 Okay, good afternoon, good evening, everyone. It's a great pleasure to welcome you to SOAS for this evening's talk and discussion. For those of you that don't know me, my name is Graham Ware. I'm the new head of college of law, anthropology, and politics, and I've been here for three months. And one of the good things about starting a new job in an institution like SOAS is that you get to meet and to learn about some of the fantastic research that's going on in the university and to meet some of the esteemed guests who come to visit this institution and give it kind of world-class profile around the global South, and particularly in the region of Southeast Asia, of which myself, I'm also a scholar in that particular field. So I think today's talk opens up a whole range of debates around politics and political process, but also I think as well, and I'm hoping very much to hear from our guests today, very much thinking about and reading our guest profile, looking at ideas about how a kind of creative process around and reflection on the politics of a particular context and thinking about the cosmological underpinnings of political process and how that is played out, for example, through ideas about forgiveness, through ideas about writing as a particular process and the types of expressions that we hear today. So it's my great pleasure to be able to introduce Dr. Martheeda, who is going to present today, and her accolades are numerous, too much for me to talk about in this space of time, but just to kind of pull out a few of the highlights about our guest is that she's a renowned activist, a writer and a surgeon. She is a member of the Board of Independent Journal of Burma Studies. She's elected to the Board of Penn International in 2016, and she is currently the chair of Penn International's Writers in Prison Committee. And she is also the recipient of the Penn Barbara Goldsmiths Freedom to Write Award. And she's published numerous books, both in Burma and Burmese and in English. And she's also held fellowships at Brown, Brown University in the US, and the Radcliffe Institute of Advanced Studies at Harvard. So the list kind of goes on, but in particular, I think what's very inspiring and very interesting is the kind of basis and the subject matter about Martheeda's works. She spent time in the notorious insane prison from 1994, for endangering public peace at a time when she was suffering from tuberculosis. And she's also written about this in her kind of memoirs, written and translated in English in 2017 as prisoner of conscience, might step through insane. So this is a kind of opportunity to really kind of pin down and understand the work of Martheeda. And it's my great pleasure to welcome her here today. Thank you. Just to say that the format today as well is that there are also two of my colleagues, Professor Michael Jani, who's the chair of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, and he will share his comments and expertise on Myanmar. And the session as well is going to be moderated by the professor of practice in the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy, Ico Dodon, who is a journalist and works for Japan's public broadcaster, NHK. And this is a kind of co-hosted event both by the Department of Politics and International Studies and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. So a very warm welcome and I'm very much looking forward to this event. So thank you. Thank you, Graham, for the kind introduction. And thank you, Professor Jani, Politics Department and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies for hosting this event and making this possible. And I thank the audience for coming. It's such a show of enthusiasm and interest to this very important topic. And I'm a journalist myself, also a professor of practice at SOAS and a friend of Matida. And I'm very happy to be able to be on the same panel with Matida. As Professor Jani might also know, Matida is a known figure in Myanmar. So whenever I tell my friends in Yangon that I was going to see Matida, someone, my colleagues would say, so may I come with you? I will carry your tripod. And so I have to tell the person that I'm not going to film Matida, I'm going to have lunch with her. But that's the amount of the popularity that the Matida has and the respect she's garnered among the people of Myanmar. Because of her courage and commitment to bring about democracy to the country. And so we are very happy to have her here. And I think this is such an apt occasion to welcome Matida just two days away from the three years anniversary from the coup in 2021, where the military violently took down the democratically elected government under Aung San Suu Kyi. So this is such a valued opportunity to hear firsthand from someone like Matida, who is actually and literally living Myanmar's struggle for democracy. Let me just briefly explain how we plan this event. This evening, this will begin by Matida giving us a lecture for about 30 minutes. And then Mike will comment and share his comment, expert views regarding Matida's talk. This will be followed by 30 minutes conversation with Matida, with Mike as discussant, followed by questions and answers from the floor for the next 30 minutes. And so Matida, floor is yours. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, all of my friends and the colleagues. I really appreciate to be here at the time of the difficult and pretty much like critical also. This is the very hard time for all the Burmese and all the friends of Burma. So it's a very hard walk for me to finish the book and it took me almost one and a half years to find the design and the writing, the flow of the book, but it took me less than three months to finish the whole book. This book going to be published very soon and it's might be 500 pages long. So I try my best to, with the help of the PowerPoint, I try my best to talk about the issue, not about the book, indeed, because the book, the design of the book is pretty much like not pure nonfiction, but I love storytelling. So it's mixed and very different form of the design. So, but today I just want to focus on the issues and the facts. So I make the book title is just simple amaze. I use a dash maze. We wear a maze to see what's going on in our own beloved lands because it's done to be amaze. So it's a question mark for us. As soon as the coup happened in 2021, a lot of people asked me because I wrote the book, The Roadmap, in 2010, before 2010. It's published in 2012 and then 11. And then the final chapter of the book is called Fork in the Road. Since 2011, all the journalists keep asking me, where are you right now? After this, the quasi-civilian quasi-military governments. And I keep saying we are still at the Fork in the Road. And after the coup, people started raising the questions, whether we are making a U-turn. And I said no, because we were never being to the point B from point A where we were. That's why there was no U-turn. We were still at the point A in amaze. So this is the key argument of this book is, how come we were in amaze? Why we were in amaze? And what this current spring revolution