 Welcome everybody to this event on the German siten bender and its implications for British-German relations and the strategic review. I'm very pleased to speak to a virtual audience which I hope will be large and hopefully we have reached across continents to attract a lot of people to what I think is a very very timely and important topic not least because of the broader implications for European security and defence and of course the crisis in Ukraine overshadows everything. Now you will have heard some of the news around the speech that the German new German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave a couple of days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine where he used that term siten bender to really make an argument of how German security defence policy needs to change in radical ways. The most visible expression of that change is that commitment to a 100 billion euros special fund special purpose fund to support German defence procurement to support the German armed forces a commitment to spend 2% of GDP i.e. the NATO target for the next coming years on defence and to break with some of the taboos certainly around providing weapons to Ukraine. Now after that landmark speech some of the things that have happened since have caused perhaps some doubts over the seriousness of that siten bender not just beyond the money but in the head so the siten bender in den Kupfen and how serious that commitment has been. Now there are lots of questions that arise from this significant shift in German defence policy perhaps the potential shift beyond the issue of spending and I hope we can elucidate some of these implications particularly for British German relations in the coming hour or so and we've got fantastic speakers that can help us to make sense of these these changes. First of all I'll just introduce the speakers one after the other starting with Dr Helena von Bismarck who's currently a visiting research fellow at the Centre for British Politics and Government at Kings College London as well as a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. She has lectured on Western European history at Homebold University to Berlin where she also completed a PhD in modern history. Her first book Conceptions of Informal Empire British Policy in the Persian Gulf 1961 to 68 was published in 2013 while her current book project will explore the relationship between Margaret Thatcher and Jack DeLore. Next is Gesine Weber who's a research analyst at the Paris Office of the German Marshall Fund of the US the PhD candidate at the Defence Studies Department at Kings College London where her research interests include the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, EU-UK Security Cooperation after Brexit and the E3 which you all know is France, UK and Germany and the respective security policy. She has previously received an MA in European Affairs with a distinction from South Port Paris and an MA in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin. Last but not least is Dr Eileen Matelé. She's a research fellow on the Security and Defence Programme at the German Council on Foreign Relations, the GRP and was previously Deputy Head of the Comrade Adonar Stipton's Israel Office in Jerusalem. An alumnus of the War Studies Department, she earned her PhD on the impact of US engagement with NATO during the Obama presidency from Martin Luther University at Halle Wittenberg where she was a research associate for the Chair of International Relations and European Politics. I should have said my name is Christoph Meyer. I'm a Professor of European International Politics at the Department of European International Studies at Kings College London and of course I've done also a lot of research on European Foreign Policy and there's a book coming on European Foreign Policy in an era of surprise which we submitted before Ukraine but I think there's still relevant lessons because we are looking at the 2014 Ukraine crisis. So hopefully we'll have a good discussion. Every speaker has I think around 10 minutes for comments, 8 to 10 minutes and then I would really welcome any questions in the chat and I will read out the questions. I'm not sure whether you can rate them but if you can rate questions you really like then I will that will increase the chances of me posing them. So in the order I've just started I would like to invite Helena to hit us off please. Well thank you very much Christoph for the introduction and to the Center for Grand Strategy. Thank you for having me. I've attended the other two sessions on the Integrated Review in celebration of its first birthday in recent weeks and from what I gather the point of tonight is to establish how post-integrated review Britain, post-Brexit Britain should deal with Germany or can deal with Germany particularly in times of site and vendor. Site and vendor is a German word which means much more than turning point it means watershed moment and we need to discuss this in the context of the significant increase in defense spending precipitated by the Russian attack against Ukraine. There has been a lot of talk recently about the question whether site and vendor is even taking place if it's even a thing anymore and as a historian I would say that the jury is still out and that it is far far too early to say. In fact looking at other watershed moments both in British and in German history such as the Suez crisis or indeed the fall of the Berlin Wall will probably need years to establish how much has changed. I would also point out that it is not these watershed moments in hindsight very often they turn out not so much as moments where everything changed but moments of truth moments where long-term problems or grievances or developments just become impossible to overlook so a big crisis focuses minds and makes us look at the world in a different way and that in itself precipitates change or at least it can and we have to see what happens in Germany. So rather than giving you a definitive judgment whether or not site and vendor has taken place what I'd like to do is give you a few things to look for in the months and indeed years to come that will in my view determine that question. The debate about Germany's site and vendor is in my view very often conducted in a much too narrow way. We need to talk about much more than just the increase in defense spending and also about much more than the question how we're going to spend that money although both of these things are very important and significant but I would like to and I'll leave this to Eileen and Gazina who actually know much more about this than I do I think but I want to talk about three other things determining really the relevance of this site and vendor. First we need to talk about the way in which political elites and indeed German society at large talk and even think about war in general about questions of war and peace about the military and about foreign policy and I think that the Russian invasion has had a very profound impact on this. I think there has been a change and I don't think it will change back anytime soon. Germany is long standing pacifism for which there is there are very sound historic reasons and the very widespread discomfort with all things to do with the military that has been really shaken to its core by what's been happening in Ukraine. This debate about how Germany approaches the question of you know being at war or dealing with a war in Europe because we're obviously not at war. This is a debate which will take time and I can fully understand how this is very frustrating from a Ukrainian point of view because they don't have time but still that debate is very much happening it's everywhere it's in every newspaper it's in every talk show and a really not insignificant number of sacred cows have been slaughtered over the last three months. The political party where this is most perceptible are the Greens but it's not at all limited to them so if I would look at this question the way Germany looks at war in general I think there has been a site and vendor or at least there has this has been a turning point. The second thing we need to look at to determine the relevance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on Germany's defence and foreign policy is the relationship between in Germany between supposedly unpolitical business elites and long-term geopolitical developments or to put it much more plainly we need to talk about the way in which Germans look at the map. Germany's