 Mr Chairman, thank you very much. It's a great pleasure and a great honor to talk to you today. Unfortunately, I would say that my talk faces some problems. First of all, I'm a bit behind the schedule and with the outcome of last night, my slides are a bit behind the schedule too. I tried to fix it and muddling through, but I think this is rather common at the moment in the European Union. So what I want to start with, or my main hypothesis is that the unfinished currency union, so that an institutional problem is an main driver, or is an important driver for the acceleration of this crisis dynamics, and that of course dealing with this issue is an important issue, and it's important to solve the crisis and to prevent further crisis. However, I want to give some warning that a simple answer like we had a crisis, now we need more Europe or we had a crisis, now we need more Germany, is not meant by this title unfinished currency union. And I would say that we should be very careful about the things we, how we want to reform the currency union. With respect to get more Germany, just a little example, if the crisis would have taken place in 2002 and not in 2012, we would have seen a sick man of Europe called Germany and a vibrant and vital Spain and vibrant and vital Ireland. So some things about this, the setting of this crisis might rather accidental and not very deeply rooted in a better Germany or a better or worse Spain or whatever, so we should be very careful. And the same is true with the simple outcry, we need more Europe. Why should we be very careful with it? So if we want more centralization, well, it should be, there should be good arguments for this. And there should be detailed economic reasoning, this is one thing, or maybe the people want it. With respect to do people want more centralized Europe, I'm not sure about that, but if there's good reasoning, I would say it's the job of economists to advertise this. And that's what I now want to do. I want to advertise one particular piece of more Europe. And this is to overcome the unfinished currency union. We have heard a lot of on this today. I will just add some more slides on this topic. I hope you're not too annoyed by this. Before I go deeper in this issue, I'd like to start with some spot the debt crisis scheme. If we have a short look at these figures, you'll find that, well, which currency area is in trouble, maybe the euro area, yeah. Concerning the gross public debt and the budget deficits, the figures of the joint euro area are not that bad compared to the US, the UK, and to Japan. And we're already seen, and this is to some degree also true for states that are in trouble. For instance, Spain. The gross public debt and also the budget figures are roughly comparable to those that we experience in the US and the UK. So what I want to say is the crisis we experience at the moment in the euro area is not about the sheer amount of debt. It's, of course, the sheer amount of debt is a problem and we should deal with it and we should fix it. But it's not the single root of the crisis and not the single element of this crisis. An important element of this crisis are the institutions and that the institutions we currently have in this currency union cannot ensure that the currency union does not break up. And so what I argue is that we, during the crisis, we experienced the return of currency risks. The currency risks within a currency union. So you have all the disadvantages but no advantage with this return of currency risks in a currency union. And my argument is that, yes, we experienced that and they are still these new currency risks in place. And I'd like to argue that this is, you can see this in some figure for the fall 2011. So in this picture you find the bond yields of three European countries with the bond yields, the bond spreads was Germany. So this is the Greece on the right scale and Austria and France on the left scale. And the black line is the point in time when the former prime minister Papandreou called for a random on austerity. Afterwards a lot of rumors popped up even spread by politicians that Greece will leave the currency union. And interestingly, of course the bond yields for Greece went up. That's not really troubling. I think it's normal when it's said that Greece has to leave the currency union that there is some currency risks. So to say that there's some additional risk, okay. But interestingly, the same is true but on a lower scale of course for Austria and France. And in the case of Austria it's interesting that the exposure of Austria with respect to Greece, to Greece in terms of fiscal and the rescue involvement and rescue packages or the involvement of the Austrian banking sector in Greece has relative to the GDP the same amount as it is for Germany. So it is not what we cannot see here is not that simply markets reacted on the increased Greek risks but I would argue that this increase in the Austrian bond yields relative to German bond yields is a pure currency risks. So this is risk on top, risk that we do not need in the currency union. Where does it come from? Well, this is what we have heard about a lot and you are very familiar with that. We have some highly interconnected crises at the moment. We have banking crisis and we have sovereign debt crisis. In Ireland of course it's the first place there was a banking crisis then the sovereign debt crisis evolved and for instance in Greece it was the other way around. And what is the problem with it is that of course the circulation of money is very important and banks play a very important vital role in this and that the monetary system we are in is the existence of banks is of highest importance and a country cannot afford to just to write to