 20 Russian and English Aggressions in the Pacific Northwest The danger of encroachments by foreign powers has been given prominent notice in preceding chapters as a principal cause of the Spanish Northwestward advance since the adoption late in the 16th century of the policy of the aggressive defensive. In the period from 1769 to 1781, when the future of the Californias was in fact being decided, and especially in the vital years, 1773 to 1776, this factor under the guiding hand of the great viceroy Bucarelli was the real main spring of Spanish action, though from the standpoint of the permanent foreign danger, rather than from that of a particular emergency. It is especially interesting to approach the subject of foreign conquests from different points of view, so as to bring out the importance of this factor the more clearly by providing a better perspective. As has already been pointed out, the Russians and the English were by no means the only foreign peoples who threatened Spain's domination of the Pacific Coast. The Indians and the Chinese had their opportunity before Spain appeared upon the scene. The Japanese were at one time a potential peril, and the Portuguese and Dutch voyagers occasionally gave Spain concern. The French for many years were the most dangerous enemy of all, but with their disappearance from North America in 1763 as a result of their defeat in the Seven Years' War they were no longer a menace. The people of the United States were eventually to become the most powerful outstanding element, but their chance did not appear until the 19th century. In the time of Bucarelli there were only two peoples whom Spain had seriously to consider. These were the Russians and the English. In a review of Spanish foreign policy as a whole, during the reign of Charles III, 1759 to 1788, and particularly in those years which were of most interest from the point of view of California history, it will be found that Spain was primarily concerned over the possibilities of a war with England. Russia, though a dangerous opponent in the Pacific, gave Spain hardly any cause for worry in Europe. There were troubles with Portugal and Morocco, but their importance lay in the relation which England bore to the situation, especially in the case of Portugal, whose aggressive activities in South America received English backing until 1776. Then the American Revolution produced a diversion in favor of Spain. To oppose England the so-called family compact between the bourbon crowns of France and Spain was brought into being. In 1762, therefore, Spain entered the war which for several years France had been waging against England. Having gone down to defeat in 1763 the bourbon powers thereafter endeavored to strengthen themselves for a renewal of the combat, which, it was generally agreed, would inevitably eventuate. In 1770 to 1771, and several times between 1773 and the close of 1776, Spain was ready to fight, but France each time drew back. Late in 1775, however, a change in Spain's attitude began to be perceptible, which became marked after 1776. This was due primarily, it would seem, to the American Revolution which engendered a belief that Spain's participation in the war against England would be fatal whatever the outcome. Victory, which would also mean independence for England's colonies, would result in the appearance of a dangerous neighbor in America and in the eventual loss, perhaps, of Spain's colonial empire. Defeat would subject Spain to a like fate at the hands of England. Spain, therefore, hesitated to enter the war, though in 1779 she did so. These were the principal ideas in the diplomatic history of the period. As affecting the Americas, the danger point in a war with England was the West Indies and the neighboring coasts of the mainland. Whatever anxiety there was for Pacific ports concerned South America, and after 1773 even that region does not seem to have been important enough to have found a prominent place in diplomatic correspondence. As for foreign aggressions in the Pacific Northwest, they were then regarded as of such comparatively slight importance that they have not attracted the attention of even the most voluminous writers on the history of Spain for that period. Indeed, the danger of a war with England inevitably lessens Spain's fears concerning the California's, for England's forces could be counted upon to concentrate in the Atlantic for any serious attack. Thus it may be said that Russian aggressions in the Pacific Northwest occupied a place of no importance in the general scheme of Spanish foreign policy, and English aggressions were more important, if at all, only because England was regarded as a consistent opponent in all quarters of the globe. In other words, Spanish activities in the Californias were on virtually an independent footing. They depended on Spain's surmises concerning foreign encroachments of the North Pacific itself without reference, or at most only very slightly related, to the state of affairs in Europe. Before dealing in successive chapters with Buccarelli's measures against the possibility of foreign conquests in the Californias, it seems worthwhile to trace the actual progress of the Russians and English in their endeavors to reach the Pacific coast in order to estimate what the danger really was. The Russian approach was largely in the hands of the Cossacks, the underlying causes being their yearning for new homes where they might enjoy personal freedom and the commercial stimulus of the fur trade. The first step was taken in the reign of Ivan IV, 1533 to 1584, when the outlaw Yermak led a band of Cossacks across the Ural Mountains in 1578 and conquered a Tartar kingdom on the Ob River. Thenceforth the Cossacks made rapid strides across the continent. Ten men could conquer a kingdom whether due to the superiority of their weapons or to other causes does not matter here. Tobolsk, Tomsk, Yinesiysk, Irkutsk, Yakutsk, and finally Akosk on the Pacific, successively became centers of their activity and supply stations for the next point to the East. In fifty years they had advanced to Yakutsk over half way and eleven more years suffice to reach Akosk where an establishment was made in 1639. From Yakutsk they went southward up the Lena River to Lake Baikal where silver mines were found, but here their rush was checked, the Manchu Tartars being too powerful for them. In 1646 they entered the land of the Chukchis in the extreme northwestern part of Asia and were rewarded by rich finds of mammoth ivory. The Chukchis, however, were not pleasant neighbors and were able to maintain their independence of Russia to the close of the 18th century. By 1706 Kamchatka, the last Siberian land to be taken, had been overrun. Arrived at the Pacific the conquerors wondered what lay beyond. There were evidences of a great land not far to the east, strange trees drifted ashore, the swell of the ocean was not great, and the Chukchis told stories of a rich eastern continent, and well may it have seemed rich to them when the comparatively agreeable west coast of Alaska is contrasted with the bleak and stormy Siberian shore. The Russian government became interested in the American Siberia as early as 1710, and attempts were made to reach it by way of the Arctic Ocean along the north coast of Siberia, and surveys were made of the Kuril Islands. This, it may be noted, was during the reign of Peter the Great, 1682 to 1725. Peter also planned expeditions which were to proceed from Kamchatka to see whether America and Asia joined, and to make discoveries along Pacific shores from Japan to the American continent. It fell to the lot of Vitus Behring, a dain, to execute the major part of his commands and to the reins of his successors to see them carried out. The Behring Party had first to make the overland journey across Siberia, which it started to do in 1725. Arrived at the Pacific, Behring left Akhotsk in 1727, and in the following year sailed through Behring Strait. He then returned to St. Petersburg, or Petrograd, where he recommended further voyages to discover trade routes to America and Japan, and to explore the northern coast of Siberia. Plans were made on a large scale, and the expeditions were authorized in 1734, but it was six years before they got underway. Behring commanded one ship, and Alexei Cherikov the other, but the two at length became separated. On July 15, 1741 Cherikov discovered the American coast just above 55 degrees. He then sailed northwest and west, past the Aleutian Islands, and after much suffering reached Kamchatka in October 1741. Cherikov made another voyage in 1742, but did not reach America. Behring, meanwhile, had sighted the American mainland above 58 degrees on July 16, 1741. The return voyage was one of terrible hardship. The voyagers were obliged to winter on Behring Island where their commander died, and their survivors did not get back to Kamchatka until August 1742. Incidentally, they brought back some furs of the sea otter, and this it was, which proved the impulse for a fresh series of Russian voyages. Between 1743 and 1767, a number of voyages by private individuals were made as far as the Aleutian Islands in search of furs. The year 1764 marked the beginning of a new period of imperial interest when plans were made which resulted in the Kranitsyn and Levachev expedition. Secret instructions were given, but the object seems to have been to verify the reports already received from the fur traders and to obtain as much further information as possible. The Kranitsyn-Levachev voyage took place during the years 1766 to 1769. The expeditionaries encountered great hardships and got no farther than the Aleutian Islands not reaching the mainland. Levachev at length got back to St. Petersburg in 1771. Special notice should be taken at this voyage as the principal one under imperial direction in the period of most interest here. This expedition may have been the foundation for the exaggerated reports from St. Petersburg which were transmitted to Bukarely and influenced his course of action. At about the same time, a number of books were published concerning Russian activities in the Pacific. Private expeditions continued, however, and it is impossible to say how much they entered into the rumors heard by the Spanish ambassadors. These voyages seem to have reached no farther than the Aleutian Islands. Not until 1783 did the Russians make a direct attempt to extend their fur trading operations to the Alaska mainland, for the sea otter was disappearing from the Aleutian Islands. An expedition was made under Potap-Zhikov, but it was a failure. In the same year Grigory Shelikov organized a company to make a fur trading settlement and this was established in 1784 on the island of Kadyak, the first Russian settlement to North America. Fifteen years later, in 1799, Sitka was founded on the Alaska mainland, and by 1812 Russian settlement was carried as far south as the Fallarone Islands, just out from the Golden Gate. Clearly, Spain had cause to fear the Russian approach. English approaches to the Pacific coast were along a number of lines, but may be reduced roughly to two, from the Atlantic coast westward in the most part overland, but in some degree by sea as represented by the attempts to find the Northwest Passage, and the direct approach by sea in the Pacific itself around South America, or eastward from southern Asia and even across the Isthmiths of Panama. The former was the earlier and more formidable movement, but the latter was the first to arrive in the one which in fact gave more trouble to Spain down to the close of the 18th century. English entry of the Pacific, by way of the Isthmiths of Panama, passed through two principal phases. The first came in the latter half of the 16th century, during the reign of Elizabeth, when English sailors plundered Spanish towns and ships, although their countries were nominally at peace. Drake and Hawkins