 Good morning. We're here on the margins of the National Security College conference on strengthening Australia-Japan-U.S. strategic cooperation. And we're lucky to be joined by Dhruva Jayashankar from who's a fellow with the Brookings India, certainly one of the leading think tanks in India who work on foreign policy. So good morning Dhruva. Good morning. Dhruva I'm gonna start with a big question so you can take it however, take it wherever you would like. Obviously over the last 12 months or a couple of years there's been a lot of developments in the Indian Ocean region. China has been very active with the It's One Belt One Road Initiative and its relationship with Pakistan. More recently we've seen a lot of developments in the United States of course and a lot of uncertainties coming from that. Gazing into your crystal ball, how do you see the China-U.S. relationship playing out in the Indian Ocean over the next several years and how will that affect India? Where will India sit with that? Yeah we're in for a very uncertain but very interesting time, not necessarily in a positive way. The Indian Ocean as you well know is perhaps, I mean it's one of the most important bodies of water. I mean just if you look at the as a conduit for international commerce in terms of the population that lives around in the Indian Ocean, littoral and also as a source of resources, natural resources. And so the Indian Ocean is extremely important for all these reasons and yet the security architecture to secure and govern the Indian Ocean is rather weak, particularly relatively the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. And so you have this mismatch here again between the importance of the Indian Ocean as a body of water but lack of the necessary infrastructure and relationships to secure the Indian Ocean. And so I think we're going to see this tension play out more and more. Of course the United States has long been a resident power in the Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia there's a significant presence in Bahrain but we're now seeing of course a growing presence of the Chinese PLA Navy in the Indian Ocean. And this has been accompanied of course as you mentioned by a large number of Chinese infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean, littoral, Pakistan being one place, East Africa I think is extremely significant, Djibouti where they might be establishing their first true naval base outside of China and in Southeast Asia and South Asia Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other places. Now of course this environment this is the sort of backdrop in which India which is just trying to emerge from out of a rather continental mindset towards a more sort of Indian Ocean maritime mindset is going to have to confront with these changing dynamics. And I think a few things just have to be kept in mind at least. They're no easy answers to how India or other countries in the region can respond to. So Australia being one of the countries on the Indian Ocean, littoral. But I think a few things to keep in mind. One is I think the weakness of the existing security order. I think it is something that needs to be understood and appreciated. The second is that economics is now strategic. I think there was a belief particularly after the end of the Cold War that those kinds of relationships could function on parallel tracks that you could have sort of economic interdependence at a global level but aside from strategic competition but now increasingly the lines have become blurred and I think one belt one road certainly from India's point of view and India has perhaps been one of the most vocal skeptics of one belt one road. This is certainly an issue which is now India doesn't see this necessarily as an economic project it sees it or commercial project it sees it as primarily a strategic project. I think that that's a second consideration to take into place to take into account. The third and again from India's point of view I think there's been a bit of a change in the disposition towards the US presence in the 1970s and 1980s India was quite vocal about talking about the United States as an outside presence of the Indian Ocean. It was quite critical of Diego Garcia and American presence there but this has changed and now Indian leaders talk quite publicly about the US being a resident power in the Indian Ocean and in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think this is another change that has taken place but the long I think the long game I think for all the actors involved the United States China India Australia others will be how to make the Indian Ocean how to prevent the Indian Ocean from becoming the next South China Sea from becoming the central locus of competition for the world's great powers. Just turning to the United States and and President Trump obviously over the last decade or so India has been increasingly tilting towards the United States how do you see the the Trump administration affecting that and do you see there being risks of perhaps a precipitate US withdrawal from the region which could create a power vacuum and instability. I think India is relatively speaking not badly placed by a Trump administration they're going to be some downsides I think we're going to see some issues on immigration and bilateral economic relations that may certainly complicate India US bilateral relations but that being said I think on on strategic matters they may be more of a meeting of the minds between Washington and New Delhi in the in the next few years. I think India was actually quite welcoming of a few steps that have been taken just in the last week under Trump's presidency. One is the cancellation of TPP I know it is not particularly well received here in Australia naturally but for India which was outside this actually gave a little bit of a respite. I think a better relations between Washington Moscow is another thing India would welcome and I think talk of a larger maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific by some of Trump's advisors is also something that would be welcomed. Now where are the the downsides I think the downsides are if this is if we see from Washington a sort of belligerence belligerent rhetoric that is not necessarily backed up by a will to to to see it through that is actually a very dangerous combination not just for India but I think also for US allies in the region which is we that could lead to a precipitation of 10 or greater tensions but without necessarily the the United States providing the credibility of the will even if it has the capabilities to ensure a stability in the Indo-Pacific and I think that that is a very serious cause of concern in New Delhi. Yeah and and do you think that Beijing may potentially take advantage of instability caused by I suppose unpredictability of the United States by advancing its presence in the Indian Ocean region further? I mean I think the US is the US is a very important actor in the Indian Ocean but not the only actor obviously and not not necessarily even the preeminent actor there is a bit of a vacuum all if you will in the Indian Ocean but I think we can we get a sense of this just looking at the South China Sea where even the Obama administration which had by then announced the pivot but it really wasn't able to enforce the to draw clear lines and then enforce them on China's militarization of the South China Sea. I think that that we've already we're in some ways well past that point where the you know we're through fader companies and other China has been able to to make advances and the US has been really unable to or unwilling to stop it so I do think I mean it's not specific to the Trump administration I do think that there is a larger issue of not just US capabilities which is one aspect of it but US will to play a role and these are legitimate I think for average American voters you know many of them would not know be able to identify the South China Sea in a map and and I think the national security elites in the US and I think this is a common problem not just this is not just an American problem have done a very poor job communicating to a general public or explaining to a general public why some of these issues are really so important and then so much for for national security. The conference we're at today relates to strengthening cooperation between Australia Japan United States and other partners including India. Japan is is showing increasing interest in the Indian Ocean region. Do you think that Japan could play a positive role in helping to stabilize the Indian Ocean region in helping to build security architecture there? Oh absolutely I think I think Japan is a real critical player in this for two reasons at least one is in terms of infrastructure building I mean I think we tend to under a lot has been made of one belt one road but if you actually look at infrastructure on the ground in the Indian Ocean. Japan has been has played an enormous role in East Africa their potential projects or new projects in Bangladesh in Dawey in potentially Sri Lanka and so Iran and so all over the Indian Ocean region so Japan is very competitive in that space and perhaps the only in at least in terms of these are mega infrastructure projects is the only other country apart from China that's able to deliver. The second is I think the so gradual remilitarization of Japan I mean many of this is sort of changes in national security reforms that have taken place in Japan has positioned it rather well if you look at for example all the trilateral meetings that take place at a high the senior level on a regular basis in the Asia Pacific Japan is part of almost every one China Japan South Korea US Japan Australia US Japan India Japan Australia India Japan is in some ways a nodal power for this emerging security architecture and so I think both on the security side under Prime Minister Abe but also I mean for for much longer as a key and a strategic you know country that's able to direct its commercial energies in a strategic way Japan does play an outsized role in the Indian Ocean and will be right okay well thank you very much for your your thoughts today and I look forward to further contributions at the conference. Thank you very much