 I'm Steve Morrison from CSIS. I'm going to do some quick welcoming and introductory remarks for our guest of honor here, Jay Bryan Atwood, chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee. And then my colleague, Dan Rundie, is going to moderate a discussion. And it will give you an opportunity over the course of this event to offer some comments and questions. Bryan's familiar to many of us here as a friend, as a leader, and a person who's inspired many of our careers over the last several decades in the various different incarnations that he has had. He came to this DAC job in January of this year, and we'll have a great opportunity today, Bryan, to hear from you as to your reflections on reinventing and moving DAC forward in the lead-up to Pusan and in the midst of this changing world of the emerging powers and budget crises and the like. Bryan, for the eight or nine years prior to that, was dean of the Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs, the University of Minnesota, and had a dramatic impact there in invigorating the programs, building the visibility and reputation of that major institution from 1993 to 1999, which is when many of us got to know Bryan and admire him most passionately was when he was leading USAID under the Clinton administration. And that period bore some sort of haunting similarities to the period that we face here today. I just want to remind folks that this was a period in which there was a budget crisis. There was acute political polarization and split government. There was a humanitarian spike. We were at the end of a Cold War era, and there was a proliferation of new demands and the need for new instruments like the Office of Transition Initiatives and other different capacities on the civilian military side of things. There were failed states that we didn't really know how to deal with, and there was an emerging new political reality. Some of those are very much still with us in terms of demands around how do we cope in this period? And so I think we are all very grateful to Bryan for defending the development agenda, moving the institutions forward, and creating that voice and leadership that is so vital in this town and beyond in reminding people of the development mission and the value and the leadership that the United States brings to this. His other contributions as a diplomat, as the Under Secretary for Management Affairs, and prior to that as an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, as I said, as an academic leader, a public policy leader, and working for a period of three years with Joe Kennedy at the Citizens Energy Initiative out of Boston. So please join me in welcoming Bryan Atwood. Thank you so much, Bryan, for being with us today. We're very grateful. It's wonderful to see you. Yeah, okay. Great, thank you. Thank you very much, Steve. And it really is a pleasure to have you, Bryan, with us. A very good friend of mine who's a Senior Foreign Service Officer says about you that you saved AID, you saved the agency, and I think that reflects the feelings of many people in the development community. So thank you for your service at AID. And I think when people hear that you're in town, people want to visit with you. And I think it reflects the gratitude that people have for your service at AID and also your ongoing leadership in the development community. This is a very interesting time to have you come to Washington. You're leading, as I was saying earlier, I consider the DAC to be the Major League Baseball Commission for Foreign Assistance. And for European audiences, I call it the FIFA of Foreign Assistance. So for it to, but I think there's been a number of, over time there've been a series of emerging donors. I think if you said that to folks in the global South, you'd get sort of a elicit, a sort of a variety of reactions. They'll say we've been supporting South-South cooperation for forever. And why do you say we're emerging or we're new? Or non-traditional? And so you find all sorts of labels that become sort of awkward quickly. But perhaps what might be interesting is for us just to get a sense of what the DAC does more generally. I know you were another organization earlier this morning. So I know at the risk of being repetitive, perhaps just sharing what the DAC is just a little bit. And then if we could talk a little bit about the what you're doing with these emerging donors, people often talk about China, but you were saying earlier that I mean, Turkey and many others have very significant programs that we can have a conversation about that. I think that would be, I think very timely. So yeah. Well, it's great to be here. And there are some wonderful veterans of the period when I worked at AID, including Mark Schneider over there and Steve Morrison really made with Rick Barton made OTI work. It was a great Bill Garvalink is here. And probably others, but you know, at my age, my eyes have gone bad, so I can't really see you. But this is a fascinating time. I guess it's always a fascinating time to come to Washington. It's disturbing to see what's going on here in many ways, but you know, this too will pass. And I believe that sanity will return and we'll get through this period the problem obviously is the polarization and the inclination to sort of drive up to the cliff and look over and see whether or not we want to take the economy with us. But that's just an editorial comment. I'm here to do the peer review of the United States aid program and the program continues. I'm not going to go into that at length. I want to talk more about the engagement