are the typical names. The second phase came in the 17th century, when men engaged in it tended to evolve from a shadowy British allegiance into unqualified pirates. Sir Henry Morgan is the outstanding figure of this period. Just at the close of the century also came the unsuccessful attempt to found a scotch colony at Darien. This marks the end of the English activity along this line of approach to the Pacific. Another line of advance to which little space need be given, because it did not in fact get near the Americas, is the British advance around Africa to southern Asia. This may be said to have begun with the chartering of the British East Indian Company in 1600. The English government granting to that company rights of trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Magellan. A voyage to the East Indies was made in the very next year, and in a little more than a decade, the company had already established a post in India. As early as 1637, English ships had appeared on the coast of China, and for the next century and a half they carried on an intermittent trade there. Spain had little to fear from England in this period, from the direction of the East Indies, because of the English conflicts in India with the Portuguese, Dutch and French, especially with the last named. Once the English overcame this opposition, however, they loomed up as a danger to the Spanish colonies. The capture of Manila in 1762 by an English expedition from India was a significant indication of the reality of this danger. The Kroy-Galvis plan of January 1768 referred to the possibility of English and Dutch voyages from the East Indies to the Californias. Not until the last 15 years of the 18th century was this fear realized, but then numerous English ships made voyages from China to and the coasts of the far northwest. The pioneer of English voyagers around South America to the Pacific coast was Francis Drake, who made a brief stay in Alta California in 1579. His voyage showed how weak was Spain's control of the Pacific. It was never forgotten by the Spaniards, who likewise realized how much they had to fear from the presence of an enemy ship. A fresh lesson was not long in coming. In 1587-1588 Thomas Cavendish repeated Drake's voyage, capturing a rich Manila galleon near Cape San Lucas in 1588. The 17th century was the age of buccaneers, whether virtual or real, and some of them seemed to have rounded South America. One expedition, with the semblance of governmental authority, left Virginia in 1683, turned South America, and joining with buccaneers who had crossed the isthmiths of Panama, engaged in operations against the Spaniards in the years 1684-1686. Cook, Eaton, Davis, Harris, Swan, Wafer, Cowley, Townley, Dampier, and the Frenchman Groignet were among the leaders of this enterprise. Swan and Townley got as far north as Mazatlán. The first four decades of the 18th century were marked by English voyages in which commercial objects were most largely to the fore, the promoters getting clearance papers from the government. Once in the Pacific, these voyagers acted much as had their predecessors the buccaneers plundering the Spaniards. The voyages were different in that the government required records to be kept, many of which were published, and in the general endeavor to advance knowledge about the Pacific coasts, men of science often accompanied the expeditions. The first of this series of voyages was headed by Dampier, who left England in 1699 with a fleet of five ships. The expedition subsequently split up into four separate voyages owing to the inability of different officers and men to agree with Dampier. Dampier got as far north as the coast of New Spain in 1704-1705 before pursuing his voyage around the world. Clipperton and Funnell got back to England by a similar voyage. The expedition had been a financial failure, but some Bristol merchants were persuaded to make another venture. The new expedition set sail in 1708 under the command of Woods Rogers. Three years later it got back to England with an immense profit, largely the result of having captured the Manila galleon off Cape San Lucas in 1709. After this encounter, Woods Rogers took the usual route around the world. Many companies now sprang up, but they were unable to equal the success of Woods Rogers. The shell-voct Clipperton voyages along the coast of New Spain in 1721 were the most noteworthy. The English voyages, even when unprofitable to their backers, cost the Spaniards enormous losses, both in property taken or destroyed and in precautionary measures. They also increased England's knowledge of the Pacific and its shores. Spain's sense of danger may well have been enhanced by the vast literature about these voyages and the popular interest in them in England. The new era began with the outbreak of war between England and Spain in 1739. The departure was marked by the fitting out of an expedition at government expense, a formal naval enterprise under the command of George Hanson. Hanson took the customary route around the world in the years 1740 to 1744, in the course of which he cruised the western shores of New Spain. Failing to encounter the Manila galleon he crossed to the Philippine islands and took one there. Although he did not make a profit and lost most of his men, he had caused an immense expense and a great loss to Spain. Furthermore, among the papers taken in the captured galleon were those which revealed the Spanish secrets of the Pacific. There were sailing directions for the South American coast in the Trans-Pacific routes, with charts showing islands, shoals, landmarks, harbors, and the like. The Pacific was no longer a closed sea. After the Seven Years War a new type of voyage began. The semi-paradical voyages of the past were no longer in accord with public morals, nor was there the excuse of war. Voyages for scientific objects and discovery began therefore to be set out with instructions not to interfere with the ships or territory of European peoples with whom England was at peace. The impetus came from France, who, having lost her colonies by the peace of 1763, was eager to replace them by new discoveries. The English quickly followed the French lead by the voyage of Byron 1764 to 1766 and Wallace and Carteret in 1766 to 1769. These voyagers went around the world by way of South America and the South Pacific. Then came the most important voyage of all, and especially interesting here, as they fall within the period of principal interest in this work the three voyages of Captain James Cook. The first voyage occupied the years 1768 to 1771. One object was to observe the transit of Venus, the island of Tahiti being selected as a place at which to do it. Cook followed the path of Byron, Wallace, and Carteret. After the observation had been taken at Tahiti, he proceeded westward and made extensive explorations in New Zealand and Australia. Upon his return to England, he was commissioned to go again to the South Pacific to determine whether a great southern continent existed there, about which speculation had been rife for two centuries. The expedition took place in 1772 to 1775 and the myth of the southern continent was exploded. Perhaps a more important fact here is that in all his voyage he lost but four men and only one by sickness. This was the result of special preparations by Cook. Before his time it was usually the case that from 40 to 75% of the crew were lost. Cook's methods were published and were followed by later voyagers. It meant that the terror of the seas had been banished and in a very great degree made Spain's retention of power in the Pacific so much the less secure. Cook's third voyage left England in the year 1776 and, as will be pointed out in a later chapter, caused the Spanish government no little anxiety. One of its objects was to attack another long-standing myth that of a practical water passage through or around North America. Cook was commissioned to approach this problem from the Pacific side. He was also to get information to the coast and was secretly instructed to take possession for England of all lands not hitherto discovered or visited by Europeans. On route he discovered the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, a group destined to occupy an important place in the later voyages of the 18th century. He reached the North American coast in about 44 degrees and proceeded northward. Some furs were picked up from the natives from mere trifles and were later disposed of in China at such good prices as to open the eyes of the merchants to the possibilities of the fur trade. The result was a swarm of European vessels, particularly English ships on the northwest coasts in the last 15 years of the century. To return to Cook, he continued northward and passed through the Bering Strait, but was obliged by the ice to turn back. While wintering in the Hawaiian islands in 1779, he was killed in an affray with the natives. The expedition proceeded under the command of Captain Clerk. Clerk also passed through the Bering Strait, but he too was forced back by the ice, and soon afterward made his way around the world to England. To sum up, it is clear that English exploration in the Pacific was gathering momentum. Each new discovery and each advance in the science of navigation or other form of knowledge brought the Spanish Empire of the Pacific just so much nearer a fall. To this must be added not only the activities of the Russians but also the voyages of the French, Dutch, and Portuguese. Furthermore, there were foes attacking from the Atlantic side, stripping Spain bit by bit of her colonies, and expanding into the unoccupied lands that brought them nearer to the Pacific coast. The little reflection will enable one to appreciate the vastness of the problem which Spain had to face. One other factor remains to be considered. That of the English advance across the North American continent. The westward progress of what was to become the United States had reached the Mississippi by 1776, but the American movement did not represent a threatening element as regard Spain's possessions in the Pacific until after the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. Until then, the political and geographical barriers were too great for the United States to be a danger. The Spanish government did contemplate the possibility of Americans crossing the Mississippi and encroaching on New Spain but not on the Pacific Northwest. Events in Canada, however, and particularly the activities of the Hudson's Bay Company did indeed threaten the far-flung coast of the Californias, and the peril was recognized by Spain. One must think back to the voyages of the Cabots, followed by a procession of English mariners seeking the Northwest Passage—Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, Baffin, James, and others—if he is to get this subject in a proper focus. France, however, was the first to get a foothold in Canada, and soon afterward her colonists began to realize profits in the fur trade. Two Frenchmen, Gossilers and Radisson, paved the way for England's sharing in this trade. Disatisfied with the rewards accorded them by the French, they temporarily entered the service of some Englishmen who were interested in exploiting the fur trade of Hudson Bay, and in 1668 started English fur trading operations in that region. The venture was a success and led to the chartering of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1670. The company was granted a monopoly, and the proprietorship was civil and criminal jurisdiction of all Hudson Bay lands not actually possessed by a Christian prince. Down to the Treaty of Eutect, the company was an almost continual war with the French, who did not recognize its rights to the territory. The Treaty of 1713, however, gave to England all lands embraced by the waters emptying into Hudson Bay and straight. The region acquired was not definitely known, but at