 Good evening, good morning or good afternoon depending on where you are. My name is Steve Sang. I'm the director of the Sours China Institute, and I'm delighted that we are presenting with you for you another fantastic thought-provoking seminar moving forward. And for today, our speaker is Professor Joseph Wong of the Month School for Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto. Professor Wong is the Vice President International at the University of Toronto. He's also the Ross and Ralph Halbert Professor of Innovation at the Month School and Professor of Political Science. He was educated at McGill University as well as the University of Wisconsin Madison campus. Joe is a fantastic scholar who has published very widely on many different subjects covering not only China but other countries in Asia and more general subjects. He's author to many academic articles and books. I'll only highlight the two books that I thought are particularly interesting and important and they are authored by him himself. And that is Healthy Democracies, Welfare Politics in Taiwan and South Korea, and Batting on Biotech Innovations and Limits of Asia's Developmental State, both were published by Cornell University Press. He is at the moment working on three projects, one of which is the basis of what I think he is going to speak to us in the next hour or so. And that is the collaborative book that he's working with Dan Slater, which is on Asia's Development and Democracy. The other two projects are the Political Economy of the Welfare States in East Asia, which I think he is planning to publish with Cambridge University Press. And he's also on a new project with focus on poverty and innovation. With that, I will hand over to you. Professor Wong to speak on the subject of why China should democratize and sooner rather than later. This is a project which I'm sure will elicit a lot of interesting responses. Over to you, Joe. Great. Thank you so much, Steve. It's, it's an honor to be invited to be a part of this seminar series. It's been, I think about six years since I was last it's so asked. It's always a pleasure to be interacting with and engaging with the audience there as well as the communities that you bring together. And so as so very grateful for this. I'm also grateful for this opportunity because as you say Steve, this is what I'm sharing with folks today as part of a larger book project that I'm in the midst of completing now with the translator of the University of Michigan. And it's a book project that we're almost finished drafting the first draft now. And that's to be forthcoming with Princeton. The title of the talk is indeed intended to be provocative. Why China should democratize and to put a finer point on it democratize sooner rather than later. And I'll say from the outset that part of this title is driven by for me anyway a normative concern around democracy and democratization and the importance of of transitions to democracy. But I think more importantly, from an analytical point of view, why China should democratize is also something that is a very, or a function of a strategic rationale that is to say the Chinese Communist Party should democratize. Because at the moment it is a strong regime that by democratizing sooner rather than later it should pretend a stable transition and indeed a democratic transition sooner rather than later. And so the title, even though it might evoke what some might see to be a critical view of China and the CCP in fact the argument that I'm going to make is not at all anti regime but rather from a strategic point of view, something that the party should put sooner rather than later. I go to the next slide now. So the purpose of this talk or how I want to frame this talk really is to situate it against the backdrop of what we might see as being the conventional wisdom of not only democratization, more generally, but when and where democracy will arise in China. The conventional wisdom that democracy emerges from the ashes of authoritarian collapse. As we see here in this quote from Professor town, ever since the domino collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet block of the late 1980s and early 1990s the world has been waiting for China to follow suit to collapse itself. No one can be sure about how long the Chinese regime will last, but it shows no sign of collapsing anytime soon. So again the conventional wisdom here is that democracy emerges out of weakness. We have a regime that is increasingly weakened, it experiences a legitimacy crisis, it often manifests itself in an internal crisis between different factions within the regime, and that the regime becomes so weak that it collapses under its own weight, or that it's overthrown. In other words, as we can see from this quote in this observation and indeed, indeed how we oftentimes think about democracy, it's that democratization will occur during bad times. Now, in our view, and the argument we make in the book is that indeed democracy can come during bad times democracy can emerge out of weakness. Democracy can also emerge from good times, or democracy can emerge when a party is strong. Indeed, we can see, or the argument we make is that democracy can emerge when the ruling party is still legitimate. When the ruling party is organizationally coherent and strong. The ruling party or regime does not experience a major internal crisis. The ruling regime is not about to collapse. In fact, it is very stable. In other words, the argument we make is that democracy can emerge when the ruling or incumbent party is strong. And that's the argument. That's the overarching argument that we make in our book, and it builds on the argument that we make in our perspectives on politics piece or PO piece article from 2013. And again, the argument is basically that an authoritarian regime is more likely to concede democracy to maintain its hold on power and to preside over a stable transition when it is strong. And it does so because it enjoys what we call both victory confidence that is that it enjoys the confidence that it will be not only not obsolete in democracy but that in fact it will continue to hold power, and that it also enjoys what we call stability confidence. Now the book that we're writing is not a book about China. Our editor was quite keen I think at first for us to really center the book around the China case given the importance and timeliness of this question in the Chinese context and this is not what we do again Slater is a specialist of Southeast Asian as Steve has indicated I've written much more extensively on Northeast Asian cases beyond China, but we did concede that we would write a chapter or two around China and about China and so the China case study is a case study within a larger comparative project, and it is a case study of one of 12 different cases. The chapter on China that we have written however does look at China up to the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989 and the argument we make in that chapter is that democracy does not arrive in China in June of 1989, not because the regime was so weak but rather the argument we make is that the regime at the time in 1989 was not strong enough to democratize through strength that it was not strong enough to democratize in a way in which the regime was confident that it could maintain power and that it would be able to preside over a stable transition for a whole host of reasons from the economic more proximate economic crises that China was experiencing after 1985 86 or so. The fact that many of the heart economic reforms were yet to come really quite a diminished state capacity in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the party itself was split, not just in June of 1989 but the split really emerges in 1986 and 87. And of course, the extraordinary protest that the regime is confronted with, again, not only in the summer of 89 spring and summer of 89 but dating back to the end of 86 and 87. In other words, the argument we make in the case of China is that in June of 1989 it had neither victory nor stability confidence it was not a strong enough regime to consider democratization through strength. That being said, and indeed I think in many ways one of the, one of the legacies of June fourth 89 is the indelible impact that it's had or imprint that it's had on how we think about democratic prospects in China. And again, I want to emphasize that the prevailing conventional wisdom in around China and the prospects of democracy in China centers around a collapse scenario so if we take for instance in here I'm just citing David Shambo's piece on the coming up which I think is reflective of a whole school of thought within and among China observers is this notion that the end game of Chinese Communist rule