 Thank you very much. This aspect of being a continuation of yesterday's lecture is new to me too. I had no idea, I didn't know that Piotr would be speaking about Ajivikism yesterday. So if there is any overlap or continuity or disagreement that it's pure chance, I didn't plan it that way. So let me begin. BK and yes, let me specify that unlike what Piotr did yesterday who gave a broad overview, I will rather concentrate on one minor point. BK Matilal, already in the title of his book that came out in 1981, called Anikantavada, the Central Philosophy of Jainism. Others, and perhaps most notably or most recently, Jayendra Soni, who is among us have protested describing Anikantavada as a small, albeit basic, part of Jain thought. Anikantavada, I may not need to remind you, is I quote, the theory of the many-sided nature of reality. Matilal has drawn attention to the fact that Anikantavada was, or came to be, a solution to what he calls the paradox of causality. Matilal maintained that Mahavira himself played a crucial role in the formulation of the Anikantavada. Whatever the truth in this matter, the paradox of causality is the fact that the paradox of causality came to occupy the mind of Indian thinkers long after Mahavira, so that the Anikantavada as solution to this paradox is much more recent than Mahavira, too. We will return to this question in a minute. Let me remind you what the paradox of causality is all about. The problem with which it is confronted can be illustrated with a simple example. How can a pot, or anything else for that matter, be produced? If there is no pot as yet, what is produced? And if the pot is already there, it need no longer be produced. I have argued elsewhere that the problem is the result of the acceptance of a hidden, silent presupposition which I call the correspondence principle. People implicitly believed that the words in a statement correspond to entities in the situation described or depicted by that statement. In other words, there had to be a pot in the situation depicted by the statement the potter makes a pot. For that to make sense in view of the presupposition, this describes a situation in which there is a pot which leads to the paradox if there is already a pot, why should the potter bother to make one? This implicit belief, it is but rarely given an explicit formulation, inevitably led to the paradox of causality, which all Indian philosophers from the early centuries of the common era had to face and which they all proposed to solve, be it in different ways. Now, a good illustration of how the Jainas dealt with the paradox of causality is provided by a passage which I read in translation from Jain Bhadras Vishay Shavasika Bhashya. So here we read, in this world there are things that are being produced, having been produced already, others are being produced, not having been produced already, others are being produced, having been produced and not having been produced, others again are being produced while being produced and some are not being produced at all according to what one wishes to express. Now this perhaps sounds at first side like gobbledygook, but if you see the specific problem to which it is proposed as an answer, it gives some sense. For example, and this is how Jain Bhadra continues, a pot is being produced, having been produced in the form of clay, et cetera, because it is made of that, it's made of clay. That same pot is being produced, not having been produced, concerning its particular shape because that was not there before, so far Jain Bhadra. Confronted with the question how a pot can be produced given that there is no pot at that moment, Jain Bhadra would answer that there is already a pot at that time, at least in one sense, in the form of clay. In another sense, it is not yet there because its particular shape is not yet there. In this way, the paradox of causality disappears or is believed to disappear like snow in the sun. I have argued elsewhere that this particular solution appears for the first time in the story of the heretic Jamali in the Viyaha Panati as for the Bhagavati Sutras, you know. As a matter of fact, the story of Jamali brought together two kinds of statements that had been separately attributed to Mahavira by earlier tradition. The specific combination we find here, along with Jamali's literal interpretation of one of these statements provided a solution to the problem of production or the problem of causality that had come to occupy the minds of virtually all Indian thinkers. The statement to the effect that what is being made has been made because that is repeated in that text over and over again in various variants, but what is being made has been made. What is being this would answer one combination of present participle and past participle. And so the statement to the effect that what is being made has been made was here in this passage of the Viyaha Panati, perhaps for the first time taken literally and provided a solution to the problem of production. However, the undesired consequence that this way a completely static picture of the world would arise in which nothing would ever change could be avoided by recalling Mahavira's habit to approach questions from various sides. Let us now leave the Jainism on one side and turn to a remark about the Ajivikas that occurs in a Sankhya text. The Matara Vritti, which is a commentary supposedly by Matara on the Sankhya Kharika on Sankhya Kharika nine. The Sankhya Kharika introduces here the doctrine known as Sat Karya Vada, the doctrine that according to which the effect, the Karya exists, Sat, already in its course before it is produced. In concrete terms, if the effect to be produced is a pot, this doctrine states that the