all events the attacks of the French now ceased. The trade in furs was very profitable. Perhaps for this reason, the company decided to let well enough alone and adopted a policy of secrecy and restrictions. All but the servants of the company were kept away from the territory, and the founding of settlements and even the making of discoveries were discouraged. The discovery of a strait communicating with the Pacific had been one of the charter objects of the company, yet it was charged with opposing a search until forced to make the attempt. Likewise, agriculture and mining were not encouraged. As a result, after a century of existence, the company had in 1770, but seven posts, all close to the Hudson Bay, with a total population of about 200 men, all company servants. This exclusive policy had not passed without criticism. The most notable critic was a certain Arthur Dobbs, who devoted a large part of his life to attacking the company because of its failure to find the Northwest Passage. Several expeditions were made under the auspices respectively of the company in self-defense against Dobbs' charges, the government, and a private concern, the last name being financed by popular subscription. This activity took place for the most part between 1737 and 1747. Parliament manifested interest by offering 20,000 pounds as a reward to the discoverer of the passage, but it was not found. It is noteworthy that in the last of these expeditions, one of the boats was named California, and the forming of a settlement in the California's was contemplated, if the strait should be found, to serve as a base for a vast Pacific trade. Failing to find a passage, Dobbs now sought a charter for a new corporation, charging the Hudson's Bay Company with failure to extend its settlements to the interior. The case came up in 1749, and Dobbs' petition was denied. The matter is of no small importance. A new company would undoubtedly have stimulated exploration and might have resulted in much earlier penetration by a British enterprise to the Pacific Coast, with consequences that stir the imagination. From another standpoint, the Dobbs' controversy is important. It attained a considerable publicity, and a number of books were written. These came to the notice of Spain, and were a cause of forebodings on her part. Twenty years later the company at last awakened to the desirability of interior exploration. The great name is that of Samuel Hearn. Hearn's first journey came in the year 1769. He was sent out by the company to obtain information of the interior. In particular, he was to reach a certain river said to abound in copper ore and fur-bearing animal. This journey was a failure, and in another of 1770 he again failed to reach the river of copper. In December the same year he started a third time, and on this occasion was successful, reaching the river since called the copper mine in July 1771 and descending it to its mouth in the Arctic Ocean. Not until June 1772 did he get back to the company's post on Hudson Bay. The Hearn explorations were followed by a new policy on the part of the company, which began thenceforth to push its trading operations inland. Not much progress had been made, however, by the close of the year 1776, which marks the end of the period of principal interest dealt with here. That the Spanish government might well have been alarmed is proved by the remarkable westward progress of the company and its rivals in the last quarter of the 18th century. An important competitor had sprung up in the Scottish merchants of Montreal, themselves the successors of the French since the Seven Years' War. Before that war had ended, they were already pushing into the region of the Great Lakes, and not long afterward penetrated as far as the Saskatchewan River. Gradually they drew together, and in the winter of 1783 to 1784 the Northwest Company was formed, an organization which was to accomplish vast results in the way of exploration. These companies were yet another powerful force in motion against the tottering Spanish Empire. In 1793 Alexander McKenzie, a member of the Northwest Company, reached the Pacific in what is now British Columbia. Later the Hudson's Bay Company acquired the rights of the Northwest Company, and by 1828 was already operating in Alta California while in 1841 an agency was established at San Francisco. Truly this line of approach represented a veritable danger to Spain and the Northwest, far greater than that of the Russians because of its greater resources in the way of an advancing base of supply. The gravest danger of all was that English advance which, by the Declaration of Independence, became American in 1776. It may be assumed that the outstanding details are known, and it need not be dwelt upon further than to say that it was slow-moving and late to arrive, but had behind it the greatest force and momentum of all, in addition to a shorter and better route than those of the Russians in the English. All things being equal, the people from the Atlantic Seaboard of the United States would be the first to reach the Pacific in sufficient strength to possess the Californias. As matters turned out, the equality of opportunity was not sufficiently disturbed to deprive the United States of the Pacific Coast, but the drama of California history lies in the almost countless eventualities which tended to keep affairs in normal course to the advantage of the United States. When all these elements of foreign danger are rolled into one, it appears that Spain's fears, considerable as they were, were not only not groundless, but indeed far under the mark. A Spanish statesman who would have said, in 1776, let us devote ten times as much to the Californias as we have ever done before, or let us abandon them, would have been regarded, at the very least, as extravagant in his views. But he would have been not far from right. End of Chapter 20 Chapter 21 A History of California the Spanish Period Chapter 21 Antonio Buccarelli On September 23, 1771, the vice regal term of Marques Decroy came to an end and Buccarelli succeeded to his post. One needs only to glance at the full name and titles of the new viceroy to realize that he was a man of more than ordinary distinction. The following is the signature that appears in some of his most formal documents. The knight commander of the Order of Malta, rather Don Antonio Maria Buccarelli y Irsuá, in Estrosa, Lasso de la Vega, Vilacias y Cordova, Knight, Grand Cross, and Commander of the Vault of Toro in the Order of Saint John. Gentlemen of the Chamber of His Majesty with right of entrance, Lieutenant General of the Royal Armies, viceroy, governor, and Captain General of the Kingdom of New Spain, President of its Royal Audencia, Superintendent General of the Royal Estate in the Branch of Tobacco, Judge Conservator of the Ladder, President of its Junta, and Subdelegate General of the Rent of the Males in the Same Kingdom." Ordinarily, however, the viceroy signed with only a portion of his family name and frequently was satisfied with no more than plain Buccarelli. According to Bancroft, he, quote, was a native of Seville and related to the most noble families of Spain and Italy, being, on his paternal side, a descendant from a very distinguished family of Florence, which boasted among its connections, three popes, six cardinals, and other high officers of the State and Church. And on the maternal, the Irsuas were related to several Ducal families. The Knight entered the military service of his country as a cadet and rose by gallantry an honorable service to be Lieutenant General. He had distinguished himself in several campaigns in Italy and Spain in engineering work and as the Inspector General of Cavalry. Lastly, he was called to be Governor and Captain General of Cuba, where he again rendered valuable services to the Crown, which were rewarded with a promotion to the viceroyalty of New Spain. Nara was this the only reward. He was not only permitted to grant offices to twelve of his friends and attachés, a privilege that had been withheld for some years from his predecessors, but was given by royal order of January 22, 1777, an increase of $20,000 a year above what had been the viceroy's salary, making it $80,000 as a mark of special favor." Numerous instances, besides those just mentioned, proved the esteem in which he was held, both for his abilities and for his characteristics as an honorable man. On one occasion the merchant sloned him $2,500,000 with no security except his word. At his death the king ordered that there should be no residencia or examination into his conduct while in office. Of course, said Van Croft, unprecedented in the history of royal representation. Mexican historians do not ordinarily speak well of their Spanish governors. Nevertheless, Manuel Rivera has this to say, quote, The period during which Sr. Bucorelli ruled was an uninterrupted sequence of peace for New Spain. It seemed as if Providence wished to reward the virtues of the viceroy by scattering upon his subjects everything that contributed to their well-being. He was one of those men whose memory will never be erased from the hearts of Mexicans. His administration is a clear example of what this land was able to be when a man of integrity and intelligence resolutely undertook the difficult task of developing its elements of wealth, unquote. In fine, for ability and high character, Bucorelli stands out as one of the greatest men in the history of New Spain. Far from being a narrow bureaucrat, he was capable of a broad point of view which grasped both the patent and the underlying problems of the entire viceroyalty. A well-developed sense of perspective was one of his most marked traits, enabling him to see matters as they were, but not checking him from taking measures to circumvent possible ills which to him did not appear greatly threatening. His letters show him to have been simple, straightforward, unselfish, clear thinking, and sincerely religious, without a shadow of conceit or pretense, and even without great personal ambition except to perform his duty to the full. Finally, he was keenly interested in the problems that he encountered and was an indefatigable worker, and these characteristics joined to the rest make it clear why he achieved such success in the face of difficulties that would have proved insuperable to a less capable ruler. The extraordinary activities of Bucorelli are all the more surprising when it is realized that he had not desired his promotion to the viceroyalty, but would have preferred to return to Spain. Even after he entered upon his new duties he never ceased to hope that he might be succeeded, especially if the new appointee might be his intimate personal friend General Alejandro O'Reilly, who wanted the post. Fate decreed that neither of the two men should have his wish, and Bucorelli died and harnessed in 1779. No doubt Bucorelli's desire to have affairs in the best possible shape for his friend O'Reilly entered into his zeal for the achievement of his ins, but the viceroy seems, anyway, to have been one of those rare individuals who could throw themselves wholeheartedly into an enterprise merely out of a sense of duty without a thought of self. With Bucorelli's conduct of the affairs of the viceroyalty, other than as they related to California's, this volume has no concern. It is true, however, that nothing interested him more than the precariously held province in the far northwest. It was not until 1773 that this interest began to show forth most keenly. Indeed, unable to get accurate accounts of conditions in Alta California, and aware of the stupendous difficulties in the way of its retention, he reported in February 1773, as already stated, that an early abandonment of the province might be expected. But it was just about at that time that his measures began to take effect, and in the next three years, 1773 to 1776, while the California's