 Our next speaker is Donald Johnson, doesn't need too much of presentation, ex-former Secretary-General of OECD, the minister in many capacities in Canada, and Canadian OECD angle of what Russia represents is very interesting because we are northern neighbours, we have in many ways identical industrial profile and destiny. So the floor is yours, Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much, Chair. I enjoy these comments that I've heard. I don't report to have the depth of expertise that I perhaps once had, but I think I have observations in the global context which you may respond to. And I must say the title of this panel, which is Russia in 20 years, leads me to think of what Menor Canes suggested that we should always examine the present in light of the past for the purposes of the future. And so that's kind of where I'm at in this because I just arrived as Secretary-General of the OECD in 1996 and we received a request from the Prime Minister, Chairman Medran, to join the OECD. And I had very much hoped that that would happen before I stepped down as Secretary-General in 2006 and to my great disappointment personally and in a broader sense, it did not happen. I wrote a book which was published this year and when I was going through notes for that book, I found I had written in 1997 after returning, in 1997 I took a very large contingent of experts to Russia, to Moscow, and we had very constructive meetings with some of them, I remember well, is Chubayus, who is then Deputy Prime Minister Nemesov, who unfortunately is now no longer with us. And of course Alexei Kudrin, who I continue to work with very much over the succeeding years, and also with Primakov in two different capacities, I think, as Prime Minister and also as Minister of Foreign Affairs. So I spent a lot of time there and I was very enthusiastic about what I felt lay ahead for Russia over the next 10 years, 20 years, whatever. Now it's 20 years ago, so it's quite appropriate that we should be talking 20 years from now because it makes me think that 20 years goes very quickly and an awful lot of things can happen that are not anticipated. But this is what I wrote when I came back, which I found when I was writing the book. I said, imagine a Russia with strong investment protection legislation and regulation, the rule of law rigorously applied, well-defined and fairly applied competition policy, a judicial system functioning efficiently and honestly beyond the reach of any political influence, high standard democratic practices, an investment policy that attracts business to Russia's massive natural resources and its human resources the best and the brightest. What an opportunity for Russia, for long-term security in the Euro-Atlantic region and for the world. And sadly, that was not to be, as we sit here today. And in my view, which I know I've received criticism from some of my Western colleagues, but in my view, we in the West bear considerable responsibility for that not happening. And I write about this extensively in the book. I don't think that we moved in as we had, for example, with the Sigma program in Poland. There were, I think, some Cold War warriors on both sides of the table, as certainly in the United States and Poland, Central Europe and so on. But anyway, what I say to you today is that having that aspirational paragraph, I call it aspirational, which I wrote 20 years ago, is not realistic. Although meeting with reformers at that time made it seem very realistic at that point. Well, having seen what my apra-aspirational forecast of 1997 would have been over the next 20 years, I'm a bit wary about making any hard predictions for the next 20, except for a couple of elements. First of all, I see a little prospect of Russia exiting from authoritarian one-man rule, whether it be Putin for the time being or his successor. Second, I foresee that even without an authoritarian context, Russia could raise its game considerably from where it is today, and in fact, an authoritarian context may actually contribute to that. In 2015, Russia's share of global GDP was $1.3 trillion, according to the last number I looked at, and something like 1.8%. I didn't follow your sashes exactly, but it was some number like that. And it's so hard, as I sit here, to believe that this once global superpower now has a smaller economy than either Canada or South Korea. Now, that's not going to last in my judgment. I mean, no matter what the political situation is, provided it gets its act together if it raises its game. You know, we within the Western democracies seem to think that good dramatic government supported by market economies is the best way forward to achieve general individual prosperity. And obviously, President Xi of China does not agree. And he is putting forth a vision for a renewed form of autocratic socialism, with a growing degree of market economies, naturally influenced, ignoring the proven track record of democratic open market economies, which have made many rich countries even richer. I mean, look at the United States, an unprecedented example of how a democratic system founded on principles of open markets and equality of opportunity have delivered unimaginable wealth. However, I expect President Xi, and many of you sitting around this table, including myself, must also see, especially in financial systems, there are many bright unprincipled individuals all too willing to game the system, as we've seen in the United States, which almost brought the entire rural economy down. And thus, this is true what I classify as legal corruption. Corruption does not have to be illegal. I mean, bear in mind that insider trading, which we've sent a lot of people to jail for in America, is illegal, but it wasn't illegal until 1934. It was immoral, it was obviously wrong. But what we're seeing again now in financial markets, or have seen during the crisis, is what I would call legal corruption, taking advantage of the system, gaming the system, saying, if it's legal, it's okay. Well, it's not. And I think I hope that we work our way out of that psychology. But the fact is that, overall, this American successful democratic market has for decades also widened the disparity and increased the wealth gap, which is now the greatest. The American wealth gap is now the greatest among all developed countries. And this trend, I do not see as sustainable. And I think what we're watching in the United States today, with the arrival of Trump, who's promising change, I don't think he's going to get the change that that disenchanted population wants from my perspective, but nonetheless, is based very much, and as we've heard, I think many comments during the course of this conference, on