth. A field force of some twenty-three hundred troops, one troop of cavalry, the second field battery, the first maxim battery, the camel corps, ninth Sudanese, thirteenth Sudanese, and one company, the second Egyptians, was immediately formed, and the command entrusted to Sir Reginald Wingate. There were besides some nine hundred Arab riflemen and a few irregular-mounted scouts. On the twentieth these troops were concentrated at Fashishoyah, whence Colonel Lewis had obliged Ahmed Fadil to withdraw, and at three-thirty on the afternoon of the twenty-first the expedition started in a southwesternly direction upon the track of the enemy. The troops bivouacked some ten miles southwest of Fashishoyah, and then marched in bright moonlight to Nafizah, encountering only a dervish patrol of about ten men. At Nafizah was found the evacuated camp of Ahmed Fadil, containing a quantity of grain which he had collected from the riverine district, and, what was of more value, a sick but intelligent dervish who stated that the Amir had just moved to Abu-A'adel, five miles further on. This information was soon confirmed by Mamoud Hussein, an Egyptian officer, who with an irregular patrol advanced boldly in reconnaissance. The infantry needed a short rest to eat a little food, and Sir Reginald Wingate ordered Colonel Mayan to press on immediately with the whole of the mounted troops and engage the enemy, so as to prevent him retreating before an action could be forced. Accordingly, cavalry, camel-court, maxims, and the irregulars, whose fleetness of foot enabled them, though not mounted, to keep pace with the rest, set off at their best pace, and after them at nine-fifteen hurried the infantry, refreshed by a drink at the water-tanks, and a hasty meal. As they advanced the scrub became denser, and all were in broken and obstructed ground when, at about ten o'clock, the sound of maxim firing and the patter of musketry proclaimed that Mayan had come into contact. The firing soon became more rapid, and as the infantry approached it was evident that the mounted troops were briskly engaged. The position which they occupied was a low ridge which rose a little above the level of the plain, and was comparatively bare of scrub. From this it was possible, at a distance of eight hundred yards, to overlook the dervish encampment huddled around the water-pools. It was immediately evident that the infantry and the battery were arriving none too soon. The dervishes, who had hitherto contented themselves with maintaining a ragged and desultery fire from the scrub, now sallied forth into the open, and delivered a most bold and determined charge upon the guns. The intervening space was little more than two hundred yards, and for a moment the attack looked as if it might succeed. But upon the instant the ninth and thirteenth Sudanese, who had been doubled steadily for upwards of two miles, came into line, filling the gap between Mayan's guns and dismounted camel-core and the irregular riflemen, and so the converging fire of the whole force was brought to bear upon the enemy, now completely beaten and demoralized. Two dervishes, brothers, bound together hand and foot, perished in valiant comradeship ninety-five paces from the line of guns. Many were slain, and the remainder fled. The whole Egyptian line now advanced upon the encampment, hard upon the tracks of the retreating enemy, who were seen emerging from the scrub onto a grassy plain more than a mile away, across which, and further for a distance of five miles, they were pursued by the cavalry and the camel-core. Three hundred and twenty corpses were counted, and at least an equal number must have been wounded. Amid Fadil and one or two of his principal amiers escaped to the southward and to the caliphah. The Egyptian loss amounted to five men wounded. The troops bevwacked in square formation at about four o'clock near the scene of action. A question of considerable difficulty and some anxiety now arose. It was learned from the prisoners that the caliphah, with about five thousand fighting men, was moving northwards towards the wells of Jidid, of which we have already heard in the Shirkala reconnaissance, and which were some twenty-five miles from the scene of the fight. The troops were already fatigued by their severe exertions. The water-pool was so foul that even the thirsty camels refused to drink of it, and moreover scarcely any water remained in the tanks. It was therefore of vital importance to reach the wells of Jidid. But supposing exhausted troops famishing for water reached them only to be confronted by a powerful dervish force already in possession. Sir Reginal Wingate decided, however, to face the risk, and had a few minutes before midnight the column set out again on its road. The ground was broken, the night was sultry, and as the hours passed by the sufferings of the infantry began to be most acute. Many piteous appeals were made for water. All had perforce to be refused by the commander, who dared not diminish by a mouthful his slender store until he knew the true situation at Jidid. In these circumstances the infantry, in spite of their admirable patience, became very restive. Many men fell exhausted to the ground, and it was with a feeling of immense relief that at nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fourth news was received from the cavalry that the wells had been occupied by them without opposition. All the water in the tanks was at once distributed, and thus refreshed the infantry struggled on and settled down at midday around a fine pool