 Chapter 22 of Book 2 of Rhetoric With respect to nomology, or the doctrine of a sentence, when we have shown what a sentence is, it will then especially become evident about what kind of things, and when, and to what persons, it is fit to employ sentences in orations. But a sentence is an enunciation, yet not about particulars, such as what kind of person Iphikrates was. But about that which is universal. Yet it is not about all universals, such for instance as that a right is contrary to a curved line. But it is about those universals with which actions are conversant, and those things which in acting are eligible, or to be avoided. Hence, because enthamemes are nearly syllogisms about things of this kind, if the syllogism is taken away, the conclusions and the principles of the enthamemes are sentences. Thus for instance, what Medea in Euripides says is a sentence, vis, quote, It does not become a man of a sound mind to educate his children, so as to render them transcendently wise. This therefore is a sentence, but the cause being added, and the why, the whole is an enthamem. As for instance, in the words of Medea, quote, For besides the indolence which they thus acquire, they excite the baneful envy of their fellow citizens. And also, quote, There is no man who is in all respects happy. Close quote. And, quote, There is not any man who is free. Close quote. Is a sentence. But the following words being added, it becomes an enthamem. Vis, quote, For he is either the slave of wealth or a fortune. Close quote. If, therefore, a sentence is what we have said it is, there are necessarily four species of a sentence. For it will either subsist in conjunction with an epilogue or without an epilogue. Those sentences, therefore, require demonstration which assert anything paradoxical or dubious, but those that assert nothing paradoxical are without an epilogue. But of these, it is necessary that some indeed, in consequence of being previously known, should require no epilogue, such as, for instance, quote, health, as it appears to us, is the best of things to man. Close quote. For lest it appears to the many, but other sentences, as soon as they are spoken, become manifest to those that consider them, such as, quote, There is no lover who does not always love. Close quote. Of sentences, however, which are with an epilogue, some indeed are the parts of an enthamem, as, quote, it does not become a man of a sound mind. Close quote. But others are enthamematic, yet are not a part of an enthamem, which also are especially approved. These are sentences in which the cause of what is said is apparent, as in the following, quote, being immortal do not retain an immortal anger. Close quote. For to say, quote, it is not proper to retain anger always, close quote, is a sentence. But the addition, quote, being immortal, close quote, asserts the why or the cause. Similar to this also is the sentence, quote, it is fit that mortal should be wise in mortal and not in immortal concerns, close quote. From what has been said, therefore, it is manifest how many species there are of a sentence and to what kind of things each is adapted. For in things of a dubious or paradoxical nature, a sentence is not to be used without an epilogue. But either an epilogue being added, the sentence must be used as a conclusion, as if anyone should say, quote, I indeed, since it is neither proper to be envious nor to be indolent, assert that erudition is not requisite. Close quote. Or, this being previously said, the former assertions must be subjoined. But in things which are not paradoxical indeed, yet are immanifest, the why or cause must be more concisely added. And to things of this kind, laconic apathems and enigmas are adapted, as if someone should say, what Stesichorus said among the Locrians, quote, that it is not proper to behave insolently, lest the grasshoppers should sing on the ground. Close quote. A sententious mode of speaking, however, is adapted to him who is more advanced in age. But what he sententiously says must be about things in which he is skilled. Hence it is unbecoming for one who is not so advanced in age to speak sententiously, in the same manner as it is for him to mythologize. But for a man to speak sententiously about things in which he is unskilled is foolish and in erudite, of which this is a sufficient indication, that rustics are especially sententious and easily show that they are so. To assert, however, universally that which is not universally true is especially adapted to lamentation and amplification. And in this case, such sentences must be adduced either at the beginning or when you demonstrate. But it is requisite to employ sentences which are generally known and common if they are useful for the purpose. For in consequence of being common, as being acknowledged by all men, they appear to be true. Thus he who exhorts soldiers to encounter danger, though they have not sacrificed, may employ what Hector says to Politimus, quote, without a sign his sword the brave man draws and asks no omen but his country's cause, close quote. And when those are exhorted to fight who are inferior to their opponents in force, it may be said, quote, in battle marrs to either side inclines, close quote. When anyone likewise is exhorted to destroy the children of enemies, though they have done no injury, he may say, quote, he is a fool who, having destroyed the father, spares the children, close quote. Further still, some proverbs are also sentences such as the proverb, quote, an addict stranger, close quote. Sentences likewise are to be sometimes adduced, contrary to those which are generally received. But I mean by those that are generally received such as, quote, to thyself, close quote. And, quote, nothing too much, close quote. And sentences contrary to these are to be adduced when either the manors will from then seem to be better or when the thing is spoken pathetically. But a thing is spoken pathetically if someone, being enraged, should say, quote, it is false that a man ought to know himself, for this man, if he had known himself, would never have solicited the command of the army, close quote. And the manors will appear to be better if it is said, quote, that it is not proper, according to the assertion of bias, to love as if intending hereafter to hate, but rather to hate as if intending hereafter to love, close quote. It is necessary, however, to render the choice manifest by the diction, but if not to subjoin the cause. As for instance, we may either thus speak, quote, that it is necessary to love, not as they say, but as if always intending to love. For the other, i.e., he who loves as if intending hereafter to hate, loves like a treacherous person, close quote. Or thus, quote, what is generally asserted does not please me, for a true friend ought to love as one who