Russia policy of at least the last 15 years really is a prime example of a failure to recognise that for a country of Germany's size and economic power and also for an exporting country like ours there is no such thing as an unpolitical business decision and we see that in our dependence on Russian energy in fact a few days ago Angela Merkel did her first interview since leaving office and what struck me most about the interview wasn't anything she said it was the fact that the journalist didn't even ask her how her government could allow the development of Germany's dependence on Russian energy because that's a problem which built up over at least a decade the fact that he wouldn't even ask that speaks volumes in my view about sort of the wide gap the chasm we have in Germany between talk about business and talk about foreign policy we have a very influential business elite which pretends that they're not doing anything political when in fact of course it has political consequences and in my view this needs to change and I think there has been a change this is being recognised now our energy policy and change is changing and it won't take a change back and also there has been a debate about what the example of Russia and Ukraine means for our relationship with China and in the long run this will be important that said I expect the backlash from a not insignificant part of the business elite to be substantial in fact is already happening so here the jury really is still out how much of a change we will see in sort of the development such a thing as strategic and geopolitical thinking in sort of Germany's political and business elite circles and thirdly to determine whether a vendor is really happening we need to talk about leadership and that means we need to talk about all our shots and there are in my view three weaknesses or three problems with his leadership in this moment the first is we he is just not very good at messaging or communicating his policies indeed there has been a pattern for the last three months of over promising and under delivering and it's turning into a little into a real problem because it has called into question Germany's very reliability as a security partner and it has also led to speculation of what he actually wants and what his aims actually are I think some of the speculation may be unfair but his messaging should address it and there is so we say room for improvement in that department the second problem and I think it's actually a much larger one is that the Chancellor does not is in my view not mindful enough of the role pace and timing play in times of war and everything we do about Ukraine is basically too slow that applies to sanctions it implies our policy in the EU and above all to weapon deliveries and and is this really time and pace which turns a decision into a strategy and he doesn't seem to realize that or if he does and he doesn't act on it and then thirdly the third weakness in German leadership that we're currently seeing is in my view a focus almost excessive focus on the big picture of our long-term relationship with Russia and while this is obviously a perfectly legitimate and actually very important topic and you can't really discuss it if at the same time you fail to recognize that our long-term relationship with Russia will of course be impacted by the short-term development of the war in Ukraine so again time is of the essence and that that failure to to connect the short-term and the long-term and also to maybe accept pain the short-term or problems in short-term because you're thinking of the long-term that is the opposite of strategic thinking in fact I would call it intellectual escapism so enough about Germany what does all of this mean for UK-German relations I think to establish that we first need to acknowledge that Britain is currently right in the middle of its site and vendor of its own albeit one of their own volition and that site and vendor is Brexit. Brexit is a geopolitical turning point and we don't talk about this enough because it is about much more than just leaving an organization it is about much more than leaving a market and in terms of foreign security policy it is about much more than just leaving the European Union's common foreign and security policy. If we want to talk about Britain's grand strategy and Britain's long-term future in the world we need to include the development of Britain's economy, its state capability and the state of its alliances in the conversation because all of these things are deeply affected by Brexit. So UK-German relations including security relations in 2022 really need to be looked at in the framework of a double site and vendor the site and vendor of Brexit and the site and vendor of Russia's brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine. There is a pretty significant overlap in my view in Britain's and Germany's international interests and also even policies. The war in Ukraine has radically changed Germany's threat perception. It has also been indicated the British point of view which was also put forward in the integrated review regarding the danger emanating from Russia. It has also returned the European continent to the center of British political debate after several years of focusing on global Britain. Now, since I know that there are people from the security community listening to this I know exactly what you're going to say. We were always committed to European defense. You people just couldn't see it. That's true. It is in the integrated review that Britain is primarily Euro-Atlantic power. But if you don't mind my saying so, the government hasn't exactly advertised that fact until the war in Ukraine started. So there has been a complete shift in messaging and in focus of what sort of matters and the all the existing problems with EU-UK relations notwithstanding. There has in my view been a real change in the way the British talk about Europe in the last three months. So that's good. In my view, talking about sort of collaboration. That is also a considerable overlap between when it comes to the institutions where Anglo-German collaboration takes place, particularly in NATO. I'll cut this short because I'm already over time. But I need finally to say a few words on mutual perceptions. This matters because perceptions define relationships. The Brexit policy of the current British government and the Ukraine policy of the current German government have sadly reinforced some of the most crushing prejudices and stereotypes about both countries. I recently had a chat with the British colleagues and we as a joke, but we were talking about stereotypes and prejudices. I quote, Germans are cynical peaceniks who are happy for others to do their dirty work in security while they do business with anyone. Worse, they then lecture you on morality and not to be outdone. Speaking about the British, I quote, the British are self-obsessed narcissists who refuse to see that they are not a world power anymore. Well, I'm aware that both of these quotes are brutal, but not only would I argue that they contain more than a grain of truth, but I've also very often heard variations of both of them in both capitals in recent years. In fact, if there is at the moment one thing the British and the German government have in common, and not just the government, but also parts of their foreign policy-making elites, that there is a chasm that exists between the way in which they see themselves and the way they're being perceived abroad, not everywhere abroad, but certainly in the other country, respectively, when we talk about the relationship. The consequences of this failure to see ourselves as others see us and to address this gap can be profound because it can, and in fact it already has, made both Germany's and Britain's allies question the very things that our countries supposedly stand for in the world. In the British case, that's the rule of law, and in the German case, and this is actually quite devastating for a German like myself to face up to, it is the commitment to the principle of never again. Fantastic. Thank you very much for kicking us off in such a lively and stimulating way. I mean, lots of thoughts I might have about the fate of big countries and how they are sometimes insular and not learning. And of course, you also made an interesting reference to the fact that, well, that the relationship between the UK and the EU, of course, currently is still very much in question. We are doing this talk on