 Hello, good morning and good evening everyone. We're delighted to welcome you to our final webinar for the Decarbonizing the Great Webinar Series. My name is Liangming with Bits and Watts. This webinar series is produced by Stanford Bits and Watts Initiative and co-sponsored by Stanford Environmental and Energy Policy Analysis Center, CPAC, and the Storage X Initiative. Very quick, the mission for Bits and Watts is to engage research, education, and industry to develop innovation for the 21st century electrical power grid. Here is today's agenda. I will start with very quick 10 minutes recap for the previous five webinars we have conducted. Then we'll hear from Professor Sally Benson to share her recent SB 100 study. See what is the California path to achieve 100% clean energy or clean electricity? And following that, Professor Arun Majrinda will share with us his thoughts what US electricity system might look like in 2030. In the end, we'll have about half hour moderate conversation by Professor Charlie Costa with Arun and Sally. I see many familiar names on the Zoom today, but also we have a lot of new attendees today. So if you missed the previous five conversations, I would encourage you to go to Bits and Watts website. We have all the recordings and the webinar briefs available there. A very quick housekeeping items. If you have questions, please use Q&A function in the bottom of the Zoom to submit your questions. We'll make two stops after Sally's talk, we'll take one to two simple questions and after Arun's talk, we'll take another one to two simple questions. Then all of your questions will be discussed and covered in the end with the moderate conversation by Charlie with Arun and Sally. If you have any technical questions, feel free to contact Bits and Watts Program Manager, Waheela. Okay, we talk about decarbonizing the grid. What is that and why is that? Why we talk about electricity or talk about the grid? Because when we talk about economy-wide decarbonization, three quarters or 75% of the global greenhouse emission are generated from energy use, primarily for industry, building and the transportation. Last week, when the new administration of the Biden administration's climate summit, we hear many strategies from many countries, from US, China, India, Russia, Brazil, European countries. The principal strategy for all these countries to reduce emission involves two steps. One is electrified energy demand. Second is to decarbonize electricity sector as much as we can. So when we talk about decarbonizing the grid here, we mean how we decarbonize electricity sector. So the objective for this webinar series is to convene global experts across different disciplines to exchange the view how we can decarbonize these electricity sector. Then also understand the utility and the industry requirements and the policy trends and identify the challenges and opportunity to achieve this decarbonization goal. Then also discuss what are the technologies, markets and the policy to help bridge these gaps. So we start our webinar series from four of the bits of what's members in four different countries, Shell, RTE France, Origin, Energy in Australia, Portland Journal Electric in the United States. Then in US and many countries, natural gas renewables have largely replaced the coal as the main source for electricity generation. However, reliability is still the challenge because of the massive fluctuation of the wind and the solar and also the decline fossil fuel generation. And as they have identified the potential solution as social with challenges, they are great interconnection for long distance transmission line. Also the policy to further facilitate the decarbonizing the supply side and also address the energy equity issue. The storage including battery and also beyond the battery long duration storage. Energy efficiency, demand side flexibility, the what's the role for hydrogen versus electricity as energy storage and the carrier, the future of nuclear, shall we shut down them or we do the lifetime extension? How about adopting new technology in nuclear sectors? What's the role of CCS? Then we deep dive into four areas. The first area we deep dive is electrical grid interconnection, long distance transmission line. We have a Jcastberry, we have NSOE and we have the near earnest from European countries. Jay shared with us the recent ESEC report which identifies that US needs to create a national transmission plan and authority identify high quality renewable energy zone and design a microgrid. Then NSOE also identifies that to achieve the decarbonization goal, European countries may require 10 times increase in offshore wind by 2050. In the same time may need 93 gigawatt new cross-border transmission by 2040. Then we also see that countries are slowly start building global grid to connect different continental with each other. Then a global TSO may invert in 20 years. And also in many countries, the number one issue facing the energy transition is getting people to accept new transmission line and the so-called not in my backyard issue. They also suggest a few research area including social study to convince people to accept transmission line and also develop that data model to analyze impact of deep decarbonization. After that on March 17th, we land up for professors from MIT, Chris Canito from Princeton, Steve Peccala from Imperial College, Richard Green and from our Stanford Larry Gouda. They discuss the policy to facilitate decarbonization. Steve Peccala shared a recent National Science National Academy of Science study of decarbonization. The conclusion is deep decarbonization is feasible and economic. And the US economy would have to spend $2.1 trillion to transition to non-zero by 2050. But this is a smaller fraction of GDP compared to what spent between 1990 to 2020 on the energy side. The professor Richard Green also shared with that government policy were responsible for at least 60% sharp decline of United Kingdom's emission. Then Larry discussed what's happening in China for them to meet its 2060 goal. China need to make the national trade emission system is called the tradeable performance standard more strict and then they need to restore the direct subsidies of renewables. Then they also discussed that most of the decarbonization proposal recommend the extension of lifetime of existing nuclear power plants. In the end of last month, and the professor will too, which is our storage X co-director lined up for guests from department energy, California Energy Commission and the Southern Company talk about storage integration. DOE identifies initial storage cost targets for both long duration, a stationary application and also the electrical vehicle. My group of California emission shared with us what's happening in the state of California and we have about 2,500 megawatt and your storage installed or approved. But in order for the state to achieve the zero emission goal we have to install another 7,000 megawatt storage by 2030 and need to install close to 20 gigawatt and the 40 gigawatt storage by 2045. And as you all agree upon that battery storage is dominated the market this moment, but we need to think beyond the battery. We need to advance the other long duration storage technology like thermal storage, hydrogen, pump hydro, flow battery, example. Nick Urban of Southern Company warned us that we should be very careful about not over building any storage system because the cost burden may transfer to the customers. Three weeks ago professor Ram Rajakoba lined up four speakers which including Diane Grunate, a pre-call scholar and the former commissioner of CPUC and the Ram Nayagusa from APRI and also two guests from European NSOE from Turner and Ternet. Diane identifies that achieve the decarbonization we need a shared and the 25 year federal and state commitment to develop great scale flexibility requirements. And also when they change the regulatory and the market structure and adopt new customer rate. What's happened in European country is by 2030 DER such as electrical vehicle water heaters could represent a significant part of the flexibility in the EU market. And they also identify that a key technical challenge is to create an integration platform for aggregate different type of DER together. And also NSOE warned us that achieving decarbonization will require a holistic vision and approach more than just electricity. We'll also need to look into the sector coupling how the electricity interact with gas system, with heat and with transportation. We discuss a lot of topics but still have a lot of very interesting things could be discussed in the future. And the ways that I'd like to handle to professor Charlie Costa to help us to moderate today's