will love always. Nor does that saying please me, nothing too much, for it is necessary to hate vehemently, bad men, close quote. But these sentences afford great assistance to orations, one cause of which arises from the arrogance of the hearers, for they are delighted if anyone speaking universally happens to induce opinions which they have formed about some particular things. My meaning, however, will be manifest from what follows, and at the same time it will be evident how these sentences are to be investigated. For a sentence is, as we have said, a universal enunciation, but the auditors are delighted when that is universally asserted which they have preconceived partially. Thus, for instance, if anyone happens to have had bad neighbors or children, he will adopt the sentence, quote, that nothing is more troublesome than vicinity, close quote, and, quote, that nothing is more stupid than the procreation of children, close quote. Hence, it is necessary to conjecture what the opinion of the audience will be about particulars and afterwards to adduce universal sentences conformable to their opinion. And this is one use which speaking sententiously ought to possess, but there is another use of it which is superior to this, for it causes orations to become ethical, and those orations are ethical in which the deliberate intention of the speaker is manifest. All sentences, however, affect this because he who employs the sentence speaks universally about things which are the objects of deliberate choice. Hence, if the sentences are good, they cause the speaker to appear to be one who possesses worthy manners, and thus much concerning a sentence. What it is, how many species there are of it, how sentences are to be employed, and what advantages they possess. Chapter 23 Let us now speak concerning enthememes universally. After what manner they are to be investigated, and in the next place, let us show what are the places of enthememes, for there is a different species of each of these. That an enthemem, therefore, is a certain syllogism and how it is a syllogism we have before shown, and also in what it differs from dialectic syllogisms. For neither ought things remote to be collected, nor are all things to be collectively assumed, since the former will be obscure from their length, and the latter will be nougatory, through speaking of things which are obvious. For this is the reason why the unlearned are more capable of producing persuasion among the crowd than the learned, since, as the poets say, quote, the unlearned speak more elegantly to a mob, close quote. For the unlearned speak of things common and universal, which are adapted to the comprehension of the multitude, but the learned speak of things which they know, and which are near. Hence rhetorical enthememes must not be composed from everything which is probable, but from things of a definite nature, such as are those things which appear probable to the judges, or which the judges admit. Nor is it requisite that these things should be approved by all the auditors, but it is sufficient if they are approved by the greater part of them. It is likewise requisite not only to collect from things which are necessary, but also from things which have a frequency of subsistence. In the first place, therefore, it is necessary to assume that concerning the thing of which it is requisite to speak and syllogize, whether by employing a political or any other syllogism, concerning this it is necessary to possess all or some of the things which are inherent in it. For, if we possess none of them, no conclusion can be made from nothing. I say, for instance, how can we advise the Athenians to engage in war or not, unless we know what their power is, whether naval or land, or both, how great it is, what their revenue is, who are their friends and enemies, and farther still, what wars they have waged, and how they were carried on, and other things of the like-kind? How likewise could we praise them if we were not acquainted with the naval battle at Salamis or the battle at Marathon or the deeds which they performed for the Heraclidae or anything else of the like-kind? For all men praise others from beautiful transactions which exist or appear to exist. In a similar manner also, in blaming the Athenians, we must direct our attention to the contraries to these things, considering what particular of a contrary kind pertains to them or appears to pertain to them, such as that they enslaved the Greeks and subdued those who fought with them against the barbarian, and behaved most intrepidly, viz the egenita and padadita, and other things of the like-kind, and whatever other crime may be laid to their charge. Thus too, both those who accuse and those who defend accuse and defend by directing their attention to inherent particulars, but it makes no difference whether we speak of the Athenians or the Lacedemonians of God or man, for he who advises Achilles, who praises or blames, accuses or defends him, must assume things which are inherent, or appear to be inherent, that from these he may in praising or blaming show whether anything beautiful in conduct or base is inherent. In accusing or defending may show whether anything just or unjust is inherent, and in advising whether anything advantageous or detrimental is present. The like method must also be adopted in every other thing. Thus for instance, in investigating whether justice is good or not, our attention must be directed to what is inherent in justice or in good. Hence, since it appears that this method is adopted by all men, whether they syllogize more accurately or remissly, for their assumptions are not derived from all things, but from such as are inherent in each particular, and through reasoning. Since it is evident that it is otherwise impossible to prove what they wish to prove, this being the case, it is obvious as we have shown in the topics that about each question in things contingent, and the time best adapted to them, it is necessary to have a more select nature. The investigation, likewise, must be made after the same manner in things of an unexpected nature, so that our attention must not be directed to the indefinite, but to things inherent, which are the subject of the oration. Of the things inherent, likewise, the greater part, and those which are nearest to the subject, must be included in the oration, for by how much the greater the number of things inherent is possesses, by so much more easily will he prove that which he wishes to prove, and by how much more proximate the particulars are which he details, by so much the more appropriate will they be, and less common. But I call common things, indeed, such as to praise Achilles, because he is a man, and because he is among the number of demigods, and because he fought against Troy. For these particulars