 Jay Fidel. This is Keeping the World Company. And today we're going to ask the age-old question, can Germany save Ukraine? What would it have to do, and can it do that? And for this discussion, we have our co-host, Tim Appichella. We have our special guest, Jean Rosenthal, who joins us from far away. And we have Manfred Hennigsen, who joins us from close by. And we're all ready to discuss the situation in Germany and whether Germany can help Ukraine, assuming the United States does not. So let me start with you, Jean. What is the general feeling in Germany these days about helping Ukraine? Has it been supportive up to this point? Germany is a very enlightened country, a very wealthy country. It is basically taking the lead in Europe, occupies the center geographically of Europe, and in general has a profile politically somewhat like the United States today, where a growing authoritarian party is objecting to some of the same things that the MAGA party is objecting to in the United States, namely more refugees, more dilution, if you want to put it that way, of the pure population of Germany in a kind of throwback to the 1930s. However, that said, it's a healthy democracy, and it has now in a sense pivoted to Ukraine, whereas before the war, it seemed very receptive to Russian energy, but that's not on the table right now. So it is, in essence, since the time of Angela Merkel, I think, the leading country in the European Union, and recognizing that Donald Trump may be possibly the next president again, I think they're laying the groundwork for taking the point on supplying Ukraine and supporting Ukraine in the European Union, and I'm sure Manfred has a lot to say about that. Before we get to Manfred, I want to ask Tim a question. For this discussion, we're making the assumption the United States is not going to help. How valid is that assumption? How valid is that assumption now, and as and when Trump gets back into the Oval Office? Well, Trump is in the Oval Office right now, unofficially. He's influencing the Ukraine policy. Mike Johnson, Speaker of the House, is doodly following what Trump wants, and that is to keep any funding bill off the floor for vote. So we have a quagmire there. Will the Love Jam break? Yes, I think it will, but how long that takes? One's not certain. So, as Gene mentioned, I mean, Germany is moving forward fast. I believe they've paid up to $28 billion so far in military aid to Ukraine. A lot of that's in the form of ammunition and vehicles. They're working on planes for Ukraine. So these are positive milestones, if you will. I think Gene mentioned that should Donald Trump become president, we could then expect little or no help from the United States, and I think Donald Trump will have his grasp around Congress deep enough, strong enough that a $60 billion commitment that we were hoping to get approved will not get approved, and the Europe will have to take up the slack and fund it greater and get more logistics to Ukraine, including ammunition. We're here in March. We're going to be in April very soon. There's only a few months left before we get to the crunch of the November election, however that goes, and it doesn't, it's not clear how it's going to go, but my question to you now is how important is timing here? Some people say timing is of the essence, and we've been dragging, we the country, the United States have been dragging its heels for a long time on this, standing in the way of Biden's efforts to help Ukraine. How critical is timing now? Very critical. Absolutely. Now, some of the reports, you know, the territories gained by Russia, you have some generals opining that these regions are way out. They're not critical battlefields. We, you know, those reports are very discouraging to hear, given the fact that Ukraine was advancing before winter, and winter came and their advancement during the summertime of last year wasn't as robust as news reports had hoped or predictions had hoped. So, yeah, I mean, logistics are a critical part of the battlefield, and if the supply of ammunition and man, you know, soldiers is, you know, becoming sparse, then that's going to have a horrible impact, and Russia will make significant gains if that occurs. But right now, although we hear news reports of less supply of ammunition, I think they still have supply, and I know the United States came up with a $300 million savings, and that money is being, you know, dedicated for the purchase of ammunition. And so the supply chain still is occurring, but perhaps not to the degree it was, say, a year ago. Yeah, one more point on that is that, you know, after the fire and the attack in Crocus Hall, like it's only a week or 10 days ago, Putin immediately blamed Ukraine without being very persuasive about that. And then he upped his attacks on Ukraine, and a perfect self-provocation. And I wonder, your thoughts, does that change the time frame? He's using the terror attack on the Crocus City Hall as a way to justify his attacks on Ukraine and to increase and step