strategy of the DAC, which is what you've asked me to talk about, but basically the aid program has been improving, obviously the presidential directive and the QDDR have produced at least all of the right intentions. And those intentions relate to the agenda for aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action basically talk about principles that produce development results, the principle of country ownership and aligning with country strategies and harmonization, having a predictable aid program. All of these things we have done an evaluation that demonstrates with evidence that if you do these things you're going to produce results. And that I think is what everyone wants and that isn't a partisan issue. You're going to spend the taxpayers' money, you better be able to show value for money as the British call it. The time, coming into the DAC at this time there were a lot of people who really care about development that say, gee, the DAC isn't as relevant as it used to be. Why? Because there are so many other donors out there. They're private donors. There's a good deal of activity on the corporate responsibility front. There's a lot of public-private partnerships and then there are the emerging economies that are increasingly providing assistance. More and more international organizations, more and more private organizations are providing aid. There's more ODA type aid out there than ever before and there's a lot of aid that doesn't qualify for ODA but that does have a development impact. The problem is that it's terribly fragmented and we don't know what a lot of people are doing. We don't know what the Chinese and the Brazilians and the Indians are doing. And the one thing that we all have in common is that we've endorsed the Millennium Development Goals. Every country has endorsed the Millennium Development Goals. So while they may be deficient in some important ways, they're what unites. We are now sort of judged by the extent to which we can reach those goals and we're not doing very well on many of them. And so what's the reason for that? Well, the fragmentation that exists on the international scene is probably wasting between 30 and 40% of all of the resources that are being applied. It's the transaction costs. It's the fact that we don't coordinate, that we don't know what another donor may be doing in the same country and we've got to fix that. I mean, that's the problem that we face in going to Busan, Korea, a very important city. Those of you who are old enough to remember that that's where most of the humanitarian assistance went into Korea during the Korean War. There's a cemetery dedicated to the UN forces, including many Americans that are buried there. And it's now a very modern city. It's a fascinating city. I visited it three or four months ago and they held the APEC summit there in 2005 and it's right on the ocean in the big port and the Koreans are very proud of it and they should be. Holding it in Korea is an important symbolic factor as well because the Koreans in 1961 had a per capita income of $70 and they have made major progress. And every Korean that you talk to is very proud of the fact that they remember being fed with USAID food and received an education and health care and other things from the United States and from other donors. So they have recently within the last year become a member of the DAC. They are now a major donor. They are in the major leagues and they're very, very proud of that and they're very proud of the fact that at the G20 meeting in Seoul last year, they pushed for a new consensus on development and it was signed on to by the Chinese. It was signed on to by all the G20 partners. And the development committee of the G20 meets frequently to prepare for the meeting in Paris. I mean, sorry, in Cannes that's coming up just three weeks before the Busan meeting. And there will be clearly an effort to try to link these two very important events. Now, the working party on aid effectiveness which is a part of the OECD DAC has some 90 members. They all represent constituencies. They represent the Nordic plus region. They represent Africa. They represent Latin America. And half of the members are from developing countries. And what's happened in the last eight years since the first of this series of forums on aid effectiveness is that we've educated ourselves on what's important. We started at Rome where the focus was mainly on harmonization, not imposing all of these reporting requirements on countries, haven't made a lot of progress there. We then went to the Paris principles that I've already talked about and then to Accra, the Accra gender for action in 2008. We've been, I mentioned before doing an evaluation and we know that these principles work, but there's also a survey now, 91 developing countries have contributed to this survey. And the pressures that are kind of, there are two kinds of pressures that are gonna be working at Busan. One is from the developing countries who say we want to own our own programs. And if you think we don't have the capacity to do it, you need to help us develop that capacity. The other is from the national leaders of the G20 of that variety who are saying the major global problems that we face can't be solved without development. We can't solve the climate change problem without development. We can't solve the health problems, the infectious disease problems without development, the global commons. We can't solve the security problems without development and we certainly can't solve the food problems and the volatility of food prices if we don't