conversation. Charlie, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Leon. It's a real pleasure to be here and to wrap up this series of talks on decarbonizing grid, very, very topical. I want to introduce our two distinguished speakers, Sally Benson and Arun Majumdar. They are truly in a well-positioned to talk to us today. They both have a shared history and a different history as well. They're both have an affiliation with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory before Stanford. And they both recently stepped down as co-directors of the Precourt Institute for Energy, Stanford's flagship institute dealing with energy. So they, I couldn't think of better speakers. And Sally is now the professor of energy resources engineering here at Stanford. That's a department that's in the engineering school. And Arun, who is a professor of mechanical engineering also chaired President Biden's recent transition team on energy. So is extremely well-equipped for this presentation and discussion today. So without further ado, I'd like to hand the reins over to Sally to speak for about 20 minutes. If you have a question, please put it in the Q&A section. Question directed to Sally's presentation, same applies to Arun who will come afterwards. Sally, you want to take it away? Oh, okay, sure. Thank you very much. Thanks, Charlie. Thanks, Liang. Thank you for all the opportunity to talk today. And I believe we're good to go. Okay, so anyway, what I'm gonna do today is talk about some recent work that we've been doing together with EDF, Environmental Defense Fund, Cleaner Task Force, the consulting company E3, Jesse Jenkins from Princeton and Stanford. So this was a study where we set about to try to understand what are the most cost-effective pathways for meeting California's 100% electricity goal. And I must also acknowledge my co-author here, E.J. Beck, who's a PhD student here at the university. So let's get going. And how to think about this? This has been a big, broad-ranging seminar series. So the best way to think about this is the case study. I will say though, however, that the work I'm talking about in the California context is very similar to the major conclusions from other studies looking at 100% clean energy targets. So to put this into context, California has legislation, Senate Bill 100, which requires 60% renewable portfolio standard by 2030 that means that all the electricity sold through the retail market of that 60% needs to be renewable. That doesn't include rooftops, so that's all utility scale generation. And the second target is in 2045, this is a zero carbon grid or 100% clean energy. There are also economy-wide standards that would require an overall 40% reduction in CO2s, a California CO2 emissions by 2030. So the modeling we're going to discuss includes all those kind of requirements. So just to start off with the situation today, here's the power mix. There are two major sources. One is fossil fuel generation, primarily from natural gas. And then second, we're very reliant on imports. And then the wedge you see up in the upper left-hand quadrant, that solar wind and other renewables. And California has moved very aggressively to increase renewables and we're now anywhere saved between 30, 31 and 33% renewable generation on the grid. So that's our starting point of getting to zero. And this was a very interesting study in that unlike many which have relied on a single model, we decided to run three different models which all have the same goal. These, they find the cost optimal pathway for achieving these emission cuts. But they have some different specifications. So if we look at the three of these E3, the resolve model widely used in California, it has three zones, California, which is then the grid is connected to the Southwest and the Northwest. And they use 37 representative days to try to capture the full range of climate conditions. The work we did here use the model ERPs, which comes out of TU Munich, Professor Hamaker's research group. We divided California into 10 different zones, included transmission and transmission expansion. And then we had zones outside of the state in the Northwest and Southwest. And our simulations were provided hourly time steps over the entirety of a year. So a high degree of spatial and temporal resolution. And then the model from Princeton was actually a WECWI, the Western Energy Coordinating Region that included interconnection of the grid. So it had seven zones outside the state and two in California. And their strategy is to use representative weeks. So they don't have the whole year, but they do have 16 representative weeks to try to capture the seasonal variation in weather and power demand. So basically just to give you a sense of what these models do, they broadly fall into this classification of capacity expansion and dispatch models. They're being used widely now to study high renewable penetration grids and how to get the reliability that is needed. So basically the inputs are things like existing power plant capacities, power demand, wind and solar generation profiles. You can then impose policy constraints, you pick your regions, you need to provide all the cost and performance data. Also any constraints on power generation such as ramping constraints, you can also include reserve margins and all of those things that go into reliability. And then what comes out is the cost optimal or the lowest cost solution. And it gives you the cost, it tells you what kind of new capacities you've built and it also gives you hourly energy generations and flows. So you learn what it is you need to build and you learn how you need to operate it. So just to talk a little bit about the inputs, here's some data on the net load. So in 2017, the California system required 284 terawatt hours of electricity with a peak load of 60 gigawatts. We forecast into the future to include low growth associated with the overall expansion of the economy as well as a very large fraction of light duty vehicles have been electrified as well as most of the in-state heating. So on the right hand side, you can see the hourly generation profiles or demand profiles. And yeah, so you see significant load growth, significant growth in peak and so forth. So this is one of the major inputs. So not only are we really looking at decarbonizing the electricity sector alone, but we're also decarbonizing a significant amount of the transportation and the heating system. Okay, so we need to provide costs for the different technologies. So these were the reference costs for different technologies in the system. So nuclear, CCS, retrofit, and then gas costs, solar costs, wind and battery costs. We also have operating costs for all of these technologies, but I won't go into that. We also did sensitivity studies because of course there's significant uncertainty on all of these. And I will say that the fundamental conclusions of this study were not particularly sensitive even over a relatively wide range of cost assumptions shown here. And those are the sources of the information that we put into the model. Okay, so let's quickly look at the scenarios. So what we did was we took 2018 baseline, we then modeled capacity expansion to 2030 to meet the 60% to a renewable portfolio standard goal. Then we looked at a number of scenarios to get to 2045. So we looked at a reference scenario where we didn't worry about decarbonization. We just looked at meeting the demand for electricity. We ran a scenario with renewables and batteries only. This is going to be called REB. We have a scenario with renewables, batteries and CCS, that's REBC. We have renewable and batteries plus nuclear. We have renewable and the zero carbon fuel that could be hydrogen, that could be that could be biogas. That's that scenario. And then we were in one where we offered everything. So basically the optimization model has a menu of these kind of generating sources and it's going to pick which combination of them meets the load best. So in the future and the slides, these will be referred to as diverse scenarios with clean firm resources. So clean firm power will come up again. And again, all of these are zero emission scenarios. So key findings. So in every single scenario, even the reference scenario where there are no carbon constraints, renewables end up as the primary source of installed generating capacity. So here's the reference scenario on the left, total system size of about, what, 180 gigawatts. If we look at the renewables plus batteries, our system really expands dramatically, huge amount of solar. We've got also a very large amount of storage on the system. Now this storage where we're represented as batteries with anywhere from four to six hours of capacity. So these are short-term batteries. Lithium, I think lithium