 Time for the Lawn Jean Chronoscope, a television journal of the important issues of the hour brought to you every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. A presentation of the Lawn Jean Wittner Watch Company, maker of Lawn Jean, the world's most honored watch, and Wittner, distinguished companion to the world-honored Lawn Jean. Good evening. This is Frank Knight. May I introduce our co-editors for this edition of the Lawn Jean Chronoscope? Mr. William Bradford Huey, editor and analyst, and Mr. Hardy Burt, author and correspondent. Our distinguished guest for this evening is Dr. Norman Thomas, prominent socialist leader. Mr. Thomas, it's a great pleasure to have you with us again on the Chronoscope. I'm sure that our viewers want to hear some of this robust socialist criticism of yours directed at the new Eisenhower administration. First of all, sir, what do you think of these new positive policies in the Orient? Not much. I doubt how positive they are. I would be glad for anything that would work in the Orient to end the stalemate. I would be glad for anything in the Orient that would get not only our boys, but the French boys out of the trenches and other places. Specifically, sir, what do you think about our latest action toward Famosa? Do you think that Chiang Kai-shek will be able to help us out in Korea now? Very little. There was a cartoon, I think, of hair blocks in the Washington Post that expressed my general idea. Some functionaries stood behind Cheong, having just taken off a great military coat. Very, very impressive. And here was a poor, skinny Cheong shivering on the beach as the waves of the sea rolled in. I think of it as a tactic, after all, it's supposed to be a very dubious tactic. And for this reason, Eisenhower's great and very well-deserved reputation in Europe was made by his extraordinary success in pulling together men of different nations and different points of view. And therefore, I expected from him at least a greater effort than we have had to pull together our allies and friends. The one fact you can't escape is that we have simply got to stay with the non-communists of Asia and of Europe, not just the British, not just the French, not just the Indians, the whole lot of them. Now, it's difficult. I don't think they're always reasonable or always right, but strong as we are, we aren't strong enough to ignore them. And I think just let me finish this, then ask me the next. I think that it was a great pity that Eisenhower didn't make a greater effort and perhaps a more successful effort to carry along at least the assent of these peoples before he suddenly announced it. The whole reaction in the world has been dubious to put it mildly. And I do not think that any game that Chong can make is worth that back set. When I was at your criticism of it, sir, because it wasn't well received by Britain and France and other people. My criticism is that a measure of such doubtful military advantage ought not to have been proposed without much more careful consultation to try to overcome and weaken if possible the others. I will add that I think the military's advantage is very doubtful indeed. I shall be surprised, I shall be pleased, let me honestly say, but I shall be vastly surprised if within any near period of time, Chong accomplishes much on the mainland by hit and run. And I am afraid that our allies may be right. I don't think anyone wants world war now or an extension of the Asian war for more of our boys. But our prestige, our pride, a whole lot of things might be involved if Chong comes a rather bad cropper. Well now, sir, it's very clear, sir, that you are opposed to the use of Chong's guy, Chex Troupes in the mainland or anywhere else of that matter. Now, in Korea too, I imagine. Yes, I oppose them in Korea also partly because unless they change their minds, the Koreans haven't welcomed the idea of Chong's. Are you opposed also to a blockade of the China coast by American forces? I am opposed to the blockade unless you can carry along UN assent to it. Are you opposed to the bombing of Manchurian bases? I am opposed to the bombing of Manchurian bases unless you can present evidence that may be presented. But the military advantage will be very decided and the risk is small. On the Manchurian bases, let me say this, you will know not all, not all military opinion is for the bombing of those bases. Do you think it would be helpful to recognize Red China as the British have done? No. And because of peace? I would never recognize a nation or a government in arms against the UN. I think that the principle, that you don't shoot your way into the UN, ought to be fully established. Mr. Thomas, would you agree with General Eisenhower that we are not likely to get a truce unless we are able to hurt the Chinese enemy more? I'm not so sure about that. How do you think we can get a truce then if we don't tighten the screws on them some way? I think that perhaps the screws are tighter now than we all together realize. I think there's a good deal of evidence that the North Koreans are very unhappy on this. I think that if we could do what we have not done, if Eisenhower could do it, perhaps after careful preparation by great appeal to the UN, if he could show that we were really a united world against this outrage, I think Zhang might, I mean, Stalin might find reason to change his mind. It is your belief, sir, that Russia and Stalin are behind the Chinese forces in this Korean conflict. Of course. Do you think also that the ultimate aim of Russia is world conquest? Of course. Do you think that Korea... Now, wait a minute. Let me interrupt you. I do not like to say myself, and I do not like you to say the ultimate aim of Russia. Poor Russians, they have not got such an aim. The ultimate aim of world communism, to which or on which Stalin has imposed a Russian imperial package, is the absolute conquest of mankind, body, mind, and spirit. That's all of mankind. And that's all of mankind. That doesn't necessarily mean that Stalin wants a world war. You