remained under his direct rule, he engaged in a series of activities which were remarkable, alike for their range and for their success. The underlying basis of Bucorelli's measures, with respect to the California's, was his desire to check even the possibility of foreign encroachments on the domains of New Spain. The first intimation of European aggressions came early in 1773, when it was rumored that an Englishman named Binges was undertaking a voyage to the North Pole with a view to reaching the California's, if possible. About the middle of the same year, reports of Russian activities in the Pacific Northwest reached Bucorelli. These had emanated, late in 1772, from the Spanish ambassador to Russia, and were of an alarmist variety. But it was characteristic of the viceroy that he did not become excited, though he acted much more expeditiously and effectively than the most terrified believer in these views might have done. Referring to these reports in a letter of July 27, 1773, to Areaga, he expressed some doubt whether the Russians had actually reached North America, and alluded to the difficulties they would have in establishing themselves, but gave his opinion that precautionary measures ought to be taken. I deem it well that any establishment of the Russians in this continent, or of any other foreign power, ought to be guarded against, he said. Not that the king needs any extension of territory when there is much more in his own dominions than can be settled in centuries, but rather to avoid the consequences which would follow from having other neighbors than the Indians. Thus did Bucorelli, like scores of men before his time as well as after, foreshadow the Monroe Doctrine, pronounced in 1823 by one of the peoples whom the original annunciators had intended to check. Continuing, Bucorelli said, As for the Russians, it may be possible, though it will be difficult, for them to establish themselves, but there is no doubt that it will be prejudicial to the dominions of the king if they succeed. Reason persuades us that it will be less difficult for the king to prevent it than for the Russians to undertake it, though at much cost to the treasury." This seems also to have represented the views of the Minister General in Spain, as appears from Ariaga's letter of January 24, 1774 to Bucorelli. As for the Russian discoveries, he said, to me they are still a very remote object of attention, and at the present time seems much too early for them to be a cause for alarm. But as the preparations against them may serve many other purposes, especially in that they conduce to the missionary work and the extension of the gospel, the more land we gain by discoveries, I am very well satisfied with all that has been done, for in this manner, by sea and land, we may proceed with our conquests in one place after another. Here was imperialism under a religious cloak, but nothing like fear. As for the English, Bucorelli expressed the prevailing opinion in a letter of September 28, 1774 to Ariaga. Referring to the possibility of the English having extended their conquests westward to the Pacific from Hudson Bay, he said, quote, This seems to me a very distant prospect which does not at the present time impose new cares upon us. Indeed, it has the same appearances of invention as a pretended passage from that bay to our South Sea, the Pacific Ocean, of which public accounts have spoken so much, unquote. Clearly, therefore, the Spaniards did not look upon this period as one of particular emergency any more than they had in 1768 to 1769. But on the longstanding ground of foreign danger in fulfillment of the Spanish Monroe Doctrine, a remarkable series of activities were set in motion by the viceroy with the results which were the dominating element in the future of Alta California and much else of the Pacific Coast. Chronologically considered, the outstanding events and the achievement of his policies were the following. He procured the formation of a reglamento, instrument of government, for the California's Ensemblas in July 1773, supplementing it by his instructions of the following month to Rivera. In September, he authorized Captain Anza to open a land route to Alta California, as a result of which a successful expedition was made in 1774. In November 1773, he ordered Colonel Augustine Creme to explore the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in search of a route for the transportation of artillery from the Atlantic to the Pacific. And in the next two months, this exploration was undertaken with success. In December 1773, the dispatch of Juan Perez on a voyage of exploration to the far northwest was formally decided upon, and during most of the next year, Perez engaged upon the voyage. Early in 1774, Rivera was sent to Alta California by way of the peninsula with a small party of colonists. On Perez's return on November 1774, after a voyage of only moderate success, Buccarelli at once determined upon a fresh series of voyages. As a result, Heseta and Bodega were dispatched to the northwest coast in 1775, and the yalla passed through the Golden Gate and thoroughly explored San Francisco Bay. Meanwhile, in November 1774, Buccarelli had authorized Anza to take a great body of colonists and herds of domestic animals to Alta California along the route that Anza had recently discovered. This expedition, second only to the discovery of gold in 1848 and its positive consequences upon California history, took place in 1775-1776. As one of its important incidents, it brought about the founding of San Francisco in 1776. And through all these years, the viceroy was most energetic in providing for the supply and development of the California's and of the Department of San Blas on which they so greatly depended. His plan and the preliminary steps for their accomplishments reached much further. He wished to bring about the discovery of new routes connecting New Mexico with Alta California and Sonora. This was in part achieved by Father Garcis in 1776 before Buccarelli had given the formal order for an exploration. He was also about to establish settlements on the Gila and Colorado rivers, more particularly at the junction of the two in order to secure the land route to Alta California when a change of government occurred late in 1776 which took the frontier provinces out of his jurisdiction. The total result of his work was to place Alta California on a permanent basis and ensure it from foreign seizure until such time as an overland advance from the Atlantic coast of upper North America should reach the Pacific. Given three years more time, he would almost certainly have brought about a populist development of Alta California by use of the Sonora route. The inevitable result would have been the discovery of gold and a rush of colonists to the province. The chances are, however, that the influx would have resembled that at Cienguela in 1771 rather than the predominantly Anglo-American colonization of 1848 to 1849. In that case, California would today have been, most likely, a Spanish American Republic, though the probability of its passing under the English flag was not small and there was a remote chance that it might have become a Russian province. In fine then, Buccarelli saved Alta California temporarily for Spain and ultimately for the United States and was only prevented from making an eventual gift to the province to Spanish America or perhaps England by an occurrence, fortunately for the present possessors, over which he had no control. The events which brought about these great consequences are too important to be passed over summarily. Having already outlined them, however, it will be possible in the next several chapters to abandon chronology and treat the subject according to the different lines of endeavor by which Buccarelli aspired to reach a single end, the defense of the Californias against the possibility of foreign encroachment, which, it must be borne in mind, was at all times the main spring of the viceroy's action, though other reasons were prominently set forth by others and even by himself. Thus, such a harmless document as the instruction to Rivera in 1773, year and after considered, was produced by the reports of English and Russian aggressions and the Anza expeditions were ordered for the same purpose, though hardly a word to that effect appears in the discussion of Junta's call to consider them. The official communications directed by Buccarelli to Ariaga and his private correspondence with O'Reilly repeatedly affirmed this idea, however. Furthermore, nothing in the affairs of the viceroyalty interested him so much or got so large a share of his attention as the problems of the Californias and the root thereto from Sonora. As he put it on one occasion, quote, it seems as if this has been my only attention in this command, unquote. It is appropriate to treat first of his activities directly against the possibility of foreign danger, leaving for later discussions of those measures which contributed indirectly to the same end by strengthening out the California against the likelihood of abandonment. If an attack by foreign powers had to be met, the new settlements would require canon with which to defend themselves. The problem of transportation across New Spain was so difficult that it had been the practice to rely upon shipments from Manila for use along the Pacific coast of North America. Wishing to avoid the delays incident to the long voyage across the Pacific, Buccarelli sent Colonel Cromay to the isthmus of Tawantipec to see if a good route existed. A tradition had long been current to the effect that Cortez had used that route for the transportation of artillery, and there were also some canon at Vera Cruz on the Atlantic which had been cast in Manila. Late in December 1773 and early in January 1774, Cromay made his exploration and reported that he had found an excellent route. Indeed, by making use of the rivers, he said it would even be feasible to build a canal from sea to sea. Pleased with this initial success, Buccarelli wrote to Ariaga that it might be well to employ this route for the supply of the California. No such use seems to have been made of Cromay's discovery, but it is interesting to note that in recent times the isthmus of Tawantipec has been one of the principal trade routes connecting California with the Atlantic ports of the United States. Of much more actual importance was the Perez voyage of 1774. Since the founding of Alta California, Juan Perez had been by far the most notable maritime figure in the life of the province, and when he now signified his desire to make a voyage to the far northwest, Buccarelli eagerly availed himself of his services. The essential features of instructions, which were dated December 24, 1773, were the following. He was to put to sea in the Santiago and at David to reach 60 degrees north latitude. Turning southward, he was then to make a thorough exploration of the coast, landing as often as possible and taking possession. And he was to avoid communication with foreign ships or foreign settlements, but was in other ways to procure such information of them as he could. On January 24, 1774, Perez left Zamblas and, after stops at San Diego and Monterey, departed from the latter on June 11. He got to about 55 degrees, thus forging the first link in the later claim of the United States, in succession to Spain, of 54-40 or fight. But on account of bad weather, he was unable to land or even make good observations of the coast. Furthermore, he found no Russian settlements and no clear proof either that they did not exist. On July 22, he turned south, and on November 3, after a long stop at Monterey, reached the port of Zamblas. He had indeed procured some information, and Buccarelli was satisfied that he had achieved as much as could have been expected. But preparations were at once begun for a fresh voyage of discovery. The