ion batteries, though we have done lots of models where we allowed flexibility in the, going say up to 10 hours or 14 hours of storage. It didn't fundamentally change the results either. Now we can see the next case is the renewables plus batteries plus CO2 storage. System size drops dramatically. Again, very large fraction of renewable capacity. Now in the nuclear case, we see the overall smallest system capacity and the lowest install capacity for renewables. Here is the case where we have renewables plus a renewable or a zero emission fuel. Again, I think hydrogen or biogas and the system is bigger. Again, lots of solar. And then finally, when we have the entire mix, this is the allocation, okay? But solar in particular in California, costs have come down so much that this is a preferred source of electricity. Okay, so now what we're looking at is generation shares. Okay, so these are the, before we looked at capacity, now we're looking at generation from renewables. And so we can see in the reference case, no carbon constraints, we would still have 65% renewable generation, 95% in the renewables plus batteries, 74%. In the nuclear case, it's less than half. In renewable fuels, very high. And then in a case where you offer it everything that it wants, it's about half. So again, a renewable dominated grid, regardless of which scenario pick. And this conclusion is very similar across all the models. The data I was showing you was our modeling, but very similar. So you can see that between these anywhere from say 45 or 40% up to a little over 85% renewable generation from all the models, which is interesting given that they had quite different assumptions. It's also comforting that if people are running these models that at least for this case, they were robust against different structures of the models. Okay, second major point. Again, all this chart is is the same one showing you the system capacity that I just showed you a minute ago. But the point of this is I wanna talk about the incremental cost to produce electricity in the system. And we use the reference case as a zero incremental cost. So to go to the renewables and battery only that will increase cost about five cents a kilowatt hour. And then all of these other scenarios, regardless of whether it's nuclear, CCS, a low carbon fuel or zero carbon fuel, increases are in the range of one to two cents per kilowatt hour. So sort of number one message, not that much more expensive than a case that's not carbon constrained. And second, all of the cases where you offer a clean firm power are significantly less expensive than the case where you don't allow those to contribute to the power mix. Okay, so again, moving on to look at the next issue is how much system capacity do we need for these clean firm resources to provide all these benefits of smaller system size and lower incremental cost? And so the bars you see on the bottom here refer to the clean firm power, the amount of system capacity in gigawatts that you would have. And again, you can see that they are in the range of say what 25 to about 40 gigawatts of clean firm power. Interestingly, it's not really much different than what you would use in your reference scenario. Okay, so moving on again, looking across all these models, this is the clean firm capacity needed. And again, a lot of consistency suggesting that these conclusions are quite robust to a number of different modeling assumptions. Okay, so it's really curious, one to two cents per kilowatt hour cost increase to get to 100% clean energy as long as you have clean firm power. But each of these strategies for clean firm power has different constraints. They have different capital costs, they have different operating costs, and they have different ramping constraints. And this is really reflective in how they contribute to providing reliability in the power system. So the first case we have nuclear, nuclear very high capital costs, low operating costs, limited flexibility in terms of ramping. And what we see is that the nuclear is in essence sort of acting like a base load power system. And we have some solar and storage still important, but the nuclear, this is the way nuclear helps solve the zero emission challenge. Now, if we go to the case where we've got carbon capture and storage on natural gas combined cycle plants, system operates very differently. This gray bar is basically CCS. So the role of CCS is two things. One is it provides clean firm nighttime power. And then the second thing is during the winter time when we go through multiple days with no wind, no sun, it can provide a significant fraction of the sort of base load power, but this is a representative of midwinter, midwinter day. But again, lots of storage and lots of solar still on the system. And then finally we have, oh, so just one more thing about that scenario. So basically natural gas plus CCS has sort of mid range, mid range capital cost got relatively high operating costs due to the need for fuel. So that's what's driving how this is operated. Now, the final case is where we have this again, clean zero emission fuel. And we modeled a very high cost for this fuel. So basically, and it's very low capital cost to build the facility. So basically it builds a lot of facilities and generating capacity and it uses this resource really as a sort of a resource of last resort. And it just fills in when the solar and storage plus wind can't meet that. But again, they're all operating very differently, but providing the same benefits to the system. So just to throw in one more graph now. So this is the renewable energy plus battery storage on the top here. And you can see that as we compare it to all three of them, the bottom, the first thing you note is that there's massive amount of solar generation. Basically it has to overbuild the solar to achieve the reliability 365 days a year. Now, if there's offshore wind available, that can mitigate this to a certain degree. We're all hoping that there's some real progress on offshore wind that would change us. So that brings us to looking at the PV capacity that would be required for these different scenarios. So for the renewables and battery only, you're way up here in terms of system capacity and you can see that if we look at historical growth rates, we are gonna need to significantly increase the pace to get on track to do that. Whereas if you look at the diverse scenarios, they have a broad range of requirements for PV, but significantly less than the case for the batteries. So just one more thing I'm gonna throw in, which I thought was quite interesting. An alternative strategy is to say that we're not going to put carbon capture on natural gas combined cycle plants. Instead, let's allow the needed amount of unabated emissions from natural gas plants. And then let's just put in direct air capture as a way to offset those emissions and achieve a net zero grid. And we were curious about, well, is this going to be cost effective compared to actually directly putting CCS on the natural gas plants? And the results from that study are shown here that if direct air capture is available at $200 a ton and we add that to the renewables and battery scenario, we end up with incremental system costs of about one cents a kilowatt hour, very similar to having clean firm power available. If the cost is much higher, up at $800 a ton, we're up in the two cents, again, still in that range. And again, comparing that to the zero carbon grid. So it looks like DACA is maybe a cost effective alternative and in the right circumstances, be a useful choice. And on the right hand side, we have how much CO2 we're going to need to capture. In the case where we have the $200 a ton, it's not that different from the case of how much CO2 would be capturing on the natural gas plants itself. So just to quickly rack up, number one, renewable electricity from solar and wind power will become the mainstays of California's 100% carbon free grid, regardless of whether there's clean firm power not available or not. Now we're going to need about 30 gigawatts of clean firm resources. If that's available, we can meet our 100% clean energy targets with very modest cost increase. And the big benefit, the reason that it costs so much less if you have clean firm power is it reduces need to overbuild solar and wind generation and battery storage. And then finally, it's worth taking a second look at integrating some amount of director capture. And again, one conclusion that I didn't say go along is the more of these resources you have available, the more flexibility, the more optionality you have, the higher the probability you'll succeed and the lower the overall system costs will be and you'll increase robustness. So thanks very much. All right, thank you