the day that the government has published its draft amendment to the Northern Ireland protocol, and that will no doubt spark further discussion. But I will leave it there for the moment and encourage again everyone to leave questions in the Q&A. I think we have already a first one, but we are not going to do the Q&A yet. We are still looking forward to two more contributions to the debate. And the next one comes from, let me just, I think the next one in our order was Gizine. So Gizine, please take the next step for us. Thank you. Yeah, thank you very much, Christoph, and also from the center to the center for having me here today. In fact, I want to pick up the last point that Helene mentioned, which was perceptions, because I'm going to widen our perspective a bit here. You see that in my background. I'm doing a lot of research on the EU, and that's also why I'm going to quickly elaborate on how the Zeitman was basically perceived in other European countries, and then open this up to German-British cooperation in post-Brexit Europe, because we always, while we're thinking about bilateral relations, we always have to see them in the framework of the fact that Germany is still an EU member state, and this is an important addition to this debate. So maybe quickly on the, on how the Zeitman was perceived in other European states, I would say that there are basically two aspects of Zeitman that have to be taken into account here. On the one hand, this is, of course, as you mentioned in your introduction, Christoph, the announcement of this special fund, of stepping up the capabilities of the German armed forces, and on the other hand, that is also the action that is supposed to follow this announcement, and particularly the immediate action in the case of Ukraine. And in terms of reactions from the European partners, in my opinion, it is very important to separate the two of them first, to then merge them again, because the announcement of Zeitman really sparked, I would say, reactions from cautious to very euphoric optimism, sometimes also concerns, that this idea that Germany would step up, its military with 100 billion euros, that was perceived as something that is significantly moving. And I'm based in Paris, so here in Paris, it was something that was absolutely not anticipated for any time to happen. And what was interesting in this regard was that on the one hand, it was of course welcomed by the policymaking community in France, but I think also in other European countries. But particularly in France, there was, however, a bit the reflection of concurrence between France and Germany, and what this announcement of stepping up defence and kind of really levelling up, if everything was invested as planned, how this levelling up would affect leadership in Europe. Because when we're talking about Zeitman, we're not only talking about Germany investing just to put it bluntly, lots of money in its army, it's also about being among the top five countries worldwide in terms of defence investments. And it would also be having by far the largest budget among EU member states to be spent on military. And this was in the current European setup, significantly alter the power dynamics given that Germany is now already the biggest economic player and France is actually the biggest military player. But as I said, if these investments were maybe really made as planned and also underpinned by policy, this would make Germany potentially a leader in both fields over the long term. And this for some European states might become problematic given that German leadership has not always been uncontested in the European Union. So that is on the Zeitman as such. But overall, particularly also in the EU institutions, it was of course welcome because you might also know that the strategic compass has been adopted in late March. This is a kind of guiding document for the EU security and defence policy over the next about 10 years. And this document contains a lot of information on procurement, on joint development of defence capacity capabilities, and the fact that Germany would invest so much money in defence and make it available for procurement was very well received particularly in Brussels because there is the potential of really creating good new projects together. So this is the announcement, how does practice look like? The thing is that many basically expected German policy to change from one day to another, or at least that there was among Europeans the expectation that while shots had been quite hesitant, or yeah, you could also say too little too late since the beginning of the crisis, there was hope that this announcement would be underpinned by policy and that it might lead to a new form of German leadership. But this has not really been the case, or not been the case. Let's delete really from this sentence. So the perception now is basically that this cautious optimism from the beginning that we saw on the announcement is rather shifting into sober realism, or one could even say frustration. Because the fact is that given also that the German political system is very complex and that there are many veto players also when it comes to the concrete investments, it's complex for other Europeans to understand who will be taking which decision when, what exactly is the role of German domestic politics, and that in fact is a major source of uncertainty. Because it's still the German parliament that will have to vote, for instance when it really comes to the investments, as every investment of more than 25 million, not billion, has to go through the parliament when it's as far as arms or weapons are concerned. And this sparks concerns in other member states and also the fact that the German position position on Ukraine is so little defined and that there is so little leadership. This is sparking major frustrations. So the Zeitmann announcement as such in European countries has at best a mixed perception at the moment. From this I want to skip to this question on how this mixed perception and the fact of whether Zeitmann can actually be translated into politics or into policies that have positive impact on the European project can benefit the UK or how the UK can fit into that. I would say it should definitely not be seen as competition because we have already or the first defense investments that have been announced by Germany for instance and capabilities have been the so-called F-35 that's a fighter jet coming from the US bought off the shelf. And this has been a system that has been also bought by other states and there will most likely not be a concurrence or I don't see concurrence evolving between Germany and the UK. First because there even though the interests might be similar as Helena outlined the strategic doctrines and also the fact how their military has intervened abroad is very different and I don't see the German army transforming into an army which is leading more combat missions abroad at least not on the short term. So I don't think that there is any kind of competition in it. When it comes I mean again it's about leadership as well but here the leadership question is more about leadership in the EU and then it's more about leadership between France and Germany or potentially also other European countries but I don't really see competition in terms of leadership also in institutions given that also the UK has a very special relationship with the US and on the other hand Germany is the US first interlocutor among the EU states. I see that as rather complementary within NATO than as a pattern of competition. When talking about cooperation I think I would have answered this question a bit differently one week ago. The draft amendment that we see on the Northern Ireland protocol of course changes this because the fact that the UK is ready to override the protocol and is just a significant breach of trust in the eyes of many Europeans and given that the EU has proven a significant cohesion throughout the entire process of Brexit I don't see a bilateral project coming out of the blue that would kind of undermine a common EU stance and furthermore we see also in the French-German relationship how difficult joint armament projects basically are. France and Germany jointly developing a future combat air system the so-called F-CAS which is an endless hassle it's super complicated to get the industries on board to agree among governments and I don't see a similar project happen between Germany and the UK anytime soon because the