voyage, now projected, was to be one of the most thoroughgoing of any of the Spaniards had ever set out. Bruno de Haceta, on the Santiago, was to be in command, while Perez was to be his pilot and second in authority. The 36-foot craft Sonora, under Juan Manuel de Ayala, was to serve as consort of the Santiago. These two vessels carried much the same instructions as those given to Perez a year before, but 65 degrees was now set as the northerly point, which they should endeavor to reach before turning south. At the same time, the San Carlos, under Miguel Manrique, was to make a thorough survey of San Francisco Bay, the former so-called estuary, which had now become definitely recognized by the name previously applied to the smaller port to the north. I regard the occupation of this port as indispensable, wrote Buccarelli, in discussing his plans for Manrique's voyage. Yet another ship, the San Antonio, under Fernando Quiroz, was to go to Alta California with the other three, but was to proceed only as far as San Diego, with supplies for the southern missions. The San Antonio did, in fact, not leave port until five days after the rest of the fleet, but the other three set sail from Somblas on March 16, 1775. The voyage had not proceeded far when the commander of the San Carlos became insane, and it was necessary to send him ashore. This occasioned a shifting of commanders. Ayala was placed on board the San Carlos, while Juan Francisco de la Borega y Cuadra took charge of the Sonora. The Santiago and Sonora went on to the far northwest without stopping in Alta California. On July 30 they became separated and did not come together again until they met at Monterey in the fall. The seitha got to about 49 degrees, usually sailing near the shore and anchoring often. In the course of its exploration he discovered the mouth of the Columbia River, thus antedating the American sailor Robert Gray, long reputed to be the discoverer by 17 years. Sickness of his crew had linked the force to seitha to turn back, and by August 29 he was already at Monterey. Borega, who was destined to attain the greatest reputation of the Spanish navigators along the northwest coast, accomplished even more. He went to nearly 58 degrees with the tiny Sonora, made a thorough survey from the limit formerly reached by Perez, and landed twice to take possession. Scurvy in the low state of his provisions finally caused him to make for Monterey, but he continued to explore the coast as best he could until on October 7 he rejoined his chief at the Alta California capital. On November 1 the last two ships departed in company for Sonblas, arriving there on November 20. On the second day out from Monterey Juan Perez died. No man of his time knew the coast of the California so well as he, and none had worked more faithfully and unassumingly for the good of the new establishments. The voyages of Heseta and Bodega had been an unqualified success. In addition to their exploration and acts of possession they had found no foreign ships or settlements, and could feel reasonably certain that those coasts were safe from aggression so far as they had seen them. More important perhaps in its ultimate results was the voyage of Ayala to San Francisco Bay. At the same moment that he was making his way up the coast from Sonblas to Monterey, the Lexington farmers in far off Massachusetts were firing the shot that was heard around the world. Ayala may well have failed to hear that shot, but he was made painfully aware of another. The insane manrique had left loaded pistols about his cabin, and one of these was accidentally exploded, wounding Ayala. On this account Ayala was obliged to conduct much of his subsequent explorations of San Francisco Bay through his subordinates, Jose Cañizares and Juan Bautista Aguirre. But Ayala himself remained with the ship to the end of the voyage. Stopping long enough at Monterey to build a launch by hollowing out the trunk of a redwood tree, Ayala set sail again on July 27th. Eight days later, on August 4th, he arrived off the entrance to San Francisco Bay. Early the next day he sent Cañizares inside with a launch to look for an anchorage, but when Cañizares did not return during all that day, for the currents and tides of the Golden Gate had proved too strong, Ayala resolved to attempt an entrance himself. During the evening of the 5th of August, therefore, the little son Carlos successfully passed through the strait into the famous port of the west and anchored near the present North Beach. Cañizares and Ayala between them had thus attained to the honor of making the first recorded entrance into San Francisco Bay by way of the Golden Gate. For the next 44 days Ayala and his men remained in the bay, making a thorough exploration of every part of it, even as far as the mouth of the San Joaquin River, taking soundings and naming geographical points. Two of their names have survived, though in slightly different form. The Great Island, just inside the strait, in a sheltered nook of which the San Carlos itself remained during most of their stay, while the launch was used for explorations, was called Our Lady of the Angels, Nuestra Señora de los Ángeles, and the name remains in the present Angel Island. Another island was called by them the Island of the Pelagons, Isla de los Alcatrazes, and the name appears today in Alcatraz Island. Curiously enough, however, this name has jumped over several miles of water, for it was applied by the Spaniards to Yerbauea, vulgarly called Goat Island, instead of to the islet which now bears the name. Rivera had been ordered to cooperate with Ayala in erecting buildings for the settlers who were about to be sent from Sonora, but the indolent procrastinating governor never left Monterey. In this part of the viceroy's plan was not now accomplished. But a vast deal of information had been acquired. On September 18th, Ayala left the bay, having failed to get out in a previous attempt on September 7th, and the following day he anchored at Monterey, whence not long afterward he departed for Samblas. Ayala reported to Bucarelli that the Bay of San Francisco was the best that he had seen in those seas from Cape Horn North, and added that it was not one port but many with a single entrance. Giving a summary view of his impressions, he described the bay as follows, quote, The said bay is a good port, not only because of the fine proportions which it offers to the site, but also because there is no scarcity of good water, wood, and stone for ballast. Its climate, though cold, is entirely helpful, and is free of the annoying daily fogs experienced at Monterey. To all these advantages must be added the best of all, which is that the heathen Indians of the port are so faithful in their friendship, and so docile in their disposition, that I was greatly pleased to receive them on board, end quote. San Franciscans today would, no doubt, like to believe that what Ayala said about the fogs was true for all seasons and all years. The great voyages of 1775 closed for a time the activities directly against foreign encroachments. On the Perez, Haseta, and Bodega voyages alone, Spain had spent more than 50,000 basils, then considered an enormous sum, especially by a government which was not in the habit of applying its resources to quixotic schemes. It seemed at the time that Spain had assured herself that the danger was not very pressing, just at the moment when James Cook was about to sail from England on a voyage that was to bring home the reality of Spain's traditional fears. Buccarelli, however, was by no means inclined to give up his measures, for on the ground of the longstanding and eventual peril he understood that would be best to carry on the aggressive defensive in order to place Spain in a strong position against the time when the storm should break. Meanwhile, he had, all along, at least since early in 1773, been devoting his attention to matters indirectly conducive to the same end. It is now time to review some of those activities. Chapter 22 Buccarelli's attention to the local problems of the Californias Nothing is more characteristic of Buccarelli's services to all the California than his attention to the purely local problems of the province, though in these, as in other matters, he was influenced primarily by his desire to ward off an eventual foreign danger. His activities centered around two principal ideas—that of averting and abandonment of Alta California through watchful care over the remission of supplies by sea and over the affairs of the Department of Sunblocks, and constructive measures for the government and development of the northern province. As already pointed out, the climate and natural resources of Alta California were not sufficient in themselves to keep civilized men alive, however well the Indians were able to subsist. Everything had to come from Mexico or from Spain. Even food had to be sent, for the colonists could not depend upon acorns and chance supplies of bare meat, and agricultural products and domestic animals were not yet raised in sufficient quantities to provide for the needs of the new establishments. In practice, all of these things—provisions, goods, and effects—were shipped to San Diego and Monterey from the port of Samblas off the west coast of New Spain. Founded by Galvez in 1768, Samblas was to be the principal medium between Alta California and the outside world during most of the Spanish period. The development of an overland route to Alta California was necessary, for the elements of permanence, settlers, and domestic animals could not be forwarded in the storm-tossed, scruvy-stricken, cockleshell boats which Spain employed along the Pacific coast. But the sending of supply ships was an equally vital necessity without which the province would soon have been abandoned. Alta California had been saved by a narrow margin in 1770, when the dutiful Port de lau held out against starvation until relief came. In 1772, Fagas had averted failure by a successful bear hunt. The greatest peril of all, perhaps, came in 1774, when Alta California was in the midst of the worst famine it had ever experienced. This time the hero of the occasion was none other than the viceroy Buccarelli, who saved the situation by his good judgment and his attention to the supply ships. By his good judgment, Thor, in spite of reports from the pilots of the supply ships, the commissary of Samblas, Governor's Barry and Fagas, and Father Verger, who is Father Superior of the College of San Fernando, was in receipt of communications from the missionaries, to the effect that Alta California was well supplied with provisions. He resolved to play the game safely and sent off an extra ship. And, by his attention to the supply ships, in that at this time and thereafter he sought to it that the provisions were good and that the boats got off on time, despite the difficulties presently to be mentioned, in maintaining the Department of Samblas. Meanwhile there had been an all-around scarcity in Alta California, lasting from the summer of 1773 to the spring of 1774, during which time the Spaniards of the Presidios and missions lived principally on milk, and none too much of that, for there were few animals to supply it. Herbs were sought to eke out the colonists' scanty fare. The lack was equally great in manufactured articles of civilized life, though it was perhaps less pressing than the need for food. Writing in June 1774, Rivera reported a lack of essential articles at the Presidios. Some of the soldiers had a gun but no sword, some a sword but no gun, and some had neither one nor the other. Munitions were also scarce. Furthermore, there was a need for soap and this surely was important for tobacco. Utter famine was averted, and relief in other respects extended, when Perez put in at San Diego on March 13, 1774 in the Santiago. Perez, however, was in the midst of his voyage of exploration to the northwest