them up. Does that change the timing issue? This question for Manfred or for me? You. I'd have to say, yeah, it does change things a bit. You know, I think to get to part of their question is Putin is blaming Ukraine for an obvious reason. The United States tried to warn Russia of this pending attack, and it was completely ignored. Putin went on record to say that this was blackmail, and the United States was trying to create chaos in Russia. So those warnings were ignored, and lo and behold, there was a terrorist attack of great magnitude, and now Putin has to pivot with this normal and usual propaganda on how this was almost US sanctioned attack on Russia. But it was, you know, he's pinned into Ukraine, but through Ukraine he's tried to tie in the United States. Yeah, you know, and in fact, there was an article in The Times, an opinion piece a couple of days ago, where one of the opinion writers suggested that Putin was somehow responsible, with the FSB was responsible for this, and it's just another provocation. Putin doesn't care about life, human life, and the provocation is more important for him. So he might have been responsible. His agencies might have been responsible, such as they were in various terror attacks in Chechnya years ago, where he used those attacks to enhance and consolidate his own power. Anyway, it's part of his history, and this, you know, has to be taken in light of all that. Okay, Manfred, we're going to come to you now. I really need to know from you how strong Germany is, how strong it is in terms of its industrial base. You know, we had a show not too long ago about the ability of Germany to help rebuild Ukraine. That's kind of at the beginning of the attacks against Ukraine, where we looked for sort of comparative expertise in rebuilding after a war. And the thought was we would bring some engineers in there from the U.S. and elsewhere, and we would rebuild all those buildings and infrastructure that the Russians have destroyed. And we had one German guest, actually from the University of Hawaii, who spoke about what happened in, I think, was the Ruhr Valley in Germany after World War II, where they were brilliant in terms of rebuilding infrastructure and destroyed towns and villages. So I wonder about that. I wonder about the ability of the German industrial complex to provide ammunition, to provide missiles, and Germany to provide money, especially with the apparent contention that Jean described. Manfred? Well, look, the most recent poll that you had in Germany about the support for the Ukraine is very strong and positive. The industrial complex, even though you have strikes in Germany, but most of them seem to be ending. But as you know, Germany moved now in place number three in the size of the economy after the U.S. and China replacing Japan as number three. So the capacity is there, and one of the biggest factories, ammunition factories, is now opening a new factory in the Ukraine itself. So what you have to understand is Germany is, as Jean mentioned before, at the center, not only of geographically of Europe, but it's the center of the political configuration. It has moved in a situation that is quite unusual because it is now without any enemies. There is no enemies, at least no enemies in the West, the South. Germany has become the leading power in the EU. And I think people are aware if the catastrophe should happen, that Trump will become president again, Germany has to take over the lead position completely. And I think there is a problem with that because the leading party, Schultz's party, the Social Democrats, are still suffering from this emotional attachment to detente German attitudes towards the Soviet Union. There is these emotional memories left. On the one hand, on the other hand, what you have now, not only in Germany, but in the Eastern part of the EU, the Baltic States, Poland, and with the exception of Hungary, the fear of Russia has grown tremendously. So in addition to the Ukraine story, it is now the general European story of being threatened by Putin's Russia. And the madness of the ISIS attack recently, and the madness of the interpretation of that attack by Putin, has made this fear even stronger. But I think, as of now, Europe is afraid of Putin's Russia moving beyond Ukraine. And what you have all over the place is the reinforcement of military budgets. And there's one interesting thing that has to do with the Taurus missile. Macron wanted to push Schultz to deliver the Taurus missiles to the Ukraine. But Schultz refuses so far to do that because he says there's a long training period involved with the management of these missiles. And that has to be done in Germany because he does not want to send German soldiers to the Ukraine to train Ukrainians in the management of these missiles because he feels if he does do that, that would be interpreted by Putin as another sign of NATO involvement in the war. Now you have this very interesting proposal by the former prime minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, who