strategic compass and also Germany's membership in the EU will most likely rather motivate Germany to pursue this kind of project within the EU. However I would say that the fact that Germany might invest this into the EU projects and now I'm getting a bit technical can in fact be a window of opportunity for the UK if there is or maybe I should say if there was political will. The fact there are many EU defence initiatives for example the PESCO permanent structure cooperation the European Defence Fund now there is a new hub for European defence innovation and when a lot of German budget is flowing into these initiatives this might fuel these projects and for instance the permanent structure cooperation is open for members for states that are not EU member states so in theory there could be potential for cooperation but in practice I see what is happening with the Northern Ireland protocol and I don't see it so in my opinion the only format to pursue any kind of EU UK or Germany UK cooperation is in form of informal formats that have worked well such as the E3 format between France Germany and the UK on Iran or potentially also replicate this format in other crises and I see the white card from Christoph which perfectly matches the end of my remarks. Fantastic thank you very very much for broadening our view to highlight the connections to the broader European context the strategic compass to European security and defence policy I must say this is still something that in the UK debates is largely ignored I went to this big conference on the defence of Europe and I think strategic autonomy and strategic compass which is mentioned in passing over six hours as a some sort of a silly little project of the French but I think I think that is vastly underestimating the significance certainly in the long term of that maybe we'll come back to that and thank you again for placing that in that context and giving us some hints also to where maybe opportunities for collaborations may lie between the UK and Germany and the EU industry. So questions are coming that's good I can see them coming in the Q&A section but again we'll have one last but not least speaker to listen to and learn from and that's Eileen so your 10 minutes start now welcome. Many thanks also from my side from the invitation and good evening I will try to add something to our discussion by zooming in on the German perspective. So as we've already heard now and already know Olaf Scholz the German Chancellor announced the Zeitinwende or transited into English sea change or watershed moment in German security and defence policy. To be more precise when really looking at the speech again he used the term Zeitwende in reference to the Russian invasion and its consequences for Euro-Atlantic security and the architecture of European security but not so much in direct relation to Germany's security and defence however. That's rather what commentators not least think tankers and journalists in Germany but also abroad in Europe read into the speech instead. As we've already heard and know as well the speech included the announcement among other things of the establishment of a special fund for the armed forces the Bundeswehr worth up to 100 billion euros arms deliveries to Ukraine and the promise to finally reach and even exceed NATO's 2% goal from now on out. Now three months later, three months after the speech has been delivered, parts of the announcements were put into practice or are in sort of in the process of being put into practice. The German polyamines the Bundestag passed the legislation in support of the 100 billion euro special fund for the German armed forces which necessitates a change of the German constitution in order to bypass a so-called debt break. Last Friday the second chamber of chamber of legislation the Bundesrat followed suit and approved the law too. According to the acquisitions acquisition plans put together and presented by Germany's Defense Ministry, most of the 100 billion euros will be spent on air capabilities supporting the Air Force, Army and Navy and Gesine mentioned it already. One example of that comes in the form of the announcement to the acquisition to acquire the F-35 fighter jet to replace the tornado fighter jet. That is an important announcement and decision in my mind because it emphasizes Germany's commitment to NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement and which Germany has been part of for over 60 years now. In addition a hefty sum about 20 million is allocated to the modernization of communications equipment which has been aging for many years now as well. There are many more procurement projects that are part of the procurement plan which I won't go into detail at this moment we can talk about that later if you want to. Instead I would rather raise and address the question does all of that and many more things that have been subsidized or that have been put under the label Titanwende actually add up to and Titanwende who are heartedly supported by the government and at least Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz. I fear not and here's why. In relation to Ukraine as has already been alluded to the military support is too little and possibly and in some cases too late with regards to the arms deliveries plus and that also has been touched upon by Helina already the communication and decision-making is quite cumbersome at times and difficult to comprehend even for someone like myself who's working on those topics on a daily basis. Now in relation to Germany's security and defense policies I would argue that money obviously is important for acquiring capabilities but money alone won't fix anything. What do I mean by that and what needs to be done instead and in addition firstly equipping the armed forces is direly necessary but most certainly needs to go hand in hand with the modernization of the procurement system in Germany and the necessary change of bureaucratic structures in order to avoid wasting money on a large scale as has happened in the past time and again. Secondly the establishment of strategic culture to allow for more and deeper discussions on Germany's place in the world and in Europe has to be instigated. Such a culture can be defined as I quote a number of shared beliefs norms and ideas within a given society that generates specific expectations about the respective community's preferences and actions in security and defense policy and of quote translated into practice that could mean fostering more acceptance in the public sphere for the need of security and defense policies on part of politicians without however dictating the terms and or outcomes of those discussions. It could also mean allowing and instigating an exchange with all types of stakeholders that are working on security and defense including think tankers and political foundations among others. Without wanting to sound cynical in light of the horror we're witnessing in Ukraine I do think that the current situation really does offer a window of opportunity to sort of instigate and lay the groundwork for for such a culture or at least sort of the establishment of such a culture give the attention that the media places on the war against the country in the midst of Europe. In the past in Germany the public at large has not been much interested in security and defense policies which in my mind is also down to politicians not really touching those topics publicly. Yet currently we see poll numbers that suggests a different attitude and I just want to give you a few examples from the very recent past. The majority of Germans 52% are in favor of US nuclear weapons being stationed on German soil which indicates in my assessment a huge step forward and makes a strong argument for the continuation of Germany's role in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. About two-thirds of the population are in favor of the special fund for the Bundeswehr however I would like to add that there are huge rifts within the population most notably a strong east-west divide in Germany. Another example in the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the majority of Germans was in favor of weapons deliveries to Ukraine although we have seen a public split on so-called heavy weaponry ever since Germany decided to or at least announced to provide heavy weapons to Ukraine. And then lastly as another example while the majority of the population is worried about Germany being tracked into the war in Ukraine they don't think that