have a development input. I'm not saying it's the exclusive input, but it becomes so important to these national leaders that they get comprehensive solutions that they can agree to at the G20 level and beyond. The OECD is contributing in a major way to that because it's one of the more important government policy think tanks, if you will. It's not more than that. It's a place where if governments can agree they can create essentially soft law that influences people's behavior. I mean, we have, for example, laws related now to have been adopted here in this country to the minerals that come from conflict zones. Bill knows about this, having been ambassador to Congo. And we're trying, as best we can, to clean up those transmission belts that to make sure that the bad guys aren't taking advantage of that. So I get to the DAC and there are people writing articles saying, is the DAC really relevant anymore? Well, we had contributed $130 billion worth of ODA in 2010. All of the other emerging donors, probably total about $20 billion. Private sector may be another $20 or $30 billion. We don't know how much is going out in remittances and certainly corporate responsibility can be credited with some as well. But the DAC is still at the center of all of this, but how does it reach out? How does it engage? We've done a lot of things. We created something called the International Dialogue, which involves 40 countries, some of the lowest income countries in the world. They came together in Timor and Dealey and in Bogota, Columbia, and then most recently in Liberia. And they themselves, 17 of those countries declared themselves to be fragile states and said, we don't have any chance of making, of achieving the MDGs. So we basically wanna be measured by a different measuring stick. And they basically passed a resolution, all 17 said they will take this to Busan. We are fragile states and we want capacity. We need security so that our people will feel confident that the government is going to protect them. A number of things that they've agreed to do that I think are very important. We hadn't seen the Arab donors for 20 years at a high level. We, about a month ago, had a meeting with all of the Arab donors at the Lancaster House in London. I was quite surprised because we planned this meeting for a period of time. And I wasn't quite sure about how to introduce the subject that the G8 hit right on the head, which is we wanna see democracy in the Middle East. And I wasn't so sure how enthusiastic they would be about that. But in fact, we added an agenda item that said the issue of legitimacy. And they wanted to talk about corruption in their region. They wanted to talk about democracy. And they came to London with the notion that this is irreversible and that we need to get on board. And we're gonna put our money behind it. And I won't tell you, they've got a lot of money. Seen the price of oil recently. What came out of that meeting was an agreement that they would share statistics with the DAC, that they would give us detailed statistics about what they're doing in individual countries. And they're working not just in their region, but in other regions as well. And an agreement that they would meet with us to talk about a common position at Busan. So you add up all of these things, the international dialogue, the working party on aid effectiveness, the China DAC study group. This meeting with the Arab donors. And you're beginning to see how we're pulling this together to reach what I call the common ground agreement. I'm not saying that we're gonna come out of Busan with night turning into day. What I'm saying is that we're going to rationalize the international system. That we're gonna put everyone on a path toward 2015. Now, it's a journey, it isn't a destination. It is gonna take a while before the peer pressure is brought to bear. Right now, the Chinese say, we're very proud of our traditions. We do South-South cooperation. We think that that's an important supplement to North-South cooperation. I think we've already gotten beyond the issue of the charge that somehow North-South cooperation is just a way for the West to impose its values on us. That is no longer being talked about. We are saying, we said in the DAC statement that we issued, it's a unilateral statement by the 24 members of the DAC, that we welcome a dialogue with you without preconditions. We don't expect you to become members. We don't expect you to share statistics. We honor your tradition of South-South cooperation, but we need to have a dialogue because we share the MDGs and we share the desire for results. The big issue here for many of these middle-income countries is that they have become donors. They ironically don't like that word and they want to be called providers of assistance. Too many people say that the DAC is just the donor's club, so maybe that word has gotten out of currency. But their worry is, and you put your finger on it earlier, their worry is that they will no longer be able to be recipients. And there are countries that are saying, look, you've had growth rates of eight to 10 to 12%. You don't need foreign assistance any longer, yet there is more poverty that exists in those emerging economies than all of Africa combined. So we have to work in those countries and we're saying to them, it doesn't matter. It doesn't legally affect you in any way. You can still be recipients and we're trying basically to eliminate those words because they tend to polarize. So that's it. I'm sorry to go on so long. No, this is absolutely fascinating. This is exactly the kind of