coast and needed great stores of supplies for himself. It had not been intended that he should leave anything for the southern colonies, though he had planned to provide for Monterey in the north. The south was to receive supplies, which had for this one time been landed in Baja California, but the old problems of the peninsula route, notably the lack of pack animals, had prevented Governor Berry from forwarding them. Because of his anxiety over the Perez voyage, Buccarelli had decided to send out a second ship. Holy on his own initiative he arranged for a voyage of the San Antonio, and it was the arrival of this vessel, not long after Perez and the Santiago, that put the province out of danger. San Diego was relieved in March 1774. The other southern missions had to wait a while until the provisions could be taken to them by mule train, and those of the north held out yet longer until the relief ships got to Monterey. Having had one narrow escape from failure, Buccarelli never again allowed Alta California to incur such risk. It is now time to point out that the affairs of the Department of San Blas, on which both California's depended, were no slight problem in themselves. But, just as he had meanwhile attacked questions of the internal conditions of Sonora and Baja California, because of their bearing on the settlements in Alta California, so too Buccarelli turned intently and efficiently to the situation at San Blas. The port itself at San Blas was inadequate, and shortly after its founding it began to show signs of filling in. Several times ships ran aground within the port. Soundings were taken of nearby ports, and numerous suggestions were made to locate the Department at Acapulco or elsewhere, but the change was never made. Furthermore, the site was more than usually unhelpful. Not only did this affect the men, but also food supplies could not be stored at San Blas, for they would spoil. It was necessary, therefore, to make careful calculations so that provisions would arrive only shortly before a ship was about to depart for the north. A more serious difficulty arose from the lack of sufficient shipping to carry on the duties of the Department, such as the sending of supplies to Alta and Baja California, and engaging in explorations of the northwest coast. Naturally, this problem tended to become harder to solve as Alta California developed, for more and more provisions, goods, and effects were needed than formerly. This difficulty may be illustrated by the state of affairs in 1776 after Anza's colonists had reached Alta, California, and therefore greatly increased its population. Writing to Areaga in August, Bucharelli explained that there were then five boats employed by the Department, of which four were absent on provision voyages, two having gone to the northern province and two to the peninsula. Meanwhile, orders had come from Spain to use one ship to carry Jose de Areche, at that time Fiscal of the Audencia of Mexico, to Peru, where he was to serve as Visitor, and also to employ two ships for a fresh series of explorations in the northwest to begin in December 1777. Yet the two ships bound for Alta California had not been able to carry all that was needed. It was almost essential that the only remaining ship at San Blas should also go north, but the orders were imperative to send Areche to Peru at once. On this occasion Bucharelli was aided by good luck. A stray merchant ship happened to put in at Acapulco, an unusual occurrence in those days of trade prohibition. It was at once pressed into service for Areche's use, and the Santiago at San Blas was freed for the supply voyage. There still remained the question of northwestward exploration, which was impossible of execution without more ships. Bucharelli solved this on his own initiative without waiting for authority from Spain. He ordered the postponement of the exploring voyages for a year. On the ground said it was much more important to ensure supplying the Californias lest Spain lose what she already had. He sent Bodega to Peru with Areche to procure a ship there, and he himself took steps to have another built at San Blas. Thus was the emergency taken care of. It should be noted that this is presented only as an illustration of the kinds of problems that confronted the viceroy almost every year. One may wonder why it was that boats in sufficient number and of adequate size were not built at San Blas. The answer to such a query goes to the route of Bucharelli's principal difficulties in the maintenance of the department. In the first place he at all times had to manage with scant funds. So much has already been said on this phase of Spanish colonial policy that there is no need to dilate upon it here. Even aside from this factor, the viceroy was at his wits end to procure both the manufactured articles and the men required for shipbuilding and the other tasks of the department. This may be illustrated by the events of 1775 to 1777. Late in the year 1775 there arose a need at San Blas for certain tools, iron, canvas, tackle, and artillery. The backward state of New Spain can be understood when it is said that these things had to be procured elsewhere. It was necessary to send a Spain for the tools and iron, but it was hoped that the other effects might be picked up in Havana. Orders were given immediately for both requests to be supplied. The affair was handled with all possible speed in Spain with the result that the tools and iron reached San Blas about a year after the request. At best, therefore, the viceroy had to know the needs of the department for a year ahead. This was only at best as becomes clear by a review of the attempts to procure the materials sought for in Havana. Buccarelli's original request was made on August 27, 1775, and this he followed up repeatedly with other petitions. The canvas, tackle, and artillery got clogged up in Spanish administration in spite of all that Buccarelli could do. It proved impossible to get them at Havana, and the authorities in Spain hesitated before the great expense of shipping them from Europe. Finally, in April 1777, after nearly two years of fruitless endeavor, Buccarelli wrote to the viceroy of Peru to see if they could be supplied from there. Presumably he got them, though the evidence has not yet come to light. But if he did, it was only after many more months. At least equally difficult was the problem of getting the men that the department required. Soldiers were needed, not on account of the Indians, but to suppress disorderly sailors. Sailors in port, after a long voyage, are traditionally inclined to be refractory, but this was not the sole or perhaps the principal reason why the soldiers had to be on hand. The sailors objected chiefly to being sailors at all, especially for the death-dealing Alta California voyages. They knew well that their prospects of escaping the scurvy were slight, and the chances of death if they contracted the dread disease were very great. It was therefore necessary almost to drive them aboard ship. Thus it was that soldiers had to be obtained, and governmental authorization was necessary as they involved expenditures. Similarly, the men needed for other purposes had to be authorized by the Spanish government. Thus, in 1775, when there was no surgeon or chaplain at Samblas, Buccarelli had to get a permit in order to supply them. Early in 1776, Buccarelli asked for a number of pilots, carpenters, and caulkers for the department. The men were sent from time to time, but through death or other causes the posts were rarely filled. In November 1776, Buccarelli asked for a shipbuilder, who of course had to be procured in Spain. One man was appointed, but managed to avoid the disagreeable duty. Finally, another was selected in November 1777, and over his objection on the ground that he was leaving his family destitute, was forced on board ship that obliged to go. Presumably, he arrived at Samblas at some time in the spring or summer of 1778, and a ship was built there in that year which took part in the voyages of exploration of 1779. It would be seen, therefore, that the difficulties of supplying the Californias were very great. Yet the vice-roy was able to manage it, despite the long and, so far as he was concerned, unavoidable delays in connection with the department of Samblas, and despite the inadequacy of funds and equipment. Yet, at the same time that he was attending to such other maritime affairs as the voyages of exploration along the northwest coast, he was also able both to sustain and to some extent develop the Californias, especially the new establishments in the north. From the time of his arrival in the vice-royalty, Luccarelli gave a great share of his attention to the local affairs of the Californias, first with the idea of retaining what Spain already possessed, and later with a view to their development. The earliest problem was that of an adjustment of internal affairs. The first great step was taken in 1772 when two Californias were divided for missionary purposes between the Franciscans of San Fernando and the Dominicans. Ever since 1768 the latter had sought to gain entry to the peninsula, but had been prevented from doing so by the opposition of Galvez. By 1772, however, the Franciscans themselves made no objection. So the division was made, the boundary being placed a few miles farther south than the present international line. It is worthy of note that the Franciscans consented because they had learned to appreciate the scant utility of Baja California, whether as a mission field, or as an aid to the much more valuable country farther north. As regards the matter of a route, they hoped to profit by an establishment of communications with Sonora, which they realized would be far more used to them than the connection with the peninsula. The division of the Californias was only one of a number of preliminary measures looking toward the forming of a Reglemental or Instrument of Government for the Californias Ensembleas. A great step ahead was taken with the arrival of Father Sarah in Mexico in February 1773. This was the occasion when he came from Alta California with the object of procuring the removal of Governor Faguez and the adoption of regulations which he believed essential to the continuance of missionary work in the northern province. Though the substitution of Rivera for Faguez, due to Sarah's request, was an unwise step, there can be no doubt that the Father President rendered a great service to Alta California during the several months that he remained in the capital. He came to Mexico at a time when Buccarelli was all at sea over the affairs of the Californias. Sarah was just the man he needed for the information that he required, and it is to the credit of both Father Juniparo and of the viceroy that they used their opportunities for conferring to the full. One result was that Buccarelli was able to proceed with more confidence to the forming of a Reglemental. The first California Code was the Reglemental Provisional of 1773. This was drawn up by Juan José de Esteveste, whose name is often applied to it, who had gained much of the knowledge upon which he based his Reglemento throughout having been several years the purchasing agent in Mexico City for the two Californias. The Reglemento, in its final form, had little of what would ordinarily be expected in an instrument of government. It was composed of three documents, the recommendations of Esteveste dated May 19, 1773, the supplementary opinion of Junta of July 8, making some modifications, and Buccarelli's decree of July 23, adopting the suggestions of Esteveste with the changes proposed by Junta. The body of the whole instrument was the Esteveste document, the terminology of which suggested and argued in favor of certain courses of action, but did not order them. These, of course, became commands by virtue of Buccarelli's decree. Naturally there were many