the government should thus conclude to halt its support of Ukraine. On a very final note and to sort of wrap up my remarks to better capture and frame the current window of opportunity which I think we are witnessing and seeing at the moment the work on Germany's first ever national security set strategy that is currently underway and is supposed to be published in the beginning of next year should also include an extensive outreach with the broader public which as far as I'm concerned is in planning on part of the foreign office and not only expert communities should be included in in that process thereby combining sort of bottom up and top down communication and exchange approach. In addition allies including Great Britain ought to be closely involved in that process in order to ensure a streamlining of European meaning EU but also and I'd argue in some respects more importantly your Atlantic priorities meaning NATO which obviously and Great Britain is still a member state of. I will leave it at that thanks for your attention and I look very much forward to your questions and the answering discussion. Thank you very much for being for these interesting information bits of information around the defense spending all the things that Germany still needs to do also mentioning the security strategy which I think again will be I think it could be a landmark document particularly if it is then supported and widely debated and not just amongst expert circles but wider and German public. So thank you very much for giving us that perspective and I think it all these different pieces of the jigsaw fit together very very nicely so thank you thank you for that. Now we do have some some questions in in the chat already and maybe I will just go through to some of the questions straight away I do have some remarks and questions of my own which I might use my privilege to ask them but let us just start with the questions I should also say that those who are posting in the question and answer section it might be useful if you were able to say to who whom the question is addressed so that might make it a little bit easier to address it to different panelists. I think one question that comes up is from from I think I'll just pick one from Poland here from Zbigniew Cieszynski who I think describes I'm not going to read out the whole question but I think he puts forward kind of a East European viewpoint as he describes it and he says what we can actually what kind of is actually a more invisible proof that the political and business elites of Germany in France are looking for sort of strategic partnership with Russia along the continental axis turning EU and EU Russia into an independent global power at the cost of US and China. This setup has no room for sovereign nations between Berlin and Moscow. So Germany and France are actually pretending support for Ukraine looking for going back to the pre-war status or relationship with Russia as soon as possible. So this is I suppose a bit of an epitomizing some of the disappointment with what happened after the Titan Vendor talk in Central and Eastern Europe. So one would so I think it as such because I think it illustrates some of the disappointment maybe that's the question that is worth addressing. So do you think that this is actually the case for Germany that there is an inclination to just kind of go back to Russia as a cheap provider of energy and belittling or patronizing of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and of course part of the neighborhood the wider neighborhood such as Ukraine and Georgia and so forth. Do you think that is that is that is still the case or do you think there is a Titan Vendor in the way in which Germany sees Russia and in the way also Germany listens to Central and Eastern European countries. So I don't know who wants to engage with that kind of question. If you want to put up your hand then you can you can I don't know whether it's Eileen or or or yeah Eileen if you want to give it give it a first try. I know Eileen has also talked about this a little bit so maybe you have a view on that. Sure I can I can start. I don't think quite honestly that Germany is trying to return to to a status quo anthem. I think the decisions that have been sort of put in place and have been launched especially with regards to to Germany's energy dependency vis-à-vis Russia will not be overhauled. I think that really is a process that will not be that will not be changed by by this government or by any future government. However I do understand viewed from a Polish perspective or a perspective of you know you know the Baltic states for example that France or Germany especially in tandem with France seem to be a bit reluctant in wholeheartedly supporting Ukraine especially with regards to weapons deliveries. However when it comes to to to one's own security arrangements i.e. NATO and the protection of NATO allies I think Germany really has stepped up its game. I mean it's it's been an evolution since 2014 to be quite frank but even now since the beginning of this year and even more so it's been accelerated since the 24th of February this year. Germany is trying really hard to demonstrate not only with words but also deeds to its eastern allies that that it's that it does take their worries seriously and it is trying to address them by ways of putting more boots on the ground. For example Olaf Scholz just very recently announced in Lithuania that Germany is trying as the first of of now eight framework nations to sort of up the ante by by placing a brigade-sized battlegroup to Lithuania and I know that sort of when looking at the technicalities of the arrangements they're still really room for improvement and they're still yeah a bit of sort of wiggling room how to actually how to actually put that into into practice but in sort of in defense of of Germany I'd say that with regards to its own NATO allies Germany is trying to sort of learn from its past mistakes by sort of as you said I wouldn't say belittle but at least not taking their worries too seriously. Great thank you very much for that Eileen. Helena has her hand up as well on the topic. Well yes I agree with Eileen but I would like to ask about this question of perception that goes to what I used to say the way that we look at the map and especially the way in which Germans look at a map of Eastern Europe and I think it is entirely understandable why it would seem that way that we don't care and especially that we haven't cared in the last 20 years about the interests and threat perception really of smaller Eastern European countries I think and that's again where our history sort of comes into play and this our whole relationship to Russia is of course deeply influenced by the Second World War and what we have seen for decades is the tendency to equate the Soviet Union with Russia when they're in fact not at all the same and when lots of the horrors the horrors inflicted by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union a lot of this took place in Russia but also a lot of it took place in Ukraine and also Belarus and there has been now recently this is in all the newspapers and people talk about this but this is sort of in the I mean historians were aware but this wasn't really I think at the forefront thinking of politicians and also again with the energy I mean the Baltic states and also other Eastern European states made their concern about Nord Stream not just Nord Stream 2 but also Nord Stream 1 very clear and we again just pretended that those were business decisions so we have failed them so I understand what I would say is that right now I don't think that this is the French-German plan I don't think there is a French-German plan and I'm not at all sure there is a German strategy really and what I gather from sort of conversations with people in Berlin is a complete feeling of being completely overwhelmed with this crisis of really sort of 30 years of certainty and you might call it smugness really crumbling around them and now trying to find their feats and there again what's really tragic as a historian for me to see is how the Chancellor seems to be unable to sort of be mindful of how our history obviously defines how the world sees us and in times of crisis everybody is being renationalised and it's the job I think of governments to address this you actually have to walk the extra mile to make your position clear otherwise you can't be surprised that people would think in this way. Great