 Good morning, and thank you all for joining us this morning for this very important and very timely conversation, which is entitled Exposing Atrocities in Ukraine, The Relationship Between Reporting and Accountability. My name is George Moose, and I have the honor of serving as the chair of the board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace. For those of you who may be joining us for the first time, USIP was established by the U.S. Congress in 1984 as a nonpartisan public institution dedicated to preventing, mitigating, and helping resolve violent conflicts abroad. To lead our discussion today, we are very pleased to have with us Chuck Todd, political director of NBC News, and Bill Taylor, vice president and director of the Europe and Russia Center here at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Their topic is a difficult and sobering one, how to address and expose mass atrocities committed in the midst of armed conflict, and how to understand the relationship between journalistic reporting and accountability. Throughout its history, USIP has been deeply engaged in the examination of how to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. The institute served as co-chair of the 2009 Genocide Prevention Task Force, which established the broad framework currently used by the U.S. government for its atrocity prevention and response policy. Today's discussion will focus on efforts to document and respond to atrocities committed in the context of Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. The discussion will consider the often heroic work of journalists to expose these crimes. It will also examine ongoing efforts to hold perpetrators accountable, as well as the challenges facing policymakers in ensuring that justice is delivered to victims. Today's event also marks the launch of an equally timely exhibit entitled Imagine, Reflections on Peacebuilding. This multimedia exhibit, which opens officially tomorrow, is the product of a partnership between the Institute and the Seven Foundation. The exhibit explores the themes and challenges of peacebuilding through an immersive look at societies that suffered and survived conflict. Conceived and designed by the Seven Foundation, the Imagine exhibit uses historical photos, texts, and video to bring visitors face to face with the realities of violent conflict. It asks the question, why is it so difficult to make a good peace when it is so easy to imagine? For those who are here in person, we hope that you will take time after the today's discussion to visit the exhibit, which is located right next door in the Institute's Great Hall. Our program today will begin with a moderated conversation with Chaptad Bill Taylor. Mr. Todd is political director for NBC News and the moderator of Meet the Press. He leads the network's premier political coverage across NBC's many platforms, offering the American public insider analysis and critical insights into happenings inside the Beltway. He also is a primary anchor for the network's primetime election coverage and is known for holding both politicians and networks accountable. He earned the reputation as one of Washington's most respected political journalists responsible for establishing Meet the Press as the number one Sunday public affairs program. Ambassador William Taylor is one of USIP's vice presidents and director of its Russia and Europe Center. In 2019, he took a leave of absence from the Institute to accept an appointment as Charger d'affaires at the US Embassy in Kiev, having previously served as the US Ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. From 1992 to 2002, he was coordinator for US assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He later served as the State Department's Afghanistan coordinator and as director of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office in Baghdad. Following discussion, we will allow time for questions from our audience, both here and online. For those of you following us online, please use the question box on the event webpage. And now Chuck, Bill, thank you again for joining us today and with your permission, Chuck, I'll turn the floor over to you. Thank you very much. I really appreciate it. Well let's dive right in as much as I'd love to talk about this amazing building. It's my first time actually in the building. You drive by this every day and you look at this beautiful building and you're like the federal government actually helped fund this beautiful building and not that horrible architecture right across the street. But let's get started. We got a lot of news this morning, Bill, from the President himself in the op-ed. And I want to sort of take it piece by piece. First I want to talk about the specific, the decision. There apparently was a debate about whether to send this new advanced rocket system to Ukraine. And apparently the Russians had let it into be known that if somehow if we did this, this was an escalatory move. President Biden decided to try to split hairs here and said we're going to give him this system. They've pledged not to use it to fire into Russia. My question is so what? The Russians are offended that the Ukrainians might actually launch a rocket into the other side? What are they doing? So there's that aspect of it. But how important is that? Chuck, first of all it's great to have you in this building. I've been in your building a couple of times and it's great to have you here. And George, thank you very much for getting us started here. It's great to have this opportunity. I think this is a big deal. The war in Ukraine, as George indicated, unprovoked, unjustified by the Russians invading their neighbor for no reason that they can even identify, has gone on now into its fourth month and it's shifted location and it's shifted tactics such that these longer range weapons are more important now than they were in the beginning. The beginning the Russians came down, as we know, from the north. They thought they would be able to take Kyiv and replace President