of comparatively pure water. At Jidid, as at Nefisa, a single dervish, and this time a sullen fellow, was captured, and from him it was learned that the Caliph's army was encamped seven miles to the southeast. It was now clear that his position was strategically most unfavorable. His route to the north was barred, his retreat to the south lay through waterless and densely wooded districts, and as the seizure of the grain supplies which had resulted from Fadil's foraging excursions rendered his advance or retirement a matter of difficulty, it seemed probable he would stand. Wingate, therefore, decided to attack him at dawn. Leaving the transport under guard by the water, with instructions to follow at four o'clock, the troops moved off at midnight, screened in front at a distance of half a mile by the cavalry and their flanks protected by the Camel Corps. The road was in places so thickly wooded that a path had to be cut by the infantry pioneers and the artillery. At three o'clock, when about three miles from the enemy's position, the force was deployed into fighting formation. The irregular riflemen covered the front, behind them the thirteenth and ninth Sudanese, and behind these, again the maxims and the artillery were disposed. Cautiously and silently the advance was resumed, and now in the distance the beating of war-drums and the long booming note of the caliph's horn broke on the stillness, proclaiming that the enemy were not unprepared. At a few minutes before four o'clock another low ridge, also comparatively bare of scrub, was reached and occupied as a position. The cavalry were now withdrawn from the front, a few infantry pickets were thrown out, and the rest of the force lay down in the long grass of the little ridge and waited for daylight. After about an hour the sky to the eastward began to grow paler with the promise of the morning, and in the indistinct light the pickets could be seen creeping gradually in, while behind them along the line of the trees faint white figures, barely distinguishable, began to accumulate. Sir Reginald Windgate, fearing lest a sudden rush should be made upon him, now ordered the whole force to stand up an open fire, and forthwith, in sudden contrast to the silence and obscurity, a loud crackling fuselage began. It was immediately answered. The enemy's fire flickered along a wide half-circle, and developed continually with greater vigor opposite the Egyptian left, which was consequently reinforced. As the light improved large bodies of shouting dervishes were seen advancing, but the fire was too hot, and their amours were unable to lead them far beyond the edge of the wood. So soon as this was perceived, Windgate ordered a general advance, and the whole force, moving at a rapid pace down the gentle slope, drove the enemy through the trees into the camp about a mile and a half away. Here, huddled together under their straw shelters, six thousand women and children were collected, all of whom, with many unwounded combatants, made signals of surrender and appeals for mercy. The ceasefire was sounded at half-past six. Then, and not till then, was it discovered how severe the loss of the dervishes had been. It seemed to the officers that, shortest was the range, the effective rifle-fire under such unsatisfactory conditions of light could not have been very great. But the bodies thickly scattered in the scrub were convincing evidences. In one space not much more than a score of yard square lay all the most famous amours of the once far-reaching dervish domination. The Caliph Abdullah, pierced by several balls, was stretched dead on his sheepskin. On his right lay Ali Huad-Helu. On his left, Ahmed Fidel. Before them was a line of lifeless bodyguards, behind them a score of less important chiefs, and behind these, again, a litter of killed and wounded horses. Such was the grim spectacle which in the first light of the morning met the eyes of the British officers, to some of whom it meant the conclusion of a perilous task prolonged over many years. And while they looked in astonishment not unmingled with awe, they scrambled unhurt from under a heap of bodies the little amour Eunice of Dangala, who added the few lengths necessary to complete the chain. At Omderman Abdullah had remained amounted behind the hill of Sergum, but in this his last fight he had set himself in the forefront of the battle. Almost at the first discharge his son Osman, the Sheikh Eddin, was wounded, and as he was carried away he urged the Khalifa to save himself by flight, but the latter, with a dramatic dignity sometimes denied to more civilized warriors, refused. Dismounting from his horse, and ordering his amours to imitate him, he seated himself on his sheepskin and there determined to await the worst of fortune. And so it came to pass that in this last scene in the struggle with modism the stage was cleared of all its striking characters, and Osman Digna alone purchased by flight a brief ignoble liberty soon to be followed by a long ignoble servitude. Twenty-nine amours, three thousand fighting men, six thousand women and children surrendered themselves prisoners. The Egyptian losses were three killed and twenty-three wounded. The long story now approaches its conclusion. The river war is over. In its varied course which extended over fourteen years and involved the untimely destruction of perhaps three hundred thousand lives many extremes and contrasts have been displayed. There have been battles which were massacres and others that were mere parades. There have been occasions of