beyond 2021 is doing, either getting out of amaze or getting rid of its walls. This is all about my understanding the issue and it is all about my attempt to understand the issues. It's all about my book, indeed. To make a very short history, since 1962, there was a coup and Burmese Socialist Program Party took the power. And since 1971, it's changed into the one political party system constitution. And I wrote that roadmap and I made the study White was in 1988. It was the whole country protest looking for democracy at that time. We were in the middle of the road in 1990 election. The main opposition party won the election, but there was no power, transport of the power or nothing happened. Instead, we were detour to the path of the somewhere from 1993 because of the national convention to draw the drop of the constitution. And then we were in the road from since 93 to 2005. Only in 2005, a lot of the political prisoners were released and the movement of the civil society came pretty much alive. And in 2005 is another kind of the opening. It's not the starting point. It's kind of the hint for the way out because of the release, political prisoners started convincing the community to stand out again, something like that. But of course, we were in the junction in 2007, the suffering revolution and afterwards in 2008, the Nagis, Cyclone Nagis, something like that. But beyond 2008, 2010, it was like the fog in the road. We can make either U-turn or we can choose any different paths. But I think from 2010, the energy and Aung San Suu Kyi, she was released pretty late, but they decided not to join for the general election in 2010. And since there was no confident, effective rivalry, the military political party USDP won the majority and they saying the generals become the leader of the country, the president of the country and Nhamar peace centers. So from 2010 to 2012, they were pretty making sure they enjoyed doing all three pillars walks, executive, legislative and the judiciary walk. But what happened? From 1946 to right now, you can see the escalation of the conflict. Even though the politically we having moving this along, there are so many new ethnic forces has been came up. So even in beyond 2010, there are a couple of new armed forces based on the identity that the ethnic identity is coming up. So there was no time for peace throughout these history. And beyond 2012, it's very interesting. On 20th April, 2012, there was by election and NRI won, the Aung San Suu Kyi party won 43 out of 44. And D1 is disqualified. So they won 100, but the one is disqualified for quite a silly statements. Then what happened in 2012, May 6th, there was incidents, the rape incidents in Rakhai. So less than a month, it's pretty like within two weeks time. And it was thought to be no coincidence, because it's since then, you know, since 2012, the state or emergency has been applied to Rakhai states until 2016. So that's mean according to the 2008 constitution, if there is a state or emergency, the decisions making for all operations or three billers is in the hands of commander in chief, no more in the hands of the other. So in July, 2012, censorship relaxation and the whole war in July and including us, of course, it was very good, but I have a big doubt to be frank, because the hate speech campaign and the hatreds among the society based on religion and race has been pretty much higher since July, since just before July, you know? So to be frank, I couldn't show any evidence, but it's thought to be the realization of censorship is needed to distribute the hate speech. And the military always tries to prove they are the saviors of the country and they need instability inside the country to prove that the presence of them is much more important than the others, you know? So it's a very big doubt for me and there are some other, the small little facts and informations and I explained in my book, but I couldn't explain here, it's too much already. So the good thing is freedom of association law in 2013 and the since they declared, the military ever declared the multi-party political systems and they also tried to convince the war wheel on the right track to democracy, but I'm not sure, that's why I said, since 2010 we were in a maze indeed, not on the track to democracy. Even with the freedom of association law, even with having the more than 90 political parties, since the military started saying, we are going on the multi-party system, they need more parties rather than well-established military-run USDP. So some of the ethnic political parties is funded and organized by them, by the military. It's been pretty well-known. So that's why for the civil society also, according to the freedom of association law, I think we should appreciate because pen your mark can be running. It's established since 2013 as soon as the freedom of association law has been established, but at the same time, there are a lot more other civil society organizations, more or less either funded, supported, or behind the scenes approved by military can also enjoy the law. So in 2015, it's also very important just before the things in government and the USDP run the parliament has stopped, they established the protection of race and religion bill. It's just been known as the four bills and it's very much to undermine the freedom of religion and freedom of the gender issue, marriage issue, so many. So that's why I want to say we were already in a maze, but we thought we were on a passage because we were in a corner. It's a bigger space like the freedom because after 2015, the opposition could enjoy the leadership in the country. After 2015, they won the election and they can have the 75% in the, not all 75%, the most of the 75% of the civilian share because the 25% is reserved for the military presence. Every single, not just as a national assembly but also the regional assemblies. At the same time for the executive, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, under Ministry of Home Affairs, there is police forces. So it means all the legal armed forces is directly under the control of commander in chief and the Ministry of Border Affairs. All three ministries is directly under the control of commander in chief. Even for appointing the commander in chief, there is no one can do, nor the president, nor the other people. It's itself. That's why unilaterally, May online declare himself as the ongoing commander in chief even though he reached his pension year, 60 years old, but he said, I couldn't find any suitable persons to succeed me. That's why I will be as the commander in chief for another five years, something like that. So the whole, and even for the supreme judiciary system, the supreme court, according to the 2008 constitution, the appointed, the current supreme, judges, jury in chief, he can serve the positions until 70 years of age. So by the time when he was appointed to that position in 2010, he was only 55 years. So he's still surviving as, so he's the ex-military general and he keeps serving as the head of the judiciary, the whole judiciary system until today. Then we can see 2008 constitution itself is