very much. A very, very fascinating talk, Sally. I have a couple of questions to actually have a lot of questions here. We have 14 in the queue, but I'm just going to focus on one or two. One from Ola Augustin, from pronouncing it right. He's referring back to a statement you made early on that utility solar is what the renewable portfolio standard is focusing on. He says that in 2018, California utility solar is about 9% of capacity. He wants to know what it would look like with if you include a rooftop solar and what do you, how do you think that will evolve by 2030 as a result of a new rules requiring rooftop solar on new construction? Right, yeah. So California also has a lot of rooftop solar. I think we have, I don't know, six gigawatts of rooftop solar. So it's a significant fraction. And that's spurred by a completely different set of policies than SB 100. So we have modeled rooftop solar with its own costs in our models. And it doesn't deploy to a great deal in the cases where you have clean-firm power, in the cases where you do the REB only or renewable battery only, there's significant incremental deployment of rooftop solar. I don't remember the proportions exactly. In terms of the mandate for new, all new housing have having PV, California unfortunately doesn't build the housing stock that quickly. So yes, it will be important and change things and basically reduce demand in the middle of the day. But it fundamentally doesn't really change the nighttime situation too much unless you have very large, unless you have very large scale storage. And really the challenge in California I think is meeting nighttime power, clean power in the nighttime and during the wintertime when we'll have a week or two of bad weather and our renewables just aren't available to us. Okay, thank you. Let's see if we can squeeze one more question in with a short, give us a short answer. This is from John Fox. He is asking about demand management in the models. Whether that's in there, time of use, is there anything on the demand side or is this mostly supply side? Right, we did not focus on demand side management in these models. We have done studies in the past where we've modified the load shape to get rid of peaks, basically spreading out that demand either before or after and that obviously helps, reducing peak demand. But once you get these systems so big that you really have a lot of storage around and you've got a lot of, yeah, you've got a lot of flexible capacity. So in the future, how beneficial that's gonna be, it'll be interesting to tell, to see. Because really, it's again the challenge in California because we're a solar dominated state. That's our great resource. The system costs are driven by extreme events and nighttime power and the cold winter months. Okay, well, thank you so much. Appreciate it. And I hear a resounding silent applause for your talk. Thank you very much, Sally. We're gonna turn now to Rune Majumdar who will be, I've already introduced and take it away, Rune. That was a terrific presentation from Sally who's gone through detailed analysis and optimization of the California system. And what I'll present is nothing compared to that but the conclusions that we are reaching are roughly the same. What I'm gonna do is to take a macro view and take a very simplistic scenarios to see what the United States could do to reach the 80% carbon free by 2030. And that is on the road 200% by 2035. But if you don't reach 80% by 2030 it's difficult to see the last 20% which is a more difficult one in the next five years, the five years following. Now, I've taken some, I made some assumptions. I'm not considering infrastructure at all in this but what I'll do later on is the some conclusions, major conclusions on the infrastructure that is needed to get to 100% or 80% by 2030. So just to some reference numbers. The total energy demand in the United States 2020 was about 4,000 terawatt hours. If you look at the demand projection by 2030 it's roughly 1. something percent growth. Let's assume it is 4,430 terawatt hours, maybe 4,500 terawatt hours. So, and if you take the 80% of that it's roughly about 3,500 terawatt hours plus minus. I mean, this is, the conclusions will be sort of independent of the deviations plus minus but let's say that's the target. If he can somehow reach 3,500 terawatt hours by 2030 I think that'll be a great achievement. It'll be about 80%, maybe 79, maybe 82% but roughly in that ballpark. So where are we today? This is the 2020 capacity as well as the energy generation. The total capacity of the United States is 1,117 gigawatts in a 1,117 gigawatts or 1.1 terawatts capacity. The total energy generated is about 4,000 in a terawatt hours. So the capacity factor is roughly 41%. It's not that high, it's roughly 41%. And so where did this all come from? So on the blue bar chart is the capacity. This is coal, natural gas, a little bit of petroleum, nuclear, solar, wind, hydro, biomass, geothermal. So this is the capacity and the brown line is the terawatt hours that are being generated by different sources. And these numbers out here, you see other capacity factors. What is the capacity utilization? And what is striking is that, coal is 41%, natural gas is 38%, nuclear is 93%. That is extremely high capacity utilization. Solar capacity utilization is about 22%. Wind is 33%, hydro 32%, et cetera. And the majority of the energy that has been generated, as you can see, and it's not surprising, is natural gas and about 20% from nuclear and of course, solar and wind are growing fast. So this is the mix today. Now we say, okay, so if you are to build solar and we heard from Sally that there'll be a massive expansion with solar and the United States is not just solar, but solar and wind also. So how fast can we go? So if you look at the solar projections, this is the blue histograms are the capacity additions and the business and usual scenario. Like for example, 2021, the capacity addition, the projected capacity addition is about 25 gigawatts. And as you go forward towards 2030, it'll go up to about 50 gigawatts. So that is the business as usual scenario. But if you want to make an aggressive scenario where you want to reach 1,200% by 2035, then that's the brown, the orange bar where you start adding almost close to 30 gigawatts in 2021 and you keep increasing the capacity utilization over the years of this decade, all the way to about 90 gigawatts by 2030. So that's now the bounds that you have. And if you add that capacity utilization per year, the cumulative capacity are the blue and the orange lines and you would have about by the end of 2030 about 400 gigawatts of solar in the business as usual scenario. And you will have about close to 700 gigawatts of solar in the aggressive scenario deployment scenario. So let's say we do that. So the 2020 capacity factor was 22%. Let's say we increase it to 25%. I would love to go above that to maybe 30% or so. So the business as usual scenario you have four and 20 gigawatts and you take 25%, it's about 918 terawatt hours of solar energy that is generated by 2030. You got the aggressive one, it's about 700 gigawatts and you take 25%, it's about 1500 terawatt hours. So that's the bounds. It's between about 900 and something terawatt hours to about 1500 terawatt hours. Those are the bounds that you can get in a business as usual to a fully aggressive deployment scenario. It is not 3,000 terawatt hours, that's the bound. If you look at the wind, and this is not counting some very recent development in offshore wind, but if you just look at wind, the 2020 capacity factor is 33%. As the wind turbines are going up in height, the capacity factor could increase. Let's assume 45% capacity factor, which is what is being projected and that is a very high number. And if the capacity today is about 100 gigawatts, let's say it goes up to 200 gigawatts, that is what is projected. We're generating about 800 terawatt hours of wind power, of wind energy. So we all know that as you go into these kinds of penetration of solar and wind, you need storage. So what is the situation with storage today? There's a very nice paper that came out last year by Paul Albertus and Scott Litzman and others on long duration storage. First of all, we must realize that the grid was never designed. The Tesla are Edison architecture and how the grid is operated was never designed for fluctuating wind and solar. We all know that. The question is, how much solar do you need and what is the cost of solar? So on the X axis is the penetration of electricity from solar and wind on a regional grid. And as you can see that as you go from 20% to 40% to all the way to 80% or so, the amount of storage that you need per shot goes up from about 10 hours to about 100 hours at 80% or more as