think he would start one to achieve his ends? If he thought it would work without too much cost, he is fairly prudent. Do you think Korea could be a starting place for this world war? It could, though I do not think he now wants it, but I remind you you can blunder in the wars when you don't altogether want them. The thing that I wanted to go back to is this. We now know that Stalin's policy for the time being is a policy of dividing the non-communist world. It's a policy of making them all hate us. And that's one reason why I think it's so vitally important for us to cultivate even our unreasonable allies and potential friends. But I think that if Stalin could be shown that his obduracy, that his contemptuous rejection of that Indian formula on the truth was really uniting the world, he might find reasons to change his policy. Would you tell our viewers, would you say to our viewers that you don't think we should take any action as a nation that is not enthusiastically supported by the British and the French? No. I wouldn't. That's stating a general rule much more deftly than I would. I'd want to know the action. I would simply say that any action which alienates not only the British and the French, but the great mass of Asians, ought not to be taken without an overwhelming evidence of its military advisability, such as not even Eisenhower or any of his cabinet have tried to give us. Well, Mr. Thomas, obviously now you are opposed lock-stocking barrel to the Eisenhower program in Korea. No, no, no. Wait a minute. That is so far as promosary is concerned, so far as the possibility of a blockade is concerned, so far as bombing manchurian bases are concerned. But that is not a lock-stocking barrel. You must have a positive policy for ending this conflict in Korea. No, I have a very positive policy and neither has Eisenhower. It's all very experimental. We live in a world so bad, partly because of our own past mistakes, that there are lots of things that we passionately want to do that we can't do quickly at a cost we can afford to pay. I think that we have a better chance of reaching within a foreseeable time, even if it's Korean stalemate, if we keep close to our allies, if we hold our presentation and push it if we can, if we train more rocks, I think we've got a better chance than by darting off without properly consulting our allies on this promosary business. Well, on the rest of the administration, sir, how do you feel about the administration in general, the new administration? Are you enthusiastic? It's too early to tell. I am rather enjoying it. I like to, I think that a new room may sweep clean and there was some sweeping that needed to be done. I think it's going to be very educational. I think that I'd like to see a big business openly responsible for government for a while. It's quite edifying to see what happens to business and to government to the people. I shall be very, very, I shall watch rather dubiously. Now that Mr. Hewitt has brought up this question of new administrations, would you make a prediction as to when you think a socialist candidate will occupy the White House? If he's called himself socialist, probably not for quite a while. But if they, about the socialist candidate in the sense of believing that you can only get a decent society by exalting cooperation of men and nations and that it will require planning and planning and involving the state, which must be kept democratic, if that's what you mean? Might be pretty soon. The Democrats have come along and look how far the Republicans have come since I first knew them. You mean a socialist might go in under the guise of... I'm saying he wasn't a socialist. That's right. He might be a Republican or a Democrat. And I'd say, well, God bless your names. Don't matter too much. A rose under any name would smell as sweet as that. On your last appearance, yes, sir. I remember you startled some of us by stating that you didn't think taxes were high enough. Now, what's your attitude toward taxes now? Do you want to see them come down? Taxes are never high enough when there is an unbalanced budget, except in the very beginning of an emergency. The first business is to balance the budget. After that, I'd like to see taxes reduced. Presidentally, if I were Stalin, I wouldn't be too scared about what's going to happen in Korea when I see the passion to reduce taxes. Well, as a final question, sir, do you believe as an individual and as a veteran observer that there is a chance to have a peaceful world and they meet in the foreseeable future? I think there is a chance in the foreseeable future that's simply on a plane of self-interest to get a world in which conflict is transferred from the realm of atomic war, simply in order that we should live. The conflict would be transferred. The only way you could do it would be a greed disarmament under a strengthened UM, disarmament down to a police level. And in terms of 20, 30 years, it's the world's only hope. I do not believe that we can accord atomic and hydrogen war, even to get rid of the commonest menace. On the other hand, we can't afford peace by a piece. And my hope would be that firm resistance could sometimes bring even a communist to recognize that you've got to transfer it. And as a lifetime student of communism, you see the communist world perhaps joining with us in building a peaceful world. In bringing a world in which conflict is taken out of the realm of atomic war, if you mean by that peaceful, yes. There are a lot of conflicts that could carry on without war. I'm afraid our time is up, and thank you very much for being with us, sir. The opinions that you've heard our speakers express tonight have been entirely their own. The editorial board for this edition of the Longe in Chronoscope was Mr. William Bradford Huey and Mr. Hardy Burt. Our distinguished guest was Dr. Norman Thomas, prominent socialist leader. The traditional presentation gift to symbolize achievement, honor, or respect is a fine watch. 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