a very big maze for us. We have no way to get out of this because the article 436 of 2008 constitution, it's bar to change anything even for the vocabulary. It's very hard. So that's why the constitution itself is a big maze. And very, I might say the military itself is a very patriarchal and corrupted institution. And what the military right now, the male high military, I am going to say the commander in chief CIC military. I don't want to pronounce his name. So this CIC military, it's doing the self-supportage by corruption. That's why they are not doing the governance, they are just destroying the country and destroying themselves until now. So it's very hard for us to get out of the maze because some of the religious figures also intervened the society issues. And these religious figures are being well supported by the military too. And they always looking for supports from the military. That's how the relationship between the religious figures and the military leaders, it's that's been throughout the history. And another things I have been saying this for so long is the intellectual blindness, how did they do? Since 1962, we have censorship until 2012, five decades of censorship. At the same time, propaganda machine is still working until now. So very heavy censorship and the ineffective education system. There's three things making us, our society intellectually blind. And I normally say, most of our people don't know what they don't know. This is the most serious problem when we do serious educational things on the human rights and democracy. But after the freedom of the association law, we can do something. So we keep walking on the training and education about the human rights and democracy. That's why I think this is the very first time after the 2021, the biggest achievement ever is people show how much they do know their role in making the change. That's why their motto is without our consent, nobody can govern us. This is the spring revolution motto. And this is the biggest achievement ever in our history, I think. In the bus, the people, they really can't understand their role, but they now comes to the sense, their role and they show how much they know it and they practice it. So yeah, then social media platform with the height of the technology change and social media, it's very enjoyable for the military to distribute misinformation and disinformation and it's very effective and it's going on still. And that's another kind of the maze we were in and we still are in. And I would like to say in the international media over simplifications narratives, our issues is so much complicated because of that. And another thing is there is still no right to information as the law in my country because of that, even for us, access to information is very questionable. And then that's why the international community cannot understand much about what's going on, reality on the ground. For that reason, I think they try to oversimplify to understand and that's why the narratives of having the new election will be helpful for us. But according to our experience, having election means not much political change, having elections in 1990, nobody recognized the results and it's always been used by military to manipulate us. Again, in 2020, the election results was overwhelmingly the opposition's one, but they don't want the results. So that's why they try to do this attempt. So, and then another big issue is the peace business, I might say, either the Myanmar Peace Band Center or the National Reconciliation and Peace Center run under the insane and the Aung San Suu Kyi government, is pretty much like not actual ground to find the mediation. It's more like direct negotiation between the state's military and the ethnic armed forces. So there is no mediation and that's why it's based on their own interests. It's based on some of the political or the economic interests of these armed forces. That's why the peace process is not the pure platform for looking for peace. So it's another maze we are in. We are in, yeah? And related to that, the identity politics has been pretty much overwhelming. The federalism, under the title of the federalism, the ethnicity issue has been pretty much like very important. That's why if you want to be recognized as someone on the stage to talk legitimately to the people with power, you either have kind of the ethnicity identity or the armed. That's why all the armed forces make their organization, their groups, under the title of the ethnicity. So there is not based on the political ambition. Most of the new armed forces are based on the ethnicity. That's identity politics is still going on. It's a maze, another maze. And in 2016, of course, the state's consular law, as soon as the enemy won the election and when it get to the parliaments, it's established a state consular law because Aung San Suu Kyi was barred not to become the president, according to the 2008 constitution. So the lawyer, they invented the state consular law according to the 2008 constitution. One of the article in the 2008 constitution is giving this law half a chance. The state consular aiming at one point, essentially, the ex-general, the ex-tictator, can be part of the leading scheme. That's why they put this article, but the lawyer of NLD very subtly crafted this law in order to give the post of the state consular to Aung San Suu Kyi. So that was very, very effectively making such a tension between the military and NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. So that's why that lawyer, Aung Kyi, exactly yesterday, six years ago, he was assassinated at the airport. So that's all the maze we have to get lost in that. And another very first tensions about announcing the general amnesty of the political prisoner. So as soon as the NLD took the power, everybody was waiting for a chance to make the general amnesty, but NLD couldn't have it. Because according to this constitution, we do need a census from the defense and security council. Six out of 11 members of this defense and security councils are all generous military passengers. Even though the civilians part of this council try to introduce anything, they will try to undermine or reject. Because of this potential, NLD government never ever called the meeting of the defense and security council. That was the biggest tension between the NLD and the military again. Because military thought, as soon as NLD got the power, it's trying to undermine the rule of military in every single aspect and in every single way. The way they look at these things is very different from the way the international community look at that. So it's another maze, it's a double maze, I might say. So 2017 incidents also, it's very interesting. Commander-in-Chief, he was in Tokyo at the time, but as soon as he got back on August 9th, he was meeting with the ANB, the American National Party leaders, but they announced the meeting is for the peace and development in Rakhine. But ANB leaders said CIC made detailed explanation about the operation, but never disclosed what operation it was, what kind of operations we could imagine, something like that. It