the issue of not only the income disparity, but the wealth disparity. There are two different measurements that refuse a genie courtship efficient that we do with that. But it's extraordinary to me that the richest country in the world in history should not have adequate medical system, should not have an adequate education system. And, you know, it's just, frankly, it's shocking. And I think that people looking at the United States and looking at democracies in general and seeing how we've moved may really believe that, and I'll come to that in a moment, that those models are in real jeopardy. Now, too many Americans see themselves left behind. And of course, as I say, that's a major contribution to the arrival of Donald Trump. But as China, and I say Russia, watch the unraveling of the so-called vaunted United States model. I don't think it will be emulated by either of them, you know, in the same way. You may cherry pick the best, but certainly not emulate, you know, much of it in the worst. I've had this discussion in China very recently actually, but he tries the International Chamber of Commerce private sector. And, you know, they can see where these fault lines are. And it'll soon be the largest economy in the world. And so it's very important to see what steps they take to discipline their market system in a way which is fair and effective and transparent. Now, Russia, here it is with a population approaching 150 million, I think, or some of you, 140 to 150 today. Maybe it'll follow more closely the Chinese model. As Russia seems, as China seems destined, it is going to overtake the United States by any measure as the largest economy in history in the relatively near term. You know, when I got to the OECD, we did the world in 2020 in analysis, and it was predicted that China would actually surpass, would become the leading economy in the world by total GDP size by 2020. It won't happen, I don't think, by 2020 because there have been a few hiccups on the way in the financial sector and in the Asian crisis of 1997, 1998. But the fact is, I think it's inevitable that that will happen. Now you look at China now, think about it. In 2010, it surpassed Japan for the first time as the largest economy. Today, it has grown to 14.8% of the world economy, with Japan trailing at 5.9%. It's extraordinary in that lifetime. Well, when you come by and see the Russian human and natural resources with a well-educated population, and I lay emphasis on that point, I foresee major transformations over the next two decades. And we will be left with, I think, probably two global ideological positions. One, which is much more authoritarian. The other, which is democracies, which also have to be renewed if they're going to be effective and competitive. Something I find quite interesting is that western democracies and autocratic strongman regimes, of which I suggest Russia will remain one, this trend to strongman governments has begun. There was an interesting thoughtful, but I found it disquieting, to some extent, for us in the, in foreign affairs, the summer of, sorry, September 2016, I'll read it to you. Why personalization rules? And it says, the author suggests that personalized systems of government are growing across the globe. Data shows that personalization is on the rise worldwide. And though the trend has been widespread, it has been most pronounced in authoritarian settings. Data shows the personal, the pertinistic state or ships, et cetera, where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual have increased notably since the end of the Cold War. In 1988, that's not very long ago, personalist regimes comprised 23% of all dictatorships. Today, 40% of all autocracies are ruled by strongmen. So, you know, we have to start thinking. I mean, maybe a democracy like the mystically said of Athens, maybe a democracy is not forever. Now, it suggests though that the, you know, the tripartite of multi-skew in terms of divisions of power in his seminal works, Spirits of Laws, checks and balances and so on, does not exist in many countries, may these countries and strongmen able to seem able to absorb powers by other mechanisms with the military often playing a key role. We're also, though, seeing an extraordinary and amazing evolution of AI. I don't know how many have been sitting and listening to the panels on this subject. But this is an amazing development and very hard for many of us at my age to really come to grips with intellectually. But it's happening. And it seems to me, forgetting about hydrocarbons for a moment, which I think you said are picking into the developing world in the 2030s or something, Russia's bound to diversify its economy. But here's Russia. Combined its highly educated population, which it is, it'll be at the leading edge of new technologies with a governing capacity common to autocratic governments to get things done more effectively and more quickly. And I don't say that in a negative way, but I can tell you I used to represent at one time Lockheed Aircraft Corporation as a lawyer in Canada. And we used to discuss intercity travel by aircraft, airport to airport, downtown to downtown. And they said it's not worth it. I mean, the fact is there are so many layers of government in our system, federal, provincial, municipal, regional, referenda. I mean, it's almost impossible to get things done effectively and quickly. Chinese don't have that problem. Authoritarian governments don't. Which is a big edge when you're talking about the use of new technologies. I don't know if you saw the presentation with that helicopter buzzing around that was presented yesterday on connectivity. That's not going to happen very quickly in a lot of areas of the United States. Maybe it'll happen in Moscow. I've got a call now. So I think that for traditional democracies to compete in the years ahead, they must also be seriously renewed. And so I think I hope that happens. But I come back to the point that the two things Russia has, which I don't think can hold it back or will hold it back, but will propel it forward, are a very, very high literacy rates, 99%. One of the highest graduates of tertiary education. And here you're facing now from what we see, challenges that require exactly that. In fact, Stiglitz wrote that, remember Joe Stiglitz, chief economist of the World Bank, he said, one of the good things that Russia inherited from the Soviet era is a high level of education, especially in technical areas so important to the new economy. And I think that's absolutely true. So that's probably your greatest central resource. Thank you very much. As Einstein said, the most strong power is the intellect power, not military or whatever.