thank you very much Helene for that and of course Germany perhaps also a reminder to everyone else is your foreign policy is made in a different way in Germany compared to the UK right you have three parties you have ministries who have their own powers you have the groups within the parliament I mean there's someone called Mützenech who's the head of the SPD fraction in the parliament who's a pacifist and has blocked lots of previous attempts for German rearmament and I think it may also be a case of Mr Schultz looking over his shoulder and wondering what it is that he can get through his own party and some of the ranks within his own party but let's leave it at that and maybe briefly Gesine on that question because we have got a couple of other questions particularly on defence spending and coordination and opportunities related to the defence spending that we need to get through but yeah Gesine any any any kind of comments on that initial question I promise I'll be quick just wanted to pick up Helene's point whether there was a French German plan I'm not sure either whether there is but I think the point is that this situation in Ukraine is basically showing us that the French German engine even when even if Schultz and Macron tried to kind of relaunch it with their trilateral call with Putin basically basically this situation shows that the French German engine is not enough for Europe in times of crisis so I think it's a good symbol that we now see that the two of them are traveling together with Draghi from Italy to Ukraine but also that we need to think about other formats like for instance the Weimar Triangle which is French France Germany and Poland or also broader groupings of coalitions of the willings within the European Union or also with other willing and able states like the UK thank you very much for that brief brief answer to the question. I would like to go to some of the questions on defence spending and there's a question from Kevin and Ryan in France in the light of Brexit to what degree if any will British defence contractors be able to help Germany spend their new military spending spending funding or is it more likely that Germany will buy American or perhaps French and I think that also relates a little bit perhaps to Bruce Ben's Nemef question about the UK should not see the increased defence spending as competition do you see this happening or is it a danger in the future so I suppose in the background there's a question over where will Germany's defence capabilities be in 10-15 years in relation to France and Britain and whether that is seen as a threat or not so that's one big question the other is more in the short term over where is the German defence spending going and are there opportunities what are the expectations of Britain in particular with regard to that spending is there a need perhaps also for coordinating in some ways to make sure that you know we are not overloading you know industries and that the spending is done in the most efficient way delivering capacities for Europe as a whole but just maybe more narrowly in the short term on the issue of British defence contractors and the question of opportunity or risk related to that new defence spending do you have any thoughts on that I see Gesina has her hands up on that question yeah I can kick us off so I mean to be very realistic that would have been much easier without leaving the single market that is really the brief but very yeah that's very the brief answer to that so of course there might be some projects where British defence contractors could potentially come in but it's quite difficult when you're thinking about joint R&Ds so research and development projects and so on to bring industries that are not in the European single market on board given that we already see how difficult it is if you do it with industries that are part of the European single market to come to this question of competition the question is really how will the money be invested so current estimates basically say that we need 65 million 65 billion to basically close the capability gaps and to live up to the expectations of allies and partners and to basically allow the German armed forces to perform the tasks that they are supposed to perform and then we would technically still have around 35 billion left which might go into multinational projects although there would probably also be a preference either for buying European or for which in my opinion would be very desirable work on the European side of development of capabilities I think one aspect of competition that the UK might need to be aware of on the short term but that doesn't only affect the UK but also other Europeans and overall other states that now decided to step up their capabilities that is that in a moment where everyone decides to buy off the shelf at one point your shelves will be empty so there will be competition in the market in general in the defence market and I think that is something where Germany and the UK with other Europeans and also the US should potentially also through NATO really coordinate to make sure that we don't have a race to the shelf if you want to put it like that which would particularly be to the detriment to less economically powerful states great thank you thank you very much for for those evaluations of what the the limits of opportunity for the UK are and I should perhaps also mention briefly in this context that there has been a lot of comment on Finland and Sweden joining trying to join NATO and relatively little comments that mean the UK about Denmark the Danish referendum about rejoining CSTP which really had a very overwhelmingly I think 70 in favour which is quite a quite a watershed itself so I think that should give a bit of pause to the UK as well why is it that Denmark felt the need to to be part part of those discussions and to benefit from from what that kind of growing momentum gives but there are many other questions here one is I think going on starting from what Aaron Reiser said given that the UK and France both are strategic operational national security European powers how will the E3 fit into NATO and into the EU strategic compass so there's the EU NATO cooperation and the kind of E3 format what is the potential for that and and really is Germany I think it also goes a little bit in the direction that that David has said is Germany becoming is modeling is Germany modeling its role in security defence according to what kind of country is it modeling according to France to the UK nothing nothing of that sort but some sort of unique German a model of being a security defence actor so so I think these these two questions may may may go together so one is about how do they think different institutional settings fit together and how can we envisage Germany's strategic culture changing and and and developing towards what kind of strategic culture if if if indeed France or the UK are models any any thoughts on those two questions but I by Aaron and and and David okay we have again a casino and then Eileen feel like I'm talking a lot here but I maybe pick the institutional settings and the E3 so in general the E3 has rather proven efficient as a diplomatic initiative so that is more like a security than a real defence cooperation as we see it for instance with Iran and here negotiations have become a bit more complicated over the last weeks but I would say this is in general something that can work out in general for the E3 a lot of work is being conducted behind the scenes so when we are not seeing big initiatives of Johnson Schultz and Macron at the same time that doesn't mean that there is no cooperation the cooperation between the three countries and also the consultation is extremely strong and has been also in particularly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine personally I don't really see a big diplomatic initiative of the three of them at the moment when it comes to Ukraine just because particularly for other European states that's an issue of legitimacy I would rather see for instance Poland or also Italy because of Mario Draghi who's just very experienced who could form kind of a core group here and more broadly speaking I don't see something like an E3 core emerge in NATO behind the scenes or among high-level diplomats absolutely as an institutionalized format rather not because the UK really has traditionally a preference for security and defence cooperation through NATO and I rather see it sticking to this doctrine