happened, but because of these facts, we cannot easily look back right now because all posted under the military Facebook page, it has been set in 2018 by Facebook, you know. But we luckily got the information and the IJBS, one of the writers of the IJBS has wrote this article very detailed. So in that case, it happens on August 9th about the Rakhine State incidents. Indeed, their aim is, and next days, the Vice Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of the Defense, they went to see a State Counselor to declare the State of Emergency in Rakhine State because it's lifted in 2016. So they want to reintroduce in 2017, but she declined because if there is an announcement of the State of Emergency in Rakhine State, it should be in the hands of Commander-in-Chief to operate every single thing, every single aspect. So she denied, she just issued the order, a few order sections 144. But interestingly, Minister of Defense Facebook has shown photo news two regiments, Regiments 33 and 99, including 70 battalions has been deployed already, either by road or either by air. Deploying troops by air was very, very rare, but it was done on August 10th. At the same time, they asked about to issue the State of Emergency. Indeed, they already decided to run the operation. They just want to inform having this. But yes, everyone expected, she just talked about this issue only on the 19th September. So this is what happened in the past. It's like a very, so in 2018, the NRE having the tension with the Karani or Kaya for the Bojo statue, the his, her father's statues. Indeed, here I just used the Bojo statue. For me, this term is also very allergic to me because her father, our son was assassinated not as a general, but as a members of parliament at the time of the assassination in 1947. But after 1962, the very first dictator Nehwin, military dictator Nehwin, throughout these days, through the propaganda machine, through the textbooks in the education, they refer him to as Bojo Generals. That's giving the whole society the impression of the only one and respectable leader should be the military officer, the general. So that's, it's the, not just through the censorship, not just through the subter propaganda, it's also through the education process. It's very well designed, the whole society to believe in militarizations. So and in 2019, I don't want to discuss small, minor things. In 2020, there was the COVID and some other issues as being doing. And since then, as soon as the results has been established, even though the USTB and the military supporters started protesting. Indeed, it's very ridiculous, you know? The results, election results, is an early one, the majority. But in small little towns, the enemy supporters and USTB celebrating their victory. Out of blue, people don't know what's going on. But because they already know that's going to be the coup. That's why they enjoying and they say, okay, you know. So that's also, but since then, NLE has been using the term national unity government. They aim for having the national unity government, even though they won the majority of the seats, but it's also another very big issues to discuss. I don't want to disclose very detailed. It's also, so just before the, on the 1st February, the states or emergencies declared by SAC unilaterally, it's didn't, according to the 2008 constitution, current constitution, they cannot do that. So it's the attempt of the coup on the 1st February is according to 2008 constitution, it's the high treason itself. But they just say, we still keep the 2008 constitution, they make some excuse and they just did it. So beyond that, the comedy representing the parliament, Pirangzu Lutto set up by the elected members for parliaments in 2020 election on the 5th February and the national unity government in April and the people's defense forces started in May after a couple of weeks with the peaceful protests. A lot of people were shooting down and arrested. So people decided to take arms, but it's a hybrid revolution, I might say. The peaceful protest is still going on, even though the armed revolution, it's being added to the resistance. So the, and this is the graph. You can see the armed, the peaceful demonstrations, it's in blue and the civilians, the SACs, the violence against civilians is in green and the civilians fatality. So it's pretty much very obvious that's how they handle with the protest, peaceful protest. And this is the SAC setting fire to the civilians houses and airstrikes do the civilian targets and the military targets. It's also very obvious how they do. Their targets is becoming for the civilians. And it keeps extending their time according to the current constitution. They're going to declare what we'll be doing tomorrow or the day after tomorrow on 1st February because they do the time already. Every six months, they do need some things to keep up. So there are some issues since the 22nd June, the Almsansuji's was moved from the go-to's to the prison's venue. And in July, 2022, they executed the activists, Jimmy and Pyozi Atoh. Pyozi Atoh was also a member of parliament. And the, since then, yeah, the, some of the release of the political prisoner is still going on. And in December, she was sentenced to 33 years. And this is pretty much outdated. Since the 27th October last year, so many kind of the battles going on in so many places. And so far, almost 40 cities on the ground has been conquered by the resistance forces, and it's more than, it's thought to be, I think the around 20,000 soldiers has been surrendered and be defected. And almost 20,000 soldiers has been killed and a lot more has been injured already. I mean the military, the SAC's soldiers. So it's pretty bloody on the ground. And last, 2023, March, NAD was dissolved as a political party because the new electoral law is pretty much ridiculous. It's in terms of the demands for the deficit money and demands for the amount of the population of the membership is pretty much ridiculous. And it's aims for the next elections going to nowhere. That's why Shian National Leagues for Democracy and NLD decided not to register again. So they were pretty much dissolved as a political party. But they keep going atrocities, it's the airstrikes in the kind of divisions going on. So yeah, this is some of the facts. I don't want to say details. And after the coup also, yeah, 2.5 million is displaced. By the time now, I think it's almost three millions already because every single day people need to leave their places because of the battles and the atrocity and the fire or the area bombardment, something like that. So so many humanitarian assistance has been needed and it's still not yet met. And this is some of the on the ground, the currently the national unity government is doing something for the humanitarian assistance, but compared to the needs, it's just not big problem, not big supporting on the ground. It's pretty much struggling. And I feel, you know, because of so many reasons, the global trend of the shrinking of the civil space and the post-pandemic economic problems and the global trend of the authoritarian rules and so