Zelensky and take over the country by putting a puppet government in that they could control. That of course failed spectacularly. But the fighting around Kyiv into the north of Kyiv in the forests, short range. The weapons that NATO provided, that the United States provided, suited to that kind of terrain. It's now shifted. The current phase is wide open territory. Those of us who have seen that part of Ukraine, indeed, that part of the world, can picture Kansas. You can't sneak up like you could when you were in the forest. Long range weapons are important. The so-called multiple launch rocket systems, MLRS, have been on the Ukrainians' mind for months now. They knew what was coming. They knew what the change in terrain and tactics were going to mean for them. And sure enough, the Ukrainians are getting bombarded by the long range. Not losing the war because they have won the first face around Kyiv. They've even pushed the Russians back out of the second largest city, Kharkiv, in the northeast. The Russians have made progress, as we know, in the south. They've been stopped short of a major port, Odessa. Ukraine still owns that port. If the Russian fleet were able, would allow ships to go back and forth in and out of that port, we wouldn't have this food crisis that we have around the world. But different story. But the Russians have been stopped there. So the Ukrainians are not losing this war. The battle now is exactly what you say. It's kind of in this center. It's called around this area, Donbass, that the Russians invaded in 2014. And they're still trying to take a little bit more of Donbass. And they're making some progress because of these long range fires. It's not just artillery. It's also ballistic missiles. It's cruise missiles. It's aircraft. It's airstrikes, which the Russians weren't using very well in the beginning. But they are now. And they're taking some territory. There's no doubt about it. So the Ukrainians are gradually pulling back. And they're resisting in the south. They've won the battle in the north. So it's kind of edging toward an uncomfortable stalemate back and forth. Does Ukraine have what they need to win this, or do they only have enough to be in a stalemate? They have enough to be in a stalemate. We will know the answer to that question if they win. When they win. They're convinced that they will win. It's grim. It's grim for them right now. I have some good friends who are in the Ukrainian military. I hear from regularly. I heard from him yesterday from the front lines. And he describes the bombardment in horrific terms that he's observed himself. He's back and forth to the front line moving equipment. And it's grim. But part of the equipment that he's moving is it gets to your question that it's coming from the United States. It's coming from NATO. And these long range artillery pieces, long range for artillery. So we're talking 50 miles. Less, less. But the longer range, the MLRS gets back to your question about President Biden's statement, decision to provide these MLRS. At least the medium range versions of those, which do go 50 miles, don't go 300 miles or don't go 180 miles, 300 kilometers. Because that then gets to your point about shooting into Russia. And the Ukrainians have said that that's not what they're after. That's not what they're interested in. What they are interested in is stopping the bombardment of their front line troops. And do you think this weapon system can stop that? It can start to stop it. It can certainly give them the ability to stop it in certain places. The Russians just have a lot of stuff. They've got a lot of artillery. And they get a lot of ammunition. Ukrainians don't have as much artillery and are short of ammunition. So it's grim. We won't know the answer. You asked the right question. Do they have enough? We won't know until they win, at which time we will say yes. I probably used this quote with you before. A woman named Amy Acton was the Ohio Public Health Director during the start of COVID. And she had this quote that I've been dining out on forever. And I feel like it applies to this war. She says, in a pandemic, you never look back and regret what you did. You look back and regret what you didn't do. When it comes to what we're watching now, Ukraine had Russia on its heels. And essentially, Russia was allowed to regroup. Are we in the West, NATO, America, however you want to define the EU, are we going to look back and regret what we didn't do? I think we may well look back and regret what we didn't do at the beginning of the war. Our intelligence services, and not just the United States, but allied intelligence services, were right about the Russian intentions when they had 120, 150, 170,000 Russians surround on three borders of Ukraine. Our intelligence services were right. And they were also right to say, they're going to invade. There were a lot of people who said, yeah, they got all those forces there. We can see that. But they wouldn't be so crazy. They wouldn't make a blunder. Putin wouldn't be that dumb to invade. Well, he invaded. And our intelligence services predicted that. A lot of people didn't. And our intelligence services did not predict how well the Ukrainians would do. Was European intelligence where they looking to be? Were they wrong because of confirmation bias? Because they saw what happened last time and they wanted to believe. And they didn't believe what they were seeing. Or this was truly just a, the American intelligence saw one thing. And European Germans and Germany and France saw another. German and France, good distinction, because the Brits agreed with the Americans. As they almost always do. As they regularly are. And the Brits and Americans said, they're going to invade. And the Germans and the French and the Ukrainians to a large degree. I was in Kiev. I was in President Zelensky's office three weeks before the invasion. And we had this conversation exactly. So that wasn't just rhetoric. I always thought Zelensky said that publicly because he wanted to