conversation we're hoping to have with you. Just a couple of topics I wanted to double-click on, if you will. One is talk a little bit about how the China Study Group came about. You referred to it a little bit, but if you could just talk a little bit about that because there's certainly a lot of energy in Washington and elsewhere about, oh, the various ways in which China is in a variety of places. And I know historically they've been reluctant to engage with the DAC. And I think some of the way you've described it, I think reflects some of the sensitivities, I think. If you could just talk a little bit more about that and then if you could talk about, I know that you've also instituted some form of structured engagement with the Gates Foundation. Could you talk a little bit about that as well? Yeah, there really is a very enterprising USAID official who is based in Beijing who came up with the idea that we ought to have this DAC Study Group. And she's done a wonderful job. And it's an interesting thing. I used to argue with Mark Schneider that we couldn't afford to keep sort of development diplomats in places because they really didn't have money or programs. But frankly, with the expertise that some of our development professionals have, they can engage. And she started engaging with the Chinese. The Chinese, as anyone who's worked with them know, have a real thirst for knowledge. And they really wanted to know more about this. They have, in essence, a foundation model for their development programs. Now you can be really cynical and say yeah, and they're very well aware and very sensitive to the charges that are made that it's all about commercial interests. It's all about foreign policy interest and the like. So they're very sensitive. They become even more sensitive because there are other issues that are causing tensions with the middle income countries and with the developing countries involving their currency level, involving frankly the human rights issues that are raised. There are tensions that they don't like and they don't want. And now the developing countries, all of a sudden, aren't just satisfied with non-interference. Basically, their foundation model was you give us a proposal, we'll not only give you the money, we'll give you the labor. Well, that got old too. I mean, and the developing countries are now embracing this notion of development cooperation. They want a partnership. They don't want to be handed a check that nobody knows about. They don't want Chinese laborers coming into the country doing all the work. They'd like to learn how to do some of this work themselves. I know that's caused them some trouble in Africa, right? I think there's been a lot of blowback. Well, in some cases they've sent prisoners over to do this work and that's not too cool. But they're changing. I mean, the fact that they've gone public with their program and justified it on television and set up a website so that people can respond to it is an indication that they're prepared to justify the expenditure of taxpayers' money to their taxpayers. It isn't easy, so they're gonna have to show that they've made good investments. So they wanna know from us, how do you evaluate these programs? What are you doing? And there are a lot of young people that are coming to school at places like the Humphrey School that really want to learn, take the master's degree in development practice. There's a big change. And it's true in India and it's true in Brazil and a lot of other countries. These countries, as the former deputy secretary general knows, are what we call the EE-5 within the OECD, the enhanced engagement countries. The countries that we would like to see join the OECD. And they certainly qualify in many ways. The most recent country to become an accession country, as we call it in OECD, was Russia. And they've signed at the ministerial meeting in May, the Antibribery Treaty, which was one of the conditions. They haven't met all the conditions, but Russia is an accession country. So there's a lot of effort to try to, there's so much they can learn from the OECD countries and from the various directorates of the OECD. Are they members of the, they're not members of the DAC, but do they have some sort of structured engagement with you? There's a structured engagement in that they're invited to most of the meetings of the council. There are many of the committees have approval to invite them to their meetings. And so, and there's much to be learned from them too. I mean, if you look at Brazil's agricultural development, we can learn from them as well as the other way around. So they're very much engaged at this point. Just how about Russia? How about in terms of engaging, engaging with Russia with the DAC? Can you talk a little bit about that? Before I got to the DAC, there was a meeting in Russia by minister Kudrin, one of the, I don't know how one would characterize him, but he's very good at what he does. I was gonna say liberal or conservative or whatever, and I won't say that. But he invited all of the bricks, but he also invited the DAC chair and the World Bank president to their meeting in Moscow. So once again, I mean, the bricks just met again in Beijing. They didn't invite us. I suspect the reason that they didn't invite us is because they wanna get together and decide what their common position would be at Busan. Just guessing, but I think that's what's happening. There's just a lot of pressure on them to come to Busan with an enlightened position. We'll see how far they'll go. Just try to describe the preamble or the declaration of Busan will