many new war on earth, making us pretty much in another maze, I say. Pretty fee, we are only the diaspora, Burmese all over the world are the key funders for the resistance movement, not official assistance from any other government yet. So we still fighting most of the attempt and most of the movement and activities with the resistance right now is trying to getting rid of the walls of the maze, but still not yet successful that much. But we already on the path to tearing down the walls of the maze, because we cannot be living inside the maze, what had been very black magically crafted by the military. So it's, I think it's all, yeah, thank you, thank you. Thank you, Matilda. I think you have to write another book on the modern history, seeing through your eyes or do a series of webinar. And I hope you won't test us on how much we've learned from you, but that would be lovely. And I would like to ask Mike to comment on what Matilda has to say. Yeah, well, as Mathe does talk shows, Burma is one of the most complicated countries in Southeast Asia. And what we've seen over the past, oh, how many years since independence is 1948 is that a lot of problems don't get resolved. They just get layered. You just had one problem after another and they don't get resolved. And we can understand a lot of what's happened right now. Part of it, you can't even cover because you just had to deal with so much of the history to deal with why Eriken, the Eriken army is fighting for autonomy and that kind of thing. But in terms of my comments on what you talked about here, I'm gonna have to come up with a simplified narrative because it's kind of so complicated. You can't possibly deal with all the factors. It's not deniable that Burma lost democracy in 1962, but we have to question just how much Burma has ever really enjoyed full civil liberties. Not, certainly not before the colonial period, not during the colonial period, not under UNU. And one thing we don't talk about with UNU is that so many journalists and others were in prison even in his time. Not afternoon, not since 1962, not since 2011 or even 2017. And it's clear though that the response of people to the 2021 coup was not just about democracy. It wasn't an issue about having democracy anymore. It was about they want democracy plus. They want civil liberties as well. That's one of the things that came up really clearly from looking at the crowds. And it was not about, they just didn't want a majoritarian rule anymore. And it was much more than we saw in 1988 or 2007, which could be depicted in that way. The spring revolution has been successful in part because regardless of the limits to democracy, growing up in Burma or experiencing the Burma from 2011 did see a lot more exposure and a lot more maneuver room, a greater commitment by people to make clear a greater desire for civil liberties. And it wasn't just, ethnic tolerance and the ring and LGBT and the commitment to inclusion and everything else. It was just like a real desire to bring Burma up to date without the liberties that people enjoy in democratic countries. But this is also why the spring revolution has not been not yet succeeded. Even obviously if we were talking a year ago, you might not be quite as positive as you are right now because a lot of the gains have really accelerated in the last year because it's not just about democracy anymore. We've seen other groups that have emerged that are just as much against an inclusive Burma. And that's why I don't think this is as much, we sometimes depict this as military coup people oppose the military. But one of the reasons military has kept going despite many times it should have collapsed already is it's more of a civil war because you do have elements in Burma society who they may not have been on board for military rule versus democracy per se, but they are on board for things like keeping Muslims out and holding on to Burmese ethno-nationalism and really pitching that kind of vision of the country. There's that kind of commitment to Berman ethno-nationalist gemini. So this was something that was also built up ironically during the very same period since 2011, this kind of popular feeling. So the problem before us is that no one was really committed to military rule, except for the military. But what you have now is the majority, you have people who are opposed to the old style or the vision of Burma as a Berman entity and those who see it as much more broad inclusive of federal Burma. So the legacy of the transition in a way as Mathida has pointed out, but one in which the is that it is amazed as Mathida says, but now since 2011, the hedges have become a lot higher and they're trickier and it's much more difficult to find a way out. Now, some of the things you didn't mention are one of the things you didn't mention. I noticed that you didn't say a whole lot about how you feel about Ancestral Chino and I'm guessing probably you haven't changed your opinion too much, but it must have raised some concern that over the period we're talking about, she had started to move away from the herself, started to try to, whether it was strategy or something else, but she started to pick herself as a friend of the military as being a general's daughter. And I know that some civil rights groups people had mentioned me who knew her at the time was that they noticed that a change had taken place because she started to emphasize that she wasn't an activist, she was a general's daughter. And you know, there were all those photo ops and everything else for people who had spent the 1990s in prison, what did that do to their feelings of her commitment to be budding up to the military like that? And so anyway, this is an important, all and the other thing you didn't mention, you mentioned the August 2017 incident, but you didn't mention the ring by name. And I'm not raising this point to be belligerent or to, because, but I am trying to raise it to emphasize that actually we can't just draw clear lines on everything about people beyond one side and the other. It's hugely complicated, right? So this is an important, this has important consequences for Burma's future, but it's also important for us to remember that in the 2011 to 21 period, who we see as the good guys and the bad guys, according to these simplified narratives we come up with, how we see the tax on the ringa and how we understand Anson and Tsukshi is really unclear what we'll be talking about in the next 10 years, depending on who wins, right? And how they win. So the last will probably be a question that fades out over time, but for right now, I wonder whether we should see to, since I've been to relatively recently, all we did when we talked about Burma's talk about Anson and Tsukshi, should we see Anson and Tsukshi as a hero, as a villain, or someone who since 2011 got lost in the maze? Well, I think the front of the very beginning, it's a very, not very right way to focus just one person to represent my country. You know, that's pretty much like the chicken and egg story, you know, as long as the international community focus mainly on her and looking her as the one and only