 Chapter 1 of Book 1 of Rhetoric. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jeffrey Edwards. Rhetoric by Aristotle. Translated by Thomas Taylor. Chapter 1 of Book 1. Rhetoric reciprocates with dialectic or logic. For both are conversant with such particulars, as being common may after a manner be known by all men, and pertain to no definite science. Hence, all men in a certain respect participate of both these. For all men to a certain extent endeavor to examine and sustain an argument, to defend and accuse. With respect to the multitude, therefore, some of them do these things casually, but others through custom from habit. Because, however, this is possible in both ways, it is evident that these particulars may also be reduced to a certain method. For it is possible to survey the cause why some men render what they assert probable from custom and others from chance. But, all men now will acknowledge that a thing of this kind is the work of art. At present, therefore, those who compose the arts of orations, i.e. who unfold the art of rhetoric, explain only a small part of rhetoric. For credibility is the only artificial part of the art. But the other parts are additions. The rhetoricians, however, of the present day say nothing about enthemumes, which are the substantial part of credibility. But their attention is, for the most part, directed to things foreign to the purpose. For accusation, pity, anger, and such like passions of the soul do not pertain to the thing itself, which is to be proved, but to the judge. Hence, if all judicial processes were conducted in the same manner as they are at present in some cities, and especially in those that are governed by good laws, these rhetoricians would not have anything to say. For, with respect to all cities, some think it necessary that the laws should thus ordain, but this method is adopted by others, and they forbid rhetoricians to say anything foreign to the purpose, in the same manner as in the Areopagus. And in this respect, they think rightly, for it is not proper to pervert the judge by exciting him to anger, or envy, or pity, since this is just as if someone should make the rule distorted, which he intends to use. Again, it is likewise manifest that the only business of the litigant is to show that a thing either is, or is not, or that it has, or has not been done. But, with respect to such things as the legislator has not defined, whether they are great or small, just or unjust, these ought to be known by the judge himself, and he is not to learn them from the litigants. It is especially requisite, therefore, that laws which are rightly framed should define all such particulars as can be defined, and leave very little to be defined by the judge. And, in the first place, indeed, this is requisite, because it is more easy to obtain one person, or a few, than many that are intelligent and wise, and who are able to act the part of a legislator, and a judge. In the next place, the establishment of laws is the effect of a survey from a long series of past time, but judgments are the result of a survey from recent times, so that it is difficult for those who judge to attribute what is just and advantageous in a becoming manner. That, however, which is the greatest reason of all, is that the judgment of the legislator is not conversant with particulars, but with future events, and universals. But the judgment of the barrister and the judge is directed to present and definite circumstances, with which love and hatred and private advantage are frequently conjoined, so that they are no longer sufficiently able to survey the truth, but their own peculiar pleasure or pain darkens their judgment. With respect to other particulars, therefore, it is necessary, as we have said, that very little should be left in the power of the judge. But with respect to the inquiry, whether a thing has been done or not, or whether it will or will not take place, or is or is not, it is necessary that this should be left to the judges, for it is not possible that these things should be foreseen by the legislator. If then, this be the case, it is evident that those rhetoricians who define other parts of a narration accept credibility, such, for instance, as what the proem or the narration should contain, and each of the other parts, these exercise their art in things foreign to the purpose, for in these they affect nothing else, except delivering the method by which the judge may be influenced, but they demonstrate nothing respecting artificial credibility. Viz. Whence someone may become enthemic, or possess the power of discovering artificial proofs of that which is the subject of controversy. Hence, though there is the same method respecting popular and judicial orations, and the popular is better and more political than the method pertaining to contracts, yet rhetoricians of the present day are silent as to the popular method, but all of them endeavor to unfold the art pertaining to the judicial genius, because it is less advantageous in popular orations to assert what is foreign to the purpose, and a popular oration is less pernicious than a judicial discussion, but is more common. For in the former, the judge decides about appropriate concerns, so that nothing else is necessary than to show that the thing is as the counselor asserts it to be. In judicial processes, however, this is not sufficient, but it is requisite to pay attention to the hearer, for the decision is concerning things of a foreign nature. Hence, the judges, looking to their own advantage and regarding their own pleasure, gratify the litigants, but do not decide with justice. Hence, too, as I have before observed, in many places, the law forbids anything foreign to the purpose to be said, and in these places, this law is sufficiently observed by the judges themselves. Since, however, it is evident that the artificial method is conversant with credibility, but credibility is a certain demonstration, for we then especially believe in a thing when we think it is accompanied with demonstration, and a rhetorical demonstration is an enthamim, and this in short possesses the greatest authority of all credibilities, but an enthamim is a certain syllogism, and it is the province either of the whole or of a certain part of dialectic to pay attention similarly to every syllogism. This being the case, it is evident that he who is eminently capable of surveying this fizz from what propositions and how a syllogism may be made, he will be especially enthamimatic in consequence of assuming what the particulars are with which enthamims are conversant, and what differences they possess with respect to logical syllogisms, for it is the province of the same power to perceive truth, and what is similar to truth, and at the same time, men are by nature sufficiently adapted to the perception of truth, and for the most part obtain it. Hence, he who sagaciously conjectures probabilities is disposed similarly to him who perceives truth. That others therefore artificially discuss things foreign to the purpose, and why they especially incline to judicial precepts is evident from what has been said. But rhetoric is useful because things true and just are naturally more excellent than their contraries, so that unless judgments are formed according to what is fit, what is more excellent will be vanquished by its contrary, and this is a thing worthy of reprehension. Further still, though we should possess the most accurate science, it is not easy when we speak to persuade some persons by employing that science. For a scientific aeration proceeds from discipline, and it is impossible from this to persuade the unlearned, but it is necessary when addressing these to procure credibility and frame arguments from such things as are common. Just as we have asserted in the topics respecting a conference with the multitude. Further still, the power of being able to persuade contraries, or the ability of disputing on each side of a question, is necessary in the same manner as in syllogisms. Not in order that we may do both, for it is not proper to persuade to what is base, but that we may not be ignorant how contraries subsist, and that when another person employs those arguments unjustly, we may be able to solve them. No one, therefore, of the other art syllogistically concludes contraries, but this is alone affected by dialectic and rhetoric, for both of them are similarly conversant with contraries. Though the things which are the subjects of their consideration do not subsist similarly. But always, as I may say, things which are true, and naturally more excellent, are more syllogistic, and adapted to procure persuasion. Besides, it is absurd that it should be shameful for a man not to be able to give assistance to his body, and that it should not be shameful for him not to be able to assist himself by the reasoning power, which is more the peculiarity of man than the use of the body. If, however, it should be objected that he who uses unjustly the rhetorical power may injure others in a great degree, this objection is common to everything that is good, except virtue, and especially to the most useful things, such as strength, health, riches, and military command. For he who uses things of this kind justly may benefit others in the greatest degree, and by using them unjustly may affect the greatest injury. That rhetoric, therefore, is not conversant with one certain definite genus, but resembles in this respect dialectic, and that it is useful, is evident. It is likewise evident that the employment of rhetoric is not to persuade, but to perceive on every subject what is adapted to procure persuasion, in the same manner as in all other arts. For it is not the business of medicine to produce health, but to do everything as much as possible which may procure it. Since the healing art may be well exercised upon those that are incapable of being restored to health. In addition, likewise to what has been said, it is the province of the same power to perceive what is persuasive, and what appears to be so, just as it is the province of dialectic to discern what is a true and what is only an apparent syllogism. For the sophisticle art does not consist in the power of reasoning, but in deliberate choice, except that here indeed, viz in the rhetorical art, one man will be a rhetorician from science, but another from deliberate choice. There, however, viz in dialectic or logic, the sophist indeed is from deliberate choice, but the logician is not from deliberate choice, but from the power of reasoning. Chapter 2 Now, therefore, we shall endeavor to speak concerning the method itself, i.e. the rhetorical art, and show how, and from what particulars, we may be able to obtain the end proposed by this art. Again, therefore, as if defining from the beginning, let us discuss what remains. Let rhetoric, then, be the power of perceiving in everything that which is capable of producing persuasion. For this is the employment of no other art, since each of the other arts is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is the subject of its consideration. Thus, for instance, medicine is doctrinal and persuasive about that which is salubrious and morbid, geometry about the properties accidental to magnitudes, and arithmetic about number. The like also takes place in the other arts and sciences, but rhetoric, as I may say, appears to be able to survey about any given thing what is adapted to produce persuasion. Hence also we say that it does not possess an artificial power about any certain peculiar definite genus. With respect, however, to things which procure credibility, some of them are without art, but others are artificial, and I call those without art, which are not devised by us, but exist prior to all artificial invention, such as witnesses, questions, writings, and other particulars of the like kind. But those are artificial, which are capable of being procured methodically and by us, so that it is requisite to use the former and discover the latter. Of the credibility, however, which is procured by argument, there are three species. For one kind indeed consists in the manner of the speaker, another in the disposition of the hearer, and the third in the argument itself, in consequence of demonstrating or appearing to demonstrate. Credibility, therefore, is procured through manners when the oration is delivered