has begun. It's progressed further than many think President Xi Jinping exudes conviction and confidence and so forth but as he says this hard personality to lies a party and political system that is extremely fragile on the inside. In other words, you know as David Shambo calls it the coming crack up of the regime it really is about identifying the cracks in the regime that pretend its potential collapse and out of this crisis and collapse scenario is the only way in which we might imagine a democratic transition occurring. So in a strange way I mean an ironic way or a democratic people who are hopeful for democratic transition are looking for signs of regime collapse. And the other view is a view in here I'm quoting Daniel Bell in his book the China model but again it can. I think it reflects a pretty dominant prevailing view around the situation in China now is is Daniel Bell rise China single party state structure didn't collapse in 89 of anything it seems to have strengthened since the early 1990s. The rule democracy seems to be further off than ever before right so the argument here is that what we have is a strong party, a strong regime, we have the absence of crisis and collapse and therefore, we have the absence of democratic prospects in China, the argument, the implicit argument here is that the regime does not need to democratize either way if you're looking at the, the coming collapse scenario of the shambles and other observers, or the resilient scenario and in fact the not just resilience but the strengthening of the regime scenario that Daniel Bell puts forward, either way the expectation of democracy in China centers around the prospects of crisis and collapse. In the event of a crisis and collapsed we may expect democracy to emerge in the absence of crisis then we should expect that no democracy will emerge. And the argument or the sense that Dan and I bring to this question is that this is this is not the only question we can ask of the China case in fact, in many ways it's a bad question to ask of the China case because you know no one wishes upon China and Chinese people to collapse in the regime that would just be calamitous for not only China and Chinese people but for the entire world, and just also seems normatively unethical to be wishing collapse on anyone. But it's also the wrong question to ask because it assumes that the conventional wisdom, ie democracy will emerge through crisis is the only pathway for democratic transition. It really puts at its center alternative pathways to democracy and the argument we make here is that ultimately democratization is a reflection of choices that people have to make choices, it's not just simply a structural imperative that creates democracy but rather structures and structural imperatives may compel certain choices to be made, and that ultimately a pathway to democracy results in the choice to concede democracy. And therefore what we're looking for in this book or alternative pathways of democratic possibility and indeed possibilities for democracy to emerge when and where you might not expect it. To reiterate again the conventional wisdom is particularly in China is that democracy will come with crisis and when the ruling regime is weak. But in our argument democracy through strength, we suggest that authoritarian regimes strong and stable ones can choose democracy when they are strong and not weak and therefore the two questions that animate our book or why do authoritarian regimes choose democracy and why do some authoritarian regimes choose democracy when they don't need to ie when they continue to be strong. That's the puzzle that drives the book. And again, the case of China is one of many situated in there but I want to use that theory today to animate some discussion around the prospects of democracy in China. Our theory hinges on a key insight that Barbara Gettys and others have pointed out, which says the preferences of party cadres are much simpler than those of military officers. Like democratic politicians cadres simply want to hold office so we work with the assumption that party cadres and parties, their primary preference political preference is that they want to stay in power. Although they stay in power is less relevant or less important but rather that they maintain power. So in our book for instance and indeed in the article that we wrote in POP and 2013 one of the cases that we draw on is the example of Indonesia. Indonesia I think provides for us an instructive story, it demonstrates the logic that we are arguing but it's also our weakest case. And so I want to just go over that very quickly so you get a sense of how the theory works in action. So if we go back in time to May of 1998. We have Suharto who is overthrown in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. In many ways this looks like the end of the ruling gold car party. Habibi takes over who is by every measure a very weak president and his regime looks as though it's hanging on by a thread. Now conventional wisdom around authoritarianism is that this regime would repress. Allah Barbagetti's point here to hang on to power is the most important preference for any regime and therefore to hang on to power the regime will repress. But we actually see something different happen in Indonesia rather than repress. The gold car ruling party under Habibi in fact expedites elections moves them from 2002 which was a schedule time for elections to 1999 and indeed in many ways this would seem counterintuitive because in many ways it was simply expediting his own defeat. Our argument in our interpretation of those events take a slightly different take or a slightly different spin. Our argument is that while Habibi himself was a very weak president. The party, the gold car party in fact was very strong. After all, it had it had integrated itself with the developmental state apparatus, it certainly had territorial advantage in terms of its reach into the periphery. And it also had a developmental record that it could trade on in terms of electoral politics. In other words, while Habibi is weak, while the regime looks to be on its heels. It still had enough strength and accumulated strength such that by expediting the elections, it was in fact increasing the probability that the regime and the party would survive. And therefore by having the elections in 1999 instead of 2002. This was actually the best option, not for Habibi, but for the gold car party, because the party was still relatively strong. In fact, in 1999, gold car did emerge as the second largest party in the legislature. In 2004 it regained its plurality of seats in the legislature. Had it waited until 2002, it may have hurtled through and lost all legitimacy. In other words, by expediting the elections, by conceding democracy sooner rather than later, it actually helped save the ruling party from its own obsolescence. Obsolescence. In other words, it conceded democratic possibilities to survive. And so far as to make this argument in the case of Japan and this is a case that we cover extensively in the book. The conventional wisdom around the Japanese case in terms of post-war democratization is that democracy was effectively imposed upon Japanese elites through American triumphalism. In other words, the conventional wisdom is that democracy was imposed upon Japan, the Japanese elites had no agency, they had no choice, that what we saw was the conversion of authoritarians into democrats through military might and US occupation. Now, there's no denying of course that the US occupation played an important role in the democratization of post-war Japan, but we argue that it's not the full story that in fact when you delve into the details what we see actually through the period of 45-47 is the passage through of Japanese conservative elites who had first arisen to political prominence as well as political institutionalization through the era of Tisho democracy in the 20s and 30s, which of course gives way to fascism. But those conservative elites who passed through in fact are tasked with drafting the first constitution in post-war Japan. The first constitution in this constitutional draft is unknown to many in the West because it was eventually scrapped and indeed the constitution that the American constitutional drafters put together was the one that was institutionalized and passed in Japan. But the original constitution that these conservatives were asked to draft was in fact basically the Meiji constitution redo. It's not as though these conservatives had passed through and suddenly had become democrats and indeed even in the wake of the start of the occupation when given the political agency to draft their own constitution alluded to and basically mimic the constitution that was no better or no more