persons to solve all the solutions for our country, and you undermine the role of the citizens, the other citizens. And because of that, you know, giving her an enormous title, giving her the enormous privilege, and that's making the one positive counter-effect is the some people who not that much believe in her started thinking, oh, even these big guys from the West and the international community recognize her, let's recognize her, something like that, you know, pushing the society just believe in her, and then we were never, to be frank, you know, and we looked through the history, we were not like the French Revolution, you know, we were never against the imperialism, we were automatically destroy the imperialism because of the colonization. So that's why the country itself is never been setting as a nation or the country. It's like the because of the colonization, you know, it's after that, it's automatically moved to the modern country after the independence, something like that. And then we were in the two extreme kind of the feeling, you know, at one point, we believe in one and only leader, like the imperialist, the king or queen can solve everything for us, that the persons, if the leader will be good, the country will be good, something like that. So it's one extreme. At the other extremes is we normally say we have all the five enemies, you know, five enemies is fire, water and including the government. So the perspectives of the Burmese society to the rulers is not very positive. So whatever you did in the past, it's good or bad. If you gain the power, people will look at the power having people pretty much negative as an enemy, something like that. So we are swinging the sensation in between this relying on the one and only leader and refusing the ruler, something like that. So in this situation, I think the effect of the international community keep finding her, Aung San Suu Kyi, as the one and only leader making a small, difficult situation, how to accept her, how to contribute. That's why I say that after the 2021, nobody's that much talk about Aung San Suu Kyi inside the country because they know they are raw and they know they need to go by themselves. So it's a very clear signal inside the country but the irony is, you know, in the past, everybody just criticized, okay, one lady shows it's not good. Now the resistance group, resistance movement has been led by the collective leadership. Then everybody asked, who shall we look at as the leader of your resistance outcomes? So that's another kind of the maze I might say, you know, the concept of the, the concept from the ground and concept imposed from the outside is not very much in that way. So it's another layer of the maze we are now facing but hopefully what I understand is for example, like Rohingya issue, we were, you know, I was, I was pretty much very badly criticized by the ultra nationalist monks because my stance with the, I walk for Muslim free hospital and I pretty much empathy to these people. But for me, humanity is the base and I don't like the identity politics and I don't believe in blood to be frank. I'm also not Burma, but I'm happy to be recognized as Burma. It's okay for me. It's not worthy for me to be identified under this title. I just want to be recognized as human being, something like that. So for, but for the majority of people, they are in between this kind of the identity crisis for themselves. They really cannot accommodate themselves in so many levels in both inside the country or from outside. So I think the, for the Rohingya issue, it was very hard, but after the coup, it's more positive responses and attempt from the collective leadership, one of the Rohingya becoming the deputy minister or ministry of the human rights and yeah, of the national unity government, something like that, you know? So it's a not very promising as we wish, but it's still moving to more inclusive way, you know? Not just inclusive way, I mean justice and inclusive. I don't believe in the pure inclusiveness because the SAC, the very first member of the cabinet of the State Administrative Council for the Kamenei Achieve, is very inclusive, very inclusive in terms of the ethnicity. Right. And in terms of Aung San Suu Kyi's role, that was precisely one of the topics that I was intending to ask both of you, but when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 2002 in May, I was at the NLD headquarters and I had a chance to speak with her and I asked her a question regarding how she thinks democracy can be brought about to Myanmar and she responded that the people should not think that democracy is something that someone else can bring to them. No, you have to work towards bringing about democracy to your country. And I'm thinking, of course, we don't have access to Aung San Suu Kyi now, but something in me tells me that she might be partially happy that the time has come for people to try and define what democracy is all about and how they might collectively work towards achieving it. We can't be too optimistic and have a rosy picture about everything, but it's a very interesting sign that we are seeing today. And I also want to ask Mike because in Myanmar, the relationship between people used to be defined by the Sayada pay relation, patron client relationship with a very imposing figure like Aung San Suu Kyi or the military and the followers. But do you think that we are seeing a change in that today? Well, I think we saw a big change in that from the CDM. And one of the big things that stuck out from that was all these people who had shifted, again, not to be too critical of her, I don't want to make it long, so she's just asking, but a lot of people didn't like the way that she was running the NLD in a very hierarchical and a patron client way. And so they'd started to shift to other parties. And it's a lot of these people who we saw on top of the buses and cars and that thing, meeting the people in the CDM. And of course, one of the problems was, I think some of the NLD leadership at the time tried to pitch everything as being about her particularly, but the protests were actually about the full range of things that they wanted back from the military. So yeah, I think that that's one of the big problems. Actually, I think it's become partly a problem because it's a good thing when you have all these disparate groups opposing military. So it's very broad-based, but it's very hard to coordinate it. Usually in civil wars, what we've seen historically is that the winner is usually one that's the most centrally organized and can, no, I think the military is weak. And so this is not allowed to achieve full victory, but it has prolonged the conflict that the opposition is so hydro-headed. And I'm sure during the questions and answers period that there might be questions about the role of Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as the current situation we are seeing with regards to the opposition offensive towards the military, which you have referred to. And I would also like to dive into that. I'm sure the audience here are very much familiar with the situation, but the current