in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of belief. For, about everything in short, we believe the worthy in a greater degree and more rapidly. But in those particulars in which an accurate knowledge cannot be obtained, and which are ambiguous, we entirely confide in the decisions of the worthy. It is, however, requisite that this also should happen through the oration, and not entirely from any previous opinion respecting the speaker. For we must not admit what some teachers of rhetoric have asserted in their art, that the probity of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasion. Since, nearly, as I may say, manners possess the most powerful and principal credibility. But credibility is procured through the hearers when their passions are influenced by the oration. For we do not similarly form a judgment when we grieve or rejoice, love or hate, to which species of credibility we assert that those who now deliver the art of rhetoric alone direct their attention. Each of these particulars, however, will be elucidated by us when we speak concerning the passions. But belief is produced through arguments when we show what is true, or appears to be true from the probabilities pertaining to the several objects of inquiry. Since, however, credibility is affected through these things, it is evident that to obtain the three species of it above mentioned is the province of him who is able to syllogize, who can survey what pertains to manners and the virtues, and in the third place, what pertains to the passions, what each of them is, what quality it possesses, and from what particulars it is ingenerated in the hearer, and how, so that it happens, that rhetoric is, as it were, something which grows upon dialectic and the discussions concerning manners, and it is just to call it political. Hence, rhetoric assumes the form of the political science, and those who profess it do so partly through ignorance, partly from arrogance, and partly from other human causes. For it is a certain particle and resemblance of dialectic, as we observed in the beginning of these treaties. For neither of them is the science of anything definite, and which shows how a thing subsists, but there are certain powers of procuring arguments, and thus we have nearly spoken sufficiently concerning the power which they possess and how they subsist with respect to each other. With respect, however, to proof either real or apparent, in the same manner as in the dialectic, one kind is induction, another is a true syllogism, and a third is a parent syllogism. Thus also, similarly in rhetoric, for example, indeed is induction, but enthameme is a syllogism. But I call enthameme indeed a rhetorical syllogism and example a rhetorical induction. All rhetoricians, however, who procure belief by the proofs which they adduce, affect it either by the examples which they bring or by enthamemes, and in a certain respect, there is nothing else besides these. Hence, if in short it is necessary to point out any person or thing by syllogism or induction, bracket, but this is evident to us from the analytics, close bracket, it is necessary that each of those should be the same with each of these. But what the difference is between example and enthameme is evident from the topics. For there, syllogism and induction are previously discussed, because if it is shown in many in similar things that what we assert is true, there indeed it is induction, but here it is example. When, however, certain things existing, something else besides happens from these, because these subsist either universally or for the most part, when this is the case, there indeed it is called syllogism, but here enthameme. But it is evident that each form of rhetoric is benefited by these two. For, the like to what we have observed in the methodical treatises takes place also in this treatise. For some errations are of the nature of examples, but others are enthamematic. And in a similar manner, with respect to returitions, some are delighted with examples and others with enthamemes. Arguments, therefore, from examples are no less calculated to persuade than others, but those from enthamemes cause greater perturbation. But the reason of this and how each of these, viz of examples and enthamemes is to be used, we shall hereafter explain. Now, however, let us more fully and clearly discuss these very particulars themselves. For, that which is persuasive is persuasive to someone, and one thing, indeed, is immediately of itself persuasive and credible, but another, because it appears to be proved through things that are credible. No arc, however, speculates that which is particular. Thus, for instance, medicine does not speculate what is salubrious to Socrates or Callius, but what is so to such a one or to such persons in general. For this is artificial, but particulars are infinite and are not the objects of science. Nor does rhetoric speculate opinable particulars such as what is the subject of opinion to Socrates or Hippias, but that which is the subject of opinion to such or such persons in the same manner as dialectic. For dialectic also syllogizes not from such things as are casual, since certain things appear to be credible, even to those who are delirious, but dialectic syllogizes from such things as require to be developed by a reasoning process, and rhetoric from such things as are accustomed to take place in consultation. The employment, however, of rhetoric consists in such particulars as are the subject of our consultation and respecting which we have no art, but it is also conversant with such hearers as are incapable of perceiving a conclusion which is deduced through many media or of syllogizing remotely, i.e. who are incapable of a long series of reasoning. But we consult about those things the subsistence of which appears to be possible in both ways, i.e. which may subsist otherwise than they do. For with respect to such things as cannot either in the past or future or present time have a different subsistence. No one consults about these, conceiving that they thus subsist, for it is not possible for anyone to consult otherwise than thus about things of this kind. But it is possible to syllogize and collect some things indeed from such particulars as have been previously syllogistically inferred, but others from things not inferred by syllogism. But which require syllogism? Because they are not probable. And it is necessary indeed with respect to these that the consecution of the one should not be easy on account of its length. For the judge is supposed to be simple and that the other should not be adapted to persuade because it does not proceed from things acknowledged nor from such as are probable. Hence it is necessary that enthamem and example should be conversant with such things as for the most part admit of a various subsistence. And example indeed requires induction, but enthamem, syllogism. It is likewise necessary that enthamem and example should consist from a few things and frequently from fewer than those from which the first syllogism consists. For if any one of these is known it is not necessary to say anything farther since the hearer himself will add this. Thus for instance for the purpose of concluding that Doricus was victorious in the contest in which the victors were crowned it is sufficient to say that he conquered in the Olympic games. But there is no occasion to add that he was crowned because he conquered in the Olympic games for this is known by all men. There are however a few necessary things from which rhetorical syllogisms consist. For many of the particulars which are the subjects of judgment and consideration may have a various subsistence or subsist otherwise than they do since men make their actions the subjects of their consultation and consideration. All actions likewise belong to the genus of things which are contingent. And no one of these as I may say is from necessity. But things which are for the most part accidental and contingent must necessarily be syllogistically collected from other things which are of the like kind. And such as are necessary must be deduced by syllogism from necessary propositions. But this is evident to us from the analytics. This then being the case it is manifest that with respect to those things in which enthamemes are deduced some indeed are necessary but most of them are such as have a frequency of subsistence. For enthamemes are deduced from the probabilities and signs so that it is necessary each of these should be the same with each. For the probable is that which subsists for the most part but not simply according to the definition of some persons. That however which is assumed respecting things which may have a various subsistence has the same relation to that to which the probable is directed as universal to particular. But with respect to signs one indeed has such a subsistence as some one of particulars to that which is universal but another as some one of universals to that which is particular. And of these signs that indeed which is necessary is an argument but that which is not necessary is anonymous according to difference. I call therefore those things necessary from which syllogism is produced on which account also a sign of this is techmarion or an argument. For when rhetoricians fancy that what they say cannot be solved then they think they have deduced an argument as being something proved and definite. For techmar and bound or limit are the same according to the ancient tongue. With respect to signs however that indeed which subsists as particular to universal is just as if someone should say it is a sign that wise are just men for Socrates was wise and just. This therefore is a sign but what has been asserted though true may be solved for it is unsilogistic. The following however for instance if someone should say it is a sign that a certain person is diseased for he has a fever or that some female has been delivered because she has milk are necessary signs and which are the only signs that are techmaria. For these alone if true cannot be solved but that which subsists as universal to particular is as if someone should say it is a sign that a certain person has a fever for he breathes short and frequently. This however may be solved though it is true for it is possible that one who has not a fever may labor under difficulty of breathing. We have therefore now shown what the probable a sign and an argument are and in what they differ from each other. These however are more clearly unfolded in the analytics where also it is shown that some are unsilogistic but others are silogistically deduced and with respect to example that it is indeed induction and what the subjects are about which it is an induction we have already shown. It is however neither as a part to the whole nor as the whole to a part nor as a whole to whole but that which is as a part to a part and as the similar to the similar under the same genus but the one is more known than the other is example. Thus for instance that Dionysius endeavored to establish a tyrannical government when he required a guard is an example for Pisistratus who prior to him attempted the same thing demanded a guard and having obtained it tyrannized over the Athenians and the Aegeanese over the Megarenzians all such others likewise as are known to have acted in this manner become an example of Dionysius with respect to whom it is not yet known whether he requires a guard with a view to a tyrannical government all these however are under the same universal that he aspires after tyranny who requires a guard and thus we have shown what the particulars are from which the credibility that appears to be demonstrative is derived. Chapter 3 with respect to enthamemes however there is a great difference of which nearly all the professors of rhetoric are particularly ignorant and which is conversant with the dialectic method of syllogisms for some enthamemes pertain to rhetoric just as some syllogism subsist according to the dialectic method but others pertain to other arts and faculties some of which are in existence and others are not yet discovered hence they are not understood by those that hear them and if rhetoricians employ them more than is fit they relinquish their own art and exchange it for some other but what we have said will become more evident by a more copious discussion for I say that dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms are those which are formed from propositions derived from places and these are such as are conversant in common about things that are just and natural and about political concerns and many things which are specifically different such for instance as the place respecting the more and the less for we cannot in any greater degree syllogize from this place or produce an enthameme from it respecting what is just or natural than respecting anything else though these things are specifically different but peculiar or proper syllogisms are those which consist from propositions pertaining to each species and genus thus for instance the propositions respecting natural things are those from which neither an enthamem nor a syllogism respecting ethics can be formed and ethical enthamemes are those which are formed from propositions peculiar to ethical subjects and from which physical enthamemes cannot be produced the like also takes place in every subject and those dialectic and rhetorical syllogisms indeed do not render a man wise in any kind of discussion because they are not conversant with any definite subject but with respect to these that are peculiar and appropriate in proportion as the selection of them is better in such proportion will he who makes it produce a science different from dialectic and rhetoric for if he should happen to meet with the principles of any science the peculiar syllogisms will no longer pertain either to dialectic or rhetoric but to that science of which he possesses the principles most enthamemes however are derived from those forms which are particular and proper and a few of them are derived from common places as in the topics therefore so here the species and the places of enthamemes from whence they are to be assumed must be distinguished but I call species indeed the peculiar propositions according to each genus and places those propositions which are similarly common to all genera we shall therefore speak first concerning the species and in the first place we shall assume the genera of rhetoric in order that we may ascertain how many there are and with respect to these we shall separately assume the elements and the propositions but the genera of rhetoric are three in number for so many also are the auditors of orations for an oration is composed from three things from the speaker from the thing about which he speaks and from the person to whom he speaks the end also of the speaker is directed to this last I mean to the hearer but it is necessary that the auditor should either be a spectator or a judge and that the judge should be a judge either of things past or future he however who judges of future events is as it were one who speaks in an assembly but he who judges of past events is as it were one who determines causes and he who judges of the power of the oration is as it were a spectator hence there will necessarily be genera of rhetorical orations the deliberative or that which pertains to counsel the judicial and the demonstrative but of counsel one part is exhortation and another dehortation for always both those who privately give counsel and those who publicly harangue do one of these ie either exhort or dissuade of judgment however one part is accusation but another defense for those that are engaged in controversy must necessarily do one or another of these but of the demonstrative one part is praise and another blame there are also times appropriate to each of these to him who gives counsel indeed the future for he consults about future events and concerning these either exhorts or dissuades but the time which is adapted to him who judges is the past for always concerning things which have been done one accuses and another apologizes and to him who demonstrates the most appropriate time is the present for all those who demonstrate praise or blame according to existing circumstances frequently however they employ the past time for the purpose of recollecting and they form a conjecture of future events but the end to each of these is different and as there are three persons there are three ends to him who gives counsel indeed the end is that which is advantageous and detrimental for the advice of him who exhorts is directed to that which is better but he who dissuades dissuades from that which is worse and at the same time they assume other things with a view to this is either the just the beautiful in conduct or the base but to those who judge in courts of judicature the end is the just and the unjust and they also assume other things with a view to these and to those that praise and blame the end is the beautiful and the base in conduct and they likewise refer other things to these an indication however that the end of each of these is what we have said it is is that sometimes there is no controversy about other things thus for instance he who is tried will assert that the things were not done or that he has committed no injury but he will never acknowledge that he has acted unjustly for if he did the trial would be unnecessary in like manner those who give counsel frequently admit other things but will not acknowledge that they have advised what is disadvantageous or that they have dissuaded from what is beneficial frequently however they are not at all concerned whether it is not unjust to enslave the neighboring people and those who have done them no injury in like manner also those who praise and those who blame do not consider whether the subject of their praise or blame has acted advantageously or perniciously but frequently applaud him because disregarding his own interests he performed some worthy action thus for instance they praise Achilles because he gave assistance to his friend Patroclus though he knew it was necessary that he should die himself by giving this assistance and that it was in his power to live but to Achilles indeed a death of this kind was more honorable and to live more advantageous from what has been said however it is evident that it is necessary to possess in the first place propositions about these things for arguments like it, tecmeria, close bracket probabilities and signs are rhetorical propositions for in short syllogism is from propositions but enthamim is a syllogism consisting from the above mentioned propositions since however impossibilities cannot be performed either at present or in future but this can only be asserted of possibilities and since likewise it is not possible that things which are neither done nor will be done should be performed at present or in future it is necessary that he who counsels he who judges and he who demonstrates should possess propositions concerning the possible and impossible and whether a thing has been done or not and whether it will be or not farther still all those who praise and blame who exhort and dissuade who accuse and defend not only endeavor to show the particulars we have mentioned but also something which is great or small good or evil beautiful or base just or unjust whether they speak of those things themselves or compare them with each other this being the case it is evident that it is requisite to have propositions concerning magnitude and parvitude the greater and the less the universal and the particular such for instance as or less good an unjust or a just action and in a similar manner in other things and thus we have shown what the things are concerning which it is necessary to assume propositions chapter 4 in the next place a distinction must be peculiarly made respecting each of these as for instance what the subjects of consultation are with what demonstrative orations are conversant in the third place what the subjects are about which judgments are employed in the first place therefore it must be assumed what the kind of good or evil is about which he who advises counsels since he does not give counsel about all things but about such as may happen to be or not but with respect to such things as necessarily either are or will be or which cannot possibly exist about these there is no consultation hence neither is there consultation about all contingent events for there are some goods from nature and some from fortune which not withstanding they are contingent and may or may not be yet consultation contributes nothing to them but it is evident that consultation is respecting such things as are naturally adapted to be referred to us and the principle of the generation of which is in our power tension is exerted thus far till we find whether it is possible or impossible for us to perform such things accurately therefore to enumerate the several particulars and to distribute into species the subjects of popular discussion and besides this to determine according to truth as much as is possible concerning them it is not necessary at present to investigate because it is not the province of the rhetorical art of an art more aligned to wisdom and more true for even now much more is attributed to rhetoric than pertains to its proper theorems for that which we have before observed is true that rhetoric is composed indeed from the analytic science and from that political science which is conversant with morals and it is partly similar to dialectic and partly to sophisticle arguments in proportion however in one endeavors to discuss either dialectic or rhetoric not as powers but as sciences so far he ignorantly destroys the nature of them by migrating through this attempt into the sciences of certain subject things instead of alone making a transition into the powers or faculties of words at the same time we shall now speak of whatever it is indeed requisite to distinguish and which leaves matter of consideration to the political science for nearly the subjects which are discussed by all those who give counsel are especially five in number and these are concerning wealth, war and peace and besides these the defense of the country exports and imports and legislation hence it is requisite that he who is to give counsel about wealth should know the revenues of the country what they are and how if they are deficient an addition to them and how if they are too small they may be augmented it is likewise necessary that he should be acquainted with all the expenses of the city and how any unnecessary expense may be removed and that which is greater than his fit may become less for men not only become richer by accumulation of property but also by a decrease of expense and these things may not only be surveyed from the experience of private affairs but in order to give counsel about these it is necessary to be skilled in what has been discovered by others with respect however to war and peace it is necessary to know the power of the city what the forces of it are at present, how great they may be what the nature of the strength is which is possessed and what addition may be made to it and farther still what wars the city has had and how they have been conducted and it is not only necessary that he who gives counsel should understand these concerns of his own country but also those of the neighboring countries he should likewise be particularly acquainted with those cities against which it is not fit to wage war in order that peace may be made with the more powerful and war undertaken against the less powerful if requisite he must also know the forces of these cities whether they are similar or dissimilar for in these it is possible to be superior or inferior it is likewise necessary for this purpose that he should not only have surveyed the wars of his own country but likewise the event of the wars of other countries for similars are naturally adapted to be known from similars farther still with respect to the defenses of the country it is requisite not to be ignorant how it may be defended but to know the multitude of its defenders and the form of the defense and the places proper for garrisons this knowledge however cannot be possessed by him who is unacquainted with the country for such knowledge is necessary in order that if the defense is less than it ought to be it may be increased that if superfluous it may be taken away and that garrisons may be formed in more appropriate places again it is requisite to know what expense is necessary to comply the city with provisions what the country will afford and what must be supplied from abroad what commodities are fit to be imported and what exported in order that conventions and compacts may be considered accordingly for there are two descriptions of men with whom it is necessary the citizens should preserve themselves blameless viz with those that are more powerful and with those that are beneficial to them in a commercial point of view and it is necessary indeed to be able to survey all these particulars for the sake of security and in no small degree for the purpose of understanding the business of legislation for the safety of the city is in the laws hence it is necessary to know how many forms of government there are what kind of things are advantageous to each and by what they are naturally adapted to be corrupted both among things appropriate and contrary to the quality but I say governments are corrupted by things appropriate because all other polities except that which is the best are corrupted by remission and intention thus for instance a democracy not only becomes more imbecile by remission so as at length to arrive at an oligarchy but it is also weakened by vehement intention just as an aquiline and a flat nose not only arrive at mediocrity likewise when they become very aquiline or flat cause the nose to be so disposed that it no longer appears to be a nostril it is more over useful for the purpose of legislation not only to understand what is advantageous to a polity by a survey of past events but also to know the condition of other polities and what is adapted to each hence it is evident that traveling is useful for the purposes of legislation since from hence the laws of nations may be obtained but the knowledge of history is requisite to political councils all these particulars however are the business of politics and not of rhetoric such therefore are the principal things which he who intends to give council ought to possess Chapter 5 let us again however enumerate the particulars from which it is requisite to exhort or dissuade both respecting these things and other things but nearly both privately to each individual and in common to all men there is a certain scope to which choice and diversions are directed and this is in short felicity and the parts of it hence for the sake of an example we shall assume what felicity is and from what the parts of it consist for all exhortations and all dissuasions are conversant with this and with the things which contribute to it and the contraries to this for it is necessary to perform such things as procure this felicity or a certain part of it or which render it greater instead of less and not to do those things which corrupt or impede felicity or produce its contraries let felicity therefore be defined to be acting well in conjunction with virtue or the life sufficient to itself or the most pleasant life in conjunction with security or a prosperous condition of possessions and the body together with the power of preserving and affecting these for nearly all men acknowledge that felicity is one or more than one of these if therefore felicity is a thing of this kind it is necessary that the parts of it should be nobility of birth and abundance of friends and these such as our worthy men riches a numerous progeny and a good old age and besides these the virtues of the body such as health, beauty strength, magnitude agonistic power glory, honor and prosperity virtue or also the parts of it prudence, fortitude, justice and temperance for thus a man will be most sufficient to himself if both internal and external goods are present with him for there are no other goods besides these but internal goods indeed are both those which pertain to the soul and those which pertain to the body and external goods are nobility of birth friends, riches and honor and besides these we think it requisite that power and fortune should be present for thus life will be most secure in a similar manner therefore we shall assume what each of these is nobility of birth then both to a nation and a city is when the people are indigenous or ancient and their first leaders or commanders are illustrious men and when many persons illustrious in those things which are the objects of emulation are the progeny of these but private nobility is derived either from men and a legitimate procreation from both and in this nobility as well as in that of a city it is requisite that the first authors of the race should be illustrious either in virtue or in riches or in something else which is honorable and likewise that many illustrious men and women young and old should be the progeny of this genus with respect to a good and numerous offspring it is not a manifest what it is but in a community a good offspring is a multitude of young and worthy children who are worthy indeed according to the virtue of the body as for instance in magnitude beauty, strength and agonistic power and according to the virtue of the soul in temperance and fortitude which are the virtues of youth privately however the offspring is good and numerous if the proper children both male are many and worthy but the corporeal virtue of females is beauty and magnitude and the virtues of their soul are temperance and sedulity without illiberality it is requisite therefore to investigate both privately and publicly the existence of each of these virtues in men and in women for where these virtues are wanting in the women as is the case with elacidemonians such women are scarcely half happy the parts of wealth however are money, a great quantity of land and the possession of farms and besides these furniture cattle and slaves which are remarkable for their multitude magnitude and beauty all these possessions likewise ought to be secure free and useful but those are more useful which are profitable those are free which are subservient to enjoyment and I call those profitable which yield a revenue and those consist in enjoyment in which nothing is esteemable besides the use but the definition of security indeed is for a man to possess what he has in such a place and in such a manner that the use of it may be in his power and so that it may be his own property or not when it is in his power to alienate it but I call alienation giving and selling and therefore riches consist more in the use than in possession for the energy and the use of things of this kind are riches renown is to be esteemed by all worthy persons or it is the possession of a thing of such a kind as is desired by all men or which many or good or wise men desire but honor is an indication of beneficent renown and benefited others are justly and especially honored though he likewise is honored who is able to benefit but beneficence is that which either pertains to safety and such things as are the causes of existence or to wealth or to some other of those goods the possession of which is not easy and this either entirely or in this place or at a certain time which appear to be small but the modes and the occasions are the causes of it the parts of honor however are sacrifices eulogies in prose and verse rewards, sacred grows precedency in sitting sepulchres, statues and public salaries barbaric honors such as adoration by inclining the body giving place and gifts which are universally valued for a gift is the donation of possession and an indication of honor hence the ambitious and the avaricious are desirous of gifts since gifts contain in themselves what each of these require for possession is that which the avaricious desires and is also attended with honor after which the ambitious aspire but the virtue of the body is health and this in such a way that the avaricious who use the body free from disease for many persons are healthy as Herodocus is said to be and yet no one will proclaim them to be happy on account of health because like Herodocus they abstain from all or the greater part of human concerns with respect to beauty it is different in every age the beauty therefore of a young man is to have a body useful for the endurance of labor for the force and for violent action and which is also pleasing to the view hence those that contend in the five games are most beautiful because they are naturally adapted both to violent action and celerity but the beauty of him who is in the acme of life is to be capable of war like labor and to be terribly pleasing to the view and the beauty of an old man is to have a body sufficiently adapted to unnecessary labours but without pain because he has none of those diseases with which old age is defiled strength also is the power by which a man moves another thing as he pleases and it is necessary to move another thing either by drawing or impelling or lifting or compressing or crushing so that he who is strong is strong in all or in some of these but the virtue of magnitude is to have the multitude in length depth and breadth so that the motions of the body may not be rendered slow by this excess of magnitude and the agonistic virtue of the body is composed from magnitude strength and celerity for he who is swift is strong since he who is able to hurl forth his legs in a certain respect and to move them with celerity and to a great distance is a racer a grapple and hold fast is a wrestler he who can drive another person away by a blow is a pugilist and he who can do both these is a pancrateist but he who excels in all these is a pentathlon or skilled in the five games a good old age also is when age slowly approaches unattended with pain for neither has a man a good old age if he becomes rapidly old nor if he becomes old with difficulty but attended with pain a good old age however consists from the virtues of the body and from the goods of fortune for an old age which is neither free from disease nor strong will not be impassive to maladies and will not be unattended with pain or possess longevity nor can it be permanent without the goods of fortune there is however another certain power of living long separate from strength and health for many live long without the virtues of the body but an accurate discussion of these things is of no use at present but what the friendship of many and worthy persons is will not be immanifest from the definition of a friend a friend therefore is one who performs those things for the sake of his friend which he thinks will be beneficial to him and he who has many such has many friends which men are worthy persons as worthy friends moreover prosperity consists in those goods of which fortune is the cause that either all or most or the greatest of these befall us but fortune is the cause of some things indeed of which the arts are the cause and likewise of many and in artificial things as for instance such as those of which nature is the cause and it happens that these are preternatural for art indeed is the cause of health but nature of beauty and magnitude and in short those goods are from fortune which are attended with envy fortune also is the cause of those goods which are contrary to reason as when all the rest of the brothers are deformed and one alone is beautiful or when all the rest did not see the treasure and one alone discovered it or when the next person happens to be pierced with an arrow but this man escapes or when only one person did not come to a place where others were accustomed to come but others who only came to it at that time were destroyed for all such circumstances appear to be the effect of good fortune with respect to virtue however because it is a topic most adapted to applause we shall then discuss it concerning praise and thus we have shown what ought to be our aim in persuading or dissuading whether in reference to things present or future for persuasion is contrary to dissuasion end of chapter 5 of book 1 recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards chapter 6 of book 1 of rhetoric this is a LibriVox recording so in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jeffrey Edwards rhetoric by Aristotle translated by Thomas Taylor chapter 6 of book 1 since however the profitable is the scope proposed by him who counsels but men counsel not concerning the end but those things which refer to the end and these are such as are advantageous to action but that which is advantageous is good this being the case the elements must be assumed of the good and advantageous simply considered let good therefore be that which is itself eligible for its own sake and for the sake of which we choose something else let it also be that which all things desire or which all things desire have sense or intellect or would desire if they had let it likewise be such things as intellect dictates to everyone and whatever the intellect of each person dictates to each this is the good of each it is also that which when present causes its possessor to be well disposed and sufficient to himself and is self sufficiency it is likewise that which produces preserves things of this kind to which things of this kind are consequent and which prevents the contrary and such things as are corruptive of these but things of this kind are consequent to food in a two fold respect either at once or afterwards thus for instance scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline but life subsists at one and the same time with health and the efficient causes have a three fold subsistence some indeed in the genus of the formal cause as to be well is effective of health others in the genus of the efficient cause as food is productive of health and others in the genus of the disposing cause as exercise because this for the most part produces health these things therefore being admitted it is necessary that the assumptions of things good and the rejections of things evil should be good for the non possession of evil is at once consequent to the former and the possession of good to the latter the assumption likewise of a greater instead of a less good is consequent to these and of a less instead of a greater evil for that by which the greater surpasses the less becomes the assumption of the one and the rejection of the other it is likewise necessary that the virtues should be good for those who possess them are from these well disposed and become effective of and practically good with respect to each virtue however what it is and what quality it possesses we must speak separately it must also be admitted that pleasure is good for all animals naturally aspire after it so that things which are pleasant and beautiful are necessarily good since these are productive of pleasure but those things which are beautiful some indeed are pleasant but others are themselves eligible by themselves that we may however speak of them separately it is necessary that the following things should be good felicity for it is eligible for its own sake is sufficient to itself and we choose many things for the sake of it justice likewise fortitude temperance magnanimity magnificence and other habits of mind are necessarily good for they are the virtues of the soul this is also the case with health beauty and the like for they are the virtues of the body and are effective of many things thus for instance health is effective of pleasure and life on which account also it appears to be most excellent because it is the cause of two things which are most honored by the multitude is pleasure and life health also is good for it is the virtue of possession and is effective of many things a friend also and friendship are good for a friend is a thing eligible of itself and is effective of many things this is also the case with honor and glory for they are delightful produce many things and those things for which men are honored are for the most part attendant upon them the power likewise of speaking and acting is good for all such things are effective of good and besides these a good disposition memory an aptness to learn sagacity and everything of this kind for these powers are productive of good in a similar manner this is the case with all sciences and arts life itself also is good for though it were effective of no other good yet it is eligible of itself the just likewise is good for it is something profitable and these things are in general acknowledged to be good with respect however to those things which are dubious syllogisms are thus framed to prove that they are good that is good the contrary to which is evil this is likewise the case with that the contrary to which is advantageous to enemies thus if to be timid is especially advantageous to enemies it is evident that fortitude is especially beneficial to citizens and in short the contrary to that which enemies wish or with which they are delighted appears to be beneficial hence it was well said quote sure prime will rejoice close quote this however is not always but for the most part true for nothing hinders but that sometimes the same things maybe beneficial as well to our adversaries as to us hence it is said that evils conciliate men when the same thing is pernicious to both that also of which there is no excess is good but that which is greater than it ought to be is evil that likewise is good for the sake of which many labors have been endured and much wealth consumed for this is now an apparent good and a thing of this kind is considered as an end and as the end of many things but the end is good hence it is said by Juno quote and fame indeed to prime will redound close quote and by Ulysses quote longer to stay is shameful close quote when salsa the proverb quote a water pot at the door close quote that likewise is good which is the object of desire to many persons and which appears to be worthy of contention for that which all men desire is good and the many appear to be as it were all that also is good which is laudable for no one praises that which is not good in a similar manner that is good which both enemies and bad men praise for it is just if all men acknowledge it to be good if it is acknowledged to be so by those who are badly affected if it is apparent it is acknowledged to be good just as those are bad men whom our friends blame and those are good men whom our enemies do not blame hence the Corinthians conceived themselves to be reviled by Simonides for saying quote Ileon however does not Corinth blame close quote that likewise is good which is preferred by some wise person or some good man or woman thus Minerva preferred Ulysses Theseus Helen the goddesses Paris and Homer Achilles and in short things which are the objects of deliberate choice are good but men deliberately choose to perform the things we have mentioned and such as our evils to enemies and good to friends things that are possible also are good but these are two fold viz such as may be done and such as may be easily done and those things may be easily done which are unattended with pain or which may be affected in a short time for that which is difficult is defined either by pain or by length of time things likewise are good which are done according to our wish but we wish either no evil or less evil than good but this will take place if either punishment is latent or small men also wish to possess good their own property and which no other person possesses they likewise wish to possess superfluities for thus they obtain more honor and also things adapted to themselves but things of this kind are such as are fit both according to genus and power things likewise which they fancy they are defective in are the objects of their wish though they should be little things for they no less deliberately choose to perform these well things which may be easily affected for these are possible as being easy but those things are more easily affected which all men or those that are similar or those that are inferior have performed rightly and well likewise those things with which friends are gratified or which are odious to enemies and such things as those who admire them deliberately choose to do likewise those things in which men are ingenious and expert for they think they shall easily accomplish them with rectitude also those things which no bad man will undertake for these are more laudable and such things as are the objects of desire to men for these are not only delightful but they also appear to be more excellent men also especially choose to do things to which they are most propense thus for instance victory is the object of choice to the warrior to the ambitious to the covetous and other characters after the same manner concerning the good therefore and the advantageous credibility may from these things be derived chapter 7 because however those who counsel and to acknowledge the subjects of their deliberation to be profitable are frequently dubious with respect to that which is more profitable it follows that we should in the next place speak concerning the greater good and the more profitable let therefore that which exceeds be so much and something more but let that which is exceeded be that which is inherent in the thing which exceeds and that which is greater indeed and more is always referred to that which is less but the great and the small and the much and the few are referred to the magnitude of many things and that which exceeds indeed is the great and in a similar manner with respect to the much and the few we call good therefore that which is itself eligible for its own sake and not for the sake of another that which all things desire that which he who has received intellect and prudence would choose and that which is effective and preservative or to which things of this kind are consequent but that for the sake of which other things subsist is the end but that is good to any individual which with reference to him possesses these definitions of universal good hence it is necessary that more goods should be a greater good than one or a few goods when the one good or the few are co-enumerated for they transcend but that which is inherent is exceeded if also that which is greatest in one genus exceeds that which is greatest in another the one genus will also exceed the other and when one genus exceeds the other that which is greatest in the one will also exceed that which is greatest in the other thus for instance if the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman then in short men are greater than women and if men are in short greater than women the greatest man is greater than the greatest woman for the excesses of the genera and, of the greatest things in the genera, subsist analogously. When also this thing is consequent to that, but that is not consequent to this, the latter is a greater good, but one thing is consequent to another either simultaneously or successively or potentially. For the use of the consequent is inherent in the use of the antecedent, and to live is indeed simultaneously consequent to the being well, but the latter is not simultaneously consequent to the former, and scientific knowledge is posterior to discipline, but it follows potentially that if a man be a sacrilegious person, he may commit a private theft, for he who robs a temple would also steal private property. Of two things also which exceed the same third, that which more exceeds is the greater, for it is necessary that it should exceed the other by that greater excess by which it exceeds the third. Those things likewise are greater which are effective of a greater good, for by this the efficient cause is greater, and in a similar manner that of which the efficient is greater is also itself greater, for if that which is salubrious is more eligible than that which is pleasant, and is a greater good, health is also a greater good than pleasure. That likewise, which is more eligible of itself, is a greater good than that which is not eligible of itself. Thus, for instance, strength is a greater good than the salubrious, for the latter is not desirable for its own sake, but the former is, which is the characteristic of good. If also one thing is the end, but the other is not, the former is the greater good, for the latter subsists for the sake of another, but the former for the sake of itself, as for instance to be exercised is for the sake of the good condition of the body. That likewise, which is in a greater degree indigent of another, or of other things is a greater good, for it is more sufficient to itself. But that is in a less degree indigent, which requires fewer things, or such as are more easily procured. Then likewise, this thing cannot subsist without that, or it is not possible it can be generated without it. But that can subsist without this, then the latter is a greater good than the former, for it is more sufficient to itself, because that which is not indigent of another is more self-sufficient, so that it is evidently a greater good. This is also the case for the same reason, if one thing is a principal, but another is not, and if one thing is a cause, but another is not. For without cause and principal, it is impossible for a thing to be or to be generated. When likewise two things are principles, that which proceeds from the greater principle is greater, and also when there are two causes, that is the greater which proceeds from the greater cause, and vice versa, when there are two principles, the principle of the greater thing is greater, and when there are two causes, the cause of the greater thing is greater. From what has been said therefore, it is evident that in both ways a thing may appear to be greater, for if this thing is a principle, but that is not, this thing will appear to be greater than that, and also if this thing is not a principle, i.e. if it is the end, but that is a principle, for the end is greater and is not a principle, as Leodomies, when he accused Calistratus, said that he who advised did a greater injury than he who performed the deed, for it would not have been done had it not been advised, but again, accusing Chabrius, he said that he who did the deed acted more unjustly than he who advised it, for it would not have been done unless there had been one who did it, for men give advice to others for the sake of this, viz, that they may act, that which is more rare also appears to be a greater good than that which is found in abundance, as for instance gold than iron, though it is less useful, for the possession of it is greater because it is obtained with more difficulty. After another manner, however, the plentiful is a greater good than the rare, because the use of it surpasses the use of the rare, for that which is frequently surpasses that which is rarely found. Whence it is said by Pindar, quote, water is the best of things, close quote, and in short, that which is procured with more difficulty is a greater good than that which is procured with facility, for it is more rare. After another manner, however, that which is procured with facility is a greater good than that which is procured with more difficulty, for it subsists as we wish it should. That also is greater the contrary to which is greater, and likewise that of which the privation is greater. Virtue likewise is greater than what is not virtue, and vice than what is not vice, for the former are ends, but the latter are not. Those things also are greater, the works of which are more beautiful, or more base, and of those things of which the virtues and the vices are greater, the works also are greater, since such is the subsistence of causes and principles, such also is the subsistence of events, and such as is the subsistence of events, such also is the subsistence of causes and principles. Those things likewise are greater, the excess of which is more eligible, or more beautiful. Thus for instance, to see accurately is more eligible than to smell accurately, for the sight is more eligible than to smell. To be a lover of friendship also is better than to be a lover of riches, so that to be a lover of friends is more beautiful than to be a lover of wealth, and on the contrary the excesses of better things are better, and of more beautiful things more beautiful. This is also the case with those things of which the desires are more beautiful or better. For of greater things there are greater appetitions, and the desires of more beautiful and better things are for the same reason better and more beautiful. Those things likewise of which the sciences are more beautiful or more worthy are themselves more beautiful and more worthy. For such as is the subsistence of science, such also is the subsistence of that which is true. But each science is employed about its proper subject, and for the same reasons the sciences of more worthy and more beautiful things have an analogous subsistence. That likewise, which either all, or many, or most prudent persons, or the most excellent characters have judged, or do judge to be good or greater, necessarily thus subsists, or simply, or so far as they judge according to prudence. This also is common to other things. For everything is such according to substance, quantity and quality, as science and prudence asserted to be. This principle, however, we apply to good. For good is defined to be that which everything that possesses prudence would choose. It is evident, therefore, that that thing is a greater good which prudence says is more good. That likewise, which is inherent in better things, either simply, or so far as they are better, is a greater good, as, for instance, fortitude and strength. This is also the case with that which a better man would choose, either simply, or so far as he is better, such, for instance, as to be injured rather than to injure. For this, a more just man would choose. That which is more delightful likewise is a greater good, than that which is less delightful. For all beings pursue pleasure, and for the sake of it desire to be delighted. For these are the things by which good and the end are defined. But the more difficult is both that which is less painful, and that which is for a longer time pleasant. That which is more beautiful also is a greater good, than that which is less beautiful. For the beautiful is either the delightful, or that which is of itself eligible. Such things also, as men wish to be in a greater degree, causes to themselves or their friends are greater goods. This is likewise the case with things that endure for a longer, than with those that endure for a shorter time, and with things that are more, than with those that are less stable. For the use of the former exceeds in time, but the latter in the will. For we in a greater degree use that which is stable according to our will. Such things also, as follow from coordinate and similar cases, are greater goods. Thus, if an action which is accomplished with fortitude is better and more eligible than that which is affected by temperance, fortitude also is more eligible than temperance, and to be brave than to be temperate. That likewise which all men choose is a greater good than that which all men do not choose, and that which is chosen by many, than that which is chosen by a few. For good was defined to be that which all beings desire, so that what is more the object of desire will be a greater good. That likewise is a greater good which is admitted to be so by those who controvert what good is, or which enemies, or judges, or the skillful acknowledged to be so. For that which enemies admit is just as if all men admitted, and that which the latter admit is equivalent to what is granted by men excelling in power and knowledge. And at one time indeed that is a greater good of which all participate, for it is disgraceful not to participate it, but at another time that of which no one, or of which a few participate, for it is more rare. Those likewise which are more laudable are greater goods, for they are better. And in a similar manner, those things of which the honors are greater, for honor is, as it were, a certain dignity. This is also the case with those things of which the punishments are greater, and likewise with those things which are greater, than such as are acknowledged or appear to be great. The same things also, when divided into parts, appear to be greater, for the transcendency of many things becomes apparent. Hence, the poet says that Meliagr was persuaded by his wife to rise to battle by enumerating the evils which happened from a captured city. Quote, she paints the horrors of a conquered town, the hero's slain, the palace's overthrown, the matrons ravished, the whole race enslaved. Quote, this is also the case with composition and exaggeration, as may be seen in Epicharmus, and for the same reason as in division. For composition shows an abundant excess, and appears to be the principle and cause of great things. Because however that which is more difficult and rare is greater, occasions also, and ages, and places, and times, and powers produce great things. For if any one performs a deed, beyond his power, and beyond his age, and those that resemble him, or if in this way, or in this place, or at that time, it will have the magnitude of things beautiful, good, and just, and of the contraries of these, whence also the epigram on him who conquered in the Olympic games. Quote, some time ago Sol Vulgar was my trade, with a rough sack on both my shoulders laid. From Argos to Tagaea still I trudged, to sell my fish, till Victor here adjudged. Close quote. And Iphicrates passes an Incomium on himself by saying, Quote, from whence came these. Close quote. That likewise, which is spontaneous, or springs from itself, is greater than that which is adceticius, for it is more difficult. Just also the poet says, Quote, self-taught am I, close quote. And also the greatest part of a great thing. Thus for instance, Pericles in a funeral oration says, Quote, that youth being taken away from a city is just as if spring were taken away from the year, close quote. Those things likewise, are greater which are useful in a greater necessity, such as things in old age and disease. This is also the case with that of two things, which is nearer to the end. That likewise, which is good to a certain thing, is a greater good, than that which being good simply is not good to it. And also the possible, than the impossible, for the former is good to a thing itself, but the latter is not. The goods also, which are in the end of life, are greater than others, for those things are in a greater degree ends, which are near to the end. Things likewise, which pertain to truths, are greater goods, than things which pertain to opinion. But the definition of that which pertains to opinion, is that which, if it were latent, no one would choose. Once also it would seem, that it is more eligible to be benefited than to benefit, for the former would be chosen, though it should be latent, but to benefit it latently, does not seem to be a thing that would be chosen. Those things likewise, are greater goods, which we rather wish to be, than to seem to be, for they pertain more to truth. Hence also the Sophists say, that justice is a small thing, because it is more eligible to seem to be, than to be just, but it is not so with health. That also is a greater good, which is more useful for many purposes. As for instance, that which is more useful to life, to living well, to pleasure, and to the performance of beautiful actions. Hence, riches and health appear to the vulgar to be the greatest of things, for they contain all the above mentioned particulars. That also is a greater good, which is more free from molestation, and is attended with pleasure, for in this case there are more goods than one, so that the good is both pleasure and a privation of pain. That likewise of two things is the greater good, which being added to the same thing renders the whole a greater good. And those things which when present are not latent, are greater goods than those which are latent, for the former tend to truth, hence to be rich will be considered as a greater good than to seem to be rich. That also which is lovely is a greater good, and which to some things indeed is lovely when possessed alone, but to others when possessed in conjunction with other things. Hence the punishment is not equal to deprive him of an eye who has but one eye, and him that has two eyes, for the former is deprived of that which is dear to him, and thus we have nearly shown from what forms it is necessary to derive credibility in exhorting and dissuading. Chapter 8 The greatest however, and most powerful of all things, in order to the ability of persuading and counseling well, is to assume all polities, and the manners and legal institutes of each, and to distinguish what is advantageous to them. For all men are persuaded by that which is advantageous, and that is advantageous which preserves the polity. Further still, the annunciation of him who possesses the supreme power possesses the principal authority, but dominion is divided according to polities, for as many polities as there are, so many forms also are there of dominion. There are however four polities, a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a monarchy, so that the supreme power, and that which judges, will be either a part or the whole of these, but a democracy indeed is a polity in which the magistrates are distributed by lot. An oligarchy is a polity in which the magistracy is distributed to the rich alone, and therefore is distributed according to estates. An aristocracy is a polity in which magistrates are chosen according to their erudition, but by erudition I mean that discipline which is appointed by the law, for those who persevere in legal institutes govern in an aristocracy, hence it is necessary that these should appear to be the best of men. What a monarchy is, as the name indicates, a polity in which one person has the supreme authority, and of this polity that which is conducted according to a certain order is a kingdom, but that which is indefinite is a tyranny. It is also requisite not to be ignorant of the end of each polity, for those things are chosen in each which pertain to the end. In the end indeed, of a democracy is liberty, of an oligarchy wealth, of an aristocracy whatever pertains to erudition and legal institutes, and of a tyranny safeguard. It is evident therefore that those customs, legal institutes, and things advantageous which pertain to the end must be distinguished if the choice of the several polities is directed to this. Since however credibility is not only produced through a demonstrative oration, but also through that which is ethical, for we believe the speaker because he appears to be a person of a certain description, viz, if he appears to be worthy, or benevolent, or both these. This being the case it is requisite that we should possess a knowledge of the manners of each of the polities, for it is necessary that the manners of each should be most persuasive with reference to each, but these manners may be obtained through the same things, for manners become apparent from deliberate choice, but deliberate choice is referred to the end. What the particulars therefore are, to which the attention of those who exhort should be directed as future or present, and from what forms credibility about that which is advantageous must be derived, and farther still concerning the manners and legal institutes of polities, and through what things and how we may abound with arguments, all these have been unfolded by us as much as is sufficient to the present purpose, for these particulars will be accurately discussed in the politics. Chapter 9 After these things let us speak concerning virtue and vise, and the beautiful in conduct and the base, for to these the intention of those who praise and blame is directed, for it will happen that at the same time we speak about these, those things also will become manifest from which our moral character is formed, which is the second thing that produces credibility. Therefore we may be able to gain credit of being virtuous ourselves, and cause another person to do the same from the same things. Since however it frequently happens that without being serious, and also seriously, we praise not only man or god, but also inanimate things, and any animal that may occur. This being the case, propositions also respecting these must be assumed after the same manner, so that we must also speak concerning these, so far as is requisite for the sake of example. The beautiful in conduct therefore, is that which being eligible of itself is laudable, or which being good is delightful because it is good. But if the beautiful in conduct is this, it is necessary that virtue should be beautiful, for being good it is laudable. Virtue however, is indeed a power, as it appears of imparting and preserving good, and a power of procuring many, and great benefits, and of imparting all things about all. But the parts of virtue are justice, fortitude, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, mildness, prudence, wisdom. It is however necessary that those virtues should be the greatest, which are most useful to others, since virtue is a beneficent power, hence just and brave men are especially honored, for fortitude is useful in war and justice in peace. The next to these is liberality, for the liberal freely bestow their property, and do not contend about money, of which others are so eminently desirous. But justice indeed is a virtue through which everyone legally possesses what is his own, and injustice is that through which a man possesses the property of others, contrary to law. Virtue is that virtue through which men perform beautiful deeds in dangerous circumstances, in such a manner as the law commands, and those who possess this virtue are subservient to the law, but timidity is the contrary to this. Temperance is a virtue through which men are disposed towards pleasures in such a way as the law commands, but in temperance is the contrary. Liberality is the beneficent use of money, but illiberality is the contrary. Pucillanimity is a virtue which is effective of great benefits, but pusillanimity is the contrary. Magnificence is a virtue effective of magnitude in expense, but pusillanimity and in decorus parsimony are the contrary. Prudence is the virtue of the reasoning power, according to which it is possible to give good counsel, respecting the above mentioned good and evil pertaining to felicity. And thus we have spoken sufficiently, at present of virtue and vice, and the parts of them. With respect to other things, however, it is not difficult to see which among them are beautiful or base, for it is evident that such things as are effective of virtue must necessarily be beautiful, since they pertain to virtue, and also those things which proceed from virtue, but things of this kind are indications and works of virtue. As however the indications and such things as are the works or passions of virtue are beautiful, it is necessary that such things as are the works of fortitude or are indications of it or are bravely accomplished should be beautiful. This also must be the case with just things and with works which are justly performed, but not with the passions of them, for in this alone of the virtues that which is justly done is not always beautiful, but in being punished it is more base to be punished justly than to be punished unjustly, and in a similar manner with respect to the other virtues. Those things also of which the reward is honor are beautiful, and likewise those things of which honor more than riches is the reward, and such eligible things as a man performs not for his own sake, likewise such things as are simply good, such as what a man performs for his country, neglecting his own interest, also things which are naturally good, and such things as are good, but not to their possessor, for things which are good to their possessor are performed for his sake alone. This is likewise the case with such things as are more present with the dead than with the living. For those things which are present with a man when living have in a greater degree a subsistence for his sake, and also with such works as are performed for the sake of other things, for they have less of a subsistence for the sake of him who performs them. This likewise is the case with such deeds as are well performed with respect to others, and not with respect to him who performs them, and also with respect to benefactors, for this is just. The like may be said of benefits conferred on others, for they are not attended with private advantage. This is also the case with the contraries to those things of which we are ashamed, for those who say or do, or are about to commit base actions, are ashamed, as in the verses of Sappho when Alcayus said to her, Quote, something I wish to say, but shame prevents. Close quote. Sappho replied, Quote, if good and upright actions you desire, and your tongue mediates no ill to speak, your eyes will never be suffused with shame, but freely you will what is just reveal. This is likewise the case with things about which men fearlessly contend, for men are affected in this manner about things which tend to glory. The virtues also, and the works of things which are naturally more worthy, are beautiful. As for instance, the virtues and works of man than those of woman. This is likewise the case with those things which procure more pleasure to others than to their possessor, on which account the just and justice are beautiful. It is also beautiful to take vengeance on enemies rather than to be reconciled to them, for retribution is just, but the just is beautiful, and it is the province of a brave man not to be vanquished. Victory likewise and honor are among the number of things beautiful, for they are eligible, though they should be unattended with advantage, and they evince the transcendency of virtue. Public celebrations also of the memory of anyone are beautiful, and the greater they are the more beautiful. This is likewise the case with commemoration of the dead, and also with those things which are attended with honor. Things to which possess a certain excellence, and belong to one person alone are more beautiful, for they are more worthy of being remembered. This is likewise the case with possessions that are unfruitful, for they are more liberal. Things also, which are the peculiar property of individuals, are more beautiful. And likewise such things as are indications of what is laudable among those with whom we inhabit. Thus, for instance, in Lassidiman, it is beautiful to wear long hair, for it is a sign of liberty, for it is not easy for him who wears long hair to do any servile work. It is also beautiful not to exercise any illiberal art, for it is the province of a free man not to live subservient to another person. Things also, which are allied to the beautiful, are to be assumed, as being the same with them, both with respect to praise and blame. As if, for instance, we should call a cautious and animated person timid and insidious, a stupid, a good man, and one who is insensible, in the endurance of injuries, a mild man. And after this manner, we should always proceed from things which are consequent to that which is best, so as to call him who is wrathful and furious simple, and him who is arrogant, magnificent, and venerable. We may also praise those who air through excess, as if they were virtuous. Thus for instance, we may call an audacious, a brave man, and a prodigal, a liberal man, for they will appear to be so to the multitude. And at the same time, a paralogism will be made from cause. For if anyone is prepared to encounter danger when there is no necessity for it, he will much more seem to be so prepared when it is beautiful to encounter it. And he who is profuse to any casual persons will appear to be much more so to his friends, for to benefit all men is the excess of virtue. It is likewise requisite to consider by whom anyone is praised. Or as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise the Athenians among the Athenians. It is necessary, however, to speak of that which is honorable among the several nations, as of a thing which actually exists, as for instance among the Scythians or Lacedemonians or the philosophers. And in short, it is requisite to refer that which is honorable to the beautiful in conduct, since it appears to approximate to it. This is also the case with such things as subsist according to fitness, as if the deeds of a man are worthy of his ancestors, and of the deeds which he has already performed. For to make an addition to the honor already acquired contributes to felicity, and is beautiful. This likewise will be the case if, besides what is becoming, a man conducts himself with a view to what is better and more beautiful, as if being prosperous he is indeed moderate, but in adversity he is magnanimous, or is better and more affable, the more dignified his situation in life becomes. And a saying of this kind is that saying of Iphicrates, quote, some time ago, so vulgar was my trade, with a rough sack on both my shoulders laid, close quote. And also that inscription of Simonides, quote, a woman whose father and husband were the brothers of tyrants, close quote. But since praise is derived from actions, and the peculiarity of a worthy man is to act from deliberate choice, we must endeavor to show that he who acts acts from deliberate choice, and for this purpose it is useful to render it apparent that a man has frequently thus acted. Hence also casualties and events which result from fortune must be assumed as pertaining to deliberate choice. For if many and similar things are adduced, it appears to be an indication of virtue and deliberate choice. But praise is an oration exhibiting the magnitude of virtue. It is necessary therefore to evince that actions are things of this kind, fizz, that they proceed from great virtue. An encomium however pertains to deeds, but those things which surround him who is praised pertain to credibility, such as nobility and