default the whole banking sector and let it go down. And so if a country comes to the cycle that it has to rescue its banks and then the sovereign debt comes to sovereign debt crisis and that the banks are in trouble due to the sovereign debt crisis there is at least one can think of one way to come out of it to leave this circle printing money. And this temptation to print money is I would say the one cause for the reemerge or the return of currency risks within the currency union that now several countries are suspected that they have that they will or that they will be tempted to leave the currency union to fix to to leave this circle. Of course there are other ways to leave the circle Ireland ask for assistance and I think this is a good thing to do but it didn't prevent the return of the currency risks. So where come where why is it so that the currency risks why is it so that that these crises banking crisis and sovereign debt crisis are so highly interconnected. Well we all I already mentioned and I think it's got clear today that the country cannot let its banking sector down totally. So it has an vital interest that in that the banking some banking sector exists to keep up the circulation of money. But there's also a different second aspect of the story and rather with the banks. Banks have some kind of home bias I call it or it's not called it's not said by me but by some other economists and this home bias well what does it mean. Banks have the tendency although the the the the currency union is the capital markets and the currency union were highly interconnected there was was still the tendency to to have more national debt in relation to to debt from other assets related to government debt from from the national government than from from governments abroad. And these are figures for much from March 2010 and you see that that here they are very high figures for many countries for instance interestingly for Greece and Spain but also for Italy and for instance Italy. Italy is the biggest bond market in the world so that a relatively high share that Italian banks have a relatively high share it's okay yeah but here Italian banks have something more than 70 percent. Even though the Italian bond markets is the biggest one in the the second biggest one in the world with relation related to the whole euro area the Italian bond markets is not 70 percent it's some very below 50 percent and so what so we have here a second channel for this interconnection between the banking crisis and the sovereign debt crisis that is if the sovereign gets in trouble the banks will get in trouble too and simply due to the fact that they have so much government debt of their own government. If it's it's not the problem that they have government debt but if it would be fairly fairly distributed all over the the place then this wouldn't be a problem then we would have more write-offs and troubles in Germany of course but I think the German banking sector would be able to to bear this. Unfortunately so unfortunately what what is happening during the crisis is that this tendency to have a national view in the banking sector is enforcing and the crisis itself enforces. What I can show you here is the foreign exposure of German and French banks and these these figures are similar for even for Italian banks for Spanish banks interestingly not but what you can see here is that these banks they try to to close down their their business in a broad and and repatriate all their their exposure and this has of course severe consequences and this has also severe consequences for all the other banks in the rest of Europe that might be more in trouble than than the French and the German banks because they have a hard time to get money from them and before 2008 it was rather easy to get money from German or French banks and this is also hard time for the ECB and this is a figure that German economists are very excited about and yeah a bit puzzled or not not not really puzzled but but there's a bit there's high anxiety that this shows the future inflation risks in the euro area what you can see here is the money that is lent from banks to the ECB and we have we now have the interesting it's Germany it is that way that the the banks the German banks are net lender to the central bank so the the central central bank is indebted with its with the banks in Germany it's a totally strange situation and this figure shows you this that for GNL and F these are Germany Netherlands Luxembourg and Finland that the banks hold a lot of money within the central bank and this is idle money this money is is is not working is is not not available the banks prefer to to leave the money with the central bank and of course this is a big burden for the ECB in terms that they are their monetary multipliers their way how to to bring their policy to the real economy is highly disturbed because the banking sectors in Germany Netherlands and so on so was they are very reluctant to to lend the money and especially to lend the money abroad and so and and this of course accelerates the crisis further because this has also some business cycle implementation that are particularly bad for for countries in trouble so now my conclusion on my what I wanted to ask for is not very brilliant I would say or you could ask you that I try to it's rather redundant and pluggy ate some things and I just wanted to advertise here that the the ideas about a banking union are good thing that they are not just a good thing to to get Ireland bring Ireland in a better position but they are also a good thing to maybe to reduce the overall risks in the euro area and to break an accelerating circle that has a bad bad impact on on the business cycle thank you very much for your attention