situation is that the events of the last three months since the three Brotherhood Alliance stats, the Coalition of the Ethnic Armies, have initiated Operation 1027, which was October 27th this year, which is a major offensive that took over several towns, bases in the north close to China, which was originally occupied by the military. How has that shifted the powers in Myanmar? And what does it say about the dynamics in Myanmar, do you think, Matita? What does it say about the military today? Well, I think the military is doing the suicidal attempt by Sef, you know, with the corruption and Sef Sabotage. I think we believe we were told its population is 500,000, but it sounded like they have the maximum is 200,000. With the defection and everything, the real combatants is the total population of the combatants, because some are just the clerical staff and some other who don't want to fight. So the total number will be 70,000, something like that. And the morale is also low. Moral is pretty low because of the social punishment. In the past, people tried to cooperate with them, some people, but right now, every single person's trying to get the information from them leaked to the resistance group. So that's why they are failing. And the way they recruit is two-level, the low-level soldiers, the real fighters and the high-ranking officers. For the high-ranking officers, the incentives to do the bribery at the civilian's post, this was the way they recruit. And for the low-level soldiers, the real fighters is more like the human trafficking. It's by force, and all the unemployed, uneducated folks were recruited. That's why right now, even though they are well-equipped, in terms of their military weapons and the artillery, the Myanmar military is on the war's rank 38. But they are failing almost 99% of the battles against three years old, the defense forces, because they couldn't use. And the defense forces is now running mainly on the technology. The drone bombardment is very effective. And recently, what we found out at the one battalion space very near to the Defense Service Academy, it was captured by the resistance forces and found out that they arrested the top of the leaders of this battalion. And he was in the picture, he was smiling. And when the interview, it's like he was much relieved. Oh, now I can be alive, something like that. But when the resistance forces interview him and he confessed that most of his soldiers, it's kind of the trainers at the technical institution. He's also the lecturer or professor at the Defense Technical Institute. He was not a combatant. He has no experience at all in the fighting, he confessed. And then the soldiers for his battalion is 3% from the medics, 3% from the firefighters, something like that. So he said, during this fight, after the surrender, during this fight, the key message to these fighters from him is try to shoot, try to shoot, because they really don't know how to shoot, nor dare not to shoot. They are not yet ready. But since they have not enough population, they have so many fronts on the ground. So they cannot deploy properly. That's why I think this is also another problem for them. But in Myanmar, military was about infallibility, never makes mistakes, always writes, father of the nation, holding institution that holds the country together. So do you think that narrative is no longer valid? It's from the very beginning it was not valid, but it was told. This is the narratives to be told by the others. That's the reasons. Their propaganda machine is very well effective, even to the outside. For example, like the CIC speech in the last couple of months, in Burmese version and the English version is pretty different. So the propaganda machine is targeting not just us, but the international community to misunderstand things, something like that. So that was never been true. They are the key, because as I said, to prove they are the saviours of the country, they truly need this unity and distrust among each other. And instability. That's why if there is no stability, they try to make incidences to destroy the stability. Okay, so now they're seeing the reality. But Mike, on the part of the ethnic armed organizations, how well are they coordinated, do you think, Mike? Because the impression among many was that they are awfully fragmented. They are fragmented. And they have their own special concerns. Right, and different interests as well. How coordinated are they, do you think? They're not very well coordinated. That's one of the big problems. We have so many uncoordinated groups all opposed to military, which makes it difficult for the military to take things back over, but it prevents the opposition from unseeing the military. And I just want to add a comment to one of the counts earlier is that one of the things that the military had done so much of, which was smoking mirrors, is that the Damodile was much larger on paper than it was in reality because of the corruption involved. And that's why so often they had to rely on one or two special regiments, 33 light infantry regiment, for example, fly them in to do something. And so they were really caught off guard when you had this CDM explode like it did, and then the actual opposition. I thought for a little while, that was the best time to unseat the military. It didn't, it takes a long time when people has been suppressed like that to come around. And now we're getting back again. But I think that was a lost opportunity because they couldn't cover much of the country at that particular time. They've been so reliant on a few regiments and everything else was on paper. Marjida, what about you? How do you see the level of coordination among the EIOs? As well as how much initiative is there on the part of a national unity government, which is the civilian government in exile, made up of activists, politicians who opposed the coup. What do you think? Well, it's hard to see NUG as a government in exile because some of the cabinet members are still inside, inside the country on the ground. Well, it's a coordination among the ethnic armed forces and NUG is ongoing process. It's not yet to the momentum yet, but it's thought to be tomorrow, by tomorrow, we're going to read the new statements by them. Moral collaboration, cooperation, you know? It's, of course, the civil war is more than 70 years. So, yeah, misunderstanding has been overwhelmed. So within these three years, they are trying to do not very effectively, but it's on its ways, I mean. So, people wonder, is the military down and is it out? Is end feasible? What is your view? Well, with the military, the situation right now is cannot be worse than ever, so without them, it can be worse, but it's better. I might say. Because the example of the military is the, as an institution, pretty much corrupted and the impunity is the real big issue. They are committing and then they don't care about, you know? So, yeah, when we talk about the civil liberties, you know, this is the institution never ever willing to grant the civil liberties, something like that. So with their presence, I mean, we don't want any military. We need