shocking cowardice and surprising heroism, of plans conceived in haste and emergency, of schemes laid with slow deliberation, of wild extravagance and cruel waste, of economies scarcely less barbarous, of wisdom and incompetence. But the result is at length achieved and the flags of England and Egypt wave unchallenged over the valley of the Nile. At what cost were such advantages obtained? The reader must judge for himself of the loss in men, yet while he deplores the deaths of brave officers and soldiers, and no less the appalling destruction of the valiant Arabs, he should remember that such slaughter is inseparable from war, and that, if the war be justified, the loss of life cannot be accused. But I write of the cost in money, and the economy of the campaigns cannot be better displayed than by the table below. LOWAY 1,181,372 Egyptian Pounds TELEGRAPH 21,825 Egyptian Pounds GUN BOATS 154,934 Egyptian Pounds MILITARY EXPENITURE 996,223 Egyptian Pounds FOR TOTAL EXPENITURE OF 2,354,354 Egyptian Pounds AND ONE EGYPTION POWN EQUALS ONE POWN STIRLING SIX PENTS FOR SOMETHING LESS THAN TWO AND A HALF MILLIONS STIRLING ACTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS WERE CARRIED ON FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS, INVOLVING THE EMPLOYMENT, FAR FROM ITS BASE, OF AN ARMY OF 25,000 DISCIPLINED TROUPS, INCLUDING AN EXPENSIVE BRITISH CONTINTION OF EIGHT THOUSAND MEN, AND ENDING IN THE UTER DEFEAT OF AN ENEMY WHO'S ARM FORCES NUMBERED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, UPWARDS OF EIGHTY THOUSAND SOLDIERS, AND THE RECONQUEST AND REOCCUPATION OF A TERRITORY MEASURING SIXTEEN HUNDRED MILES FROM NORTH TO SOUTH, AND TWELV HUNDRED FROM EAST TO WEST, FROM LUTENANT CURNAL STEWARTS REPORT, OF EGYPT NUMBER 11, 1883, which at one time supported at least twenty millions of inhabitants. But this is not all. Of the total two million three fifty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-four Egyptian pounds, only nine hundred and ninety-six thousand two hundred twenty-three Egyptian pounds can be accounted as a military expenditure. For the remaining one million three hundred fifty-eight thousand one hundred and thirty-one Egyptian pounds, Egypt possesses five hundred miles of railway, nine hundred miles of telegraph, and a flotilla of steamers. The railway will not indeed pay a great return upon the capital invested, but it will immediately pay something, and may ultimately pay much. The telegraph is as necessary as the railway to the development of the country. It costs far less, and when the Egyptian system is connected with the South African it will be a sure source of revenue. Lastly, there are the gun-boats. The reader cannot have any doubts as to the value of these vessels during the war. Never was money better spent on military plant. Now that the river operations are over, the gun-boats discharge the duties of ordinary steamers, and although they are, of course, expensive machines for goods and passenger traffic, they are by no means inefficient. The movement of the troops, their extra pay, the supplies at the end of a long line of communications, the ammunition, the loss by wear and tear of uniforms and accoutrements, the correspondence, the rewards, all cost together less than a million sterling, and for that million Egypt has recovered the Sudan. The whole 2,354,354 Egyptian pounds had, however, to be paid during the campaigns. Towards this sum Great Britain advanced, as has been related, 800,000 pounds sterling as alone, and this was subsequently converted into a gift. The cost to the British taxpayer of the recovery and part acquisition of the Sudan, of the military prestige, and of the indulgence of the sentiment known as the avenging of Gordon, has therefore been 800,000 pounds sterling, and it may be stated in all seriousness that English history does not record any instance of so great a national satisfaction being more cheaply obtained. The rest of the money had been provided by Egypt, and this strange country, seeming to resemble the camel on which so much of her wealth depends, has, in default of the usual sources of supply, drawn upon some fifth stomach for nourishment, and to the perplexity even of those best acquainted with her amazing financial constitution, has stood the strain. The Extraordinary Expenditure in Connection with the Sudan Campaign, wrote Mr. J. L. Ghorst, the Financial Advisor to the Kediv in his note of December 20, 1898, note by the Financial Advisor on the budget of 1899 in Egypt No. 3, 1899, has been charged to the Special Reserves Fund. At the present moment this fund shows a deficit of 336,000 Egyptian pounds, and there are outstanding charges on account of the expedition amounting to 330,000 Egyptian pounds, making a total deficit of 666,000 Egyptian pounds. On the other hand, the fund will be increased when the accounts of the year are made up by a sum of 382,000 Egyptian pounds, being the balance of the share of the government in the surplus of 1898, after deduction of the excess administrative expenditure in that year, and by a sum of 90,000 Egyptian pounds, being part of the proceeds of the sale of the Kedivial postal steamers. The net deficit will therefore be 194,000 Egyptian pounds, and if the year 1899 is as prosperous as the present year, it may be hoped that the deficit will disappear when the accounts of 1899 are closed. A great, though perhaps academic, issue remains. Was the war justified by wisdom and by right? If the reader will look at a map of the Nile system, he cannot fail to be struck by its