belong also to many others, so that praise of this kind no less pertains to Achilles than to Diamond. Things peculiar, however, are such as happen to no other person than Achilles, such as to of Slain Hector, the bravest of the Trojans. In Cygnus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the Greeks from descending from their ships to the land, and that being very young, he entered into the army, though he was not bound by an oath yet against the Trojans. These and other things of the like kind are peculiar to Achilles. This, therefore, is one place of selection, and is the first topical place. Chapter 24 Let us now speak of the elements of Enthememes, but I call the same thing the element and place of an Enthemem. Let us, however, first speak of those things which it is necessary in the first place to discuss. For, there are two species of Enthememes, and the first species contains ostensive Enthememes, which show that a thing is, or is not, but the other species is adapted to Confutation. They differ also in the same manner, as in Dialectics, and Elincus, and Syllagism differ. But, an ostensive Enthemem is when the conclusion is collected from things acknowledged, and the Enthemem adapted to Confutation is when things not acknowledged are collected in the conclusion. Nearly, therefore, places have been delivered by us about each of the useful and necessary species. For propositions respecting each have been selected. Hence, we have shown from what places it is requisite to derive Enthememes about good or evil, the beautiful or the base, the just or the unjust, and, in a similar manner, places have been assigned by us concerning manners, passions, and habits. Again, therefore, it remains that after another manner, we should assume universally concerning all the three genera of erasions, indicating which of them are adapted to Confutation, and are ostensive, and what are the places of apparent Enthememes, but which are not Enthememes in reality, since neither are they Syllagisms, but these are considered manifest, we shall discuss solutions and objections, and show whence it is requisite to reduce these against Enthememes. One place, therefore, of ostensive Enthemes is from Contraries, for it is necessary to consider whether one Contrary is inherent in another, subverting indeed if it be not inherent, but confirming if it is inherent. For instance, we may less show that to act temperately is good, for to act temperately is noxious, or as in the Messinic oration of Alcidamus, for if war is the cause of the present evils, it is necessary to correct those evils with peace, for as a certain tragic poet argues in Greek Centuries, quote, if it is not just to fall into anger with those who have done evil willingly, neither is it fit if anyone has acted beneficently from compulsion to be grateful to him, close quote. But if to speak falsely is among mortals calculated to persuade, it is requisite to think that on the Contrary many things are true, which are considered by mortals as incredible. Another place is from similar cases, for it is necessary that they should be similarly inherent, or not inherent. Thus, from this place it may be shown that not everything which is just is good. For if everything just were eligible and good, everything which is justly done would be eligible and good, but now to die justly is not eligible. Another place is from relatives, for if someone has acted well or justly another has suffered well or justly, and if the command is just, it is also just to obey the command. As the publican, Diomedon said about the tributes, quote, for said he to the people, it is not disgraceful in you to sell the tributes, neither is it disgraceful in us to buy them, close quote. And if one man deservedly and justly suffers a loss, he who caused him to suffer it acted well and justly. And if he who caused another to suffer a loss acted well and justly, he who sustained the loss sustained it well and justly. In this place, however, it is difficult to paralogize, for if a man died justly, he suffered justly, but perhaps not by you. Hence it is necessary to consider separately whether he who suffered deserved to suffer and whether he who did the thing deserved to do it, unless to infer what is adapted and appropriate. For sometimes the thing of this kind is dissonant and nothing impedes as in the alchemyon of theodectes, quote, did never any mortal hate thy mother? Close quote. To which the answer is, quote, distinctly this must be considered. Close quote. Al-Fasaba also inquiring, quote, how therefore have the judges condemned thee? Close quote. Alchemyon answered, quote, of death deserving she was judged, but I, twas said, could not have slain thy mother. Close quote. Thus, likewise, on the trial of Demosthenes, in those who slew Nicanor, because they were judged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he was justly put to death. In like manner, when a certain person was slain at Thebes, it was inquired in the court of justice whether he had been unjustly slain, as if it were not unjust to slay him who deserved to die. Another place is from the more and the less, such as, if even the gods do not know all things, much less do men. For the meaning of this is, if the more is not inherent in that in which it ought to be more inherent, it is evident that neither will it be inherent in that in which the less is inherent. But this place, that he will strike his neighbor who strikes his father, depends on this, that if the less is inherent, the more also will be inherent. And, this place is useful for both purposes. Viz, whether it be requisite to show that a thing is inherent, or is not. Farther still, if a thing is inherent, neither more nor less. Once it is said, in a certain tragedy, quote, is thy father to be pitied because he has lost a son, and is not envious to be equally commiserated, who has lost his son, Millie Ager, one of the most illustrious of the Greeks, close quote. And, that if thesius did not act unjustly in ravaging Helen, neither did Paris. And, if the tinderida, i.e. Castor and Pollux, did not act unjustly in ravishing the daughters of Lusipus, neither did Paris. Likewise, if Hector did not act unjustly in slaying Patroclus, neither did Paris in slaying Achilles. And, if other artists are not vile men, neither are philosophers. And, if generals are not vile, because they are frequently conquered, neither are Sophists. And, that if a private person ought to be careful of your renown, you also ought to be careful of the renown of the Greeks. Another place consists in the consideration of time, as is exemplified in what Iphicrity says in his oration against Hermodius. For, said he, quote, if before I had done the thing I had demanded a statue in case I did it, you would have granted it to me. And, will you not grant it, now