to reestablish a military, you know? Not with these current top leaders or some already committed soldiers, something like that. And we see in the news reporting that the role of China in it, China is allowed to mediate, but it's also selling weapons. How do you see China's role in it, Matilda? Well, we cannot move our country away from China. So that's the biggest challenge. And the China always on one hand is a torch, one hand is a water, that's their policy. And yeah, it's a, it's wants to be, the China always wants to be behind every single stakeholders. That's the conflict of interest by itself and among us that's going on. But I think for the longer run, of course, we need to be very careful looking at their play because it's also behind some of the armed forces. And it's some ethnic armed forces thinking of having more than federalism. And, you know, it's pretty much dangerous, easily be conquered by China, if not by India. Meaning they can be drawn closer to China's orbit as the ethnic minority. But ethnic minority, being ethnic minority in Myanmar is one thing, but being an ethnic minority in China is another, isn't it? Yeah, it's pretty much like that. Yeah, that's why we need to be very careful, yeah, making the decisions in terms of politics because it's pretty much, yeah, dangerous. Mike, you might have something to say about the way that it's grown. I kind of want to ignore Burma because for one thing, it doesn't want an intersection between Thai groups and the Shang groups and that kind of thing. But China is already on the path to dominating Burma permanently. And one of the big problems with the Civil War too is China arms both sides, the ethnic armies and the military, just so that both sides make deals not to harm Chinese infrastructure passing through the country. And so that's part of the situation here. We're not gonna, it's not gonna play a role in the resolution of this. The big question for the future is, does China think it's gonna benefit from a divided Burma or a unified Burma? And if it thinks that it's gonna benefit from a divided Burma, you're going to have virtual Civil War going on forever. True, true, true. But you must remember, I remember when the foreign ministers and prime ministers and presidents all wanted to march into Myanmar and shake hands with Sansa and Suu Kyi when the country started opening up. And Myanmar sits right in the intersection of Belt and Road Initiative and in the Pacific strategy put forward by the US and its allies. But unfortunately, there seems to be a sort of absence of the West's presence in the region. Isn't that a problem here? The absence of the West's presence, I mean, one of the big problems the West always has is when it does try to get involved, it's new in parallelism. So even when there were, people hoped that they would get involved after Nargis, for example, when the military wasn't helping people after the tsunami, the US had an aircraft that wouldn't get involved because it didn't want to be, have these charges put against us. The big game, we're talking about the West now relative to China, but the big game being fought in Myanmar is actually between Japan and China. And this has been one of the reasons that Japan didn't step in earlier to deal with some of the humanitarian crises in Burma and the activities of the military because they're trying to bolster any country that, or they're trying to win the friendship of any country that seems on the verge of falling within the Chinese orbit. And so I would actually say that the China versus Japan game is a much bigger game being played in Burma than the West versus China. That game is being played out in Sri Lanka and the Maldives and other places and now popping again. In terms of ODA and providing assistance for infrastructure as well as humanitarian assistance, that there is a, it is an intensely debated issue in Japan, very challenging indeed. So something that we have to keep an eye on. And I would also say that what the West is interested in will take a back seat increasingly with what India wants. And about the use of the role of youth at the spring revolution, you said that you were at one point not very confident whether they would be able to stand up, raise their voice. When I interviewed you during the darker days, you spoke about freedom of expression is not about freedom to speak up, not just about freedom to speak up, but also about the freedom to think. And that can be eroded when there is suppression and oppression. But do you still speak up and stand up? Why is that, do you think? Well, I think the most effective part of the censorship and propaganda is freedom of opinion, not on the freedom of expression. So if we, our opinion has been pretty much well controlled and shaped by mainly, I might say mainly by propaganda and ineffective education rather than the censorship, because if we know there is censor, everybody tried to overcome the censor. But if we doesn't know it is the propaganda and ineffective education, people have no weapon to combat it. So that's why I think for the youth in the earlier days, we really don't know how they will respond, how much they will equip with the knowledge and the ideology and opinion. But thanks to the new technology, I think the internet and the open access to this whole much information, making them strengthen them. 1988, we didn't have those censors during your days. Yes, now it's a very open sources, making them more equipped with the knowledge and the opinion. True, true, true. You know, the Freedom House just published a report on visible and invisible bars, meaning the cost of raising their voices in countries where oppression still persists, meaning no activists can be silenced in prison, but imprisonment can mean damaging impact on prisoners and their families' amounts to civil death. You have been in it, too. I mean, harassment and repression can perpetuate the behind bars and beyond bars. I understand that applies to Myanmar, too. Sure, definitely. Yeah, I think being a Burmese or being a person either inside the country or outside the country, we were already barred for some sort of the liberty, you know? Especially after this last coup, you know? They tried just not to arrest and kill people. They also tried to make so much harassment to the family members and the properties. So, for example, my passport was denied to be extended. So that's kind of a response. Even though I keep writing, I try to say so many things. They cannot arrest me because I'm already outside, but they try to limit my movement. True, and once you go abroad, you face the risk of being deported to Myanmar. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. The time is almost up, yes? Okay, well, thanks for attending. We've been giving a little thank you for Aikodotan and Mathida for a very interesting event. We've had a lot to think about and a lot of interesting topics brought up on current Myanmar. I think we're still very much in the maze, so I don't think that's been resolved, but maybe in the future. So I will call this an event to a close and thanks to you for your questions and for attending. Thanks.