project. There was that, too. They didn't want panic. They didn't want panic. He knew exactly what we all knew on the number of Russian troops around. But his sense was that it would be such a mistake for Putin to actually do that. His sense was that Putin was trying to bluff or intimidate Zelensky or President Biden. By the way, Zelensky's been proven right. With the sort of, frankly, half measured invasion that they did, it seemed like he was always hoping quick strike, quick surrender. And he knew his military. And in his office three weeks before the invasion, we were talking about his military. He was talking about expanding his military, increasing the pay for the soldiers on the front line. He had this in mind for sure. But all the intelligence services missed how strong the Ukrainian military had become and how fiercely they'd be willing to fight and how supportive the Ukrainian people would be to listen. I think we underestimated. I think President Putin underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian military. One reason, one answer to your question, is the Ukrainian military, the last time in 2014 when the Russians first invaded, when they took Crimea and then continued into Donbas, the Ukrainian military was in terrible shape. Under the previous president, the one that kind of Russian oriented Yanukovych, who fled to Russia, still in Russia now, he allowed the Ukrainian military to hollow out. And so the Ukrainian military in 2014, when the Russians first invaded, not so good, the Russians missed, and maybe the West missed, the kind of strength, the morale of grit that the Ukrainians showed. In any case, going back to the question, will we regret something, I think since we didn't think the Ukrainians would be able to resist this enormous military that was arrayed on the, we didn't think they would resist, it took us a while before we realized, you know, these guys actually might win. We should be supporting them. And then the stingers and the javelins and the other ammunition came, the night vision, all of that stuff that started to come in. And it had a real effect. It really effected, it helped the Ukrainians, but it might have been late. It was late. And the question was it too late. And that's the question with this weapons system. Is it going to be help continuous stalemate or actually give Ukraine an opportunity to make some progress? Part of the answer to that is going to be the state of the Russian military on the ground. They've been, the Russian soldiers have been in the field, as they say, since what, last December, through the winter. They were arrayed, as we all saw pictures of them on the border, just waiting them. And finally, on February 24th, they invaded, they've been in battle since then and gotten whipped, frankly, in the north and in the northeast, made some progress. But with tough progress, we remember around Mariupol and how those Ukrainians held out against and took casualties but inflicted casualties on. So the answer to your question is can they win? A lot depends on military, the weapons that we're talking about, MLRS, these long range rockets, medium range rockets, not the super long. Medium range rockets and the state, the morale, the capabilities, the number of soldiers that the Russians can put in the field. Let me borrow a phrase from the Taliban. Between the Russians and in Ukraine, who's got the time and who's got the watches? It's a great line. It is. I wish I could have come up with it. I heard it early, used it a couple of times early, had to attribute it to other people, it's a great line. It's a great line. Taliban probably never did say it. They probably not. It doesn't matter, it's a great line. It is a great line and they were right. So right now, the Ukrainians need the time for these weapons not just the MLRS but others to get there. So it is a race. The Russians, however, they need some time as well to regroup and reform these units that are being beaten up. The interesting thing is the Russians seem to be pushing real hard. So they're acting like... They seem to be in a hurry. They seem to be in a hurry. And it's probably, we don't know, but I sort of don't know, it's probably because President Putin wants to take over quickly before the Ukrainians can build up the strength that they need to push them back out. So the Ukrainians need the time. The Russians are eager to move forward right now and they're watching the clock. NATO, specifically in NATO, and I wanna get to the other part of President Biden's op-ed this morning, which got very specific at walking back to of the most iconic lines through this war from American officials. First, when Secretary Austin, when he said, which seemed, Secretary Austin does not strike me as somebody who goes off the cuff. And he said definitively that Russia needed to pay a price for this. So he was another level of accountability. President Biden, during that speech that he gave in Poland when it was clearly something in his head and he went ahead and said it, we've all not used our filters before and that was probably a moment when he said, my God, this man can't stay in power. Which is an obvious observation. I always thought, but I get the diplomatic trickery there. The President walked both of those comments back. Why, how important was it that he had to do that? I think really important. He led off, or maybe it was the headline that said, President Biden outlines the goals because his administration, the United States more broadly, had not been clear about our goals. You've cited Secretary Austin who said we want to weaken, our goal is to weaken the Russians. That's not the goal. And President Biden was clear in his op-ed that the goal is a free. It's a nice outcome. Right. It would be a nice outcome, but that's not why we're there. And it's not the goals, not the objective. The objective is a free, independent, sovereign, prosperous Ukraine. That's the goal. And if it weakens Russia, so be it. If it weakens Russia, that's just fine. And we're not eager to have