is the foreign minister today, namely to deliver British missiles in exchange for Germany providing Great Britain with the Taurus missiles. So now I don't know how far this exchange proposal of Cameron has gone so far, but it may be that Great Britain will deliver missiles and Germany will repay Great Britain by delivering Taurus missiles to Great Britain. So what you have, when you're looking at this situation in Europe at this point, you have an overwhelming support for the Ukraine despite some sentimental, I don't know how to call that, reflections within the Social Democratic Party in Germany of the deterrent policies between Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt's Germany towards the Soviet Union. These people would be soft on Russia. Yes. You talked about the Taurus missiles and I'd like to explore that a little bit. That's a German product. That's advanced technology designed and manufactured in Germany. So Olaf Scholz is not particularly excited about sending it to Ukraine for reasons that Yeah. So in the deal that Cameron is thinking about, the UK would get the Taurus missiles in exchange for British missiles, but that doesn't mean that Taurus missiles will go to Ukraine. It means that the Taurus missiles will go to replace the missiles, the British missiles that the UK is giving up. So at the end of the day, this advanced technology will not wind up in Ukraine, right? Right. That's too bad, because it's supposed to be a highly effective weapon. Yes. On the other hand, you have to realize you have this German nervousness about provoking Putin by delivering a weapon system that may reach the enemy's parts of Russia. Yeah. It doesn't sound like it's really a question of training people. It sounds like the same reluctance that we've experienced with Joe Biden when he talked about when they asked him for fighter planes, and he said, we have to train everybody. And so far, that really hasn't come to pass. Well, the training issue, I think, is a very important issue, especially with this advanced technology. So for that reason, it takes months for people to be trained, and they would have to come to Germany in order to do it in Germany, because Germany does not want to send German soldiers to Ukraine. Well, let me ask you about that. Germany is pretty close to Ukraine, and Germany's interests are to really well justify to protect Ukraine. Why not? You can say that will make Putin angry. So what? The fact is that you have to remember Germany and Russia were involved in two wars, World War I and World War II, and World War I, Germany I and World War II, the Soviet Union won with the Western Allies on the Western Front. So there are different psychological and political dimensions involved in this. You know, the United States is the only country in the world that has never been attacked from the outside with the exception of 9-11. So these psychological dimensions are very, very important to remember. That's a major difference between Europe and, well, especially Germany and the United States. Well, it's troublesome, because I think, you know, as you make that assumption, so does Putin. So he knows there's a glass ceiling on all of this, and he'll take advantage of that. But let me ask you one other question, Manfred, and this is something that I saw and read about the budget in Germany. The defense budget in Germany was 50 billion, and the German army was declining. It's a volunteer army, and it was really declining badly in terms of its efficacy, its training, and the, you know, the general quality of its soldiers. And it didn't have a lot of money to replace equipment, renew, repair equipment, and so forth. It was in the neighborhood of 50 billion euros a year or two ago. And then, when this began to become threatening, Olaf Schulz had them increase that to 100 billion. Okay, that's where it is now. But the 100 billion has not yet been spent, and the German army has not yet been brought up to snuff, and the German weapons have not yet been brought up to snuff. I find it interesting that there's not enough weapons in the UK, not enough weapons in Germany, so as to require those two countries to make an exchange instead of, you know, manufacturing more weapons. So I put to you the German war machine, if you will, is really behind the curve here in terms of its army. Yeah, go ahead, talk about it. Talk about it. Well, because it's part of the general pacifism that took over in West Germany, and certainly after the end of the Cold War that became reinforced this tendency. Germany had become a pacifist country and did not invest in the military. That has changed now, and the new Minister of Defense, Pistorius, I think, has really set in motion all of these changes that are necessary in personnel, with regard to personnel, as well with regard to the... Yeah, well, I heard you say set in motion. Set in motion does not mean achieving it, you know, and the same thing with that $50 billion the EU was going to put in, and Germany was going