into these preferences instead of trying out new formats at least within NATO our talk coalitions informal groupings can be an add-on on that for instance the UK has also supported the task for Stakuba in the Sahel not militarily but politically it is part of the European intervention initiative so we see that it is still engaged in participating but that happens quite a lot under the radar and I think it's exactly about that about informal cooperation under the radar that can be reconciled with the government's position on brexit. Thank you very much Kazina, Eileen next please. Sure I'll pick up the strategic culture and questions since I've also raised a point in my remarks according to to most definitions of a strategic culture those cultures are infused by a respective country's history so naturally Germany has a different history as opposed to France and Great Britain and also its society its population has different has developed due to you know historical historical roots a different attitude towards its military and also the use of lethal force. So I don't really see and I don't think it should be sort of that's what we should be striving for that Germany builds its strategic culture based on the model of either France, Great Britain or the United States. I think Germany has to find its own way and sort of muddle muddle through and see where word you know where it ends up. I think in you know if that would include a sort of back and forth and highly contested discussions I think that that would be I would welcome that rather than sort of tabooing the military and talks and discussions on the use of the military altogether as we have seen in the past in my humble opinion. So because in the end you know discussing and contesting whether and in which situations the military should be used as one part of Germany's toolbox I think should means that we you know we actually talk about insecurity and defense instead of not talking about it at all and sort of engaging in naval gazing and only thinking about you know sort of other sort of domestic issues instead of realizing that we are while you know our neighbors are our friends and allies there are at least in the form of Russia there are countries that are not as benevolent and I think if we could sort of reach a stage where we at least talk about what war and peace could mean and without always agreeing on what that means but at least you know having a discussion on that I think that would really be a very important step forward as compared to where we've been in the past. Thank you very much for those views I see Helena has her hand up and of course it partly relates to what a historian will know and everyone also knows of course that every nation is every nation sometimes also each political party is using the history that best fits their preferences and have their own favorite moment in history that teaches the lesson that they are most comfortable with but I'm not going to say anymore Helena what are your views on that kind of complex German strategic culture and where is it going? Well I just wanted to build up on something which Eileen said and about more generally about the question of one emulating each other's examples and to the question of complimenting rather than each other in the wake of actually a joint threat which is sort of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I agree with Eileen and I would even put it more generally that it's in my view pretty pointless but actually pretty widespread for Germans to blame Britons to be so un-European and that has a long history and it's also pretty pointless for the British to blame Germany for being so as I quoted you know cynical piece and so forth because at the end of the day I mean if the basis of the relationship is that we expect each other to become more like us and we're really setting ourselves up for failure and instead we should maybe look at those differences and then look at the bigger picture and see how we can actually complement each other. Talking about Ukraine I mean Britain has had a pretty impressive record one on sort of identifying the scale of the threat pretty early on Ben Wallace especially and then on delivering weapons and also supporting Ukraine diplomatically Britain doesn't have a good record at all when it comes to taking in Ukrainian refugees that is something what Germany excels on so you can blame each other for not doing the right things you could also say look this is for you domestically and culturally easier to do than for us so you know this could be a collaboration rather than you know blaming each other for not being like us. Speaking about complementing each other I would even take this further and talk about the relationship between EU and NATO a little bit again in the bigger picture of the war in Ukraine. I think what the Russian aggression against Ukraine really shows is how NATO and the EU actually have complementary roles to play in that conflict since Russia is a nuclear power intervention is not an option so all non-military means as well as deterrents have to have to be used to stop the Russians and that's where the EU and the questions of sanctions and also the aspirations of Ukraine to join the EU come in and then again the sort of delusion that quite a few people in the EU especially in Germany and also France have had over decades this idea that you only need the EU to establish peace in Europe that doesn't hold up we need NATO very much so we need both and Britain now finds itself in the interesting and somewhat complicated position that if it takes the Russian threat very seriously and looks at things strategically about the future about European security then the EU should be part of Britain's grand strategy even if Britain is no longer a member of course this runs into political problems I'm not saying that they should rejoin tomorrow and we do it together I'd love that but I know it won't happen but what I'm saying is that there is now I think a recognition that at the time of the referendum there were plenty of people who thought the EU was ridiculous and redundant anyway and that has just proven not to be the case because otherwise why would Denmark vote in for the joint common security policy why would Ukraine be desperate to join it so the EU matters at the same time NATO obviously met us hugely in this situation so I think both in Germany and in the UK we need some very sober thinking and long-term thinking about how instead of you know hating each other for preferring one organisation over the other we should think about how we could sort of complement each other in the face of this threat. Great thank you very much for your thoughts and we are slowly running out of time but I think maybe towards the end to have one kind of last round of responses from all three of you perhaps we can bring it back also a little bit more to Britain what is it that Britain should take away from these these current developments and what is it that we can learn from each other I certainly think that one of the benefits of the British cultures is that the kind of learning and learning culture you know after things have gone wrong they're often inquiries they're post mortins people look at what is it that one can learn from these crises and I think I think one of the reasons that Britain was probably more proactive is that it learned from the 2014 crisis where it also got everything wrong about about Russia that it learned better than Germany did after 2014 where that learning was not really in depth and independent but there's there's a kind of a broader I think difficult question that always comes up now and that is not spoken about in polite circles it's really that the germ is this the return of the German problem and it's the first question by Salomon should Britain be prepared to assume its historical role as an external balancer because there's going to new power competition between France Germany potentially and and because Germany is getting too big again right and there was a bit of that also with regard to to France I mean there was I think the remark that that maybe France is also slightly worried but then again I'm also thinking about Radik Sikorsky talking about fearing German weakness more than German strength so there's there's a dilemma around German leadership that on the one hand there's call for more leadership and more more more leadership certainly of the kind that is wanted but on the other hand there are these big concerns over German