that. No, that's exactly right. That would be just fine. That's a good side benefit in some sense. But the real goal is an independent, sovereign, prosperous, democratic Ukraine. And President Biden was clear about that, and he needed to think that. He's clear in writing. It's okay. It's all right. It's out there, and he'll probably say it again. Well, this brings me to the other part of what we're supposed to be talking about here, which is the accountability aspect of this war. And let me start when it comes to war accountability. Has a loser in a war ever successfully held the winner accountable for a war crime? Exactly the right question. That's exactly the right question. If we're going to hold President Putin to account, and his whole chain of command, his minister of defense, his general officers, commanders all the way down to the soldiers who committed these war crimes, these atrocities, if we're going to hold that whole chain of command to account, they have to lose. Because the answer to your question is no. I certainly can't think. Maybe somebody here, Lauren, may be able to answer this question. I can't think of a winning side that's held itself. I mean, the beauty of our justice system is that we will hold a prosecutor account if they basically go about in a prosecution illegally. Whatever it is, they trump up evidence or they leave something out. We will hold our system, and this is sort of what makes our system, we hope, such a successful system in our belief in the rule of law. That is not the way war crimes trials work, right? Correct. There are different mechanisms that are in place, international mechanisms. The Treaty of Rome sets up the International Criminal Court, which turns out the United States and Russia are not members of. Ukrainians have kind of signed on to it without actually signing the treaty. But there's that mechanism. There are special tribunals that can be set up to do these. What we're seeing right now is within Ukraine, their justice system, which is there, has some trouble, as all justice systems do. But they've been working on their justice system rightly for a long time. But they're holding Russian soldiers into account that were captured holding to account. If they're all guilty, is that actually a problem when it comes to fairness? Or did somebody think it's righteous? But you have to do your best to try to not not report confirmation bias, essentially. And when I think about all of the different evidence that we're all gathering to show the crimes that have taken place by these Russian shoulders, the Ukrainian government is very helpful in making sure we notice or see some of these things. It's tough to vet. I'm not going to lie to you. It's tough to vet these things. You want to believe that they're being truthful to you, but we also know it's in their interests to make sure the world sees those guys as partners in Ukraine. Both the Ukrainians and the international core, press core, are not under control of any government. And they are demonstrating, documenting these horrors that you can't hide, that you can't hide. So yeah, I take your point about trying to be objective. But this war is clarifying. I mean, this, I've said on this stage that I fought in a morally ambiguous war. This war that we're talking about here is not morally ambiguous. This is clear. Well, that gets to, my frustration as an American citizen to me doesn't look morally ambiguous. And it really looks like we are still waiting and still sitting on the sidelines. We're sitting on sidelines in that we don't have soldiers on the ground. I'm not saying we should even have soldiers on the ground. We don't even have airmen in the air. And we talked earlier about the bombardment. The air strikes as well as the missile strike. Russia does not want to fight with NATO. They don't want to fight with NATO. There's a reason they picked the countries to invade that they picked. They haven't picked one that has a NATO umbrella. They have not. They have not. And the Jim, the prize, is Ukraine for Putin. To reassemble the Russian Empire, to reassemble the Soviet Union, that's the prize. And you're right. Not being a member of NATO, he could do that. He could do that. I go back to 2008. I was in Kiev in 2008 when President Bush and Steve Hadley and Condi Rice came through Kiev en route to a NATO summit where the question of NATO membership for Ukraine in Georgia was on the table. And the Germans and French said no at that time. Had they gone differently? Had Ukraine been accepted as a member or a prospective member of that? We wouldn't be here today. I am convinced. The Russians would not have invaded. For a reason that you just said. I mean, it is amazing when you look back in that moment. So in 2008, NATO passes on Georgia and Ukraine. And is it two months later? Three, yeah. That Georgia's invaded? Georgia's invaded in August of 2008. Is that not a cause and effect? I think it's a clear cause and effect. And five years after that, they went into Crimea. So I want to ask about the Germans and the French here, because that was something else that happened this weekend that's sort of gotten under-reported, is that they had another call with Putin and they did it together. And Macron has been very vocal about, essentially, pushing Zelensky to get to a piece, get to a piece. This is clearly financially driven by both France and Germany, isn't it? Maybe. Undoubtedly, there are humanitarian concerns. People are dying. Civilians are dying, as well as soldiers are dying. So that's perfectly legitimate concern. However, it's not just the leaders of France and Germany. You've got distinguished US diplomats. Henry Kissinger has been saying the same thing, that the Ukrainians, Zelensky, should give up part of his territory, give up part of his land in order to start the. One of my other favorite Washingtonisms, is a writer back in the 90s, Michael Kinsley. Washington Gaff is accidentally speaking the truth. Did Kissinger commit a Washington Gaff? No, he's believed that. He's been there for a