not only commit countries to being more transparent with one another, to coordinate better, to do all of the things, many of the things that the Paris Declaration calls for, but it will then say that we will have differentiated responsibilities or words to that effect, different roles, different approaches, division of labor, whatever. Then the rest of the agreement will define that. It might be a separate section on South-South cooperation, which was one of the clusters that met under the Working Party. And then there might be a separate section on civil society because the civil society organizations will be there big time at Busan and they've organized themselves better than ever before to make a statement. The Arabs may want to make a separate statement, but there's no reason why this can't become part of a more rational international system. Just going back, the question about the Gates Foundation, I know you have some sort of a formal, structural relationship with them. Not formal, but we've invited them to meetings. They came to our senior level meeting and they just came to the Tidewater meeting. And it's very hard to ignore them. Maybe they're $5 billion a year, it's sort of in grants. Maybe not quite that high, but high. Almost, right. And they're doing some really innovative things in the field. And I mean, there are members of the DAC that don't provide as much money as the Gates Foundation. I was thinking about when the Buffett gift fully kicks in, it's gonna be something like that. I think that it's coming close to hitting that number. It's kind of, and AFD, I think at one point, the French aid agency just several years ago was almost $5 billion. So it's sort of a medium sized, it's sort of Switzerland or Austria or something along those lines. So it's a significant player in the system. We should probably open it up. There are a lot of thoughtful people in the audience that I'd like to hear from, but I wanna first call on my friend and colleague, Thelma Aske, and she's up in the front row. So I'm gonna ask Lauren if you'd come up. I'll give Thelma Aske the first word. Thank you, Dan. It's great to see you, Thraowen. It was interesting you talked about OECD relevance at the DAC level, but it's certainly a discussion that goes on at the OECD a lot because it's often a conflict of the developed countries and how the developing countries can relate to this organization that's developed countries. But if any place that can happen is certainly at the DAC. And I think you also touched on the fact that these larger E5 countries, as I used to say, the Beaks, Brazil, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa because Russia is an accession country and treated somewhat differently. But in a lot of areas outside of the development area, they're concerned about how they're gonna be defined if they cozy up too closely to the OECD. So I think DAC really has an opportunity there to find a way for that cooperation on the development side because it can help define how they relate to an organization of developed countries without giving up their developmental status. And I'd like to hear you comment a little bit more on what the DAC might be able to do on results measurements because it seems like this drive for accountability and for knowing that to get good results in the end and become more and more important as the dollars drop off on the government side and the Gates Foundation and others have that more in their mind because they come from a business orientation. But perhaps you can comment a little bit more about how you see DAC providing some guidance in that area as well as in the kind of technology and expertise transfer that business can provide if they are brought into the development process. Thanks, ma'am. Good. Well, we've done a lot of work on this because while we tried very hard in the 90s to put in place a business model that emphasized results, it's never been more salient in political terms than it is now. I mean, everyone has to demonstrate that they're using the taxpayers' money. And so the interesting issue is whether this is going to cause countries to only go to the middle income or higher income countries where they have a good, there is capacity and they can have a good partnership and they can show results. And will that leave eight orphans that don't have that kind of assistance? Are people willing as they measure results to take risks? And that's, there's a lot of discussion about risk management in fragile states that's going on right now at the same time as this discussion about results. But the whole issue of results, we had a long discussion last week at the Tidewater meeting is really complex. I mean, it's a question of attribution. You have a number of donors working in a country. The country itself is contributing a great deal to the development process. How do you attribute the percentage of results that you're getting from your taxpayers' dollars? Well, the one answer to that question is to make sure that the country itself has the capacity to measure results, that you're measuring results against their strategies. That there's still some distance to travel. Then the question becomes results within what timeframe? I mean, it becomes very complex. Then the issue is how do you set yourself up to communicate with your people and with the people of that country to report those results so that there's more confidence that in fact the money's being spent well? These are issues that everyone's struggling with. Maybe the British have come up with better answers by setting them themselves benchmarks. What