to participate heavily in that up to two or three percent of its GDP, but that hasn't happened yet. That money has not been marshaled or sent to Ukraine. And so we're in the process, of course, and we've started thinking about it, but we're not doing it yet. Am I right? Well, it takes some time. So for that reason, I am not concerned about that it will not happen. It will happen because the urgency is understood. And in that sense, you know, the political establishment in Germany was the exception of the AFD, whose role, Gene, somewhat exaggerated. I don't think the AFD has reached the MAGA dimensions of the Republican Party. The AFD is a threat. And we will see at the European Parliament elections in June, and then the three state elections in East Germany in October, how strong they are. And I think they are losing some, but they're still around 20 percent. In that sense... That's pretty serious. We have to go to Gene now so she can defend herself, having been charged with exaggeration. Go for it, Gene. Well, no, I didn't mean to suggest that the AFD has taken over the Social Democratic Party in Germany as MAGA has taken over the Republican Party here. Although that's not a good analogy because the Republican Party is pretty conservative anyway. But what I did want to bring out is that just a couple of days ago, Putin gave a speech for the world, of course, and for the West, that he thought it was ridiculous that Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltics were so nervous about Russia attacking them if they prevailed in Ukraine. He said, oh, no, we would never do that. On the other hand, in the latter part of his speech, he said, however, any countries in Europe which are supplying fighters and missiles to Ukraine, we reserve the right to attack wherever we are threatened, meaning basically to Germany, among others, that you supply Ukraine with these advanced missiles and we will attack your facilities. So he was talking out of both sides of his mouth there, saying, no, Russia will not attack, but Russia will defend itself by, of course, attacking. So this gives cause to Schultz and Sunak and everybody with respect to just how far will Putin go because he plays his poker game like some sort of eccentric who drops in and is unpredictable just as Trump does. And I will bring out something else too. Every time Putin has thought he was going to achieve something by invading Ukraine and then rattling his rockets, all he has succeeded in doing is strengthening his enemies because now Europe is actually taking seriously by Putin's behavior and also Trump's behavior when he was president that they are going to have to defend themselves. And this is about the rearming of Europe and it's beginning now. So there is a whole bunch of new factors being brought into play here, which is bringing us actually closer to war, but we live in a time of nationalism and polarization and that should give us pause as to what the future holds. No, one thing, Manfred, I'd just like to touch on is that we're operating here in this discussion on the notion that Germany would be the leader industrially and weapons-wise and money-wise in dealing with Putin. By the way, we used to say that you could tell when Putin was lying he was moving his mouth, but maybe Gene has added a refinement to that. He's lying when he's talking at both sides of his mouth. Anyway, so my question to you is it's nice to think that Germany will make itself the point on all of this, but that's kind of strange because you have other countries in Europe, other members of the EU. Why does it have to be Germany? Why don't they get together on things? Why doesn't a group of NATO countries or NATO in general participate in Germany? Really appreciate the Germany's at the head of this, but what about France? Well, look, the EU is the political center of Europe and at the center of the center is Germany. It's not France. And I can only hope that the relationship between Germany and France remains as strong as it has been since the early period of the Cold War in the 50s. And it's sometimes challenged by Macron, who wants to move faster than the Germans do. He wants to add military dimension to the EU and Germany has been resistant because it wants to retain NATO as the defense umbrella, not only for itself, but for the rest of Europe. So you have these tensions between, well, I don't think they are, they are really critical tensions between Germany and France, but there are some disagreements about what should happen if the United States leaves, well, if the United States has Trump again as president and possibly leave NATO, should the EU in a way become the patron of the remnants of NATO, if that should ever happen. I don't think it will happen and I still don't think Trump will become president. Okay, I'd like to add to that is that Trump isn't president now, but we still are locked up. And that's because he has all this influence on a great number of the members of the House. And unless there's a real big change on that