long time. So have a lot of diplomats. A lot, well, some. Yeah, that's right. I won't speak ill of the dead. But there have been others who have made the same point. That is, these small countries don't matter as much as these big countries like Russia. We treat them like pawns. You treat them like pawns and you respect the Russians and you have to deal with Putin's ego and face and exit ramps and all that stuff. Whereas what President Biden said yesterday, or wrote yesterday as you point out, is that he will never lean on. He will never pressure President Zelensky to negotiate or to give up land, give up territory, give up sovereign Ukraine to the Russians. He won't do that. President Biden undoubtedly will support President Zelensky if he decides to negotiate. In fact, that's part of the reason for providing these weapons, is to help him be in a stronger position to negotiate. But he's not going to lean on him unlike what Henry Kissinger said and what Macron said and what Schultz have said. You know, whose definition of sovereign Ukraine is there? Because Russia, obviously, has already annexed some pieces. I see that, I hear that phrase thrown out. It's almost purposeful not defined, purposely not defined. President Zelensky has been clear. He's been clear that in the first principle, he will not give up claim to any sovereign Ukrainian territory, including Donbas and Crimea, including both of those. He will not give up claim. However, he's also said that he will not use military force to enforce that claim on Crimea. He hasn't made that same statement about Donbas. And he has said that he is willing to sit down and negotiate after the Russians pull back from the territory that they've gained since February 24, 2022, since this current version of the war began. The Russians have claimed territory, have occupied territory. They don't control it, but they've occupied it. And President Zelensky has said, if he'll sit and negotiate, or maybe a ceasefire, or maybe other things, once the Russians are pushed back or withdraw back into Donbas and Crimea. So that gives you a sense of what he thinks of the immediate sovereign nation, the sovereign territory, even though he won't give up ultimate claim for the whole. Do you expect accountability for war crimes to be negotiated? No. You don't think that ends up on the table between Ukraine and Russia? I don't think it can be. I don't think it can be. I mean, there are no statute of limitations. The Russians may call for it, right? Oh, I'm sure they will. I assume they will. Who knows what they will do? I don't think the Ukrainians will negotiate on that. And I don't think the international community will negotiate on that. It's an unanswerable question I'm about to ask you, but the United Nations, it does feel as if, because Russia is a permanent member, that at the end of the day, they're out of reach from the ICC, that they're really untouchable. And that this is a flaw in the UN Charter. There's no doubt there's a flaw in the UN Charter. We have an expert here, Ambassador Moose, who introduced this. I know a lot of people, our friend Ambassador Boldness, believe the UN has been unworthy for decades. I have to tell you, watching them throw out this, the fecklessness of the United Nations has come through in spades during this war. Well, let's be clear. That certainly applies to the UN Security Council. Yes. I get it on humanitarian, they do a few things. Food, humanitarian, maybe even, maybe even. The warm peace, that's a much. Security Council, not so much, because of these vetoes, which we use too, let's be clear. We do. But the Russians have frozen, have stalled, have stymied the Security Council. And President Zelensky, we remember when he addressed the Security Council, he was harsh. He said, this organization, UN, was designed, was founded, was designed to stop or prevent wars. You failed, he said. If you can't do it, then work. He's right. What Zelensky said, it was so clairvoyant. There's so much clarity he brought to his criticism in the United Nations. You got to take away, I don't even know if there, I'm sure there is a mechanism to get rid of a permanent member, but I don't know. I don't think there is. I don't think there is. George will know better than I, but. You know, or it is amazing that certain continents don't even have a permanent member, right? Like there's just, the whole thing seems to be. This is the topic of a lot of thought already, and more needs to happen going forward. And George is urging us to do this, and we will do this. We will absolutely do this. We are in the second half hour of our conversation, so I will get ready for questions, but I have one more question before we open up, and that is, how does Ukraine not become Syria? So Ukraine is a stronger nation, and Ukraine has been strengthened over the last eight years, but certainly over the last three months even. It is so unified at this point. Ukraine is so unified, and its military is fighting so fiercely with the support of the Ukrainian people. And again, with Zelensky being a true representative of the Ukrainian people, and the Ukrainian people strongly supporting him, that you don't see that in Syria. You've got a united nation. You have a united Ukraine determined to be independent sovereign, free, prosperous, democratic. They've been that way trying to get that way, trying to be better democratic for the last 30 years. They do not want to go back under the thumb control of an oppressive Russia. And so they're fighting for their freedom in ways that very few other nations include. Well, let me ask you, and the follow-up on that is, the West got tired of trying to get rid of Assad and gave up, including the United States. But you could argue all the West, and it was the Europeans, in some ways, pushing to de-escalate. How do we not have the same thing happen here in six months? It's the right question. It's the right question. And there will be tensions. There already are tensions. Yeah, maybe we just talked about with Macron and Schultz. We