education, for it is likely that a good man will be the offspring of good parents, and that he who is thus educated will be a man of this kind. Hence we celebrate those who act well, but deeds are the indications of habit, since we also praise him that has not acted if we believe him to be a man of this kind. The predication however of beatitude and felicity do not differ from each other, but they are not the same with praise and encomium, but as felicity comprehends virtue, so the predication of felicity comprehends these. Praise however and counsel have a common form. For those things which you may propound in giving counsel, these by transposing the diction will become encomiums. When therefore we know what we have to do, and what kind of a person a man ought to be, then it is necessary, adducing these as precepts, to transpose and convert the diction. Such for instance as that it is not proper, a man should conceive magnificently of himself on account of the gifts of fortune, but on account of those things which he possesses from himself. And thus indeed what is said will have the force of a precept, but the following will have the force of praise. He conceived magnificently of himself, not on account of the gifts of fortune, but of those procured by himself. Hence, when you praise, see what it is that you propound, and when you propound, see what it is you praise. The diction however will necessarily be opposite when that which impedes and that which does not impede are transposed. Frequently also many of those things may be used which have an amplifying power, as whether a man acted alone or first, or with a few, or whether he were the principal person in the action. For all these are beautiful. Praise likewise is increased from the consideration of times and seasons, for these have nothing in addition to what is fit. This is also the case with the consideration if a man has done a thing rightly, for this will be considered as a great thing, and not originating from fortune, but from himself. It likewise pertains to praise, if those things which excite men to virtue and cause them to be honored, were invented and prepared by him whom we praise, and upon whom the first encomium was made. Thus for instance it happened to Hippolychus to have the first encomium, and to Hermodius, and to Aristogitan to have their statues placed in the forum. The like method also must be observed in amplifying the contrary to praise. When likewise you do not find in him whom you praise an abundance of things worthy of applause, compare him with others, which Isocrates did from his custom of writing declamatory orations. But it is requisite to compare him whom you praise with renowned men, for the oration has an amplifying power, and is beautiful if he is found to be better than worthy men. Amplification however deservedly falls upon praise, for it consists in transcendency, and transcendency is among the number of things beautiful. It is if you cannot compare him with renowned persons, yet it is requisite to compare him with others that are not renowned, since transcendency seems to indicate virtue. In short, of those forms which are common to all orations, amplification indeed is most adapted to the demonstrative genus, for it assumes actions which are acknowledged so that it only remains to add to their magnitude and beauty. But examples are most adapted to the deliberative genus, or that which consists in giving counsel. For we form a judgment by predicting future from past events, and enthamemes are most adapted to the judicial genus, for the fact, which is the subject of judicial discussion, especially receives cause and demonstration on account of its obscurity. And thus we have shown from what forms nearly all praise and blame are derived, to what we ought to look in praising and blaming, and from what particulars and encomiums and oprobiums are produced. For these things being known, the contraries to these are apparent, since blame consists from the contraries to praise and encomium. CHAPTER 10 In the next place we must speak of accusation and defense, from how many and from what kind of places it is necessary syllogism should be made. It is necessary, therefore, to assume three things. One indeed, what the particulars are, and how many in number, for the sake of which men injure others. The second is how they are affected, and the third is what kind of persons, and in what condition they are, whom they attack. When we have, therefore, defined what it is to do an injury, we shall speak of what is next in order. Let then to do an injury be, to hurt another person voluntarily, contrary to law. But law is either peculiar or common, and I call that peculiar indeed according to which when committed to writing men act politically. But common law is such institutes, as though not committed to writing, appear to be acknowledged by all men. Men also act willingly, when they act knowingly, and without compulsion. With respect to such things, therefore, as they do willingly, all these are not performed by them with deliberate choice. But all such things, as they perform with deliberate choice, they do knowingly, for no one is ignorant of that which he deliberately chooses to do. The causes, however, through which men deliberately choose to injure others, and to do evil contrary to law, are vice and intemperance. For if certain persons have depravity, either in one, or in many things, with respect to that in which they are depraved, they are also unjust. Thus, for instance, the illiberal man is unjust in money. The intemperate man in the pleasures of the body. The effeminate man in sloth. But the timid man in dangers. For timid men, through fear, desert those that are in the same danger with themselves. But the ambitious man is unjust on account of honour. The hasty man from anger. He who aspires after conquest from victory. The severe man through revenge. The imprudent man because he is deceived about the just and the unjust. And the impudent man through a contempt of renown. In a similar manner with respect to the rest, each is unjust in that which is the subject of his passion. These things, however, are evident, partly from what has been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the passions. It now remains to show for what reason, and in what condition, can injure each other, and whom they injure. In the first place, therefore, let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid, when we endeavor to do an injury. For it is evident that the accuser must consider how many and which of those things which all men coveting injure their neighbours are present with his adversary. And how many and which of these things are not present with the defendant. All men, therefore, do all things partly on account of themselves, and partly not. And of those things which they do on account of themselves, some are performed by them from fortune, but others from necessity. And of those things which are performed by them from necessity, some are violently, and others naturally affected, so that all such things as men do, not on account of themselves, are partly from fortune, partly from nature, and partly from violence. But such things as they perform on account of themselves, and of which they themselves are the cause, are partly from custom, and partly from appetite. And some indeed are from irrational, but others from an irrational appetite. But the will indeed is an appetite of good in conjunction with reason. For no one wishes anything else than that which he conceives to be good. But the irrational appetites are anger and desire, so that all such things as men do are necessarily performed by them from seven causes, viz from fortune, force, nature, custom, reason, anger, and desire. The division, however, of actions according to ages or habits or certain other things is superfluous, for it happens that young men are choleric or prone to indulge desire. They do not perform things of this kind on account of their juvenile age, but on account of anger and desire. Nor yet on account of riches and poverty, but it happens to the poor indeed to covet riches on account of their indigents, and to the rich to desire pleasures that are not necessary through the power which they have of gratifying their desires. These, however, do not act on account of riches and poverty, but on account of desire. In a similar manner, also, the just and the unjust, and others who are said to act according to habits, do all things from these causes, for they act either from reason or from passion, but some indeed act from manners and worthy affections, and others from the contraries to these. It happens, however, that things of this kind are consequent to such like habits, and such and such to others. For immediately, perhaps, worthy opinions and desires concerning pleasures are consequent to the temperate man on account of his temperance, but the contraries to these are consequent to the intemperate man. Hence divisions of this kind must be omitted, but it must be considered what desires or opinions are usually consequent to certain conditions. For, whether a man be white or black or great or little, nothing follows of things of this kind, but it is of consequence whether he is young or old, just or unjust, and in short, such accidents as cause a difference in the manners of men are of consequence, as to the difference of their desires. Thus, for instance, it makes a distinction whether a man be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate. We shall, however, speak of these things hereafter. But now let us speak of the rest. Those things then proceed from fortune to which the cause is indefinite, and which are not produced for the sake of anything, and which have neither a perpetual nor a frequent nor an orderly subsistence. This, however, is evident from the definition of fortune. But those things are produced by nature, of which the cause is in themselves and is orderly, for they happen after the same manner, either always or for the most part. For, with respect to pred or natural things, it is not necessary to consider accurately whether they are produced from a certain nature or from some other cause. Fortune, also, may seem to be the cause of such-like things, but those things are affected by force, which are done by the agents themselves, contrary to their desire or reason. Those things are affected by custom, which are done in consequence of having been frequently done, and those things are affected through reasoning, which are done with a view to advantage, as ranking among the above-mentioned goods, or as being an end, or as referring to the end, when they are performed on account of utility. For, the intemperate, also, perform some things that are advantageous, yet not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure, and some men, through anger and rage, perform things which pertain to revenge. Revenge, however, and punishment differ, for punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers, but revenge is for the sake of the agent that he may satisfy his desire of vengeance. In what we shall hereafter say, therefore, about the passions, it will be evident what the objects are with which anger is conversant. Such things, however, as appear to be pleasant, are performed on account of desire, but both that which is done from use, and that which is done from custom, are delightful, for many things which are not naturally pleasant, when rendered familiar through custom, are done with delight. Hence, in short, all such things as men do on account of themselves are either good or apparently good, are either pleasing or apparently pleasing. Since, however, such things as men perform on account of themselves, they perform willingly, but such things as they do not perform on account of themselves are done by them not willingly. Hence, all such things as they perform willingly will either be good or apparently good, will either be pleasant or apparently pleasant. For, I consider the liberation from evils, or from apparent evils, or the assumption of a less, instead of a greater evil, in the number of good things. For, in a certain respect, these are eligible, and in a similar manner, the liberation from things painful, or apparently painful, or the assumption of less, instead of more painful things, rank among things which are pleasant. End of chapter 10 of book 1. Recording in memory of Mitchell Edwards.