democratic than Tisho era Japanese politics. The argument we make however is that notwithstanding this first attempt at constitutional drafting it becomes very clear for the conservative elites in Japan that democracy actually works in their favor. That they have with them a degree of what we call antecedent strength i.e. some degree of party institutionalization, some ties and quite deep ties to the bureaucracy which itself was not dismantled by the occupation, as well as some institutional legacies that it could take advantage of in terms of competing for elections. Democracy works for conservatives, especially after 1947 in the US reverse course policy in which the US effectively eliminates the conservatives main rival on the left. In other words, democracy for Japanese conservatives who had up until 45 and 46 no interest legitimate real genuine interest in democracy. Democracy in fact becomes in their best interest, the political path forward. So it's not as though conservatives were politically prostrate in Japan. It's not as though a democrat democratic constitution was unilaterally imposed in Japan. Rather we see in fact Japanese conservatives conspiring and conceding democracy. Not because they were committed democrats per se, but because it gave them the best opportunity to remain the most dominant political force and of course this creates the antecedent to what will eventually become the LDP the most dominant political party in a democracy. The key point here we're making is that the original impulse among these conservative elites was to preserve authoritarianism. But the concession of democracy, in fact, worked to these elites best interests. The best case that we, I think that we present in the book, and indeed anybody who knows the story of Taiwan knows that we in many ways inductively generate our theory of democracy through strength from the Taiwanese case. The best case of our theory really is Taiwan right Taiwan in the mid 1980s was a brutal regime. It was by every measure, an extremely authoritarian regime that had no problems resorting to the blood edge of repression to maintain power. Yet in 1986 the DPP or the DPP is formed in the fall of 1986 illegally. Many observers at the time wondered if the regime would resort to its standard operating procedures and responses which would be to quash the emergent institutional opposition, and it doesn't. In 1987 martial law is lifted in 1989 limited legislative elections occur with full legislative elections, following in 92 and of course presidential elections. In 1996, most expected Taiwan in the mid 1990s to repress the emergent opposition. But as Jiang Jing Guo himself says the times are changing the environment is changing the tide is also changing. In other words, the KMT concedes or begins the process of concession in 1986, when in fact it's still a very powerful ruling party. The economy continue to be strong. The KMT remained electorally popular now again, the limited elections that were institutionalized in Taiwan were by not at all near free nor fair but as a gauge in terms of electoral signals. The KMT had not plummeted in its popularity was beginning to wane, but it was still electorally dominant, and the opposition itself was very weak. In other words, as the opposition emerges in the mid 1980s the KMC did not. They did not have to concede it was still very powerful it certainly could have hung on. And what we see in fact is President Jiang gambling and betting on the KMT's ability to be dominant in democracy and of course we see this huge payoff emerge for the ruling party in 1992 and 96 and thereafter. In other words the came to concedes not in a period or a moment of crisis and imminent collapse, but rather the KMT concedes with both strength and confidence and it had many reasons to be confident and it had many sources of accumulated strength, everything was a developmental state record. It's record of economic growth, it's record of relatively balanced economic growth. It was a well organized political party having gone over your organization campaign. In the 1950s, it was disciplined it had institutionalized a very sophisticated if shady electoral machine. It had begun to adapt in the 1970s through the time onization process to to localize the party. It also adhered to an electoral system, the non transferable multi member district system which advantage the KMT and disadvantage the emerging opposition, and as well as transitioning to relatively stable times. In other words the KMT concedes not to lose, but to win right conceding democracy is not tantamount to conceding defeat. As we write in our 2013 article article the cam to ultimately chose to concede because the party was in a position of desperation but a fairly strong confidence that a democratic concession would ensure both the KMT's electoral victory and the maintenance of stability and indeed that's exactly what happens. So, from those cases are theory of democracy through strength has three parts the first is is that the incumbent authoritarian regime accumulates what we call antecedent strengths, a developmental record, party organization party coherence the other party, a legitimation a political legitimation formula that they're able to trade on for political support and so forth. It's these antecedent strengths that give a regime, both the stability confidence ie the confidence that transition would be stable, as well as victory confidence that a transition would in all likelihood result in that incumbent party maintaining victory maintaining power. So the theory is about the accumulation of antecedent strength. That being said, a regime is most likely to concede democracy through strength when it has passed its apex of power. So a democracy is most likely to occur when the ruling regime has just passed its apex of power when its power is beginning to slowly wane. And it knows this because it receives and interprets a variety of signals, the clearest signal for instance would be electoral. So a regime sees that it maintains dominance but that it's electoral fortunes begin to decline. One of the other cases that we look at is the case of South Korea and the ruling conservative authoritarian party there over the course of several elections through the 70s and most certainly into the 80s sees its electoral support continuing to decline. Public protest and contentious politics is another signal. We also take seriously geopolitical signals the loss of a superpower patron pressure from an external superpower force and so forth is another kind of signal we see this in all of the cases that we look at, as well as economic signals, economic crisis, economic hardships and challenges are a signal. That's a less clear signal because oftentimes regimes are able to deflect political blame but nonetheless it's a signal that an incumbent regime has to take seriously. The argument we make here is that again, when a regime is just past its apex of power is when it's most likely to concede democracy through strength and most likely able to maintain its hold on power. When a regime just past its apex of power we call this the bitter sweet spot. It's bitter because the authoritarian jig is up. And it's time to transition. It's sweet. However, because the regime provided it's just past its apex power has a strong likelihood that it will maintain power and it will be able to preside over stable transition. The second triggers the third part of our theory and that is that regimes upon assessing their accumulated strengths and interpreting signals begin to consider religion emission strategies in order for them to stay in power. One way and one choice they can make of course is to not concede and to hang on to authoritarianism. So we need to start conceding decisive democratic reforms, by which we are talking about the institutionalization of free and fair elections the introduction of an electoral commission media reform, and so forth. And so this strategy for real legitimation and the strategy to stay in power is is a conflict in which one option, in fact, is conceding democracy. This is a visual depiction of what we're talking about. This doesn't appear in the book but it helps kind of visualize what we mean when we say the apex of powers can see incumbent regime accumulate strength over time, it reaches an apex, and as it passes over the apex of power it enters into what we call the bitter sweet spot the bitter sweet spot is the ideal time to concede through strength. After a certain period and we've here marked it with the dotted line the super majority after the party has hurtled through the bitter sweet spot. In fact, the best option for that regime, if it wants to hang on to power is to repress. An authoritarian regime accumulate strength over time it hits its apex of power. It