said, Macron and Schultz, we see it in the economic strains, the Europe seems. Food crisis is real. Food crisis is real. Inflation is real. Natural gas prices are high, really. Oil prices as well, contributing to inflation. So all of that is going to be a strain. All that's going to put pressure on the international community to ease off a little bit. If we ask for more Ukraine aid, they're going to be double the amount of Republicans against it, as there were the last time. And do you think people need to prepare for that? I think we need to be prepared for that. So far, I'll just say so far, the support has been strong, even in the Republican Party in the Senate. In the Senate. In the Senate. Yeah, key. Key. And the leader of the Republican Party in the Senate has been, he was just there. Unabashed. Unabashed. And good for him. So I think that it's going to be tough. There's no doubt it's going to be tough. This is important to us as a nation. It's important to us as a leader of the international community, and it's important to the Ukraine. So I think we'll have to stick with it. One thing I'd like to remind people is in 1942, the midterm elections went against the party in power, because people were more worried about what was going on here. I'll open up to questions both in the room. And I know we have some online questions, Lauren. But go ahead. And I'll repeat. Do we have a mic? There is a mic. There's a mic coming running towards you right this moment here. Here he comes. Now that the Ellen Show is canceled, we've got some helpers from the Ellen Show. Thank you. First, I wanted to thank both of you for your service. Mr. Taylor, you have morally ambiguous conflict in the State Department and now at the Institute of Peace. And Mr. Todd, I've always liked your penetrating analysis through the years. Just two quick clarifications. What was the quote attributed to the Taliban? What is it? We've got the time, but you have the watches, I think, is what it was. And Mr. Taylor, what was Zelensky's position on the Crimea? Right. So earlier on, like about two months ago, there were negotiations. At least the Ukrainians were serious about these negotiations with the Russians, first on the border of Belarus and then in Istanbul or in Turkey outside of Istanbul. And in those negotiations, there were some serious proposals put down by the Ukrainians. One of those proposals put down by the Ukrainians was a commitment to agree to disagree about Crimea for 15 years and a commitment not to try to reclaim Crimea by force. So that's what the Ukrainians were willing to commit at that time. These negotiations, those negotiations were before Bucza, were before atrocities, were for Irpim, before Mariupol. With those war crimes, the enthusiasm, the willingness to negotiate has gone way down. But at the time, President Zelensky said that he would forswear militarily trying to take back Crimea. Great, thank you. I, too, would like to thank both of you for what's been a great discussion. I'd also like to compliment whoever titled this event as exposing atrocities because I'm not sure we're going to be able to do more than expose atrocities. And this leads to my question to the ambassador. If we don't go into Russia, how do we hold Putin and his chain of command, as you described it earlier, accountable for what they've done? It seems to me that they're going to sit in a certain security and they're not, all they have to do is not travel abroad and they're off the hook. The analogy is Eichmann, and the Israelis had to go get them before they could hold them accountable. It's a fair question. It's a very fair question. And we do know who titled this, and she's sitting right here. Congratulations, Lauren, nice work. And you're right, there is no intention. And again, President Biden in his statement yesterday made it very clear that that's not our goal. Our goal is not regime change. Our goal is not to go into Russia. Our goal is not to enable the Ukrainians to even fire in Russia. So we're not going to arrest President Putin or that chain of command that you talked about, that we talked about. But you also said the right thing. You made the right point. That is, no statute of limitations, so as long as he is in power and if the international community is able to label him and try him as a war criminal, he can't travel. Now, Lauren will remind me that there have been some leaders who were condemned, who did travel, and may not have been arrested by mistake. They should have been arrested when they went into South Africa or wherever it was. But being a pariah, being a convicted war criminal, not being able to travel, that's a penalty. Do you expect a trial in absentia? Why not? Why not? Absentia, have we done this? You could do it, but then it becomes more of a political consideration. You want the defendant there to actually try to vindicate themselves. You do. You do. Thank you. Good question. All right, let's go online. So we've gotten some good online questions, and I'm going to give you two group together, both related to the ICC. What steps should Congress take to support accountability for war crimes in Ukraine? Should this include amending some of the restrictions that have been put in place on support to the International Criminal Court? Relatedly, to what extent does the fact that the US is not a signatory to the ICC complicate US efforts to assist in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes? And will the US put aside its differences and work with the ICC? The second question to me seems to be the more relevant one, because the first question is not relevant if we're not a party to the ICC. We're not a part of the ICC, but I think it is true that while there are constraints on us by law, there's some US law that says you can't do some things with the ICC. And we know why they were put in place. But there are some things that we can do to support the ICC. I think this is true. And again, smarter people than I, or one of whom is sitting right here, have suggested that the United