the DAC does is to take the best practices of each of these countries, including the World Bank and all of the other organizations because while the bilaterals are primarily members of the DAC, the multilaterals are observers. They come to all of our meetings. The World Bank is there. Now we have just invited all the regional banks to join as observers. So we'll get that perspective as well. And everyone is struggling with this. It isn't an easy answer, but I would say the UK has done better. Andrew Mitchell was saying the other day that the poll results for the Conservative Party have gone up and much of the increase before Murdoch, but much of the increase is because they're running a very efficient aid program. And every other government department is now being forced to take their own value for money approach to what they do. I think that's interesting. It's always the foreign aid program, if you will, I hate the word aid, but that is under the gun and being scrutinized more than any other. I mean, frankly, in this city, I don't think there's a terrible amount of scrutiny going on about the defense budget. I mean, you don't have the same controversies about it, and yet you probably could go over and open closets and money will fall out in the Pentagon. Who cares? I mean, it's going for security. But that's why I think that the management of aid programs can be a lesson for the rest of government. And I think in this case, we've made more progress. What we do is simply share the information. If we can come up with a consensus on the indicators that need to be used that are common indicators, that's what we're trying to do. And I think we can really contribute to this debate. Let me call this, my friend Bob Berg who's in the third row here. This is a delicious order to the Society for International Development Conference over the next two days of the Army Charming Band is chairing, so thank you for that. You all are welcome. The, Brian, I've always heard about what a rational aid system might look like, but it's always seemed to me a little bit like heaven. I mean, we have our own images, but we're getting few direct reports of what it actually looks like. I've got a very distinct picture of what mine looks like. It's lots of steak and dulcet de leche and cigars. Probably better informed than I am, but maybe more deserving. So I'm wondering at Busan, whether you're going to have best cases of a rationalized program or you have an image that people can really grab, hold on, of what this will look like, how it might operate and so give us your heavenly. Yeah, I mean, democracy is an aspiration too, right? I mean, no one is going to reach perfection and certainly not at Busan, but there will be, it's a system, there are three days where the principal speakers will be on the second day and I'm hopeful that we'll get people like Bunky Moon and Hillary Clinton and others to come to this meeting. And that depends on the amount of progress we make between now and then, because I don't think they want to go to a meeting where there isn't a pretty solid agreement before they get there. But we will have something called a building block exercise where there will be side events where people will be able to show off what they think are their best practices. And we've encouraged donor countries to partner with developing countries in putting on these events. One event could involve a very well-known former prime minister who is working with fragile states that may involve people like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and President Kagami of Rwanda and the president of Sierra Leone. There may be, there'll be events like that that will show off and explain approaches that have worked. So the, you know, again, coming out of this with a more rational system is a pretty low standard because it couldn't be less rational. It couldn't be any less rational coming out of Busan but my expectation is much higher than that and I think we can come up with something that will lead. Again, we're all on different paths now. We're not, even though we've all agreed on the MDGs, we're not on the same path. I just think the most, the biggest aspiration I have is to get everyone heading in the same direction. So we're talking to one another because if we get to 2015 and there's no international agreement, no global agreement on what our goals are then we're in trouble. I mean, it will not help the development mission if we're not, if we get there in that form, in that shape. Mark Schneider over here. Brian, the World Development Report this year on conflict, security, and development. For the World Bank anyway, there was a fairly significant shift to focus on the conflict issue as a major obstacle to development, achieving development goals. I'm curious whether, to what degree, the DAC has focused on their conclusions and also whether you see a significant shift in the way the DAC countries are organizing aid programs to deal with the question of conflict prevention. Thank you for asking that question, Mark. Because I think if you read carefully the World Development Report of the World Bank, they will have cited many, many passages from the NCAF guidelines on post-conflict situations which were produced by the DAC. It's our international network on conflict and fragility that has been meeting for years now and produced much of the information that was in the World Bank report. I think OECD is always happy to share information with the World Bank and make the bank look good. And in this case, the World Development Report added much to the NCAF recommendations as well. But now, that's a really important working party of the DAC, this international network on conflict and fragility. And it involves trying to understand the 3D concept and better, it involves various guidelines about how to operate in these situations and obviously it's contextual. You can't just apply the guidelines in every situation but it's a very good report and it came out just before the World Bank's report. It's, unfortunately, it becomes focused because of all of the fragile states and all donors are struggling with this issue of how to manage risk. And there's obviously a continuum from failed state Somalia which is now going through to terrible famine to a fragile state where, for example, Liberia, where I was for the meeting of this NCAF international dialogue and you've got in Liberia a good example. I mean, there's an election coming up in Liberia. That could create a shock for the society. It has to be managed well. The price of rice went up by 40% in the few weeks before we got there. That's another possible shock to that economy and to that society. And so what I think is recommended in the World Development Report and in the NCAF literature is trying to find buffers against these shocks that could cause a fragile state to fall back into a failed state. I'm calling my colleague Joanne Inesov. Hi, good afternoon. You mentioned earlier today that Turkey I think is giving about a billion dollars annually in assistance. And I wanted to ask if you could say a little bit more about that. Is it, who is it going to in terms of what countries and what types of assistance is it a lot of capacity building or is it emergency relief? If you could just talk a little bit more about that, it would be very interesting. They have a relatively new aid program and a lot of it is going to the region around them. And that's why Turkey becomes such an important country with respect to the Arab Spring and what's happening there. Clearly a lot of it is going through multilateral organizations because they haven't yet developed the capacity to do a lot of the programming on their own. But they are reporting statistics to us now, the DAC. And I believe that they're ready to ask for membership in the DAC. And it involves a qualitative assessment of their program. But if they're willing to subject themselves to peer reviews and to provide their statistics, I think they should be members of the DAC. And they'll improve their program as time goes on. So what I'm trying to do on the accession question is to put the bias in the other direction. If a country is willing to do the peer reviews and all of that, they should be in rather than out. Now the other question that's raised in terms of our accession within the DAC now, not the OECD, but because Turkey's already a member of the OECD. It raises the question of whether a recipient can be a DAC member. Now we've never had a policy against it. We've had a practice of not having recipients be members of DAC. Well, Turkey is still a recipient. But I'm confident that we're going to reverse that practice and invite Turkey in. Let me give Steve Morse the last word. I would think you could argue that in the next several years folks are gonna be looking at the DAC and saying that one of the biggest tests is to what degree China's policies and practices on development have changed in the next few years. And the ability of the DAC and the DAC membership and the constituency that it represents to engineer some changes in those, in that dialogue and in those practices and policies. What do you think the two or three milestones are that you're looking for in the next, say, three to five years that would tell us that there's significant progress in moving in that direction? Milestones involve transparency. If they really are serious about coordinating, they will share more information about what they're doing. And another milestone involves triangular work, working with other donors. And a lot of that has happened already. The US AID has worked with China and Liberia and other places. Same with Brazil. There've been programs with the UK and India. I mean, there's a lot more triangular work than we even know about because the last time we looked at it was 2008. And I think we not only have to do an assessment of that triangular work again, but really analyze it to see whether strengths and weaknesses of that are. But that's a learning process when you're working with another donor. So they'll be willing to do more of that. That's helpful. If they begin to transform themselves from the foundation model that they have now to a more classic development agency, which they want to do, but they don't really have the capacity to do it. We need to know more information about their XM loans. Are they concessional? And do they have a subsidy involved? In other words, are they DACA-able? They qualify for ODA. We don't know anything about it. We were told when we were there that their program is being increased to $10 billion US dollars. A big increase. And they're worried about it because they don't know how to handle it. They know they can't keep just sending workers over to do the projects. They know they're going to have to engage in a partnership. They know that non-interference isn't enough. They've got to do more. So I think that we can watch that as we proceed. And if they want, if they're willing to engage us and they seem to be in a discussion about what replaces the MDGs, I think that's another positive sign. Brian, thank you so much for being with us. Please join me in thanking Brian Atwood. Thank you very much.