enters the bitter sweet spot. This is where Taiwan was. This is where Korea was Indonesia was, although it was, it was slightly further down. This is where a concession a democratic concession makes the most sense. However, once regime hurdles through that bitter sweet spot. It's best option is to repress. Hence the paradox of our theory here and as we write in 2013 when a ruling party, or an authoritarian party enjoys substantial incumbent capacity in other words power is not only increases its ability to sustain authoritarian rule, but can lessen its imperative to do so. So, when a regime is strong. It has the capacity to maintain the course of authoritarianism, but it may also present itself as the ideal time to democratize precisely because it would be democratizes from strength. Now this in many ways seems counterintuitive. I mean, empirical reality actually it's not that counterintuitive. And indeed, in the cases that we examine in our book cases like Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Taiwan, it was not counterintuitive in fact that was the modal pathway of democratic transition in the region, but also globally Now there's going to be some discrepancy in terms of how we code this but basically the argument here is that in 1986 there were 83 authoritarian ruling parties in the world since that time 35 of them have remained authoritarian 48 of them. This is as of three years ago, went through a political transition, and of that 4815 are now obsolete, but a total of 33 continue to exist, and in fact, 18 of them. So 18 of 33 that continue exist continue to be either the ruling party, or a major political party. In other words, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that it may in fact be incentive compatible for strong authoritarian regimes to conceive democracy. And, and both data I've written on the ways in which these authoritarian successor parties in fact can become a potential stabilizing force after democratic transition is occurred. So the question then, when we think about that theory now the the intuitive question we'd want to put to China I think becomes pretty clear. And that is why might China democratize a place where you probably would least expect it. And in our view, the democratic possibility, at least theoretically is very real in China. And in fact one might make the argument that the current moment is the best time for the current Chinese Communist Party to succeed, because it continues to be extremely powerful. It continues to be popular. In view that it has passed and just past its apex of power, there are certainly looming problems on the horizon that do not portend stability for the regime over the longer term. And so if there was ever a time for the regime to concede democracy strength. Now would be the time it would be inconceivable that the Chinese Communist Party would not win. Indeed, one can reasonably expect that if China were to democratize it would not fall apart in fact it may serve to stabilize the country, particularly in peripheral regions. It may also another reason why we might expect China to democratize strength sooner rather than later is because of what Bruce Dixon refers to as the dictator's dilemma. And in his recent book or not so recent anymore a couple years ago, he portrays the CCP as a party of reform but a party of reform without democracy. And this party of reform creates for itself a double-edged sword. And as Bruce puts it rather than solidifying the CCP's hold on power, these reforms in fact instead create greater challenges to the ruling party. So as the party continues to reform, it opens up you vistas of potential challenges, which is Dan and I call or what we refer to as the regime becoming increasingly hemmed in. And indeed this feeds to the idea of the top million notion of a revolution of rising expectations. So rather than understanding political conflict in China today as exemplar of presentist deprivation that is to say the kind of conflict that is a function of deprivation and political inequality today. It's, it's rather a revolution of rising expectations over time. So the argument basically here and I refer again to this graph that despite or maybe even perhaps because of the dictator's dilemma as Bruce has outlined for us. Democracy is possible in China, because we have a regime that is very powerful, it is at or near the apex of its political power. One can reasonably make an argument that it has passed its apex of power, but that nonetheless it's accumulated antecedent strengths should give it victory confidence that it would maintain political power in the event of a democratic transition. And it should also have stability confidence that it's that it's grip on political power and the institutions that it's put into place should maintain stability. Indeed, the lesson that the regime should take is not the lesson that is dominant by the lesson the regime should take from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the CPSU's fate, which is not the dominant view and the party is not that the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted from a regime conceding democracy, rather the collapse of the Soviet Union and the obsolescence of the CPSU was the result of a dream conceding democracy too late. And so therefore the lesson that the CCP should take from the CPSU is you should concede democracy when you're stronger rather than your weaker, in other words conceding democracy sooner rather than later. Now there are several reasons and of course folks in this room will know them as much as I do, and no doubt, even more with even greater depth than I would there are many reasons why, despite the theoretical expectation that China should democratize sooner rather than later that it remains improbable in China, if not over the longer term most certainly in the near term. Some of the reasons why a democracy through strength scenario in China remains improbable include things like for instance the electoral signals are unclear one of the things that really benefited the KMT in Taiwan was that the elections as much of a sham as they were were an important loop for the regime to really receive quite clearly signals from Taiwan society about its waning hold on political power signals in China are unclear. The central regime has done an extraordinarily effective job of defecting deflecting political blame, localizing for instance contentious politics, offloading political pathologies and economic challenges to local levels. The Chinese regime so far has resisted us pressure and is in fact created a very powerful counter narrative to us pressure so the geopolitical variable has been neutralized in fact I think as many ways strengthen the regime. And the regime has done a very good job of normalizing the economic slowdown, talking about the new normal, talking about and managing expectations of continued economic transformation in China and so forth. And so there, the economic slowdown in China has had an unclear effect on the regime. I think most importantly though, in terms of why a democracy through strength scenario is improbable in China is because many who are inside the party or who think about the party. Don't really have a good sense of where the party is on that curve that I have here up on the slide right now. I've given or we've given this talk many times in China. And this shared this theory in many seminars in China and spoken to a lot of people in China about this. And one of the things that I, you know, is is emblazoned in my mind is, is, you know, one of the things that will do is we will ask folks, just in a, in a, in a vote, where do people think the party is on this curve. And having done this in a few years. This is something we don't talk so much about in China anymore but as of about three years ago when we did a straw poll what was really interesting was that, and we gave them four choices the party is still rising. The party is at its apex, the party is just past its apex, or the party has hurtled through. And the votes among folks in that audience was a four way even split. About a quarter felt the party was on the rise quarter felt the party was at its apex, a quarter felt the party was just passes apex and indeed a quarter felt the party had already hurtled through the bitter sweet spot so not knowing where the party is on the curve is a serious challenge for the ruling regime, understanding if it's just past its apex of power, it is continuing to accumulate power, or worse yet, that it's already hurtled through the bitter sweet spot. The absence of those signals is a real challenge, and therefore makes a democracy through strength scenario improbable. So let me just finish up by saying that I think that there are potentially three pathways that China may take here one