States, either with the government or more likely through legal capabilities that we have, can support ICC investigations. That's right, Laura. So there are things that we can do even under this restrictive law that we are operating on that says we can't actually participate. And we don't accept jurisdiction over them. So there are some things that we can do, but the questioner also asks, are there some changes to the law? Some people are suggesting some changes to the law. For example, there is an amendment. I don't think it's moved yet, but there's an amendment that says if there's a war criminal who comes to the United States, who is convicted of war crimes in another country, we can arrest him, which we can't do. So we don't make a distinction on being named a war criminal by the ICC versus named a war criminal by Ukrainians, judiciary, versus another country. I think that the law will have to see what the law aburges. And it's being worked on right now. But there seems to be bipartisan support for saying if there's a war criminal, we ought to be able to arrest him if he lands in Dallas. Gotcha. We had a question out here. Let's get to the mic. Hi, good morning. Thank you both so much for your remarks. And thank you for the lovely kickoff to the event, George. In this conversation and in high level conversation, to what degree are gender dynamics being considered both in the analysis of the war and exposing atrocities, especially considering the high level of civilian casualties and the history of prominent human trafficking and sex trafficking in the region? Who's chronicling this? It's a great question. And it is being chronicled. I mean, we see it in your reporters. All the reporters have recognized the incredible burden on women and children, in particular in Ukraine. We see them leaving. We see them giving up their homes, traveling to another country. They hope they can come back is why they're not all coming to not big flows to the United States because they want to stay in the area because they want to go home. And it really is a burden on women, children. You mentioned the sex trafficking. There's worry about that. It had gotten a whole lot of attention in Eastern Europe. But there have been a couple of indications. And again, I go back to the importance. And this is part of what we're talking about today of journalists, of reporters who are documenting this as well, some more than others. But nonetheless, that story is getting out. I'm just always struck with Timothy Snyder and his dedication to the book, The Road to Unfreedom. And he says, for the journalists, the heroes of our time, because they are the ones actually doing the most to identify the truth in some real sense, but also the truth about gender. I want to follow up on child trafficking, right? Ukraine has this robust industry of adoption. And we've done some stories about what's happened to some of these places as they can't travel. But to me, that is a concern. You've got to be worried about child trafficking. Absolutely. And you're right. In Ukraine, the orphanages, some have tried to stay. Some have moved totally, just moved into Eastern Europe. So the child trafficking has to be a big concern. And before the adoptions, there were a lot of Americans and other nationalities who adopted Ukrainian kids. And this war has actually stopped that, has really put a halt to that, really big problems for both the Ukrainians and Americans. But that's an issue that we ought to be focused on. That's a great question. Some more online. So I have another online question. Incredible reports of torture are emerging out of Kherson. How have these sorts of atrocious acts, including against non-combatants, been known to have been committed previously by Russian forces elsewhere, and that includes globally? Chetsnia, Georgia, and Syria, right? Isn't there evidence in all three countries that the Russian soldiers have gone above and beyond? Above and beyond. And Kherson is the latest one. But we saw that so vividly in Bucha, the torture that was evident. And yes, in Kherson, which the Russians now occupy, but don't control, there are stories coming out again. The heroes of our time, the journalists, are showing this. Ukrainians and internationals are showing the torture that's going on there. And as you just said, this is what the Russians seem to do. I guess is this the penalty for not holding them accountable in Chetsnia, not holding them more accountable in Georgia? I mean, is this in some way? I'm not saying that the wet, but this is a fallout of not pursuing justice back then. This is a further demand, requirement, imperative that we hold them accountable, because otherwise, it keeps happening. What else? And a final question directed to you, Bill. In your opinion, what does winning look like for Ukraine? This is a great question. Winning, I go back to President Biden. He needed to say this, and he did. Winning is the emergence, the defense of and the continued existence of a democratic, independent, sovereign, prosperous Ukraine. Those are all important pieces of it. The prosperous part, that suggests that the free Ukraine needs to have access to the Black Sea. So it needs to have Odessa. And he said, prosperous, that's what I read, that free Ukraine needs to have. He didn't say that it has to be immediately the full territory of Ukraine as it was before 2014, when the Russians first invaded. He did not say that. Nor has President Zelensky said that. President Zelensky said, that's a claim he's going to maintain forever. Doesn't have to happen right away. But the answer to the question of what the goal is, there needs to be a sovereign, independent Ukraine that can continue to develop. Continue to develop economically. So free Ukraine, even if there is some portion, whether it's just Donbass or Crimea, that is still occupied, free Ukraine can join the European Union. Free Ukraine could apply to NATO again. Free Ukraine could think North Korea, South Korea. South Korea developed pretty well its economy, even though it