I have done the thing? You would not, therefore, when expecting a benefit, promise a reward, and refuse it, when you have the benefit. And again, for the purpose of persuading that the Thebans ought to permit Philip to pass through their land into Attica, it may be said, that if you had made this request before he sent you assistance against the Fakensis, you would have permitted it. It is absurd, therefore, that because he then neglected to ask permission and trusted you would grant it, close quote. Another place is taken from things said and reported on the speaker. And this mode is eminently useful, and was employed in the tragedy of Teochris by Iphicrates against Aristophan, when he inquired of him whether he would have betrayed the ships for money, and when Aristophan denied that he would, Iphicrates afterwards said, quote, you, therefore, being Aristophan would not have betrayed them, and should I, being Iphicrates, have betrayed them? Close quote. It is necessary, however, that he who is opposed should appear to have acted more unjustly than the opponent, for if not it would seem to be ridiculous if anyone had said this against Aristides, accusing who was in every respect worthy of belief, and which ought to have been said against an accuser who did not deserve to be credited. For in short, the plaintiff ought to be considered as better than the defendant. He, therefore, who opposes another should always reprobate this, and universally that which is said is absurd when anyone who reproves others in things which he himself does, or would have done if he could, or who persuades others to do those things which he himself does not do, nor would have done. Another place is derived from definition, such for instance as quote, that which is demonical, is nothing else than either God or the work of God, but whoever thinks that it is the work of God must necessarily think that there are gods. Close quote. And as Iphicrates said against a certain person named Harmonius, quote, he who is the best of men is most generous or noble, for there was nothing generous in Harmonius and Aristogiton till they had accomplished some generous undertaking. Close quote. He added that he was more allied to, i.e. he more resembled the ancient Harmonius, quote, for my works, close quote, said he, quote, are more allied to the works of Harmonius and Aristogiton than thine. Close quote. And as in the aeration concerning Paris, quote, all men will confess that those who are intemperate are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one body. Close quote. Hence Socrates said that he would not go to Arkelus, king of Macedonia, quote, for it is disgraceful, close quote, said he, quote, for him who has received a benefit, not to be able to recompense him from whom he received it. Just as it is disgraceful, in him who has been used ill, not to return the ill treatment, close quote. For all these, defining and assuming what a thing is, syllogize about the things which are the subjects of their speech. Another place is derived from multiplicity of diction as in the topics. An argument is derived from that which has a rectitude of subsistence being multifariously predicated. Another place is derived from division as if all men act unjustly for the sake of three things. For they act unjustly either for the sake of this vis utility or for the sake of this vis pleasure or for the sake of this vis because they are enraged. But for the sake of two of these they could not do the injury and the opponents themselves confess they did not do it for the sake of the third. Another place is from induction as from the oration inscribed Peparthia in which it is said quote that women everywhere determined truly about the birth of children, close quote. For this is evident from what happened at Athens since when Mantius the rhetoration was dubious about his son his doubts were dissolved by the mother of the child. This likewise happened at Thebes. For when Ismenes and Stilbo contended which of them was the father of the Salicus didonus demonstrated that he was the son of Ismenes and on this account the Salicus was considered as the offspring of Ismenes and again from the law of the Edectes if no one would commit his horses to the care of those who not pay a proper attention to the horses of others nor his ships to those who destroy the ships of others and if the like takes place in all things we ought not to commit our safety to those who have badly attended to the safety of others and as Alcidamus says quote that all men honor the wise close quote for the Perians honor Archilicus though he blasphemed them and the Chians honor Homer though he was not their fellow citizen and the Midlennans saffo though she was a woman the Lacedaemonians also though they were in the smallest degree philologists made Kylo one of their senators the Italians likewise honored Pythagoras and the Lampsini buried Anaxagoras though he was a stranger again the Athenians by using the laws of Solon were happy and the Lacedaemonians by using those of Lycurgus the city of the Thebans also as soon as philosophers were their governors became happy another place is derived from the judgment made about the same or a similar or a contrary thing and this indeed is especially the case if it is the judgment of all men and always but if not if it is the judgment of most men or of all or the greater part of wise men or of good men or if it is the decision of those who are judges or of those whom the judges approve or of those against whom there is no judgment to be given as of princes or of those whose judgment it is not becoming to oppose a father or preceptors but of this place there are many examples and one is what Atocles said against mixedemides quote, if it were well indeed for the venerable goddesses the Furies to plead their cause in the Areopagus can it be improper for mixedemides to do so? close quote another is what Sappho said quote, that to die is an evil for the gods have judged it to be so since otherwise they themselves would die, close quote another is what Aristipus said against Plato asserting something as he thought to positively quote, but our associate said he meaning Socrates affirms no such thing, close quote another example is that of a Jesipolis who at Delphi inquired of the god Apollo having prior to this consulted the oracle of Jupiter Olympus quote whether the son was of the same opinion as the father, close quote as if it were shameful for a son to descend from his father another is that of Isocrates concerning Helen who shows that she was a worthy character because Theseus judged her to be so and who also says the same thing of Paris because the goddesses preferred his judgment to that of other men he likewise asserts that Evigorus was a worthy character quote, because Conan when his affairs were adverse