resemblance to a palm tree. At the top, the green and fertile area of the delta spreads like the graceful leaves and foliage. The stem is perhaps a little twisted, for the Nile makes a vast bend in flowing through the desert. South of Khartoum the likeness is again perfect, and the roots of the tree begin to stretch deeply into the Sudan. I can imagine no better illustration of the intimate and sympathetic connection between Egypt and the southern provinces. The water, the life of the delta, is drawn from the Sudan and passes along the channel of the Nile as the sap passes up the stem of the tree to produce a fine crop of fruit above. The benefit to Egypt is obvious, but Egypt does not benefit alone. The advantages of the connection are mutual, for if the Sudan is thus naturally and geographically an integral part of Egypt, Egypt is no less essential to the development of the Sudan. Of what use would the roots and the rich soil be if the stem were severed, by which alone their vital essence may find expression in the upper air? Here then is a plain and honest reason for the river-war. To unite territories that could not indefinitely have continued divided. To combine peoples whose future welfare is inseparably intermingled. To collect energies which, concentrated, may promote a common interest. To join together what could not improve apart. These are the objects which, history will pronounce, have justified the enterprise. The advantage to Great Britain is no less clear to those who believe that our connection with Egypt, as with India, is in itself a source of strength. The grasp of England upon Egypt has been strengthened twofold by the events of the war. The joint action and ownership of the two countries in the basin of the upper Nile, form an additional bond between them. The command of the vital river is an irresistible weapon. The influence of France over the native mind in Egypt has been completely destroyed by the result of the Feshoda negotiations, and although she still retains the legal power to meddle in and obstruct all financial arrangements, that power, unsupported by real influence, is like a body whence the soul has fled, which may indeed be an offensive encumbrance but must ultimately decompose and crumble into dust. But apart from any connection with Egypt, Britain has gained a vast territory which, although it would be easy to exaggerate its value, is nevertheless coveted by every great power in Europe. The policy of acquiring large waterways, which has been pursued deliberately or unconsciously by British statesmen for three centuries, has been carried one step further, and in the valley of the Nile England may develop a trade which, passing up and down the river and its complement the railway, shall exchange the manufacturers of the temperate zone for the products of the tropic of cancer, and may use the north wind to drive civilization and prosperity to the south, and the stream of the Nile to bear wealth and commerce to the sea. This is the end of the nineteenth chapter, the final chapter, of the River War. What remains is a file containing the text of the Sudan Agreement, and also the declaration relative to the British and French spheres of influence in Central Africa, which were important political documents signed as a result of the war. If you choose to go no further, then thank you for listening. The River War. By Winston Churchill. The Appendix. Text of the Sudan Agreement of the nineteenth of January, 1899, and of the declaration of the twenty-first of March, 1899. Agreement between her Britannic Majesty's government and the government of His Highness the Kediv of Egypt, relative to the future administration of the Sudan. Whereas certain provinces in the Sudan, which were in rebellion against the authority of His Highness the Kediv, have now been reconquered by the joint military and financial efforts of her Britannic Majesty's government and the government of His Highness the Kediv, and whereas it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, under which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different localities, and whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims which have accrued to her Britannic Majesty's government by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working-in development of the said system of administration and legislation, and whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wadi Halfa and Swaqan may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered provinces to which they are respectively adjacent. Now it is hereby agreed and declared by and between the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose as follows. ARTICLE I The word Sudan in this agreement means all the territories south of the 22nd parallel of latitude, which, one, have never been evacuated by Egyptian troops since the year 1882, or two, which having before the late rebellion in the Sudan been administered by the government of His Highness the Kediv, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been reconquered by Her Majesty's government and the Egyptian government acting in concert, or three, which may hereafter be reconquered by the two governments acting in concert. ARTICLE II The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and water, throughout the Sudan, except in the town of Swaqan, in which locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used. ARTICLE III The supreme, military, and civil command in the Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor General of the Sudan. He shall