was divided. Think of West Germany, East Germany. West Germany helped found the European Union. West Germany was in NATO. Even while the Soviet Union controlled East Germany. So a free Ukraine sovereign, that is, not only the control of the Russians, Democratic can continue to develop while not giving up an eventual claim on its full territory. Let me pivot, we have a few minutes. So let me pivot to the future of Russia. Is it worth planning on a post-Putin future in the near term or not? Sure. Let's be clear. That's for Russians to decide. When Putin leaves. I hope it's for Russians to decide. Has it been the Russian people's decision or not? Well, I didn't say, the Russian people or people around Putin? I was on a panel a couple of weeks ago with a very senior ex intelligence service head. And he said, his scenario is that, bad decisions by President Putin, a blunder moving going into Ukraine, a strategic blunder that is hurting the country, it's hurting the economy, it's hurting the military, it's hurting the security services, bad decisions there, bad health, unpopular unrest, let's say, in the rest of the country. Some people right around him, these are Russians, come in and say, you know, boss, we got this dacha for you, your family's fine, you're fine. There's no brutes, right? There's no brutes, have a nice life. You can, this has happened before, this could happen. This is not for us to do, this is not for us to say, this is not, we have no Russians, whether it's that little clique around or more broadly, we'll make that decision. But your question's good, when should we be planning? Sure, we should be planning for a lot of contingencies. How does, you know, we talk about what's winning look like for Ukraine. How does the European, how does Europe sort of get its economy functioning again because it's so reliant on Russian energy? I mean, how does this look, or are we in this sort of, you know, I mean, is this gonna be, the rest of this decade is gonna be about essentially getting Europe to wean itself off of Russian energy? Amazingly enough, they seem to be going in that direction. Just in the last couple days, they've talked about cutting off all of the seaborne oil going into, which they say is somewhere between two thirds and 90%. That sounds high, but that's the commitment. They've got the Hungarians to buy onto that because they can keep getting the oil through the pipeline on the oil. They've also committed to reduce by two thirds the natural gas from Russia. That's the European Union. Yeah, and when Europe's economy is just sort of flatline for the rest of this decade, I mean, aren't we just gonna see major on political interests? It's gonna be a major transformation. There's no doubt about it. Major transformation of their economies, which they're ready to do, can affect us as well. I mean, you know, prices will go up for oil and gas when they try to move, cut off that supply, that will affect us. There's no doubt about that. But this is a major turning point. Is there any fear here we're doing retreating Russia like Germany, World War I? I sense it from Macron and Schultz, that that, I mean, Schultz is all but sad. It seems, but do you have any of that concern? I don't have that concern. My first concern is to be able to succeed on having a successful Ukraine, to have a Ukraine that's sovereign and democratic. And that's gonna take both the pieces of this, both the military support, which needs to come very fast and very heavy right now, but it's also gonna take the pressure on the Russian economy. The Russian economy is able to sustain this war effort primarily because of what you ask about in terms of oil and gas. I mean, it's a billion dollars a day that's going into Russia. Billion dollars a day from the European... Still, still going. Still going, still going. And if they succeed in cutting by two thirds and cutting by 90%, that will go down to some... History will write that Europe is both fighting and funding the same enemy. And hopefully they will continue to fight. And hopefully they will stop funding or phase out the funding. And that seems to be the direction. How is any ending to this war not put Ukraine in the EU at a minimum, let alone NATO? I think it has to. I think you're absolutely right. I think that there have been commitments from a lot of the EU, including the EU leadership, not from the French, but from the... That Ukraine's application for EU membership will be fast tracked. And they've already begun that process. On NATO, that's an interesting question. It's an interesting question. How does Europe avoid going into a war again? After this war settles down somehow, whether the Ukrainians win, which is still possible, or they have the free Ukraine that we talked about here that develops while they still have claimed anything that they don't control, how do we be sure? How do the Ukrainians be sure? How do the Europeans ensure that Ukraine's not invaded again? Or that Georgia's not invaded again? Or that Moldova has not invaded again? What's the security structure in Europe? And there may have to be guarantees. The best guarantee, of course, is what you asked about. Chuck, and that's NATO membership. It's pretty obvious. He doesn't want this fight with NATO. The Russians don't want to. Or he'd have gone into Lithuania a long time ago, right? A long time ago, which is why Sweden and Finland joining is such a big deal for the Baltics, for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, who are kind of stuck out there if Finland and Sweden are members. Suddenly you're like, oh, I've got a rear flake finally. Yeah, exactly. It's possible to defend the Baltics if Sweden and Finland are members. Well, I always learn a lot. Anytime I talk with you, Bill, so I hope everybody else did the same as well, so I appreciate it. Thank you for being here. Thank you for asking me, Lord. I appreciate it. Come back. I would love to. Love to put my office here. Right, we can arrange that. That's good to see you. Thanks very much. Thank you very much.