paragraphs of a temporary nature, and on the other hand, much that actually applied to the government of Californias was either taken for granted on the basis of Spain's general colonial policy, or else depended upon earlier isolated orders of the governors and the father president. The Esteveste Reglemento opened with an estimate of the annual expenditure required for the maintenance of the two Californias and the Department of San Blas, all three of which regions were to be in a measure subject to the same jurisdiction. The plans for Alta California called for an establishment of 82 soldiers, four carpenters, four blacksmiths, four militeers, and two warehouse keepers, without counting the missionaries who were provided for out of the payas fund. This would necessitate a governmental expenditure of about 39,000 pesos a year, but it would amount really to about 16,000, as it was proposed to charge goods to the soldiers at an advance of 150 percent over the price in Mexico City, the extra amount being considered a proper allowance for freight. Goods for Baja California would be charged at 100 percent increase, but nothing extra was to be collected in the case of San Blas. The total annual expenditure chargeable to the Royal Treasury for all three regions was estimated at nearly 93,000 pesos. The salt mines of San Blas were expected to yield 25,000 pesos a year, and it was proposed to take 10,000 from the payas fund, but the remainder, nearly 58,000 pesos, was to be paid by the government. Thus clearly did Spain demonstrate her belief in the importance of the non-revenue producing California's. Following the preliminary estimate came the Echeveste Regimento Proper in 17 numbered paragraphs. The most notable provision was that which aimed to encourage emigration to Alta California. Anybody who wished to go there was to be taken from San Blas free of charge, have free rations for five years, and be paid the wages of a sailor for two years. Once arrived in Alta California his services were to be utilized for raising crops. You can well be imagined what a stampede there would be to come to California if such terms were offered today. But it helps to give perspective on the actual situation when it is realized that this generous measure, aside from its indication of the government's desires, was without effect. The colonization of Alta California was to require a distinct effort on the part of the viceroy, but he was to provide it. One further paragraph may be noted, strict provision was made for keeping accounts and giving information to the viceroy. Buccarelli did not intend to be at a loss again on that score. Most noteworthy of the amendments by the junta was one that the payest fund should be asked to contribute 10,000 pesos for the year 1774 alone. It was brought out that the institution was already expending nearly 15,000 pesos for the regularly established needs of the missionaries, besides extra sums for irregularly occurring eventualities. The Reglamento of 1773 should be taken in connection with the viceroy's instruction to Rivera, the newly appointed governor of Alta California. These instructions, dated August 17, 1773, were largely an expansion of the terms of the Reglamento, a copy of which, including the amendments of the junta, was attached. In addition, Buccarelli showed that he understood the scant prospects of volunteer colonization when he called upon Rivera to recruit some soldier settlers with their families to take to Alta California. Several paragraphs also were devoted to the precautions to be employed against the entry of foreign ships. Great emphasis was placed upon the maintenance of harmony with the religious and upon the care to be used in the selection of mission sites. Rivera was reminded that they might one day become great cities. A noteworthy statement not only because of its prophetic vision, but also because of the fact that Buccarelli actually contemplated such a development. Rivera was particularly charged to take steps to found a mission at San Francisco, which, henceforth, became one of the principal objectives of Buccarelli's policies, this because of the well-recognized importance of the port. The relations of Rivera with the governor of the Californias, then-resident in the peninsula, were clearly defined. Rivera was to report to his superior at Loreto, but the latter was to have no power to change his measures. Thus was the virtual separation of the two Californias declared. Buccarelli reaped the inevitable reward of his appointment of Rivera to succeed Fagas, and he freely admitted his mistake when it became apparent. Rivera neglected to fulfill the viceroy's instructions about the planning of crops and the all-around development of Alta California. It was therefore with great satisfaction that Buccarelli received the news in 1776 that, henceforth, the governor of the Californias was to reside in Monterey and the lieutenant governor in Loreto. This meant an exchange of Rivera for the able and energetic Felipe de Neve, from whom Buccarelli, with good reason, expected better things. On Christmas Day, 1776, Buccarelli issued his formal instruction to Neve. These instructions, in twenty-seven paragraphs, were the last in the series of great documents by which Buccarelli provided for the internal management of the Californias, and together with a reglamento of 1773, the instructions to Rivera, and a later reglamento drawn up by Neve himself, were the foundation upon which Alta California was governed to the end of the Spanish period. From time to time there were other orders inconsistent with those just named, but none had equal influence. Among the more important of the orders given to Neve were those requiring him to take steps with a view to the founding of settlements in Alta California. He was called upon to establish two missions along the Santa Barbara Channel, two between San Diego and San Gabriel, a second mission at San Francisco, the eventual Santa Clara, and another between that and Monterey. Great attention was paid to the economic development of the province. Neve was specifically charged to heed the instructions of that character which Rivera had failed to put into effect. Spanish settlers were to be given grants of land and encouraged to take up agriculture, for which purpose Buccarelli had shipped a quantity of plow shares and other utensils of husbandry. Various paragraphs displayed the viceroy's solicitude for the settlement at San Francisco, of which to him, more than to anybody else, the beginnings were due. Among other things it may be noted that he was sending a surgeon, a carpenter, and a smith to that port from Mexico City, and a mason from San Blas. The instructions to Neve were the basis for the only development occurring in Alta California for many years after 1776. For Neve's great work was in fulfillment of these commands, rather than an obedience to any new orders from Teodoro de Croix. This document also marked about the last act of the viceroy of direct aid to Alta California, for the management of that province passed out of his hands with the establishment of the Commandancy General. Fortunately, however, the supply ships were still left to Buccarelli to handle, and this task he performed ably, as also that of another set of voyages to the northwest coast, to the day of his death in 1779. Chapter 23 A history of California, the Spanish period. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Chapter 23 Juan Bautista de Anza As already pointed out, at the close of Chapter 18, matters were ripe by the end of the year 1771 for considering the project of opening a land route from Sonora to Alta California. In March 1772, when Buccarelli learned of the discoveries made by Garcés during his journey of exploration of the previous year, he asked Governor Matteo Sastre of Sonora whether he thought it might be possible to reach Monterey by land. Before he had time to carry his inquiries further, he received a petition from the Captain of Dubac, Juan Bautista de Anza, asking for the viceroy's consent to make such an expedition himself. The author of this petition was one of the most remarkable men who ever appeared on the field of California history, and it is therefore worthwhile to pause and take account of his early career and his personality. Juan Bautista de Anza, like his father and grandfather before him, was a member of the presidial aristocracy of the frontier provinces of New Spain. His grandfather had served 30 years at Yanos as lieutenant and captain, and his father 20 years with the same rank at Fronteris, acting also as temporary governor of Sonora at one time. In the latter capacity, he had merited and won general approval, especially by breaking up an Indian conspiracy in 1737. In that year, an Indian named Arecivi claimed to be a herald of Montezuma, saying that the former Aztec monarch had come back to life to restore the Mexican empire. Anza's father hanged Arecivi and several of his followers, which ended the revolt. His connection with the bolus de plata incident and his death at the hands of the Apaches have already been referred to. The Anza, who now makes his bow, was born at Fronteris in 1735 and entered the service in 1753, taking part thenceforth, as he put it in 1770, in continuous warfare against the Apaches, Ceres, Pimas, and Cebu Papas. For the first two years, he was a volunteer at Fronteris, serving at his own expense. On July 1st, 1755, he became a lieutenant. He is mentioned as taking part in a campaign under Captain Gabriel de Vildósola against the Apaches in 1758. On February 19th, 1760, he was promoted to the captaincy of the Presidio of Dubac, but owing to the death of Vice-Roy Amarías, the appointment was not confirmed. There are references to a campaign by him in 1760 against the Ceres and to another of 1766 against the Apaches. One of his principal achievements was subjecting of the Papagos, a tribe of over 3,000 Indians, on which occasion he killed their chief with his own hand. He had made many campaigns in southern Sonora against the Ceres and others of the Cerro Prieto, and, according to Rubí, he was the one who contributed most to reducing the Suates. In the military operations of Elizondo, Anza was a conspicuous figure. In 1770, he petitioned that the full rank of Presidial Captain be accorded him, mentioning some of the salient features of his record, and stating that he had twice been wounded in the service and had participated in 14 general engagements besides a number of lesser ones. Though his petition was endorsed by Juan de Pena and Domingo Elizondo, his immediate chiefs, and by the Vice-Roy Croy, it was not at that time granted. There is an overwhelming array of evidence to the effect that this young man, who had already proved himself a great Indian fighter, was also an officer of unblemished character and unusual abilities. Simple and self-contained in manner and speech, generous of spirit, dignified and bearing, he exemplified on his intimately personal side the delightful qualities of the Spanish Cavalier. As an officer, he was kind and just to his men, and prompt in energetic inaction. Strong-bodied and courageous, he was also cool-headed, resourceful, self-reliant, and tactful, but above all was a man of initiative and enterprise. Among those who voiced their approval of Captain Anza was the Marquess de Ruby, who recorded his opinions at some length in 1767. After recounting Anza's service, Ruby says that, quote, by reason of his activity, valor, zeal, and intelligence, and notable unselfishness, he is an all-around good officer worthy of being distinguished by his Majesty in remuneration for his services and as a stimulus to others, unquote. More directly to the point were Ruby's remarks in praise of Anza as a result of the former's inspection of Tubak. Not only Anza's accounts, but also the declarations of the soldiers showed that he had never done anything prejudicial to