leaving everyone else came to Evigorus close quote another place is from the enumeration of parts as in the topics where it is inquired quote, what kind of motion the soul is close quote for it is either this or that vis, it must either be the motion which is a change in quality or relation or argumentation or generation an example of this place is from Theodex in his oration in defense of Socrates when he was accused by the judges, quote what temple has Socrates violated and what gods has he not reverenced among those whose honors are legally established by the city, close quote another place is from consequent good or evil for since in most things it happens that some good and evil are consequent to them we may employ consequent good for the purpose of persuading praising and defending but consequent evils for the purpose of dissuading blaming and accusing thus for instance we may blame literary pursuits because envy is consequent to erudition because they are attended with wisdom which is a good hence in the former case we may say that it is not proper to acquire erudition because it is not proper to be envied but in the latter that it is proper to acquire erudition for it is requisite to be wise in this place the art of the returition calipus consists to which he added what pertains to the possible and other things of which we have already spoken another place is when about two things and those opposed to each other it is requisite either to exhort or dissuade and to use the before mentioned place in both ways but it differs from that place in this that their casual things are opposed but here contraries only thus for instance a certain priest would not suffer his son to speak in public if you speak what is just men will hate you but if what is unjust the gods it is necessary however on the other hand to speak in public for if you speak what is just the gods will love you but if what is unjust men will love you this however is the same thing with the saying of buying oil and salt this argument may be retorted when to each of two contraries good and evil are consequent each being contrary to each another place is because the same things are not praised openly and secretly but just and beautiful things are especially praised openly and privately men are more inclined to praise what is advantageous one of these therefore we must endeavor to collect for this place is the most principal of paradoxes another place is derived from analogy and was used by Iphicrates for when the Athenians wished to compel his younger son because he was large to engage in public service Iphicrates said quote that if great boys were to be considered as men little men should be decreed to be boys close quote and Theodex in the law said quote you have made mercenaries such as strabuses and charitomous citizens on account of their probity but you have not made exiles of those among the mercenaries who have acted nefariously close quote another place is when in consequence of the same thing following from two things it is shown that the things from which it happens to follow are the same as Wenzhenophonies said quote that those were similarly impious who assert that the gods were generated and those who assert that they die for in both ways it happens that at a certain time the gods do not exist close quote and in short that which happens from each is always to be assumed as the same this place was also used by someone in the defense of Socrates for he said quote you are about to pass sentence not on Socrates but on his pursuit whether it be requisite to philosophize close quote and it may be said quote that to give earth and water is to become slaves and that to participate of common peace is to do what is commanded to be done close quote but whichever of these is useful must be assumed another place is derived from this that the same men do not always choose the same thing in a posterior or prior time but conversely as in this enthamim quote if when we were exiles we fought in order that we might return shall we having returned fly in order that we may not fight close quote for at one time the Athenians chose to fight that they might return to their country and at another time they were unwilling to leave their country lest they should be obliged to fight another place is when we affirm anything to have been done on account of some cause through which it might have been done though it was not in reality done through it as if one man should give something to another in order that by afterwards taking it away we may give him pain hence also it is said in a certain tragedy quote the demon gives great prosperity to many yet not with a benevolent intention but in order that they may receive more conspicuous calamities close quote and in the Meliager of Antiphon who that he might praise Meliager says quote there was a concourse of people from all Greece not for the purpose of killing the boar but that they might be witnesses of the valor of Meliager close quote another example is from the Ajax of Theodex in which it is said quote the diamond preferred Ulysses as his associate in the nocturnal adventure not for the purpose of honoring him but that he might have one to attend him who was his inferior close quote for it is possible he might have thus acted with this view another place is common both to litigants and counselors and consists in considering whatever pertains to exhortation and dissuasion and for the sake of which things are done and avoided for these are such as ought to be done when they are present for instance it must be considered whether a thing is possible and easy to be affected and whether is beneficial either to a man himself or to his friends or whether it is noxious and pernicious to his enemies or is at least attended with greater emolument than loss and exhortations are to be derived from these places and dehortations from the contrary from the same places also accusations and defenses may be derived defense indeed from those which pertain to dissuasion but accusation from those which pertain to exhortation and in this place the whole art of pamphilis and calypus consists another place is derived from things which appear indeed to be done but are incredible because they would not be credited unless they were or nearly were in existence and this in an eminent degree for whatever is done is apprehended to be done either because it has been truly done or is of itself credible and probable if therefore a thing is incredible and not probable it will be true that it has been done for it does not appear to have been done in consequence of being probable and credible thus androcleys pithius accusing the law said the multitude being tumultuous whilst he was speaking must require a law to correct them close quote for fishes also require salt though it may seem neither