 Doug is known to many of you, but he has been in and out of government. Asia Scholar now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Let's use the word peace. Doug, please. It's always hopeful to talk about peace. At this wonderful conference, there have been lots of valuable thoughts expressed, and I think that most of the things that I know about have been well covered. I think people walk away from this conference quite well informed. Kevin Rudd yesterday at lunch presented the Chinese priorities and ways with which I cannot quarrel. I think it was a tour de force and describing things in China. As I begin my remarks today, I'd like to say, remind that Asia is far more diverse than Europe and other regions. We tend to forget that. If you're far away from Asia, you sort of lump it all together. But it's a very diverse region, less disposed to coalitions than most. For a long time, the United States and the post-war world managed relations in the Asia Pacific quite successfully. Prosperity surged, peace reigned for the most part, except in a couple of wars we were involved in. We used the method called hub and spokes, where the U.S. was the hub, and we had spoke relationships with the Republic of Korea, with Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and others. We were the unifying force because they were not among themselves so unified. You take that hub away, and then you get a lot of units out there without spokes to bring them together. My first observation today is on three broad trends in the region, is that the movement of U.S. policy with respect to China from engagement to containment is eroding those spokes and making it difficult for the various countries, each of which have their own relations with China to sustain the kind of tension that will come if they also try to remain close to the United States. Trade policy is an example of this. The U.S. has not reconciled its trade policy between facilitating business opportunities within China, which would by definition deepen the connection between the two business communities and peoples, and pursuing, decoupling technological suppression, denial of high access to high technology parts, to be conductors and the like. Both are being pursued. President Trump on the one hand seems to be looking for a quick gains on the trade front, but he's afraid to probe deeply into China for having fears of the defense, how to defend such an agreement against opposition in the United States. But below President Trump, there's a very broad consensus within the government to try to dismantle the many ways in which we do cooperate with China for fear that China will overtake the U.S. technologically, militarily and economically in the decades ahead. Second observation, and this may draw some distinctions with Professor Haoyi's remarks, the administration of Donald Trump has articulated the idea emerging originally from Japan of the free and open Indo-Pacific. This is a direct descendant of President Obama's rebalance to Asia, which was articulated in 2011. I was a consultant on the original rebalance to Asia as an outside party, and I know well that it was designed to help President Obama draw down the expense and the forces in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to shift the weight of American capability to counterbalance the rise of China. I think everyone in this room knows we've never succeeded at that in that period. Materially, you can point to a few technical changes in the American dispositions in the Asia Pacific, but in fact, whatever drawdowns have taken place in Southwest Asia, the MENA have not been transferred to East Asia. Nonetheless, China has been given a signal that the U.S. intended to contain China without the U.S. following up on it. I think the free and open Indo-Pacific so far is a matter of sloganeering internationally, which has similarly not produced a result. In fact, even under Donald Trump, we've now have forces back in Saudi Arabia that we had taken out a few years ago. The commitment to the Persian Gulf region remains quite strong and new resources have not been made available to the Asia Pacific to provide the counterbalance to China's rise. Within the United States government, there has been some adjustment. It's kind of a symbolic kind of adjustment for the free and open Indo-Pacific. A few offices have been created, a few appointments have been made, but none of this translates back into capabilities in the region. And unfortunately, were we to try to go transfer some of these capabilities to the region, we would be stressing relations with alliance partners who under pressure from China and in deep codependency with China economically may be reluctant. A mention was just made by Ambassador Kim of the possibility of INF dispositions in the Asia Pacific. I think that's pretty remote both in time and in principle, but it's a real concern that we may be asking countries to very small countries, very densely populated countries to position weapons systems in their midst. This would be extremely controversial and difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances. And we know that China would work very hard to make it painful for anyone to accept them. As U.S. relative strength has declined across the board with the rise of other powers, the U.S. has seen a shift in correlation of forces and it's demanding more of the allies at a time when it can offer them less. Or in fact, it's demanding more in performance while demanding also more in support for the hosting of American forces in Korea, in Japan and elsewhere. A third broad trend being reflected in Asia I think is the global balkanization which has resulted from rapid extensive globalization and people are pulling back from the forces of globalization even in the Asia Pacific which has prospered tremendously from this. Japan and Korea, we've just talked a lot about this with Ambassador Kim, Japan and Korea are pulling apart. I'm increasingly of the mind that we're not going to be able to put this back together again someday. Earlier panels discussed how the choice for South Korea is particularly painful because of the very heavy economic reliance on China and the pressure China has put on them with respect to defense measures taken to protect against missiles from North Korea. The Myanmar, which was a few years ago seen as a emerging from dictatorship and becoming an example of the rise of democracy in the region, has gone into retreat. It's a very sad example. North Korea is about, I think in agreement with Professor Kim, North Korea is about to embark on provocations in order to press Washington back into talks and into concessions on the UN Security Council sanctions which are strangling North Korea's industry. North Korea is made due on its commercial economy that's getting by with some market reforms but the state-owned enterprises are starved for resources that people are unemployed and they're not able to act as a militarized state in their normal way and they're very eager to get this back. We're doing a few missiles and maybe even a nuclear test would be well within their interest to get the attention of President Trump before he enters the election year in January. The great irony is that the U.S. in dealing with the rising in China needs its allies and friends more than ever and yet we're making it harder for our friends and allies to work with us more than many, many years. This is going to present a tremendous dilemma not just for the current Obama, excuse me, the current Trump administration but for whichever administration succeeds. Thank you. Doug, thank you very, very much. Join in that. I come away with this image of the spinning bicycle wheel completely spinning apart with the spokes going in all directions.