you go deeper penetration of solar and wind. And so this is at one shot, you need about four or five days of storage if you have 80% and you use it probably about five or six or maybe 10 times per year. Now that determines what is the cost of these storage units in terms of CAPEX, the storage, the capital cost of storage. And for low penetration, you can survive with about $100 or $200 a kilowatt hours. But as you go up in storage and the lesser amount you use, the cost has to come down to about $10 a kilowatt hours or so. So where is lithium-ion batteries? Lithium-ion batteries today is out here. It's about $125, $200 fully installed storage units. So it can sustain in about 30% a few hours of storage, sort of the diurnal, you can sustain that with lithium-ion batteries. This is the lowest limit in terms of bill of materials of lithium-ion batteries as it's projected today. It's about $50 to $60 per kilowatt hour. But it could go less if the material costs go down, but that's sort of roughly the case. Now, as you go to lower and lower cost, you need other technologies. Pumped hydro and compressed air can be done today, but that requires the hydroelectric plants that are there today to be retrofitted. And that could be, that's certainly what we're pursuing. Or if you go down to the region of less than $10 a kilowatt hour, this is in the total wide space, R and D space, which is where ARPA-E days program is there today. The point being, except for pumped hydro and compressed air, today we don't have a solution for long duration storage in 2021. There's a lot of R and D going in, there's lots of startups going in, but to get to full-scale deployment, I worry about whether we can get there by 2030, hopefully by 2028 or so, but not at the scale of the 10-hour scale that we're talking about. So if that is the scenario, so I'm gonna now paint out some scenarios. So if you recall all the 10-hour hours that we did earlier, we're trying to reach 4,400, about 4,500 10-hour hours. 80% carbon-free is about 3,500 10-hour hours. So let's play some games with this. So this is the numbers, the 10-hour hours that were produced by EAT sources in 2020. Coal, it's 774 terawatt hours. We know that coal is phasing out. And let's say within the United States, it goes down a lot, but perhaps it doesn't go down to zero. You've got about 100 terawatt hours coming out of coal. And I'm gonna talk about natural gas with carbon capture, natural gas without carbon capture. In 2020, everything was without carbon capture. That's about 1,600 terawatt hours. Nuclear was 790 terawatt hours. Solar was about 100 terawatt hours. Wind was 338, then hydro was 291, et cetera. So let's go to 2030 and see what we can do. We can reduce coal to about 100 terawatt hours because that is, it's going out, it's, it cannot make it economically in the market. And let's preserve nuclear. Because if you don't preserve nuclear, the burden on solar and wind goes up even more and burden on carbon capture goes up even more. So let's say we decide to preserve nuclear and there's a lot of discussion going on. I'm so glad that nuclear is now included in the clean energy standards that has been proposed by the Biden administration. And let us say that we go not quite 900, not quite 1500, the bounce, let's say we go 1,000. So we got 10x in solar terawatt hours and wind goes up to 788 that we had seen before and we preserved the hydro as we had earlier. Now, if you really were to then add up all of this, it doesn't add up to 3500 terawatt hours. You need a little bit of at least in a good fraction of the natural gas to be with carbon capture which can then serve as a firming ability for the solar and wind to be there because we don't have the long duration storage. And some of the natural gas could be without carbon capture and we may still be able to make 80% of carbon free. This is what I call the 10x solar scenario. You can go up to 12x solar scenario, it's less carbon capture required and there's a cost associated with that. But then you need to go higher in solar, this is 12x and we keep everything else the same. Now we can play these games and we need some optimization which I haven't done but here is the basic regardless of which way you go. Let me just give you the key messages in this. Number one is energy efficiency to reduce total demand because if we can somehow get our buildings which is where most of electricity goes to somehow become much more efficient without compromising on the energy services and buildings are often called the lowest hanging fruit that will reduce the pressure on solar and wind deployment and getting to 80% carbon clean power. So energy efficiency, I didn't talk about the demand side but it's not just demand side management to balance the grid, that's important but this is to reduce the overall demand from the building side and the industrial side to reduce the terawatt hours that is needed to get to 80%. Preserve current nuclear and this is very important because if a gigawatt scale nuclear plan goes and it has 93% capacity factor that's a big burden on the other carbon free sources. And if you can try adding some new nuclear by reducing the cost that would be fabulous because that is high low land use, high energy density fuel that can be used for clean power not withstanding nuclear waste and other issues which we can get into the discussion. Aggressive deployment of solar and wind and we saw that 10x or 12x of solar and the wind is also growth we can increase the wind deployment as well but there is a need for natural gas for balancing the grid because we don't have the long duration storage yet and that will start coming up about 2027, 2028 or so but we don't have it at scale by 2030. So we need the natural gas for balancing grid and some fraction of the natural gas needs to be CCS. I was fascinated by the director capture discussion that Sally proposed and that could be one of the options. Nevertheless, it is carbon capture of some kind and a carbon infrastructure and finally, whoops, and so this is the key message. So yes, we need transmission lines for solar and wind to get the solar and wind to where the loads are but let's not ignore the carbon infrastructure the CO2 pipeline infrastructure and the sequestration infrastructure. And today we have FERC which is regulating and permitting the natural gas and the transmission lines but no one is doing the CO2 pipelines. The only the department of transportation does it for the safety and FERC does not regulate CO2 pipelines and we need to give FERC authority to do that if you wanted to interstate, et cetera but within the states, the states have to take the mandate to under the clean energy standards that the Biden administration is proposing but the key message is that yes, there will be a lot of solar and wind we need the transmission lines let's not forget the nuclear part let's focus on energy efficiency and you need a carbon management infrastructure not just for the 80% by 2030 but if you are to get to net zero we definitely need a carbon management infrastructure. Let me stop there. Thank you for your attention. Happy to answer some questions. Thank you, Arun. Let me just ask a couple of very on point questions then we can turn to an open discussion. One question from John Fox is what distribution and transmission changes do you think are needed to realize the goals that you've just been talking about? Yeah, this has been addressed quite a bit in the Princeton study and the various other studies. Definitely we need the transmission lines to be built between where the wind is which is a lot in the Midwest and the load centers which is in the West and the Chicago area and the East Coast those transmission lines need to be built there's no question about that as well as the transmission lines from where the solar is which is more on the South side and the various load centers. Now, I must add a little bit that building transmission lines is very, very important because it reduces the cost but it's not trivial. There are non-technical issues involved and trying to get it permitted aligning the federal, the state and the local organizations, the governance is very, very important. So it is absolutely the right thing to do but it's a non-trivial thing as we have seen in the last decade in trying to get transmission lines built with DOE leaning into this and still hasn't happened. Okay, you know, there are a lot of goals that have been bandied about since President Biden took office. Most recently, we heard that his goal for the US overall is a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 to 2030. And I just wanna, I wonder if you can try to connect that to your scenario here of 80% decarbonization 2030 because in the 14 years from 2005 to 2019 the US reduced