in both houses or a retention of liberal thinking in both houses, we'll have the same situation that we have now, even if Biden is the next president. So the United States cannot be counted on. And Tim, this discussion, we need to sort of put it together here. It seems to me, as you said a little while ago, that time is of the essence. It also seems to me that Europe has a problem getting together. It's nice to think that Germany could be at the point. Certainly it is theoretically capable of being at the point. It has made statements to suggest that it will be at the point, but that hasn't actually happened yet. And if that is the case, and time is of the essence, and we cannot count on the United States, and the ammunition is running short, and Putin is accelerating his attacks against Ukraine. This is not a happy story. What do you think? Oh, it's not a happy story. And I think there's a, you know, ultimately, there will be a political solution. And what form that will take is anyone's guess. Obviously, if you're Russia, you want to take as much land grab as you can before any kind of ceasefire settlement occurs, because the more land I grab, the more I have to negotiate with when it comes to a final settlement of borders. That's probably going to happen down the line. But when that happens is anyone's guess. I think what's critical here in the United States, as far as the politics is concerned, is you may have Democrats now back Speaker Mike Johnson. They're talking about backing him up because Mike Johnson agreed to extend, you know, the budget until September. And you have the Marjorie Taylor Greene is trying to suggest that maybe we throw him out for doing such a horrible thing as keeping the government running. So you may see on other issues such as Ukraine to say to Mike Johnson, hey, you know, we'll back you up in votes if you bring Ukraine to the floor for vote. Everyone wants it, and yours seems to be the roadblock preventing it from happening. And if that roadblock is because you're worried about getting thrown out as Speaker of the House, perhaps the Democrats will commit to backing you up and supporting you should that occur. You know, that actually raises an interesting question. Suppose things change in the United States, because Mike Johnson has made statements to suggest that he really thinks we ought to support Ukraine. And he's holding back because of the Trump influence. But suppose we clear that up. Suppose we wind up, you know, giving Ukraine, you know, weapons and money and support. That is going to be a beacon for everybody. What does that mean in terms of the contribution that have been promised from various countries, including Germany in Western Europe? How does that change the calculus? We actually do what we promise to do. I think what you have committed on the table is what you have committed on the table. It's a question is once those 54 billion from EU, whatever the number is, and the commitment of the 60 billion from the United States, the question is when those funds start to wind down, what's your next round of funding? And I think that's why the political solution is, you know, paramount. Perhaps Putin is not interested until the election here in the United States in November. He wants to see if Donald Trump, in fact, does become president. So that's his main ally in the Ukraine debacle. So I think the commitment, if it's passed the United States is on the table. And I think EU's commitments on the table. And I don't think there's any any retraction of those funds again to repeat myself is what after that, what after those funds are, are, you know, spent and they're winding down, what are the future commitments in the way of finance? Yeah, let me go to you, Manfred. Let's consider this, you know, your closing thoughts for the show. You know, what happens if the US comes back in? What happens to Europe and to Germany? Will this, you know, intention to help Europe be changed? Look, I think the strange behavior of the US Congress has sent warning signs to most European governments. And I think they have to come closer together. And they have ever been. And I think in that sense, you could say, Putin and Trump have helped Europeans to realize that they have to consolidate, you know, their union. They have to do more in order to become, for it to become stronger as there has ever been. So in that sense, it's very, for me, it sounds very optimistic for Europe. But what Tim is alluding to when he speaks about the political solution, it's interesting, you know, in the Social Democratic Party right now, there are people who are making that argument with regard to a political solution to the Ukrainian war. And the Greens and the Liberals, who are the other coalition partner of the Social Democrats, are strongly against it. They think talking about the political solution at this point means to support Putin. So what you have in Germany is a very fascinating situation that the Greens and the Liberals who are politically not really that close are