probable nor credible that animals nourished in salt should require salt and olives require oil though it may seem incredible that those things from which oil is produced should be in want of oil chapter 25 another place which is adapted to confutation is derived from considering things which are not assented to vis from considering if anything is not admitted from all times actions and speeches and this indeed may be done separately in the person of the opponent as quote he says that he loves euthenians and yet he has conspired with the 30 tyrants against his country close quote and separately as to the person himself as quote he says indeed that I am litigious but he cannot show that I ever sued any man close quote it may also be done separately both as to the person himself and his opponent as quote and this man indeed never lent any money but I have ransomed many of you close quote another place is useful with respect to men and things that have been accumulated but which do not appear to have deserved it and this consists in assigning the cause of the paradox for there is something which gave rise to the appearance thus for instance a certain woman was columnated with reference to her son for inconsequence of embracing him it seemed as if she had connection with the lad but the cause of her embracing him being assigned the cause thus to in the Ajax of theodex Ulysses says against Ajax that though he is braver than Ajax yet he does not seem to be so another place is derived from cause which if it exists the effect also exists but if it is not neither does the effect exist for cause and that of which it is the cause subsists together and nothing is cause thus Letimus in defending himself when Thrasybulus accusing him said quote that his name has been branded with infamy on a pillar in the acropolis but the inscription had been erased by the 30 tyrants close quote replied quote that this was not possible for if it had taken place the 30 tyrants would have placed more confidence in him inconsequence of his hatred to the people having been inscribed on a pillar close quote another place is from considering whether it was or is possible to advise or do or have done a thing better than it was advised to be or is or was done for it is evident that if it does not thus subsist it was not done since no one willingly and knowingly deliberately chooses what is bad this place however is false for frequently it becomes afterwards evident how it was possible to have acted better though this was before a manifest another place is derived from considering when something is intended to be done contrary to what has been done thus xenophonies when the aliens asked him quote whether they should sacrifice to Lucothea and lament her or not close quote if they thought her a goddess not to lament her but if a mortal not to sacrifice to her close quote another place is derived from accusing or defending heirs thus for instance in the meta of the poet Carcinus some persons accuse her of having slain her children because they no longer appear bracket for meta aired in sending away her sons but she defends herself by saying quote that if she had intended to commit murder she would not have slain her children but Jason for in not slaying Jason she would have acted wrong even if she had done the other thing i.e. slain her children this place however and species of enthamim formed the whole prior rhetorical art of Theodorus another place is derived from name Carcinus Sophocles of a certain woman named Cydro quote to clear thou iron art and burst the name close quote thus also it is usual to celebrate the gods from the signification of their names Conan likewise called Thrasybulus audacious and Herodicus said of Thrasymachus quote thou art always Thrasymachus i.e. bold in fight he also said of Polis quote you are always Polis i.e. a cult Herodicus likewise said of Draco the legislator quote that his laws were not the laws of a man but of a dragon for they were severe close quote another example is derived from what Hecuba says in the Troids of Euripides when speaking of Venus quote in the name of the goddess i.e. Aphrodite is rightly derived from Aphrosun i.e. Folly and as Coremin the comic poet says quote Penteas was so denominated from future calamity close quote those enthamemes however which are adapted to computation are more approved than those that are ostensive there are short collections of contraries but parallels are more obvious to the hearer of all syllogisms however as well those that are adapted to computation as those that are ostensive those especially excite perturbation in the auditors which manifest themselves as soon as they begin to be annunciated yet not because their meaning is superficial for the auditors are foresaw from the beginning what would follow this likewise is the case with those syllogisms which are understood as soon as they are completely annunciated chapter 26 since however it is possible that one thing may be a syllogism and another not but only appear to be so it is likewise necessary with respect to an enthamem that this should be should not be but should only appear to be an enthamem since an enthamem also is a certain syllogism but there are places of apparent enthamemes one indeed in addiction and of this one part as in dialectics is when though nothing is syllogistically concluded yet at the last it is inferred it is not therefore this or that or it necessarily is this or that what also is said in enthamemes contortly and oppositely appears to be an enthamem though it is not so in reality for such addiction is the receptacle of enthamem and a thing of this kind appears to be from the figure of the diction for the purpose however of speaking syllogistically in the diction it is useful to produce the heads of many syllogisms as quote for each of these is demonstrated from others but from the conjunction of these something appears to be affected another place of apparent enthamemes is derived from equivocation as if someone should say quote that a mouse is a worthy animal for the mysteries are the most honorable of all initiatory rights close quote or if someone making an enthamem on a dog should also comprehend in his enthamem the celestial dog or the god pan because pindar says quote oh blessed whom the olympiad gods call the all various dog of the great goddess close quote or if it should be said quote that it is most dishonorable there should be no dog so that it is evident that a dog is honorable close quote quote that hermes is the most communicative of all the gods for he alone is called common hermes close quote likewise to say quote that logos speech is most worthy because good men are worthy not of riches but of logos speech close quote for to be worthy of logos is most simply predicated another place consists in speaking things which