its emissions by about 12%. That's good. But that means in the next nine years we need to go the net remaining 38%. So is this a consistent scenario to yours? Is this more ambitious or is this apples and oranges? I think it's consistent towards a net zero by 2050 but 50% is obviously not gonna be easy. The first thing you want is a 80% reduction in the emissions or 80% of the clean power coming from clean sources in the electricity sector because we have an opportunity of electrifying transportation and that is picking up right now and on the at least the light duty one on the long haul trucking. I think hydrogen can play a very important role in this and but then you have to look at where the hydrogen comes from. 95% of the hydrogen today comes from natural gas and so they again you would need carbon capture. So you come to the same point that you need a carbon management infrastructure. There are issues of course, a lot of emissions from cement and steel and industrial sector, petrochemicals as well as in the food and agriculture. And it is again, if you really want to decarbonize the cement and the steel there's a lot of very interesting ideas being pursued in coming up with cement that is green, that's all fantastic but if you want to do that 50% by 2030 you got to capture the CO2 and that capture cost has to be really low and the same thing with steel. So if you are to get to a net zero economy by 2050 or 50% reduction by 2030 I think it is safe to say that we will need a carbon management infrastructure and that is the point I'm trying to make out here in addition to the electricity decarbonizing the electricity and decarbonizing other sectors. At some point we need to capture the CO2 and do something with it. Okay, I'd like to turn to a general discussion now between, it brings Sally back in so we're moving on from the phase of individual presentations and questions about that. Sally and Rune, if I'm asking a question to one of you the other one should feel free to add to the discussion just because I direct a question to somebody doesn't mean that they're the only ones to answer that. And I'd like to try to diversify the nature of our discussion here a little bit. And I first like to turn to electric vehicles. Which of course are not part of the generation system yet but that's a major part of the the Biden administration strategy is to move transportation into electricity. So let's start with a question for Sally. Focusing on electric vehicles. I want to ask you how you move from 2021 to 2020 2045 that's 19 years from now from a nearly all petroleum powered fleet to totally electric. One reason some may be skeptical is that it currently takes about 15 years to turn over the US car fleet. So help us understand how we can realistically why your findings are realistic in that context. Yeah, so I mean, I think transportation is a lot in that. I mean, if you look at light duty most projections say that the electric vehicles in the light duty sector will be cost competitive you know, 2025, you know, certainly by 2035 that it'll actually be cheaper. So I think that you've got the economics working for you on the light duty sector. I think for heavy duty, particularly for really carrying heavy loads around I think other options are very interesting like hydrogen in particular, you know it's significant hydrogen could significantly reduce the weight on the truck you'd need to devote to carrying around your fuel and delivering your fuel and so forth, you know, as compared to batteries. So I think there are going to be different solutions in different parts, but I know that there are also states are imposing either, you know, restrictions on sort of future internal questions, sales or their incentives. So I think the combination of the real economics of it just getting cost competitive combined with incentives and so many more new offerings. I mean, it's incredible how I mean you can get your electric SUV, you know. So I think in the light duty area of the transportation sector, it's, you know except for certain, I mean I think we're going to have to pay a lot of attention to equity and equal access to not only, you know new cars, EVs and so forth, but also to charging infrastructure, particularly in high density areas where people don't have garages. I would like to see a lot more workplace charging. I think that there's a really big opportunity if you could have, you know, large garages where you have charging infrastructure that could also then provide vehicle to grid services in an integrated coordinated way. I think that's an interesting thing, which could also help with some of the equity issues to make sure that everybody's got access to low emission transportation. So hopefully that answered some of your question, Charlie. Yeah, let me just follow up by saying that one of the policies that the Biden administration's proposed is expansion of the charging network or, you know, federal assistance with expanding the charging network. And just to play the devil's advocate for a minute, it seems that one of Tesla's successes has been building an expansive fast charging network. Volkswagen seems to be replicating that success through the back door by combining its penalty for the diesel gate with building out the charging network. So does that suggest that maybe that is not the best place for the federal government to focus its energies in building charging? You know, I, you know, I mean, the good thing about a gas station today is you can just drive into a gas station and, you know, it can be, you know, an SO statement, a Chevron station, it can be Chevron station, it can be whatever and you can just drive into there and it's, you know, fast and convenient. You know, I favor a model that it doesn't really matter which station you go to if you wanna charge up and to the extent that, you know, that there are sort of boutique solutions for different fleets. I don't know that that makes any sense. It doesn't seem like it's gonna be nearly as efficient as if you could have, you know, charging stations that, you know, are equally accessible for everyone. You know, on yet, having said that though, I really applaud, you know, all the companies have been very aggressive getting out there, getting the cars, getting charging stations. So, you know, I think that, you know, the investments today have been catalytic and made it really possible for this, you know, really explosive growth in EV. So, you know, I applaud everything that's taken together to this point. I think looking to the future, you know, we should think carefully about, you know, what's gonna be lowest cost, most convenient, and lowest cost, always has to do with efficient use of infrastructure and efficient use of, you know, land resources dedicated to things. So, I think we need to think more about how we're gonna make that work. We could jump in. Go ahead and run. Yeah, so the real question is, what is the role of the government? I think that's what you're asking. And look, I think if you go back in history and ask, you know, what did the United States do to electrify everyone? There was a Rural Electrification Act of 1933. And the reason that was built is otherwise it was not business friendly to electrify rural communities. And I think you could have the same question being asked today. What is the role of the government in charging? An access to charging facilities. And, you know, it's nice to sit in Menlo Park and have some, you know, Tesla in the charging stations in the Sharon Heights thing, but that's all great. But when it gets to 50, 60% penetration of electric vehicles on the ground, that's not gonna be enough. And the access to clean energy services is an important thing. Now, that's where the federal government has to come in to say that access needs to be equitable. And if there's some incentives that are required to the businesses, it's still neat, you know, it needs to be a business operation to make it sustained. But it needs to, there needs to be some governance on the federal government to make sure that people have access to it. That's a very good point. And something Sally said, actually the interoperability of the various systems, obviously one reason they don't do that now, or that it's restricted is that that helps justify the capital investment of putting in the charging station if you can capture the customers. But if we look back in history, I remember when I was at the University of Illinois, there was the story of Quincy, Illinois, which had four sets of telephone poles going down the street because there were four companies selling electricity to customers. And one of the great innovations, which is not very original, I guess, was to make one set of poles, make interoperability, make it so that it was easy