the strongest supporter for the military support of the Ukraine. The Social Democrats are supporting also, but they are, that there's a division within the leadership of the party. And I think this division also reflects some hesitation within the Social Democratic Support group in the German population. They are afraid of the Putin's Russia. Nevertheless, though, I think people look to Germany as the economic leader, as a democracy, as you know, the emerging leader in all of this. And so we talk about the consolidation, yes, we're talking about the consolidation of Europe around this issue. We are assuming, we are believing, and I think it's a good conclusion that Germany will be the leader of that consolidation. Do you agree? And you see, the interesting thing about Germany today is, I mentioned that at the beginning, it is the first time in modern German history that there are no, it's not surrounded by any enemies. Germany is not, has no tensions with anyone in the east, west, the south or the north. That's unusual. So for that reason, it finds itself politically, psychologically, in every respect, you know, in really an exceptional leadership position. Let me go to Eugene. You know, there was a movie made about a pan-European orchestra two years ago. And it was like there were representatives from every country in Europe on this orchestra playing various roles, various instruments. Glenn Close was in the movie. And the orchestra collapsed because they just couldn't get together. They could not serve under a particular conductor. That was the essence of the movie. And so, you know, Europe is a complicated place. Europe has history and historical baggage that we, we in the United States, don't fully understand. Maybe you do. And I'm asking you to tell us whether you think there could be a viable and lasting consolidation so as to deal with Putin and Russia, or whether they will simply not be able to get together on stage. I think they're living in interesting times because, as I alluded to earlier, what Putin has done is throw a spanner into a well oiled machine and force that machine to think about how it needs to reconfigure itself in order to survive. And between Putin and Trump and their basically fascist challenges to Europe, which suffered greatly from a fascist challenge and learned from it more than anybody else in the world, Germany, this well oiled machine, or the European Union, this well oiled machine, has got to figure out how to reconfigure itself. We don't know what that form will take, but we do know that Trump was the instigator when he went to that meeting in Europe and shocked Macron and Merkel with his comments about NATO. Russia and Trump both have the same goal, and that is to weaken NATO. So what will replace NATO, as Manfred has said again and again? It has to be the European Union. So because of the external forces on Europe, which is now getting along with the various states are getting along with each other, and also we haven't discussed this, the bringing in of Scandinavia and the rearming of Russia's historic enemy, Sweden, with respect to Eastern Europe and who controls Eastern Europe, that is significant. I think what we are going to be seeing is a stronger European Union, a stronger mutual defense pact. In fact, I think the Scandinavian states have already come together on that for themselves in Northern Europe, and the development of a new emerging and very technologically sophisticated and modern polity on the European continent. And I think that Trump and Putin did not intend for that to happen, but that indeed is what is happening as to how long live did that will be. History will tell us, but it is a very viable alternative now and perhaps the only alternative. Yes. Okay, last question to you, Tim. Can they do it without the United States? Are we critical in all they've been dependent on us for a long time from the Marshall plan forward? Can they do it? Absolutely, they can. In fact, one small example is when the EU is trying to come up with this 54 billion funding package for Ukraine, you had the leader of Hungary, of Viktor Orban, was a tremendous roadblock. He was vetoing every effort, and every European leader, almost everyone, got Orban into a room and said, if you continue this, we're going to block you everywhere you move. You won't be able to move left or right, we're going to veto you everywhere we can. And Orban capitulated. He then allowed his vote to go through and you have the approval of EU's 54 billion for Ukraine, which is not chicken fee. 54 billion is a very strong commitment. And so with or without the United States, I think the EU finds a common cause to unify further. And that common cause is the threat of Putin and his aggressive behavior. Thank you, Tim Appichella. Thank you, Jean Rosenthal. Thank you, Manfred Henningson. This is a really important discussion and something we have to follow going forward. Aloha. If you liked this show, why don't you give us a like or subscribe to our channel? Thanks so much.