again is China's democratic improbability for all the reasons that I've just described. The second is China's very proactive democratic avoidance that the Chinese Communist Party continues to be a party of reform. And it continues to be a party of reform that is able to reform legal systems governance structures and so forth. But ones that nonetheless actively frustrate and mean and avoid meaningfully democratic reforms. And we can see a lot of this under the early Xi Jinping era. And we can certainly see it now in the leadership demeanor in terms of its view on democracy, it really is now a party of democracy avoidance. And the third and perhaps this is something that democratic optimists and hopefuls will continue hold on to is China's democratic possibility, that in fact, a democracy through strength scenario may unfold in China, that the regime might preemptively concede and not because of a bottom up revolution, not because the regime proves itself imminently weakened and on the precipice of collapse. And certainly not because autocrats suddenly discover themselves to be liberal democrats, but rather because from the point of view the CCP the cost of avoiding democracy any longer becomes increasingly and prohibitively high. And that it makes sense for the party and for China to concede democracy from strength and to concede democracy sooner rather than later. So I'm going to end my comments there. I appreciate your attention. And as I say again this talk was intended to really be a provocation and a provocation that uses a way of thinking about much through strength to assess democratic prospects in China. So thank you so much for your time and your attention. Well, thank you very much, Joe for this fantastic and thoughtful presentation. I think we already have a lot of questions, which would challenge some of your arguments before we go there. Just let me remind everybody that this session is being recorded, and it should be available later on. So if you are concerned about your identity, when you raise your question on the Q&A box, you simply need to say that you would like your identity not to be revealed, in which case I will not without your name or your affiliation. It would be useful if you could provide the information on the Q&A box so that I know where you are coming from. It also enables me to get as good a spread of questions from different people of different backgrounds and geographical locations as possible. So if you are on a subject which politically is potentially sensitive, I would urge you to think hard about it before you want to put your name on for open consumption. And before I open it to general discussion, Joe, could I start off by asking you a question about the perhaps methodology. I mean, it's a very thoughtful theory. You have considered a lot of very important issues, and having looked at Taiwan's democratization, I warmed a lot of what you say. But there's one factor which I thought you have not taken into account, which is the regime type, the very nature of the political system in place. Does it actually matter? Or does it not? The great contrast between, say, the Taiwan system and the system on the Chinese mainland is of course that on the mainland you have a true nationalist political system, which believe it or not is still committed to communism. It certainly is under Xi Jinping. Whereas in Taiwan, the system, hard as it was as an authoritarian system, it really never functioned properly as a nationalist system. It never had a proper ideology in the ways that communism is an ideology. And the convictions that is systemed is the right one and is on the right side of history. Does it matter or does it not matter? It certainly matters. And I think, you know, one of the chapters, later chapters in the book, we have one chapter on China up to 89, which is, again, as I say, it's really the argument that we want to make there is, don't think of June 4th 89 as a moment of potential democracy through strength. In fact, what we saw there was really a weak regime. But that since that point, the regime has accumulated many strengths. The subsequent chapter in the book actually we write the chapter as a cluster of cases in which China is a key one, but we call it developmental socialist, the developmental socialist clusters. These are all ideological regimes, socialist ideological regimes, and you're absolutely right in the sense that a regime that continues to hold to a particular ideology, even if in practice right beginning, certainly beginning in the late 70s, 80s, 90s and less so today. But there is a period where in practice, this was a regime that implemented more pragmatic certainly market conforming reforms and so forth that many ways would betray the ideological foundations of the party, that there is still a narrative a very deeply entrenched narrative within the regime around a Leninist ideology. And part of that part of the constraints or why that's constraining is that there is no. There's no potential for a democratic heritage as well. I mean if you look for instance in in KMT documents and early Republican China documents that you will see allusions to democracy, it is within the realm of possibility. When you talk to the conservative authoritarians in Korea, they see democracy as being very much part of their own heritage and indeed they see democracy as a way of sort of squaring some of the contradictions that the authoritarian regime is facing the 80s. You don't see this in Vietnam, you don't see this, certainly North Korea, and you don't see this in China and so that's that I agree with you as a very limiting factor. Okay. The first question I picked is from Graham Hutchings. In some ways it's sort of parallel the kinds of the questions I raised but from a very different perspective. I will ask you for a fantastic talk and then ask you, do we need to pay more attention than perhaps seems to be at work in the arguments, your argument in the starting point, and expect story. This is when it comes down to an authoritarian party and country that might seek to undertake a democratic transition. In other words, is there not something about with the nature and the history of the CCP, and perhaps mainland Chinese political culture that makes a theorized theory of democratic transition very hard to maintain. So here the focus is more on the history and the nature of the Communist Party of China. That's a great question and as I alluded to in my response to your initial question Steve, the centrality of ideology is important and an ideology that does not permit democratic possibility is important in the DNA of the regime. I also think there's something to be said about revolutionary parties, folks like looking way and Steve Levitsky and others about this but revolutionary parties also have a genetic allergy to democracy, I think, because for revolutionary parties the main concern is really about stability and the fear of instability and the fear of chaos and indeed the fear of the kind of chaos that would ensue through political reform of any kind but most certainly through democratic reform. This I think is something that is very important in the historiography of the party, but also in terms of how the party views prospective political reform. If you look back to 89. And, and you think about what motivates the regime there, particularly the emergence and quite quick coalescence of the hard line faction beginning in 86 and 87, and frankly relatively is, is it's couched in the recentness of the chaos and destruction of the cultural revolution the, the as then as yet inability of the regime to consolidate its power its organizational coherence to preside over a stable China that was the major preoccupation, much more so than even what we call victory confidence I think that was much less important in China 89 and that has carried forward so the upshot of my responses is to is to concede just that is that there is that revolutionary parties have a deep fear of instability and that deep fear of instability prohibits them from venturing into a democratic transformation. The next one is from several individuals so I'm not going to mention all their names. The question essentially is that you mentioned Taiwan as a example. But then the KMT eventually lost power with that therefore not deterred the communist party from taking that option. So this is a question is a question of sort of strategic takes on on on on a political party so it's absolutely right. KMT loses certainly executive power as soon as 2000. When Chan is elected president. I mean the KMT has always maintained legislative dominance, almost virtually unassailable throughout Taiwan's democratic history but there are points where it's in coalition. So as a party in the, in the legislatures has maintained