his troops, but on the contrary, had always treated them liberally. He had actually reduced prices for them, displaying a generosity which, according to Ruby, was very rare in the frontier provinces. Because of Anza's just administration, many people had come to live at Tubak. To the great advantage of all that section, said Ruby, a fact which might in the future permit of transferring the prosidio to a more advanced point, affording greater opportunity for discoveries and for reducing the apaches. Footnote. At some time before 1763, Anza married the sister of Jose Manuel Díaz de Carpio, chaplain of Tubak. No further record of his family life has yet been discovered. In footnote. The discovery of a practicable route to Alta California seems from early boyhood to have been a life ambition with Anza. Spurred on by the tradition of his father's proposals, he and another officer planned an expedition to the Colorado in 1756, when Anza was 21. The governor of Sonora at first looked with favor on the project, but subsequently changed his mind. When Galva's came to the province in 1769, Anza asked permission to make an expedition, at his own expense, to cooperate with Port de la whom the Vecita door had just dispatched to the north from Baja California. Galva's was impressed by Anza's idea and meant to have it carried into effect, but was obliged to withhold his consent for the time being due mainly to the superior pressure of the Ceri Wars. Before he could take action, his health failed. Even after his return to Mexico City, he and Croy seemed to have considered the plan, but both of them left the country too early to put it into execution. As soon as it became clear that the Vecita door had departed from New Spain without authorizing an expedition, Anza addressed himself to Bucarelli, who had only recently become Viceroy. His letter, dated May 2, 1772, concerned itself mainly with the numerous evidences for a belief in the existence of a feasible route from Sonora to Monterey, referring, among other things, to the reports about Port de la and his men, which had come to Garces and himself from the Indians of the Gila and Colorado. He asked permission to make his long projected expedition of discovery, taking Garces in twenty or twenty-five of his own procedural soldiers with him. Knowing full well that he could expect suitable reward if successful, he offered to pay the entire costs of the expedition, save only the wages of his men and the salary of Garces. Bucarelli sought the opinions of various men, including the engineer Costanzo and the fiscal Arici. These two men, whose recommendations concerning the development of a supply route from Sonora have already been quoted, were strongly in favor of Anza's project. Nevertheless, a junta, which met on October 17, 1772, was not ready to authorize an expedition. In particular, it desired such further information as Garces and Governor Sastre could give. Bucarelli acquiesced, and again the matter was postponed. In due time, the desired reports were obtained. Garces enthusiastically backed up Anza's project. Sastre, who had written independently before he had heard of Anza's proposal in favor of a somewhat similar plan, was inclined to throw cold water on the idea as now set forth by the captain of Dubac. Doubtless no little jealousy was at the basis of his reply. Meanwhile, as already recorded, Father Sara had reached Mexico City in February 1773, and it was only natural that Bucarelli should turn to him for advice. Sara's replies, though the viceroy did not see fit to present them to the junta, are worthy of record for they must have reinforced Bucarelli's own decision. His reports were mainly valuable in pointing out the need for a route to Alta California by land, and especially in that he clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the Baja California route. As for the Anza proposal itself, he had little to say, but believed it would be well worth undertaking. There was yet another factor of undoubted weight with the viceroy, perhaps the greatest of all, and it too was not presented for consideration of the junta. This was the influence of the long-standing fear of foreign danger. At length, a junta was again called, and on September 9, 1773, delivered itself of a resolution favoring an expedition on much the same terms as Anza had proposed. Anza was to be empowered to select twenty volunteer soldiers for the journey, and to take Father Garcés and another religious with him, meeting all the expenses of the march himself. He was to exercise the greatest care to make friends with Indians he should meet, for it was appreciated that their cooperation would be necessary if the fullest results from the discovery of a route were to be attained. He was not to establish any settlement, but was to go direct to Monterey and back. Four days later, on the 13th, Bucarelli issued a decree putting the resolution of the junta into effect. Theoretically, the assent of the king was still necessary, and it was obtained under date of March 9, 1774. On that day, Anza was already well on the march to Alta California, and by the time the royal pronouncement was received in Mexico, he must have been nearing Sonora on his return. Anza wasted no time in making ready for the expedition, though he met with many discouraging setbacks, such as Apache raids in the vicinity of Tubac and, not least of all, the jealous opposition of some of his fellow officers of the frontier. Meanwhile, his hopes for success were rendered almost certain when he learned that an Indian had just made his way from San Gabriel in Alta California to Altar Sonora. This Indian, Sebastian Taravall by name, had gone to the northern province originally from Baja California and had been placed at San Gabriel. At length he ran away, hoping to reach the Colorado River and then go to his old home in the peninsula. His wife and brother, who accompanied him, died of thirst in the Colorado desert, but Taravall managed to get through, coming to Altar in December 1773. Clearly, therefore, some sort of rude existed. Taravall was added to Anza's party in the belief that his services as a guide might be of value. He attached himself to Father Garces and accompanied that intrepid explorer and all his wanderings during the next seven years. On January 8, 1774, Anza set out from Tubac. With him were Father Garces, Father Juan Diaz, twenty volunteers from this Presidio, an Alta California soldier named Juan Valdez, Taravall, a Pima interpreter, and eight other Indians, five militias, two servants of Anza and a carpenter, thirty-four at all, thirty-five pack loads of provisions, sixty-five head of cattle driven along for food, and a hundred and forty horses made up the material equipment of the expedition. The story of the march is told by Bolton in the following terms. Quote, Turning southwest, Anza crossed the divide and descended the Altar River through the Pima missions to Altar. Obtaining horseshoe iron, a few fresh horses, some ill-fed mules, stacks of bones, he called them, and provisions, on January 22nd he made his final start from Caborica, the last Spanish settlement between Sonora and Mission San Gabriel at Los Angeles. To the Gila Colorado Junction, home of the Yumas, the trail, though difficult, had been made familiar by Quino and Garces. On his approach to the Junction, Anza heard the discouraging news that a part of the Yumas were hostile and were planning to massacre his party, but the rumors proved unfounded for the Spaniards were warmly welcomed by Chief Balma and a throng of nearly naked Indians. Crossing the Colorado and descending its right bank a few leagues, at Santa Olaya Lake the expedition neared the edge of the great waste of sand dunes called the Colorado Desert. Here began the real test of Anza's medal. As they neared enemy territory the Khojat guides misled the Spaniards and then deserted. On the 15th of February, with the Indian Tarabal now guiding, Anza reached the terrible dunes where the shifting sands had completely obliterated the trails. Before night the packed mails were so used up that Anza decided that their burdens must be lightened and he proposed to send half the packs back to Palma's village with part of the soldiers and one friar. Garces objected and Anza yielded. Encountering now a great mountain of sand which the tired mules could not even attempt, Anza turned south toward a hill near which Garces thought was the large village of San Jocomay which he had visited three years before. But no village could be found. Both Garces and Tarabal were now completely lost in the sea of sand dunes. The animals were played out. Part of the horses had been made ill by eating a noxious herm. There was no near prospect for either water or pastridge. In short there was nothing for Anza to do but to retreat to Santa Olaya. Even this was most difficult and before it was accomplished several horses and mules had died. But after seventy-five miles of wandering at the cost of six days Santa Olaya was again reached. Anza doubt changed his plans. Instead of attempting to cross the dunes he would turn southwest and go around them. Since it had proved impossible to continue with all his strain he left part of his men in baggage with Palma. Even this step was hazardous for Palma's friendship had not yet been fully tested. With the rest of his men the strongest of horses, the ten best mules and provisions for a month, on March 2nd Anza set forth again. Six days of hard riding took him to Good Springs and Pastridge near the foot of the Sierra Navadas. Garces and Tarabal both recognized the locality. The success of the enterprise was now assured and the event was celebrated. Four more days northward and two northwestward took them to a pass in the Sierra Nevada mountains called San Carlos. Here the site was cheered by a view which repaid all the hardships of the journey. There were green plains, snow-cap peaks, live oaks, and rivulets which ran west to find their output in the Philippine Ocean as Anza called it. In spite of frequent rain and snow the descent was relatively easy and at sundown March 22nd they reached the Mission San Gabriel after a march of 700 miles from Tubaq. Their arrival was hailed by the four surprised missionaries in the small guard with the ringing of the church bells. Anza had found a way from Sonora to the sea. Continuing to Monterey and returning over his former route he reached Tubaq on May 26th. It is but natural, perhaps, that as the discoverer Anza should describe the route with undue enthusiasm. It was a good route, he said, entirely practicable for the sending of supplies. The Indians were weak in a military way and the Yumas alone were numerous. Father Diaz's report supplied a needed corrective in pointing out that the friendship of the Yumas could not be relied upon unless settlements were established among them at an early date. And without their aid he said the route could not be utilized at all except by large forces. The Franciscans and Alta-California were delighted over the discovery. As Father Palou put it, various kinds of domestic animals could now be sent from Sonora, and if that were done the permanence of the new province would be assured. Bukareli was also greatly pleased. He felt that the Anza route was better than the one up the peninsula, though the use of supply ships would still be necessary. He was especially gratified by the cordiality of the Yumas, for he understood the importance of their cooperation, and he was pleased too with the way Anza had conducted himself for them, and indeed during the whole period of the expedition. At his recommendation Anza was promoted to a lieutenant-kernelsee, and each of his men was granted extra pay for life. And in very truth, if achievements are to be measured by their results, they were richly deserving of reward, for out of their discovery flowed consequences which decided the course of Alta-California history.