might over German power potential and and that that that does bring up these old historical questions over what is it that Britain should do and how should it approach that Germany if it is changing its role away from just being focused on the bottom line and and and economics so so really some kind of takeaway points for for for Britain from from all three of you and maybe I'll start with Eileen and then go to to Helena who has her hand up as well and then Gizine last thank you. Thanks I think Helena raised her hand first but sure I'll I'll say something and keep it very short and brief. Thanks for for raising that Sikorsky quote which I think he said in 2011 and pointed out that what he feared more than German action was driven in action and I think that's neatly captures what our Eastern European allies still think of Germany and really it's it's not a question of fearing Germany becoming too big also military in military terms I think what what you know our allies in the East but to some extent and to some respect in in my interpretation at least also in in Western Europe and certainly across the pond in the United States what they expect of Germany is more leadership and also in terms of not military leadership but rather sort of putting troops on the ground and really and really sort of translating their their words into into deeds and it is thus thus my conclusion that Germany I mean Germany will always always act in in concert with its European and Euro-Atlantic allies so what the only sort of thing that I would that I would add in that regard is that Germany should always be mindful of of trying to really consult with its allies thus also the need for really cooperating closely on on the formulation of the national security strategy to really make sure that all the priorities of of all our allies are considered in that in that landmark or in you know a document that could become a landmark document so in sum and in conclusion I really don't think that Britain should be afraid of Germany becoming too big at least because Germany and Britain are obviously all still NATO allies and are part of the so-called quads in NATO which is sort of informal grouping consisting of the UK and and Germany among others were close consultations on on you know on military and planning still take place so yeah I'll leave it with that thank you very much so I'm going to Helena for some concluding concluding remarks either you know I think you will you will not struggle to have a message towards towards the UK you already had some some remarks but maybe you want to kind of wrap things up in a way that everyone will take away from this this meeting thank you. Well I also agree with Alina I don't think that Britain should be afraid of a Germany which takes a more realistic way at the world and sort of shed some of its delusions thinking that we are we are not doing anything with geopolitical consequences because we're just doing business if we sort of look into the mirror and face up to what we are and what we can do that's a good thing and I think it's to be welcomed but I would also say that at the moment everybody might be crying for Germany German leadership I fully expect that to at least in some parts of the media to change at some point it is interesting that some of the loudest voices especially in Britain during the Brexit referendum and afterwards who complained about Germany's power within the EU are now the ones calling for more German leadership and there's a certain irony to that I think generally speaking about this conflict people have been saying that we're seeing this return of history and well I don't agree it has never stopped but we're certainly seeing also in the way we think about this and how we debate this is we're seeing the return of geography because that our geography all of our geographies all over Europe it it has a big part it plays a big part in how we perceive this crisis and obviously when you're in Estonia you're more more afraid of the Russians than we are much further way so I don't really have a concluding message I don't think by the way this idea that Britain should resume its it's a traditional role of a balancing power I would actually question if that is an accurate sort of summary of the centuries of Britain history British history is actually a bit more complicated in my view what I certainly think is that Britain is needs to think more and it's already happening think more about Europe think about the role it wants to play there acknowledge its realities even though it doesn't like such as the EU you don't have to rejoin you don't have to like it but you have to acknowledge this existence sort of deal with it and I think we're actually seeing that we have been seeing this about over the last three months and we've had really pretty brutal reawakening I think both in Britain and Germany about sort of that gravity is reserting itself and that I think is to be welcomed thank you very much reminds me of the same geography is destiny which is which is interesting because of course at the same time we have these global ripple effects of the Ukraine crisis with supply chains food security issues being raised so on the one hand we have of course that that that the differences and threat perceptions according partly to geography as well as history but on the other hand we're seeing the globalization of that particular war in in Ukraine and its consequences that have not has been has has thought through but let's let's leave that to a side for the moment and Gazina has I think the opportunity for last last wrap up yeah I'll be very quick particularly I think there is potential to enhance cooperation between the UK and Germany particularly behind the scenes I don't as I already said don't see a big political declaration and particularly because for me it seems that there is no appetite for that on either of the sides and as simple as it sounds for me the most important takeaway for the UK is if you want to cooperate with either European country you have to get Brexit right and that hurts and as a little said there's a message that the UK doesn't like and also in the beginning of or when the war in Ukraine basically started even before that we saw that the UK can play a role in European security and that it is and still plays a role as a major security provider it can act quickly but if Brexit remains they it's not even an elephant in a room it's an obvious obstacle to any kind of bilateral relations as well and it poisons and complicates bilateral relations and as long there is no normal modus operandi with the EU as an institution or as an organization that will permanently slow down bilateral relations they will exist but that makes it much more complicated for European partners and such as Germany and that is what the UK needs to be aware of. Great thank you all very very much I think this was quite a wide ranging discussion I'm sure we could continue debating these issues for for a long long time there are so many aspects we we couldn't quite cover but I think that's all we have we have time for thank you very much to the speakers the panelists for your remarks your starting remarks and then your contributions to the discussion I found really really stimulating and interesting I was I was nodding quite a lot I mean there are some areas where I would have liked to jump in and question some of the arguments but I think on the whole it was really really good discussion and I hope this is not the the last time we're seeing each other either on the screen or or in person thank you to the audience for your great questions your comments I'm sorry if I haven't been able to pick up on on all of them I've tried to summarize some of these these questions and comments and yeah and thank you very much to the to the host of the Center for Grand Strategy for putting this on strategy is always is always ongoing and if there's one thing that is true is that Germany could do with more strategic thinking and longer term thinking that does have I think as Elena rightly said short term implications because there may be things that change in very dramatic ways that you can't recover if you lose that that window so I hope this is a useful contribution again thank you very much this meeting is recorded so it will be available at a later stage and yeah let's let's keep keep watching this space and let's see where where the debate in Germany in Europe and in the UK takes us so thank you very much and yeah have a good evening