dominance although it has lost the executive. It has never however become obsolete. And it is not even when it's not even when it was on its throes of a death spiral more recently when we thought all the KMT has gone forever. It continues to be a major political party. It has it has avoided political obsolescence. The argument we would make is the reason why it's avoided that is because it conceded democracy at a time when it was still very strong when it was able to control in many ways the post democratic transition electoral agenda. I've written extensively for instance about how the KMT adopts a much more progressive social policy agenda, despite its own conservative heritage as a way of becoming and maintaining its electoral dominance and after democratic transition. Those political luxuries that strategic latitude that was afforded to the KMT in the 1990s and into the 2000s was a function of the fact that the regime conceded democracy when it was still relatively strong. Now one might make the argument had the regime waited and waited until it became considerably weaker that it ran the risk of political obsolescence. And it most certainly ran the risk of not having the strategically risk to shape post transition order in which it would be most beneficial to the incumbent regime. So that's the question that the CCP has to ask itself. I mean I think it's it's and I'm not being flipped when I say this but nothing lasts forever. And so if, if one thinks about the prospects of democratic transition. The, the strategic advice I would give to the CCP which has done remarkable things in China's it's presided over the most extraordinary socio economic human transfer development transformation in human history. That it should consider conceding before it's too late, because the longer it waits to concede the less strategic latitude that it has to shape post transition order in ways that strategically advantage the ruling party. So, yes, the KMT eventually loses executive power, but it has retained its position as a major political party. The opposite or the, the cautionary tale, the CCP should consider is that if you wait too long, you could suffer the fate of the CPSU, which is its obsolescence. So this is a strategic decision the party has to make, and it has to make a strategic decision around the timing of the concession, and the kinds of concessions it's willing to make. And it says don't wait too long. Because the fate could be far worse than what this camp to his experience and we have seen that in many countries around the world. But the next question I'm picking is from a source graduate, Matthew Condi. This question is, what is the motive for senior leadership in authoritarian regimes to endorse a transition to democracy, when the risk being investigated, or put on trial for abuse of power that were committed during their tenure. For example, the current Standing Committee of the Politburo exposed itself to child for human rights abuse in Xinjiang. Yeah, party itself may well survive, and indeed even thrive. The leadership may not. And why would they do that. Yeah. That's a great question. Who was that from a source graduate. I hit the nail on the head that is at the core really of the, of the theory and, you know, of the limitations of our theory because at its core, our theory is a strategic choice argument for the party. There's a sense for the regime to democratize sooner rather than later, in order to ensure the survival if not continued dominance of the regime, which are absolutely right and I consider to myself that regimes don't make decisions, individuals make decisions, and individuals don't make that choice. And so there is a disconnect between what is in the best interest and what kinds of risks the institution or the party is willing to take versus what the individual is willing to take. Steve and I in an earlier conversation, you know, I was recounting to him that when I shared this argument with folks in China and with party folks in China. They will say like, totally agree with the logic of your argument makes total sense for the CCP to consider this very seriously for all the reasons you've outlined, you know the CCP is strong it's it's got a strong organizational coherence and and so forth. But they'll say like, you know, but as an individual I much prefer we embark on these reforms after my son graduates from Harvard. And I think that really reveals the disconnect between the institutional interests of the party versus the individual interests, or the self interest of the individual, the risk to the party, while not insignificant is one that the party as an organization is able to withstand the risk to the including as you've indicated the risk of retribution the risk of post hot criminalization trials and so forth. Those are risks that individuals may be less likely to take on. So if if I were to, you know, add to my list of reasons why I expect transition through strength to be improbable in China, it's precise for the reason that you just said, it makes less sense for an individual to take that risk. And the uncertainty in which the costs on the individual are considerably higher than the party organization institution, make it less probable that individuals will make that choice. So you're absolutely right. One of the ways in which we've seen some of this play out in the case of Korea, for instance, and and the account that we provide in the book is that there's extraordinary people who want to note a who in their conversations in the summer of 87, when the outgoing dictator shouldn't have one basically says to, and he was a real bastard right I mean he was a real, he's a real dictator says to note a who it's like, you know, you may want to see democracy now, because the opposition is likely to split the vote. And so the ruling DJP party can more than likely maintain this plurality of votes in the national assembly. But you may also want to concede democracy now because then you can pardon, you can pardon those around you and maintain the support that you need so they actually go through this whole traumatic charade, this whole dramatic performance of contrition and concession, when in fact it was really reflected a bunch of side payments that are even made to the outgoing dictator that that concessions and pardons would be made on his behalf. Now, we see later on, of course, that playing out very differently as Chong and others are tried and found guilty of corruption and so forth. But in the initial deal that was made in 87 that was really one of the conditions for Chandra want to go along with that plan. So you've highlighted anyway all of this says that you've highlighted. I think one of the main reasons why democracy in China remains improbable. Even if the logic makes a lot of sense. The next question I picked comes from a Chinese student who is at a London institution, which is not source. If I understand you correctly, the main incentive for the CCP to democratize is to gained more legitimacy and support. But does democracy leads to more support. It would depend on the patterns of the citizens citizenry. And if the majority only cares about economic development, then the CCP should focus on economic development, or at least a sense of economic development, what are then focus on democracy. The focus on economic development also generates the performance legitimacy for a ruling party to gain the electoral support it would need to win so economic development to continue to economic development is is absolutely critical to the electoral of any regime so I wouldn't suggest or I wouldn't want someone to leave with the interpretation that by transitioning to democracy you're jettisoning the economic development program of the incumbent regime. What I am suggesting, however, is that the introduction of democracy and conceding democracy, particularly when the incumbent regime is in many ways, is allowed to or permitted to maintain its hold on power, allows that regime more than allowed it to to bring into play new kinds of interest based cleavages and so forth that it can actually trade on and dominate so that it gives it some. So that does not rely solely on GDP growth, as it's only maybe even if it's main source of a performance legitimacy. For instance, in all three of our successful democracy drinks scenarios, post war Japan, canty in the 90s and the djp in Korea in the late 80s into the 90s. In all three cases. The incumbent regime, not only continues to maintain a course of economic development, but by virtue of having conceded democracy is afforded the issue base or cleavage base leverage or latitude to create new cleavages that work to their In all three cases, the conservative ruling or conservative incumbent regime begins to take on redistributive or at least distributive