are separated conjunctively or things which are conjoined disjunctively for since each of these modes of speaking appears to be the same though frequently it is not the same it is requisite to adopt whichever of these is more useful to know being in Sicily that there is a three banked galley in the Piraeus close quote another example is that he who knows the elements of a verse knows the verse for a verse is the same thing close quote as the elements from which it is composed another example of this place is quote that since twice so much of a thing is obnoxious neither can the half of that quantity be said to be salubrious for it is absurd if two things are good that one of them should be bad close quote thus therefore this place is useful for the purpose of computation but it is ostensive as follows quote for one good is not two evils close quote in short this place is paralogistic then another example is that of polyquities respecting Thrasybulus quote that he deposed the 30 tyrants close quote for this is conjunctive or what is said in the Orestes of Theodex for it is from division or is disjunctive vis it is just that she who killed her husband should die and it is also just that the son should revenge his father it is just therefore that the mother Klytemnestra should be slain by the son Orestes close quote for if these sentences are conjoined the conclusion perhaps will no longer be just in this Sophism likewise there is a fallacy of defect for it is not expressed by whom it is just that the mother should be slain this place consists in confirming or confuding by exaggeration and this is when a man not showing that he has done a certain deed amplifies the thing for thus he causes it to appear either that he has not done the deed when he who defends the cause amplifies or that he did it when the accuser was enraged hence it is not an enthamem for the hearer falsely collects that he has or has not done the deed the thing not being demonstrated another place is derived from a sign for this also is unsilogistic as if someone should say quote lovers are advantageous to cities for the love of Hormodius and Aristogitan deposed the tyrant Hipparchus close quote and likewise if someone should say quote that Dionysius was a thief for he was a depraved character close quote for this is unsilogistic since not every depraved character is a thief but every thief is a depraved character another place is derived from that which is accidental as in what Polycrates said of the mice quote that they aided the city by knowing the both strings of the enemy close quote or if someone should say that to be invited to supper is a most honorable thing for Achilles in consequence of not being invited was enraged against the Greeks in Tenedos but he as being despised was angry and this happened because he was not invited another place is derived from that which is consequent as for instance in what is said of Paris quote that he was magnanimous for despising an association with the multitude he dwelt in mount by himself close quote for because magnanimous men are lovers of solitude Paris also may appear to be magnanimous and quote since a certain person decorates himself and wanders by night he is an adulterer close quote because adulterers also are men of this kind in a similar manner it may be proved that mendicants and exiles are happy quote because mendicants sing and dance in temples and because it is permitted exiles to dwell where they please close quote for because these things are present with those that appear to be happy those also to whom these things are present may seem to be happy there is here however a difference in the mode on which account this example falls into defect i.e. it is a fallacy of defect another place is derived from which is causeless as if it were a cause as when that which is done together with another thing or after it is assumed as if it had been done for the sake of it and this place is especially used by politicians as by demedies who said quote that the administration of demastinies was the cause of all evils since war happened after it close quote another place is derived from a deficiency in the time when in the manner in which a thing is done such for instance as this quote that Paris just ravaged Helen for the choice was given to Helen of marrying whom she pleased close quote for perhaps this choice was not given to her always but at first and the authority of her father over her extended so far as to this or as if someone should say quote that the strike free men is insolence close quote for it is not entirely so but when he who strikes was not provoked father still another place is when in litigious disputes an apparent syllogism is produced from that which is simply and that which is not simply as in dialectics it is shown that non-being is being for non-being is non-being and it is also shown that what is unknown is the object of science for the unknown is the object of science because it is unknown because it is known that it is unknown thus also in orations there is an apparent and they mean from that which is not simply probable but is a certain probable thing this probability however does not take place universally as Agatha also says quote perhaps someone may say that this is probable that many things which are not probable happen to mortals close quote for that which is unlikely happens hence what is unlikely is likely but if this be the case that which is not probable is probable this however is not simply true but as in contentious arguments a fallacy is produced when a limitation restraining to a part to a place, to a time or a signifying relation is not added so here that which is improbable is not simply probable but is a certain probability but the art of Korax is composed from this place for whether the person be not obnoxious to the crime as he who is weak escapes an action for an assault for it is not likely that he committed an assault or whether he be obnoxious as being a strong man he has the same defense unless a certain probability is apparent and the leg takes place in other things for a man must necessarily be obnoxious to the crime or not both therefore appear to be probable and the one is indeed probable in reality but the other not simply but in the way we have shown and this it is an argument to be superior hence men were justly indignant with what Protagoras professed to accomplish for what he announced is false and not true but is apparently probable and exists in no art but in the rhetorical and contentious and thus much concerning enthamemes both the true and the apparent Chapter 27 it now follows we should speak concerning the solutions of enthamemes but it is possible to dissolve them by contrary reasoning or by introducing an objection with respect to contrary reasoning therefore it is evident that