be appointed by Kedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic Majesty's government, and shall be removed only by Kedivial Decree with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's government. ARTICLE IV Laws, as also orders and regulations with a full force of law, for the good government of the Sudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal, and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by proclamation of the Governor General. Such laws, orders, and regulations may apply to the whole or any named part of the Sudan, and may, either explicitly or by necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing law or regulation. All such proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic Majesty's agent and Council General in Cairo, and to the President of the Council of Ministers of His Highness the Kediv. ARTICLE V No Egyptian law, decree, ministerial, arret, or other enactment hereafter to be made or promulgated, shall apply to the Sudan, or any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by proclamation of the Governor General in manner herein before provided. ARTICLE VI In the definition by proclamation of the conditions under which Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with, or reside in the Sudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more power. ARTICLE VII Part duties on entering the Sudan shall not be payable on goods coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory. But in the case of goods entering the Sudan at Suwakan, or any other port on the Red Sea Latoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied on goods leaving the Sudan, at such rates as may from time to time be prescribed by proclamation. ARTICLE VIII The jurisdiction of the mixed tribunals shall not extend, nor be recognized for any purpose whatsoever in any part of the Sudan except in the town of Suwakan. ARTICLE IX Until, and save so far as shall be otherwise determined by proclamation, the Sudan, with the exception of the town of Suwakan, shall be and remain under martial law. ARTICLE X No consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents shall be accredited in respect of, nor allowed to reside in the Sudan without the previous consent of her Britannic Majesty's government. ARTICLE XI The importation of slaves into the Sudan, as also their exportation, is absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by proclamation for the enforcement of this regulation. ARTICLE XII It is agreed between the two governments that special attention shall be paid to the Enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd of July, 1890, in respect to the import, sale, and manufacture of firearms and their munitions, and distilled or spiritualist liquors. Running Cairo, 19 January, 1899, signed Butros-Gali-Kromer. Declaration relative to the British and French spheres of influence in Central Africa. Signed at London, March 21, 1899. The undersigned, duly authorized by their governments, have signed the following declaration. The fourth article of the Convention of the 14th of June, 1998, shall be completed by the following provisions, which shall be considered as forming an integral part of it. 1. Her Britannic Majesty's government engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the west of the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the government of the French Republic engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the east of the same line. 2. The line of frontier shall start from the point where the boundary between the Congo Free State and French Territory meets the water parting between the watershed of the Nile and that of the Congo and its affluence. It shall follow in principle that water parting up to its intersection with the 11th parallel of north latitude. From this point it shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as to separate, in principle, the Kingdom of Wadi from what constituted in 1882 the province of Darfur, but it shall in no case be so drawn as to pass to the west beyond the 21st degree of longitude east of Greenwich, 18 degrees 40 minutes east of Paris, or to the east beyond the 23rd degree of longitude east of Greenwich, 20 degrees 40 minutes east of Paris. 3. It is understood in principle that to the north of the 15th parallel the French zone shall be limited to the northeast and east by a line which shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, 18 degrees 40 minutes east of Paris, shall run thence to the southeast until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, 21 degrees 40 minutes east of Paris, and shall then follow the 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed. 4. The two governments engaged to appoint commissioners who shall be charged to delimit on the spot a frontier line in accordance with the indications given in paragraph 2 of this declaration. The result of their work shall be submitted for the approbation of their respective governments. It is agreed that the provisions of Article 9 of the Convention of the 14th of June, 1898, shall apply equally to the territories situated to the south of the 14-degree 20-minute parallel of north latitude and to the north of the 5th parallel of north latitude between the 14-degree 20-minute meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, the 12th degree east of Paris, and the course of the upper Nile. On at London, 21st of March, 1899, Signatures by Salisbury and Paul-Combon. That is the end of The River War by Winston Churchill. Thank you for listening.