pot is already present in the clay out of which it will be made. It will be clear that the Sat Karya Vada is the Sankhya solution to the paradox of causality. I told you already, there are many solutions, different schools, each had his own solution to this particular paradox. The Sat Karya Vada was the solution of the Sankhya School of Thought. Now, the Matara Vritti has commenced upon this. In fact, my attention was drawn to this in an article by Isabel Ratier which has not yet come out, but which he sent me for my information. And in this passage, the different schools are mentioned and among them the Jivakas. Now, Isabel Ratier didn't quite know what to do with it, asked for advice to Vincent Elchinger and Alexis Sanderson and both said you have to correct a man the text, Jivakas must be read as Jivika. And in this passage, I read this passage in the translation which Isabel Ratier is given of it, we read the following. Let us admit what has been said so far. But we now ask some thing else. Do the evolutes that are the great, et cetera, these are technical Sankhya terms which the precise meaning of which is not so important here, do these evolutes arise while they already exist in matter before their arousal or are they non-existent at that time? In this respect, Mathere continues, in this respect there is a disagreement among masters and therefore there is a doubt. And here, there's this disagreement which is then illustrated by citing the positions of different schools. The Vaisesikas, for example, I mentioned, they consider that what that which exists comes from that which does not exist. For they consider that in the lump of clay before the arousal of the pot, there is no pot. The Ratchet Ajivikas, and here, of course, Rathye translates Ajivikas because she has amended the text from Jivaka to Ajivika. The Ratchet Ajivikas consider that the effect is both existing and non-existent. And the thesis of the Buddhists, so the passage goes on, give some further examples. The thesis of the Buddhists is that the effect is neither existing nor non-existent. Thus, since those teachers hold these contradicting, hold theses contradicting each other, what certainty could we get? So far, the passage from the Matara Vriti. So obviously, the one sentence that interests us is the Ratchet Ajivikas consider that the effect is both existing and non-existent. It is not difficult to understand the use of this particular position. We find ourselves, once again, in the midst of a discussion about a paradox of causality. How is it possible to make something that is not there? What does one make when one makes a pot, given that there is no pot at that time? The followers of the Satkaryavada maintained that in spite of appearances, the pot is there. Other thinkers opted for other solutions. The Ajivikas, according to this particular passage from the Matara Vriti, stated that the pot is both there and not there. The advantage of their position would clearly be that they had an answer to the following potentially embarrassing question. If the pot is already there, at the time you are making it, why do you bother to make it? But this is also the solution, as we know, that was offered in Jinnabhadras vijeshavashikabhasya, which I read out to you earlier. What is more, this is, in essence, the position that came to be known as an ekantavada. In other words, the Sankhi commentator Matara ascribes to the Ajivikas the position that we know came to be held by Jainas. How is this possible? Now, two possibilities come to mind. One is that Matara uses the expression Ajivikas to refer into Jainas, at least theoretically, that would be an option. And we do know that the term Ajivika was sometimes used in the early Buddhist canon to refer to the followers of Mahavira. But this, of course, was many, many centuries before Matara. It seems unrealistic to assume, without proof, that this custom had survived until Matara's time. Alternatively, Matara knew the Ajivikas, and these Ajivikas had adopted the same response to the paradox of causality as the Jainas. This, if true, almost forces us to consider that the Ajivikas had taken this response either from the Jainas or perhaps Piotr would rather argue that the Jainas had taken it from the Ajivikas, but in any case, they would have been a mutual influence. And this in its turn is only conceivable if we assume that Ajivikas and Jainas had remained in close contact right until the time when the paradox of causality began to occupy the minds of Indian thinkers. And we have some reason to suppose that Ajivikas and Jainas still knew each other in Kushane times. I have argued that in somewhere else, and it has not yet been published. So, but I won't say more about it here. But we are in the dark as far as more recent times are concerned. So, we know that the Ajivikas and the Jainas had close contacts at the beginning and apparently for a number of centuries to follow until certainly Kushane times. After that, we are not so sure. Next question, when did Matara live? The date of Matara, of course, for our question is quite important. And I sum up what Larson and Bhattacharya wrote about this in their volume, the volume concerned of Indian history, encyclopedia of Indian philosophy. They say, our extant Matara Vritti has a common core of content with four other early commentaries on the Sankyakarika. Although for many years it was thought that the Matara Vritti may have been the original upon which the other four were based, there is now a general consensus that our extant Matara Vritti is the latest, the most recent of the five commentaries and maybe dated anywhere from the ninth century onward. Now, you give some reasons for that. I won't present those in detail