 Where do we think that 2015 White Paper is going to take us? I guess it's the first question, isn't it? Well, I made the point today that I don't, in terms of the strategic environment, I don't think that it will be very different from the last paper. There are some major strategic changes that have occurred, the behaviour of Russia, the implosion in the Middle East. But they're not the events that are going to result in significant change of policy or in terms of capability development. Look, I think that's right. I think those very big and interesting events like in Russia and the Middle East and so on are important in themselves but not very significant for the way Australia thinks about its future defence capabilities. I guess my thought though would be that what's happening in Asia and particularly the old transformation to power relations, that that is going to have a big effect on our strategic environment and that's probably the thing that we now need to be factoring into the way we think about our future defence capabilities and budgetary projections. Well, I'll just qualify that by saying it's interesting that we're back in the Middle East and we may be increasing our forces in the Middle East. So it's also important to design the force for the task that you're going to have rather than the task that you might have. Yes, although I'd just sort of turn that over, we have been sending forces to the Middle East and achieving our strategic objectives in the Middle East, I would say. By drawing on the capabilities we've developed essentially for the defence of Australia many decades now and going all the way back to the first Iraq war in 1991 and the various things we've done in the Middle East since then, I don't think we've found ourselves in a position where we couldn't do what governments felt it needed to be able to do in order to achieve our strategic objectives in the Middle East from the forces we've developed for the defence of Australia. Whereas I think if Asia becomes more contested between major powers we may find ourselves in a situation in which we can't do what governments think they'd want to be able to do. Well, just not wanting to argue the point but what you say may be true in a historical sense but if you look at the air capability that we've sent this time it is a very modern capability, self-supporting capability in ways that Australia never had in terms of its own, it can carry its own equipment, it's modern in-air refuelers, modern command and control aircraft and that's really a capability that has been developed because of the belief that we may well find ourselves operating in an international force in issues such as this. But on Asia, yes, I don't think there would be much in the white paper that well I think we should qualify that, the white paper will certainly recognise that the territorial disputes that have heated up in recent years it will express concerns that of a nationalistic masculinity of China that is probably worrying will be as far as the language will go. Having said all of that, I don't, in terms of response I don't think it will lead to any significant change in policy or in capability. I suspect you're right, I think it probably should but I doubt if it will. I mean I guess the other interesting angle is what it says or what it implies at least about Indonesia. We had Marty Nutteligar on the panel with us who's obviously a very fluent articulator of Indonesian views on these issues but how do you think Indonesia is going to plan to the way the white paper puts things? I can't see anything that's likely to be in the white paper that will be of any major concern to Indonesia. We are going to upgrade our patrol boats but there's no secret about that and they're really just replacing the ones that we have. We're upgrading our maritime surveillance aircraft both to the P-8s and probably the Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft but there won't be anything new in what they're actually doing. They'll just be the modern way of conducting surveillance of our EEZ area. No, I'm sure that's right. I think actually in a sense just because some other issues are looming larger now than they did in a sense Indonesia looms less large now than it used to be even though it was growing economically and in the longer term there are bigger military capabilities as well. I think in the longer term there's likely to be a closer convergence of Indonesian and Australian strategic perspectives. In a sense the more contested the region becomes the stronger the issues that Australia and Indonesia have in common and the further we're driven together and at least I hope that's what happens. I agree. I think that's a good thing and it was interesting that Marty picked it up and we should think about ways in which we can help each other in terms of our security needs. We have done it in the past. Even in my day when I made the decision to re-engage Capacits in part because a capable Capacits was a security benefit to Australians who were then under threat of terrorist attack in Indonesia. It demonstrated to me that we do have face common threats and working together we can actually help each other and I hope there's more of that in the future. No, that's right. Often people look at the geographical proximity between Australia and Indonesia as a source of tensions in the relationship and in a sense that's obviously right but it also contributes to the sense of converging strategic interests because we're next door neighbours. We both have an interest in the stability of the region which we share and if there are threats to that then that ought to be the basis for us to deepen that. So an Indonesia that's succeeding that's growing in a healthy way that's standards of living arising that is something that's in our interests. I think we've addressed economically too because we've hardly scratched the potential for economic common benefit. So we've had some testy issues in recent times but I hope that they'll be overtaken by time and we'll return to the trajectory that I think we were on a little while ago.