sensitive public policies and economic policies, which actually generate for the regimes even more power and more strength so one looks for instance at the LDP, not only does it resurrect in the 1950s and 1960s industrial development and industrial policy machinery. It's also introducing macroeconomic policies around income Dublin. It's also the time in which the LDP and not the JSP is introducing universal social insurance and so forth, which only strengthens the ruling party through democratic elections. What happens in in Taiwan and Korea, it's the conservative incumbent ruling regime that introduces the first raft of for instance social extensive social policy reform, which allows these parties to gain electoral support through through the introduction of and by virtue of them being in a dominant position which they're able to control the terms of democratic transition. So the that's the long answer. The short answer is that the advantage of conceding democracy, particularly from position of strength is that it allows the ruling regime to generate new sources of political legitimacy and sources of political legitimacy that it can trade on if and when economic development alone or economic growth alone begins to slow. And that would be, you know, that should be something of concern to the CCP, because there are, there are some deep structural economic challenges that the regime will face over the medium to longer term, and it would be the best thing for the regime to be generating additional supplementary alternative sources of political legitimacy to keep the power regime and power, other than relying solely on economic growth. Swinging from students to a seasoned China watcher. The next question comes from joined meetings. Might it not be argued that in 1989, the party did have a choice. Many of the arguments in the 80s with democracy came from within around who y'all bang and his associates and with the signs to democratize the party while retaining sufficient power to survive. There was a real possibility, even in May to June, when the moderate approach could prevail. In other words, the CCP might have gone some way down the road, as indeed your analysis implies that the CPSU should have done. Would you agree with that? Yeah, I think, you know, there was, there was certainly a window of opportunity for the regime to have considered a democratic transition in the 1980s. And I think that in 86 and 87 was probably a more a more accommodating scenario than by the time we get to 89. In 89, you, you have now a hardliner fact that was unapologetically willing to sacrifice who y'all bang in 87. 86 87, you have a disastrous so in terms of proximate anxieties and proximate causes for protests you have a disastrous economic year in 1988. And so basically the mobilization of spring 89. I think in many ways is 86 87 redo. So you do I think have an opportunity in 86 87. It's not clear, however, for a couple reasons that the regime really wasn't the, it could have democratized and it could have democratized through relative strength but there was still some I think structural weaknesses that the regime had to have. One was there was a lack of consensus within the ruling regime around political reform. There wasn't really frankly a reform blueprint that was available so there were lots of discussions around administrative reform lots of conversations around party reform. Like for instance, in the case of Taiwan or even Korea where you have electoral systems in place, where you have political parties that had already. I mean in Korea you had opposition political parties in Taiwan you had a downline movement. It wasn't clear that you had an opposition in place in the institutions to accommodate that opposition that would allow for a smooth transition to democracy. And lastly, I think, you know, this was in 86 87 we're really talking less than a decade or a decade from the death of Mao the end of the Cultural Revolution, the rest of the gang of four. The economy was only really picking up speed through accelerating forms. After 84. The party itself was still, I think, in many ways, institutionally reorganizing, putting into place institutional mechanisms for the exercise of political power. It was really only beginning to discuss what a leadership succession mechanism might look like. It was still very much growing out of the personalist politics in informal politics that had structured CCP politics up until the late 1970s. So, yes, I don't think it would have been impossible, but I think in many ways, the party was weak enough that it lacked the confidence that it could preside over a stable democratic transition, I would make the argument the party today, or certainly three years ago, four years ago was in a much better position to seriously contemplate a concession through strength scenario. Next question I picked is from a Chinese students at the University of Toronto. And the student would like to ask you about your thoughts on the in quotation marks, twisted thinking. It was twisted, twisted thinking. It distorted thinking. Towards democracy and freedom of the Communist Party. The student mentioned that when he or she was at the University of Toronto. So many mainland Chinese students thinking that all the media in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada are manipulated by the American regime. And what happened in June 4 Beijing 1989 was fake news. And no student was killed or died in Beijing that day. They have been studying in Western countries for a long time, and yet they do not have a good understanding of the Western systems. And many of those students and still loved President Xi and believe that what whatever President Xi says is the truth. And what we believe are brainwashed by Western propaganda. Now, if that is how people think, why do you think your theory will apply. Well, yeah, that's a, that's an interesting observation. I mean, I think one of the, one of the compelling reasons are one of the reasons why our theory. Should at least get a listen to in the Chinese context is that it is not predicated on the delegitimation or collapse of the regime. In fact, quite the opposite, it is predicated on the presumed strengths of the regime. And if anything, it's, it's the confusion rests in why such such a regime lacks the confidence, particularly now I think in 89. As I, as I pour over the archival evidence and the analysis at the time in 89 I can see why the regime may lack may have lacked the confidence confusion today for people like myself who think what the Chinese Communist Party has done is nothing short of remarkable and miraculous the confusion is, is why the party lacks such confidence today. And that's, you know, and therefore, you know, the working proposition is not one that presumes imminent collapse, but rather the opposite. And so it's a strategic conversation, as opposed to a critical or a conversation rooted in criticism. Of course, as I said I began, I have a normative commitment to democracy. And if someone wants to say well this is just your clever way of pulling the wool over the eyes of people and propagating what it is that you think is normatively right well that's their right to come to that conclusion. I think it's not inconsistent for someone who's writing a book like this to say, we have a normative commitment to democracy. But interestingly, democracy can arrive in context in which we don't can arrive not in the wake of destruction and collapse but actually in the wake of some real strategic leadership and strategic and self interested strategic on the part of the regime. As it relates to, you know, things like fake news and Western influence and so forth. I mean, it's, what can I say, except, you know, I think in many ways that's further indication of a regime that is what I call, you know, what I call China's democracy avoidance it is the active frustration of any democratic possibility. And, you know, that's a tactic that's a strategy that is a way of maintaining political power. And to say to my friends in China or who think about China that is what I always say is that nothing lasts forever and best to best to get out or best to transition when times are good and you can stay in power and you can ensure your continued relevance, if not dominance, better that than the alternative, which is to be thrown out and become obsolete. And I think that would be disastrous for not only the party, but also for all of China. Okay. In next lot, I will put to you two complimentary questions from two veterans China watchers. Jonathan fan be asked you how likely is an authoritarian regime to enable the growth of independent institutions needed for democracy. And Norman Stockman would like to ask you that does not the language of conceding democracy assume that there is