for folks to share the same system, same with our telephone network. That would be a policy change to make all of the charging stations have the ability to be used by anyone. I think it's a good example of something that can be done without. The same with the internet. I mean, there was ARPANET, there was BitNet and all, and then became the internet, which was sort of bringing all the, that's why it was called the internet. So those are great examples of how the government can take a step without actually spending great resources. Okay, so let me focus back on other parts of the electric sector. We don't have a lot of time here, but Arun, do you think we currently have the technology? I'm focusing on the technology to be able to fully decarbonize the grid without substantially raising the cost of providing electricity. Or are we assuming in breakthroughs that we always talk about, well, let's assume that the Amian batteries get down to $50 a kilowatt hour or even lower. What are we assuming, which of course may or may not happen when we talk statistically about this? Yeah, I mean, as I mentioned, if you, the higher the penetration of the renewals you need, the lower the cost of the storage unit we need. And we really, except for pump hydro and compressed air, we don't have the large scale storage solutions yet at scale. Now, if there was something that had been deployed today, the long duration storage, I can imagine that by 2030, there'll be a lot of it at scale. And so you can then imagine that to take place, but we don't have that today. So I think trying to develop alternative approaches because at the end of the day, the grid has to provide reliability. And Sally showed all the fluctuations in the demand and the fluctuations in generation as well. And some way to be able to manage and provide flexibility for the grid to manage those fluctuations is absolutely critical. Some of it is demand side management. There's no question about it, but that may not be all that we can do. And in fact, that would be a risky option to have only one. And so which is why I think what we have as an infrastructure today is a gas infrastructure. And I know there are emissions associated with that. That's why a storage solution with using gas that is as a storage medium with carbon to make it carbon free would be an option I think certainly worth looking at because we could do that today. But it needs the policy to be able to have the policy to be able to capture it, some kind of policy help, as well as to build the infrastructure. And I think in this infrastructure bill that we're talking about, I hope there is not only room for transmission line build out and the charging infrastructure build out which there seems to be, but also a carbon network build out and a 45 Q, which is the tax credit for carbon which is elevated to a point that are gonna actually start initiating and catalyzing a business on that carbon management. I guess gas is storage. Are you referring to natural gas as storage? Yes, I'm referring to natural gas. Now you could convert that to hydrogen, okay? You can, but electrolyzer cost has to come down. And today it's about $500, $600 a kilowatt. It's projected to come down, but it's not there yet. The cost of producing hydrogen from electricity, from electrolyzers is about $3 to $5 a kilogram. And now you take steam and reforming and capture the carbon is $1.50, $1.60 a kilogram. So it's not quite there yet. So it needs some time for it to come down in cost. Sal, you have any remarks on that comment? Although I have another question for you. No, I think we made a lot of good points, Sal. Okay, so I'm gonna ask you about CCS, which is a key to your analysis and your presentation earlier on. And so can you give me a sense? You talked about $200, $800. And you also talked about the capital costs of CCS, carbon capture and storage. Right. What is the cost that you're basically assuming in the models of the cost per ton of CO2? Right, so our costs are around $75 a ton of CO2 for capture from a natural gas combined cycle plant. That's the assumption in the model, which is very consistent with best understanding of based on coal plants. Coal plants, they're two coal plants with carbon capture. And natural gas is somewhat easier. And there's also a lot less carbon anyway. So those are the best current understanding of what the cost will be for natural gas combined cycle capture. Now there are other technologies coming along. A net power company that has a completely different kind of power generation cycle that uses a super critical CO2. They've just announced a partnership where they're going to be installing two 250 megawatt oxy fired systems, which are very interesting because not only, not only is the benefit that you can eliminate CO2 emissions, but you can also eliminate all the other criteria pollutants. It's fired with oxygen instead of air. Oxygen instead of air. And there's a hundred percent capture of everything, nox, all of the emissions. So I think that's interesting. So those are our assumptions. Our cost of electricity with carbon capture and natural gas combined cycle is 7 to 8 cents a kilowatt hour. I'm not talking about the cost of electricity. I'm talking about the cost of taking a ton. No, no, I know. And I gave you that number. That's the 70 to 80 dollars a ton. And then, and then the cost of electricity, you know, for that, the levelized cost of electricity is around 7 to 80 kilowatt hour. So it's definitely more, more expensive. You know, there's a big issue though. Is it affordable? Okay. So these cost optimal models says in the perfect world, if you could do planning and execute according to the plan, that this is the portfolios I demonstrated were the cheapest possible way to do it. Now that's the perspective of a top down systems level perspective. Like if you had a, you know, an integrated, you know, a regulated utility that had everything under under its control, and it just wanted to sell the cheapest electricity. You know, you know, you know, you know, you know, those are the kind of solutions represented by these models. Now the reality is, is that the electricity, the system doesn't operate that way. There are all kinds of markets. There's, you know, there's the day ahead market. There's an hour ahead market. There's a spot market. And under those situations, you know, the renewables, you know, basically bid in, you know, zero marginal costs. So it's very hard for something in that kind of market to be able to see the power to compete. So, so the individual project operator, you know, like an independent power producer, for example, they have a whole different set of economics, which makes nuclear look, look expensive. That makes CCS look expensive. Even natural gas combined cycle expensive. But it's because of the structure of the markets and the markets are not replicating what, what we're going to do with the electricity system. So I think as we go forward and we have to consider the entire system costs integrated over the whole course of the year, where we're really relying on these dispatchable resources, we're going to have to think differently. You know, and people are looking at resource adequacy or capacity payments, but I'm not even sure that's just the right model. I think that's also probably adds cost. That isn't necessary. If we could figure out a way to drive the markets to more closely replicate what you find in these models, which tell you the lowest cost way to do it. Well, another way of looking at it is that looking at the social cost of carbon, which is very approximately $15 a ton, which in fact I would consider to be almost the same as $75 a ton. Right. That suggests that if $75 is correct. Then that's a cost effective way to deal with carbon emissions. Oh, I think absolutely. Yeah. And I agree with you. And if you look at the 45 Q tax credit, you know, you can get $50 a ton. If it's in the saline aquifer. Or for CO2 storage. So that offsets a significant fraction of those costs. I mean, still not, it's not cost neutral, but it can go a long way towards helping, you know, if it would be, you know, very beneficial if, if it could be a little bit higher. Cause all of a sudden I think we would see the sort of gates opening to natural gas combined cycle plants with CCS being, you know, we economically viable art options, even within the kind of market structures that the electricity system operates in today. Perfect. So let me, I guess we have a little more than five minutes left. Let me ask a question on a different topic. Although certainly related to what we're talking about. Let me address this to a room, although I'm interested in hearing Sally's comments as well. So net metering here in the West and extremely popular. This is the regulatory