 In late 2008, as a result of a serious intrusions into our classified networks, the Secretary of Defense decided to place the Joint Task Force Global Network Ops under my operational control as the commander of the Joint Functional Component Command Net Warfare, recognizing both the imperative for better synchronization, synchronizing our offensive and defensive cyber capabilities as the need to leverage NSA's intelligence capabilities to support our understanding of the threat and the ability to respond to it. Last June, the Secretary of Defense directed the standup of US Cyber Command to further strengthen this model and streamline the command and control of our military's cyber capabilities. Since that time, we have been leaning forward in building an organization and a mission alignment that is more integrated, synchronized, and effective in the support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians. On May 21st, that came together in the activation of US Cyber Command. We at Cyber Command are responsible day to day for directing the operations and defense of the Department of Defense Information and Networks, and for the systemic and adaptive planning, integration, and synchronization of cyber activities, and when directed under the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the commander of US STRATCOM for conducting full spectrum military cyberspace operations to ensure US and allied freedom of action in cyberspace. We need real-time situational awareness in our networks to see where something bad is happening and to take action there at that time. That is both a coordination issue amongst the services and agencies and a situational awareness issue. We do not have a common operating picture for our networks. We need to get there. We need to build that. About 15 years ago, a great deal was written about the threat of cyber warfare, cyber terrorism, the Marsh Commission. A monograph was produced by CSIS. I wonder why it took 15 years to stand up your command. Next question. I think part of it had to do is they had to teach me to read along the way. And so that takes some time. You know, that's a tough question to answer. I think it's a combination of things. When was the department ready to stand it up? And how did we get there along the way? It is interesting to look at this. And I do think it merits a more serious part of the answer. It's not like we, this was a step function in getting to U.S. Cyber Command that the 21st, we said, no cyber command, no cyber, boom, we're here. If you go back to 2002, when you saw the department wrestling with how are we gonna do this, what we did is we said, well, first, which combatant command is gonna have the responsibility? We looked at that and went to Space Com, went to U.S. StratCom. StratCom said, so how am I gonna do this? I need technical expertise. Who has technical expertise? They picked Dyssa because then General, were you there at that time? So you see General Attagi was there. They gave him the Global Network Ops, the Defending Operate Mission. They said, now who can help with the offense? And they looked at NSA and they dual-hatted both. And then the rest is as I explained. But it takes time to evolve it. So it's not something that we just jumped into. And I think it's a well-thought-out approach. And we are one step further along and I think it's going pretty good. There were some statistics last year that came out that said the amount of money being made in cyberspace is eclipsed to the drug trade. And when you think about that, you could say, well, good news, the drug trade is down. I don't think that's true. I think it's just the opposite. As a consequence, I think of putting it from a nation's perspective, what's on those networks that we've got to secure? Well, it's our intellectual property. It's the future of our country. It's the future of our industry. It will make up the future wealth of this nation. We've got to protect it.