it may be affected from the same places for syllogisms are composed from things that are probable but many probable things appear to be contrary to each other but objections are introduced in the same manner as in the topics in four ways for they are introduced either from the same or from the similar or from the contrary or from the judgment and authority of others by an objection however being introduced from the same I mean as if for instance the enthamemes should be concerning love that it is a worthy thing an objection may be made to it in a twofold respect for either it may be said universally that all indigens is evil or partially that it would not be proverbially said conus love unless there was also base love but an objection is introduced from the contrary when if the enthamemes should be that a good man benefits all his friends it may be objected that neither does a bad man act ill towards all his friends an objection also is introduced from similars when the enthamemes is that those who receive an injury always hate the authors of it close quote for it may be objected that neither do those who are benefitted always love their benefactor close quote and objections which are introduced from the judgments of illustrious men are as if the enthamemes were quote that it is requisite to pardon those who are intoxicated for they air ignorantly close quote the objection is quote that peticus therefore does not deserve to be praised for he should not have legally established greater punishments for intoxication if he who is intoxicated airs through ignorance close quote enthamemes however are derived from four things and these four are the probable example tekmerian i.e. a necessary sign and a sign not necessary but those enthamemes which are collected from things that exist for the most part or appear to exist are derived from probabilities those which are derived from the similar either from one or many similar things bracket when the orator assuming what is universal so logistically collects what is particular close bracket exist through example but those which exist through what is necessary and real are through tekmerian and those that exist through what is universal or particular whether it really is or not are through signs which are not necessary but a probable thing is that which does not exist always but for the most part hence it is manifest that enthamemes of this kind will always be dissolved if an objection is introduced the solution however is sometimes apparent and not always true for he who objects does not dissolve the enthamem by showing that the thing is not probable but by showing that it is not necessary hence the defendant has always the advantage of the plaintiff through this paralogism for since the plaintiff demonstrates through probabilities that the thing is not the same which shows either that the thing is not probable or that it is not necessary and that which exists for the most part is always liable to objection bracket for otherwise it would not be a probability but would be always necessary close bracket hence the judge if this mode of solution is adopted will think either that the thing is not probable or that it must not be judged by him in consequence as we have said of being deceived by false reasoning for it is requisite that he should not only judge from things which are necessary but also from probabilities for this is to judge most judiciously the solution therefore of an enthamem is not sufficient which shows that a thing is not necessary but it is requisite that the solution should also show that it is not probable but this will happen if the objection rather shows that the thing for the most part subsists it is possible however that a thing may happen for the most part or frequently in a two-fold respect is either from time or from circumstances but principally if from both for if things which frequently happen does subsist this is more probable but signs which are not necessary and enthamemes derived through a sign are solved in the way we mentioned in the first book for that every such sign is unsilogistic is evident to us from the analytics enthamemes however derived from examples are solved after the same manner as enthamemes derived from probabilities for if we can induce a contra example in which the thing is not so the enthamem is solved because the thing is not necessary or because many things have happened frequently and in a different manner but if many things have happened frequently and in this manner then it must be contended either that the present circumstance is not similar or is not similarly disposed or has a certain difference tecmeria however i.e. necessary signs and enthamemes which are of the nature of tecmeria cannot be solved in consequence unsilogistic but this is evident to us from the analytics it remains therefore to show that what is said is that certain premises do not exist but if it is evident that the premises do exist and that the enthamem is derived from tecmerian then the enthamem becomes insoluble for all things now become apparent from demonstration chapter 28 to amplify however and diminish are not the elements of an enthamem for i call the same thing an element and a place for an element as also a place is that into which many enthamemes fall but to amplify and diminish are enthamemes for the purpose of showing that a thing is great or small as likewise that it is good or evil just or unjust or anything else and all these are the things with which syllogisms and enthamemes are conversant so that if no one of these is the place of an enthamem neither are amplification and diminution neither are enthamemes which have the power of solving the arguments of the opponent any other species of enthamem than those which are employed in confirmation for it is evident that he solves the arguments of his opponent who either shows the contrary to what his opponent asserts or introduces an objection but he proves the opposite thus if one shows that a thing has been done the other shows that it has not been done and if one shows that it has not the other shows that it has been done so that here indeed there will be no differences for both use the same enthamemes since they introduce enthamemes to show that the thing is or is not an objection however is not an enthamem but bracket as we have shown in the topics close bracket it is to declare a certain opinion from which it will be evident that the conclusion is not syllogistical or that something false has been assumed and thus much has been said by us respecting examples and sentences and in short respecting what pertains to the reasoning power once we may abound with enthamemes and how we may solve them it now remains to discuss what pertains to diction and order end of book 2 recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards