 I know it's late, so I'm just going to throw myself in the heart of my argument. Several of the talks throughout the day touched on the question of inequalities, spatial, social, etc. And I am finding myself, after 25 years of doing research on questions of inequality, asking the following question, is the language of a bit more inequality, a bit more injustice, a bit more poverty, a bit more slums, a bit more displaced people, will that language do? And my argument basically is no. It is time to confront a messy reality, it's like a vortex of conditions that come together and to try to find conceptual elements, narratives that capture the particularity of this development, which is a key development in a set of other developments as well, of our complex global modernity. A modernity that for me begins in the 1980s, I'm not the only one saying that. And so at the heart of this particular sort of feature that I'm trying to get at, is the notion that a whole range of conditions, and some were touched on from different angles throughout the day, is something that is well beyond inequality. Of course it is part of inequality, but it is something that I think of as systemic logics of expulsion. Now I should say that I'm a social scientist, I'm not a health expert by the way, I can barely manage my own health, so what I'm going to try to get at is a larger context, and I'm going to do that in very few minutes. And when you're standing in front of a new emergent social reality that is messy, complex, and there are all kinds of sortings to do, because not everything counts or matters. I sort of use what I like to think of as analytic tactics. That's different from method. Analytic tactics has to do with how you position yourself vis-à-vis that object of study, that question you're trying to get at. When I did the global city, I positioned myself at the center of power. In this project, I positioned myself at the systemic edge, not the geographic edge, the systemic edge, and I want to see what is the traffic. And after having done that now for a bit, I think that the traffic in this era, again that begins in the 1980s, is to expel. So yes, of course there is inequality. Yes, there is growing inequality, but there is something else that is perhaps more foundational in marking this current global modernity. Now, just to produce a bit of a contrast in the Keynesian period, I would say that if you positioned yourself at that systemic edge, what you would see is that the system, in just as it was racial, whatever, and I'm thinking especially, of course, the United States, but also European countries, the traffic was to bring in people as consumers. But as consumers meant a whole sort of infrastructure that actually produced a middle class. I think today we're moving away from that. And of course one of the guilty actors, in my view, is this question of finance, the rise of finance. So I want to, just to bring in a bit of empirics into the picture, because I think that helps. I'm going to choose one country mostly, which is the United States, which sort of in its brutality, if you want, becomes heuristic. That's a very elegant way of describing its brutality. It tells a story that is larger than itself. But it tells it in such extreme terms that it actually makes visible what in some of the nicer European countries is also happening, but in milder formats, more intermediated, and hence more difficult to capture. So again, the United States as heuristic, as an example of a much larger set of cases. Now here is a graph, which I find a very interesting graph. Now let's see, where is the pointer here? So it begins in 1917. This is the United States, and this is 202, 203, moving into 203. The shape of the curve is really what matters. This, by the way, is 1942, this sharp fall. This is 1987, sharp up. What does it represent? The share of total national income, appropriated, received, whatever language you prefer, by the top 10% of earners. Top 10% of earners, of course, have other sources of wealth. So it reached a nice 47% here, then it falls, and then we have the adorable Keynesian decades. This fall actually represents an increase of the middle class. Then 1987, as by clockwork, it goes up, we're in our global era. And we're back to, you know, by the way, we're back to the same more or less, you'll see in the next slide. Now this year, it's still a rather, it's about, whatever, 33% of national income taken in by the top 10%. That's a rather robust share of national income. But in that difference lies an economy that actually produced a larger middle class. It's also interesting to see that in this, when you read the literature of this period, the notion was it can only get better. Every new generation will have a bit more. The last census 2010, 209 census in the United States, shows that the fourth generation of this middle class, the sons and daughters, in other words, of a middle class, are making less money, less formal education, et cetera. So a decline of the middle class. We're not just talking poverty. And these are forms of expulsions. In this case, an expulsion of a middle class project. These expulsions clearly have health implications. And you, the experts on health, can sort of imagine what those might be. Now here again, on this one, this continues the story to 207, just the red thing here. This is 79, that prior census. In these 30 years, the top 1% of earners has seen an increase of 281%. Second line is the two bottom lines here. This is an epoch which is considered high growth, economic development, et cetera, et cetera. Well, 50% of the US earners were basically stable. There was not much increase. Now, because the extreme of wealth, of income inequality has become so high, there is talk about it. It's interesting to see that for 30 plus years, nobody talked about this. All they talked about was if you want the high growth, et cetera, et cetera. It also is a lesson for how to interpret these kinds of issues. Now, I want to quickly talk about, let me just talk about finance. Because I think that one of the marking features, certainly in terms of being different from that earlier period, is the rise of finance. What makes finance dangerous and powerful is not money. We use money to measure finance, but finance is not about money. On the contrary, and that is what makes it dangerous, it's about not money. So just a nice juxtaposition to communicate traditional banking, sells money it has, finance sells money it does not have. In that not having lies the creativity of you. It's enormously creative and it has brilliant mathematicians, physicists because the mathematics of economy is evidently not enough, to create something. The power of finance is that it can invade, it needs to invade other sectors. For 30 years, and then by the way, and then installs its logic in those other sectors. So for 30 years it has a wild run, it has invaded all kinds of economic sectors that used to be outside the framing of finance, now it's everywhere. And now of course it is scraping the bottom of the barrel, when it uses national law to get at national taxpayers' money to rescue itself. We the taxpayers of Europe, of North America, etc., we are the bottom of the barrel for finance. And now they're running out of options. Now, just as an illustration, this happens also to be what creates the crisis in two-way. So here you have something, I just want to see the curve. So this is two or one, less than one trillion, I mean one trillion is a lot, but anyhow, 919 billion, and six or seven years later, 62 trillion. Can you think of any other sector that can produce this sharp rate of growth? 62 times, so to speak, that's not precise mathematically speaking, but anyhow it's an approximation in about six years. This is the power of finance. This is also the power of finance to abuse itself and hence produce a crisis. Now the other thing I want to emphasize is the making. The purpose of this graph is to show a geography of the making of finance. It was made, this is ground zero in many ways, including for the financial debacle. This is the United States, always the biggest. This is Europe, much higher than many Europeans thought it was and you're now beginning to see the repercussions of that. This is Asia, and if you brought in Latin America it would be more like that. This is vaguely speaking, I'm just throwing this out a bit, an indication of again the production of financial value. Now moving on, I'm interested in a particular instance. There are many, many, many other instances in this expulsion, but for the sake of briefness and to connect it a bit to the question of cities, I just want to emphasize this. So very quickly, another bottom of the barrel for finance was developing mortgage instruments, some of you have heard about this, that would allow the high finance circuit to actually make money of a very modest material asset, a very modest home. And the key things here is that the source of profits for financial firms is not the payment of the mortgage, nor is it the value of the asset. The value was a contract on a material asset, regardless of whether the ones signing the contract could actually pay the mortgage. This makes it a dangerous instrument. Secondly, within a kind of velocity framing, you had to get 500 of these contracts. You had to get modest households. This is a United States story, but it's going to spread globally, I'm afraid. So you had to get households to actually sign off very quickly. There were rammed down their throat. More than 15 million such contracts were signed. Now, here is one result. These are foreclosures. Foreclosures is not the same as being out, but as you can see here, you see some of the numbers very quickly. So today, over 7 million households have been thrown out. Contracts have been signed for 15 million. 14 million are now in trouble. Now, 14 million households can be 14 million individuals, or it can be 45 individuals, 45 million individuals. I was born in the Netherlands. There are several Dutch people here. That is several times the total population of that country, albeit a little country, but still a whole country. A systemic feature is to make this invisible. Right now we are speaking about 27 million people, those 7 million households. It becomes invisible. That is a capability. That is a systemic capability. It happens to be a negative one. So they sort of disappear in the system. They are not even making visible something about that system. Now, what they leave behind, which is becoming visible, are devastated neighborhoods and, of course, also devastated households. And so one image that I have, I like to use this in China, this collage of a Chinese artist who got a bit tired of all the new buildings being built in Shanghai and put them together and imagined. He didn't call it dead cities. I just put that in there for dramatic effect. But you can see the point here. Now, I want to go global for a minute. I have a big clock in front of me. I'm watching my time. Now, what I want you to look at here is this gray area. This is the area. This is just one set of countries. I have a second slide that deals with Asia. This is the potential for growth of this instrument, which does not depend on a household being able to pay the mortgage. It just needs the signature. And that's, again, a repeated stranger. So here we have, by the way, this is not Slovenia. It's not that Central Europe invented just another country last week. This is a Slovenia with a missing L. And here is enormous potential. Poland, Slovakia, you name it. When you get to Switzerland, forget it. No interest in that market. There is no potential there. So again, enormous potential. And I want to just put on the table as a reminder in the 1980s when junk bonds were invented. People went to jail for doing that. Some people are now going to jail for this. That didn't mean that it didn't spread. And now it's a totally accepted. It's for non-credit rated firms. It's a global instrument. And this is going to become a global instrument as well. Now, here are the images for Asia. So forget about Singapore. It has taken care of its housing sector. Hong Kong, over 40%, et cetera. But look at India, China. These are wonderful opportunities, as they might say, for developing. So this is truly dangerous. This is truly destructive. This is, in a way, an underlying condition beneath the question of health and the kinds of issues that we focused on today. Final couple of things on this particular aspect. So this is the ratio of household credit, household debt. When finalist says credit, it's credit for them. But it means debt related to personal disposable income. Now, let's take a little example. Hungary, 11%. So very reasonable. This is in 2000. Again, this again, a very short history. And in the United States already was at 104% proudly. So now, a few years later, five years later in Hungary, it's almost 40%. And you can take other Korea, also went up, et cetera. Now, let's take some other countries, Spain. 66% in 2000, and then 112%. They really had an accelerated. In contrast, for instance, with Germany, look at this extraordinary stability. 70%, 70%, 70%, 70%. That's a German economy. And it is now in better shape. So you can see relationships. And again, my hope is that you can see then a connection with questions of health and social living standards. Now, I asked myself, who owns that rapidly growing household debt? And I just showed here, Central Europe mostly, but there are many other countries in the world. And these show foreign ownership. In other words, foreign banks. Very high in Romania, very high in Hungary, very high in Poland. It's not quite taken off in these other countries. Now, these foreign bank owners of household debt, very rapidly growing. Remember, the more debt, the more business for finance. Because finance is about not having money. Now, they are not all American banks, by the way. There are Austrian banks, Swiss banks, a very democratic ownership of that foreign debt. Again, the implication here is that this is a threat to your average household. It means that that average household might lose significant ground, significant capacities. And again, the health equation hangs in there. The final issue that I want to talk about is, you know, what happens in the shadow of urbanization? I should say that as a researcher and as a theorist, confronted with a powerful explanation, my first reaction is to say, what is it keeping me from seeing? In that sense, the penumbra that a powerful explanation produces is like, you know, the proverbial sharp light at night on a street, a circle of light. You see everything in that circle of light, but it makes it more difficult. The sharper the light, the more difficult to understand what happens around it. I think that term urbanization has become, from the perspective of a researcher like myself, a dangerous term. It explains a lot, but at the same time, it obscures a lot. So I'm interested to see what are some of the processes in the shadow of this urbanization, which are, of course, here you already, you know, you already read this, you know, expulsions of all sorts, where do they go? Well, many of them go to cities, not all to the mega cities, but they go to cities. And just here, a quick, just a figure. This is the best, I'm doing research about this now. And again, to me, it is connected to cities, you know. It's the non-ex that explains part of the ex. In other words, what's happening in the non-urban areas. And so the best estimate is 70 million hectares, mostly bought by foreign banks. The main investors right now in the last two years, hedge funds. Hedge funds are a financial sort of unregulated. But there's also government agencies. You know, China is famous for this, but so is Sweden, so is South Korea. So are the Gulf investing countries, as they call them, usually as a group. Now, 70 million hectares is not an enormous amount of land. But it is actually quite a bit. And I should say that, you know, it also includes, you know, of course, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the countries around China, around this region. And but also Ukraine and Russia, for instance, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, two very honorable, so to speak, financial firms, just bought hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. They are not about to become farmers. That's not the plan. The plan is really to, it's an investment. You can go wrong. Land represents water. It represents food production. Or it represents rare earth. Now, I'm sure the very rare earth beneath this beautiful hotel where we're in, but we're not about to bring this hotel down in order to get at the rare earth. By now, people know rare earth, right? It's necessary for all our electronic gear, also green batteries, et cetera, et cetera. Now, what I sort of, and this is the final thought I want to leave you with, what I think that one of the effects of this kind of massive land grab, and I admit that's a term that already comes a bit with a negative connotation, is that actually what was a complex condition, territory, you know, which has embedded logics of power, but also embedded logics of reclamation citizenry, is sort of being downgraded to simply land. If I may, just to use an example, a Chinese agency of the government buys three million hectares in Congo or in Zambia, same amount, to transform them into a plantation. Plantation is very special. Plantation means you raise everything that was there. You evict faunas, floras, whole villages, smallholder agriculture, rural-based manufacturing, in order to plant one thing. You have actually transformed something that may have been national sovereign territory into something else besides the issue of the unequal power. I don't want to look at that. I want to look at what is actually happening with ground, goes from territory to just land. And I think that that is part of our modernity. To me, that is another more complex and more intractable, if you want, form of expulsion that is happening. Now, I'm just a final thought maybe with a bit of something positive. When you think about how systems of power and most formalized systems of power bring themselves down, at least partly. Right now, finance has had such enormous power. It has abused that power. It is sort of bringing itself down. It's not going to disappear. It's not going to go away. But clearly, it's in another phase. My question is whether, for instance, the kind of thinking that was evident today in this room, we have got to be ready, in a way, for that void that is being actively made by these very powerful actors. There is a lot of on-the-ground work. What I find fascinating in one of the features of this epoch is a return to the territorial. And of course, occupied Wall Street, those indignals in Spain, there's a whole set of issues. So there is something about the territorial. And in that sense, and I conclude, the city, the complex city, is a very interesting kind of territory. And it is more than just land or ground. It has embedded logics of power and it has embedded logics of reclamation and of citizenship and the power, if you want, to make claims on that land. Thank you very much.