now. Let's take it on trust that the Matara Vritti is, was composed in the ninth century or later. Now, if this estimate is correct, we are led to conclude that a Sankyak commentator from the ninth century or later was acquainted with Ajivikas and knew that these Ajivikas adhere to the anekantavada in some form or other. All this is highly surprising. It certainly was highly surprising to me to think this through. And we are entitled to wonder whether we are not drawing far-reaching conclusions from shaky evidence. In the after all, it is all these stories based on a textual commendation from Jivaka to Ajivika. Let's face it, what is that worth? So our first question therefore has to be, was the commendation from Jivaka to Ajivika in Matara's text, was that justified? As a matter of fact, none of the other surviving commentaries on Sankyakarika nine refer to the Ajivikas. Matara stands all alone. They all have stories about the paradox of causality here. They gave different opinions, but none of them mentioned the Ajivikas. Only Matara does so. So clearly only the Matara vritti refers to the Ajivikas if it does. If we accept the commendation proposed, but is this commendation justified? This question leads us to an interesting and perhaps important observation. The non-emended form Jivaka exists as a synonym of Ajivika, but judging by the evidence collected in the famous book of Bashem, only two authors use it, namely the lexicographer Hala Yudha and the astrologer Vaidyanatha Dikshita. They used Jivaka to refer to Ajivikas. That is to say, even without commendation, perhaps with hindsight, we should say we don't demand at all. We keep the text as it is and where does it lead us? Even without commendation, the passage from the Matara vritti refers to the Ajivikas but by using Jivaka rather than Ajivika. It may tell us in this way something about Matara's time and place. Because look at the poet Hala Yudha. Bashem says to the following about him, Hala Yudha gives two lists of unorthodox ascetics and separate verses. And then he gives the verse that mentions the Jivakas. But what do we know about Hala Yudha? If the lexicographer of that name is also the Hala Yudha who composed the text called Kavirahasya, which serves as a eulogy of the Rashtrakuta king Krishna III, we can date him rather precisely and give him a very precise geographical location. He must have lived in the former half of the 10th century in southern India. Bashem concludes that Hala Yudha had no doubt come into contact with the Tamil Ajivikas. So we know that there were Ajivikas in Tamil Nadu and this particular feature, the Hala Yudhas mentions of the Jivaka shows that he was in contact with them, that he knew about them and what is more, he called them Jivakas. And now we recall that Matara may be dated anywhere from the ninth century onward. Like Hala Yudha, he may have come into contact with the Tamil Ajivikas. If so, he may have become acquainted with their position as to the paradox of causality. Now, something similar happens with regard to Vaidyanatha dikshita, the astrologer, who refers to the Ajivikas using the term Jivaka. He wrote in South India before 1450 of the common era, according to Pingray, which means that we have now three occurrences of Jivaka and they all point to the south of India in a period from the 10th to the 15th century. So the tentative conclusion we arrive at is that the Ajivikas of southern India of the end of the first and beginning of the second millennium, they are tested in inscriptions. So it's not only these authors that make us think that there were Ajivikas in Tamil Nadu. These Ajivikas were known by the name Jivaka, that is our tentative conclusion, and they shared with the Jainas, the Anakantavada, the view that reality is multiplex. Given that the two religions were originally close to each other, if you didn't know, you have been convinced yesterday by Piotr's presentation, and appear to have remained close for a number of centuries. I think there is some evidence until Kushana times at least. We are led to conclude that they were still close when the Anakantavada was applied to the paradox of causality. When was that? We have already seen that some scholars attribute the Anakantavada to Mahavira himself. Whatever the truth in this matter, on which I prefer not to pronounce, it became the Jaina response to the paradox of causality, and this paradox did not yet occupy the minds of Indian thinkers until long after Mahavira. In this form, the Anakantavada was introduced into Jainism before the closure of the Shwetambara Canon, because the Viyaha Panathi, of course, is a text, certainly not the oldest text, but the text of the Jaina Canon, which was closed somewhere in the fifth century, according to the Jaina tradition itself. It is already known, the paradox of causality, I've argued somewhere in Kunda-Kundas Pravatya Nessara. It is, I have not, the Tatvartesu tries to obscure to decide whether it was acquainted with this particular paradox as yet. It appears then that Ajivikas and Jainas were still in close contact during the first half of the first millennium of the common era, so close that the Ajivikas borrowed, or the other way around, the Jainas borrowed, wholesale the solution to the paradox of causality that the others, the Jainas, or respectively the Ajivikas, elaborated at that time. This relatively late example of Jaina influence of Ajivikism, or, of course, Ajivika influence on Jainism, would have remained unnoticed, had it not been for the fact that, A, that means one single Sankhi commentator, Matara felt the need to mention the Ajivikas in passing in his otherwise unremarkable commentary. Thank you very much for your attention. Thank you.