approach where consumers with solar on the rooftop, pay for their annual net consumption. For instance, letting solar generate in the summer offset electricity from the grid in the winter. This has been criticized as being a subsidy from the less well off who do not have solar just as a generalization to richer folks with solar on the roof. How do you see this settling out in the long run? Well, that's a, I guess a billion dollar question. Several billion dollars. Look, I think that our equity issues. With, with net metering. I think we just have to, because the people who can own solar. The wealthy community. In fact, we have a paper now. That from Roger Gopal and I, and a few others are writing. On the disparity of solar. Rooftop solar is certainly, you know, there's a income level distribution, but even community solar could be focused on, you know, the census track is showing the high income level. So yes, there is a issue. And I think we need to just accept the fact that, you know, if you really want to address equity. This, this cross subsidy or the subsidy from the less wealthy to the. Can we figure out ways. To finance. In a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a, in a equitable way. Solar deployment. At the community level, maybe not at the rooftop level, maybe that's not the, what makes economic sense. But at the community level. In the lower income, you know, communities. And I think that's going to be, because if you do it behind the substation meter, you can share the electricity in that community. And so that is something that I think is certainly what looking at, that's what we are looking at right now. That is what the disparity is. So that people who are less wealthy, it's not just they get their solar on the rooftop, but they get access to solar electricity. And that's very important. And so I would look at it. Not just as a, as whether we should fix the, the subsidy that is being provided, but how to address the needs of the lower income people. And that should be the role of the government. Do you have anything to add to that Sally? Yeah. You know, to me, electricity, clean water, sanitation, internet access. These are, should be, these make most sense as shared resources. They're foundational to quality of life, safety, health, and so forth. And we should also try to find a way to make them have the lowest possible cost. And have the highest possible reliability. And, and to the extent that having rooftop solar is consistent with that vision. Meaning that the planning for rooftop solar is integrated into distribution planning and distributed storage planning. Integrated together with the, you know, the transmission level, you know, generation system, you know, I think it makes sense. But I personally don't think it's at all fair that, that, that people have rooftop solar. And they don't have to pay for nighttime power. You know, I just don't that nighttime power in California is going to be much more expensive than daytime power. And the idea that you, you know, contribute more daytime power, which is actually easier to get and way cheaper to get if you get it in the utility scale solar. And then, you know, get free nighttime, but I just don't think that's fair at all. And, and, and at the very least, if there's net metering, it should be based on the real value of, you know, like real time value of that power, power to, to the grid, which might be very, very low during the middle of the day. Because there's already so much solar on the system. I mean, we're already curtailing, you know, solar, you know, as we speak, it gets curtailed quite a bit, especially this time of the year. So I, you know, I might not, that might not be a popular opinion, but you know, I think the arguments about fairness and shared infrastructure all argue for, you know, I'm much more coordinated strategy for deployment of resources within the distribution system and coordinated together with the utility scale assets. Like I said, we had the, the CEO of China power and life here speaking at pre-court a few years ago. And I asked him about this and he said, well, the way we do it is we pay the wholesale price for the solar that people are generating. So in the middle of the day, when everybody's generating solar, you don't get much for your solar. And the night that you're doing exactly what you're saying, Sally, excuse me around for interrupting. No, I was just going to say that I'm so glad to see that the Biden administration has taken what is broadly called environmental justice and equity and elevated the issue to a point that has never been done before to address exactly these kinds of issues. This is a, should be a right to get access to clean energy services, just like we have right to get sanitation and exactly what Sally said. And this needs to be in a nationwide and we are seeing communities in California that are behind. So I'm glad someone raises this issue of net metering because it's really raises the issue of environmental justice. Absolutely true. Let me, let me, I'm sorry we're running out of time, but I'm going to ask one final question. If we could be brief here as they say on the radio, because we're time is limited. And I'd like to address this to a room first and because you were at the lead, the head of the RV program some years ago, not that many years ago. So I'm not, I'm not sure how much money has gone to federal energy R&D over the past decades, but it's quite a bit. What do you think is the most stunning success resulting from that R&D? If you want to limit yourself to RP, that's fine. Well, I mean, the lithium ion battery revolution that we've seen a lot of that was funded by research. And these are materials issues that have to be figured out safety. I think that's certainly a huge amount of R&D that went into it. You know, we should, we forget about the energy efficiency part, but, you know, the LED R&D on LED and bringing the cost down at a rate even faster than lithium ion batteries and solar to the point that LEDs now are cost effective. Those kinds of technologies, very, very important. There's, you know, I can go on and on how I don't think you have enough time for looking at all kinds of grid related issues, power electronics, but I'll stop right here. There are many, many sectors where the R&D has really helped, but one has to be careful about expectations of the outcome of that in a few years. If you have short term expectation, the government R&D will produce short term outcomes, but that's not the purpose of the government R&D. It really needs to be both short, mid and the long term. And those things don't appear within a few years. That takes decades to come. Can I just say one thing really quickly? If you look, you know, really it was the 1970s, the first really big portion to clean energy, wind, solar, EVs, batteries, all those got their start then. And it took them a while to get going, but it's incredible. I mean, in 10 years, we've gone from a time when it felt like there weren't solutions to clean energy to now thinking that 80% reduction is not so hard. I mean, that's an incredible thing. And it's not any one individual or any one program. It's the collective global research endeavor that has come together to deliver something that is near miraculous, I think, and testament to the role of innovation and the public sector and the private sector working together. That is so true. And such a positive statement. I feel the same way about having been hung around this, this energy nexus for a long time. That's a very, very good point, Sally. And the government is supposed to invest in long-term things, not things that pay off quickly. We have other sectors to do that. Anyway, thank you both for sharing your thoughts about all these very, very important, interesting and definitely current topics today. And I'd like to thank the entire audience. I'm sorry we didn't get to all of your questions. There are a lot of them there. Please feel free to follow up with the speakers or anyone else after this. Thank you for joining us. And Liang, do you have any last words? Thank you again, Charlie, Sally, Arun, for this great conversation and presentation. And I'd also like to thank Wakila Wilkie, bits and words program manager, Evan Schott, and our Zoom tech guy to get us organized and all the previous panelists for the last five webinars we put together. So this concludes this webinar series. I want to thank you for attending. And enjoy this webinar and all the recordings will be available at the bits and words website. If you're interested in our future events and also the professional on-demand training opportunities, so-called energy innovation and emerging technology, you can find more information at our website. Hope you have a nice day and be safe.