a strong demand for democracy. If there is not with an authoritarian party, which introduced democratic procedures be imposing democracy. The word concedes seems to carry a lot of baggage. That's, that's an interesting. That's an interesting insight, both. One of the things that we learn from the successful cases of democracy through strength is that not only are there. Not only is there the accumulation of antecedent strengths, there's also the institutionalization or the entity, the preceding institutionalization of mechanisms that make transitioned more likely, even if prior to transition there's still shorter democratic in practice. So take for instance, I think one of the big challenges in Taiwan in China is the absence of of elections or meaningfully meaningful yet limited elections. I think one of the greatest advantages that the DJP and the KMT experience and even the immediate post war period in Japan given their experience under Taisho imperial democracy was the earlier institutionalization of unfree unfair and limited but nonetheless institutionalized elections, this accelerated not only the conversion of the ruling party to an electorally contesting democratic party, it also accelerated the development of the opposition and rules of the game which the opposition can legitimately and fruitfully compete. So, I think that you can have authoritarian regimes that put into place the institutional precursors of what become fully blown democratic institutions, but which in practice may remain limited fractured and constrained in the pre democratic era. Elections and electoral systems being a perfect example of this. I mean, it's, it's no secret that the electoral system designers in the DJP, the KMT, and the two conservative parties in Japan in 4748 had a very sophisticated understanding of electoral systems and the advantages that would accrue to the incumbent party and the specific characteristics of the incumbent party particularly large rural seat bonus. This comes through some limited institutional introductions, or the introduction of limited institutions prior to democratic transition which in the end made the transition swing particularly from the point of view of the incumbent regime. The question around concession I think is very interesting I did not thought of the loaded baggage that comes with it, or hadn't thought about it, I think that as deeply as, as, as our colleague has, has put forth. We do stress however that in our theory that authoritarian regimes will not concede democracy, when they are continuing to accumulate strength, and when they continue to accumulate power it's when they've passed the apex of power. And their whole in grip on power is beginning to wane, necessitating a new realigitimate a new legitimation strategy for to hold on to power, but oftentimes also marking the rise of democratic demands, or the rise of demands for political reform, even if it's not formulated in democratic constitutional ways. So, electoral signals, the rise of contentious politics protest uprising so forth, are all signals for a nascent demand for democracy, it may not be fully blown. And indeed, you know, a democratic revolution occurs when a regime has already hurtled through the bittersweet spot when it is already too weak. So it's incumbent upon from a strategic point of view for the ruling regime to interpret signals around the time that it said it's apex of power to interpret those signals to suggest a nascent demand for democracy, maybe a growing demand for democracy so the vector is heading in that direction. And from the ruling regime's point of view to strategically preempt its delegitimation by introducing political reform. The next two questions that I will combine in parallel to you are slightly hypothetical. One comes from Sam Jackson, who is a master student at King's College London, KCL. And the question is, what would democracy in China look like? If China did democratize, surely the Communist Party would remain the effect of authoritarian party without major competition. The second parallel can be meant to be questions is familiar how to pick decision that saw us and should light you to outline what you thought an opposition party in China in that context would be like, since any and every opposition that is emerging at the moment is being squashed by the party right away. Right. So again, I think it's important that democratic concession is one decision in a series of decisions that flips a regime from or a political system from being one that is decisively and unequivocally authoritarian in terms of the prospects of an opposition party or an opposition, no how remote those prospects maybe has an opportunity to take power. So the movement from no opportunity at all to political uncertainty is the moment in which we are making a transition to democracy. See, after all, as Adams was he always reminds us democracy is about institutionalized uncertainty. And they could have very uncertain situations or you can have very certain situations but in which there is just the element of uncertainty that is either there at the time or may emerge over time. There was no question, the KMT was going to win founding elections in Taiwan, even with the opposition DPP. It just was. There was just no question it was just impossible. DPP couldn't even feel enough candidates in the electoral system that the KMT chose to effectively contest. So that was just, you know, that was about as close to certainty as you'd get. You go back to Korea in the summer of 87. The big bet there was that Kim Dae Jong and Kim Yong Sam would split the opposition vote. And in fact, it was split along regional lines. Now, was that a certainty that they would split the vote. No, but it was a pretty good bet. So there was an introduction of uncertainty. There was an introduction of uncertainty in the system, even though in the end, the ruling regimes bet paid off and their prediction rang true. So I think, you know, but in both places, right, the field of play was relatively established. The KMT knew who the opposition was. There were electoral rules. There was an electoral system. These things all emerged prior to democratic transition. In the case of Korea, opposition parties, Kim Dae Jong and Kim Yong Sam had been contesting elections. Now they've been jailed at numerous times. They've been silenced many times. Their parties have been split and splintered many times. But these institutional and practical precursors existed prior to the moment of democratic transition. So, you know, those are important. So when people ask, well, what would democratic transition in China look like? I think that in many ways it would be chaotic because there aren't those institutional precursors there right now. There isn't an opposition there. And as the questioner has rightly pointed out, anytime an emergent opposition rears its head is it is immediately quashed and thoroughly quashed. So if the regime is thinking that a democracy through a strength scenario is even in the cards as a strategic hedge, it should start introducing short of even well short of democracy, some institutional innovations and mechanisms that will allow and facilitate a smoother transition to democracy if and when that ever emerges. It's not a concession to democracy. It's not leveling the playing field. It's not introducing the possibility that an opposition can emerge. But it's putting into place some of the institutions that might facilitate the transition. So there are, you know, again, one of the reasons why we would not expect a democratic transition to occur in China is because, as I said, one, the signals are terribly unclear. And two, it doesn't have the institutional antecedents to actually facilitate that kind of transition. It would be a disaster in short. Well, thank you, Joe. I am afraid that we are, I am being defeated by the clock that we have reached the magical moment of 631. So I will draw this webinar to a close with apologies to many of you, about two thirds of you who have raised questions that I have not been able to fit into the discussions with Professor Joe Wong. I am very, I'm sure you would agree with me is that Joe has provided extremely thoughtful observations for us to think about and about for something for Xi Jinping to think about if he wants to have a good future for people in China. And having said that no, that there is at least one of you recently questioned, which essentially says that we are doing very well in China, why should we actually even think about moving in that direction. And individuals must have the right to think what they think. But with this, let me draw this to a close. And thank you very much. Once again, Professor Joseph Wong of the University of Toronto. Thanks, Joe. Thanks, Steve. It's great to see you.