 One thing that's clear to everyone who sees this wonderful DVD, these four very experienced men have described wonderfully well what peace could bring and why it's needed. And they all agree that it is the U.S.'s job to see that it happens and it could happen sooner rather than later with the right kind of American leadership. That's the theme of the whole affair. But it's always easier for big shots to talk about big ideas than little shots to talk about the details. So we're going to go after a few of the details. But first, the first question. President Carter says early on in answer to Landrum's question that he's never lost faith in the probability or the inevitability of peace. Do you all agree, Jonathan? I agree. But again, as you say, the devil is in the details. I think there is always a good chance to move forward to that final agreement, but a lot needs to be done before we reach that agreement. I should have bounded the question this way. Do you agree that peace is inevitable within the next two decades? I don't. Thank you. Ziyan? I do. I think that no conflict or war goes on forever. Even the 100 years of war lasted for 100 years only. And I think there is only one solution for this problem. The others are continuation of the conflict in other means. That one solution is a two-state solution that I believe everybody was talking about. There is by now an international consensus about this. And in 20 years it's achievable. In 20 years I would put it at the outer end, that 20-year window. Tony? I do agree. I think that as all of the, as you say, quote-unquote, big shots commented, we now have a president with bold ideas and new leadership. And he has made it absolutely clear this is a priority in his administration. And he has made it not only a priority, he is acting on that priority. I believe that as Secretary Baker commented, and we all know, the polling data also indicates that the body politic supports. So you think it's possible? I think it's possible. In 20 years or less? I think within less. It has to be possible. Okay. Now a few of the specifics for the other three questions. It's interesting, I think, to any of us who follow these issues, that all four of them argued we have to talk to everybody, including Hamas. Baker put it this way. You need to at least find a construct for the voices of Hamas, which means, I guess, you need to work through intermediaries. But they all essentially argued you cannot resolve the conflict without really engaging Hamas in a reunification. Jonathan, what do you think about that? I think that that is essentially true, but I think another step needs to be taken first. One of the things that I talk about in my book is the fact that the Palestinians are engaged in a brutal civil war at this time. They've been engaged in this war since June of 2007. Hamas and Fatah each control one territory. Hamas controls Gaza. Fatah controls the West Bank. And we are now in a place of complete chaos. We don't know who actually speaks for the Palestinians. The Israelis don't have an interlocutor. I think engaging Hamas is probably important insofar as we need to get the Palestinians all on the same page. There needs to be a unified Palestinian leadership. And then at that point, I think we can get back to the negotiating table. But this is one of the main reasons why I'm pessimistic. Both of the Palestinian factions seem to be entrenched right now in their own territories. And there does not seem to be a very good chance, at least at this point, of moving forward towards a unified Palestinian national identity, if you will. But should the U.S. directly engage Hamas? No. In my opinion, I think the U.S. should do what it's doing now, which is to ask Egypt or the Arab League or the Saudis or the Yemenis, the Mauritanians. The list goes on, but we've been working with a number of Arab governments to try to get the Palestinians to come together to create a unity government. And that really stems from U.S. policy dating back towards the time of Richard Nixon, where the United States does not engage with terrorist organizations. So we're getting others to try to work out a Palestinian unity deal. If and when that happens, and Hamas is part of a unity government that accepts the existence of the State of Israel, does not call it the Zionist entity, does not seek its destruction through some factions and engages with others, then I think we are, you know, at least on the right path to a negotiated peace agreement. Ziyan, what do you think about that? Well, I think everybody is talking to everybody all the time. There is no lacking in communication. I think right now officially it is understood that the Egyptians are talking on behalf of the Israelis with Hamas and vice versa, for instance. The same messages are being carried. I think the question is should the United States talk directly to Hamas and publicly? And I think here is a construct that I thought that Secretary Baker came up with that would answer that question satisfactorily. There has to be a construct that is acceptable precisely like the one that was formulated for the discussions with the PLO 20 decades ago in order to get into this. What is very bothersome about the present situation is the back-to-the-no Palestinian partner, Canard. That is a disaster. You know, you make the Palestinian leadership week and you turn around and you call them two weeks to deliver. You also have a divided situation and you say, we cannot get to talk to anybody till that situation is fixed. You have to have a unity government. The problem with the unity government, if I just might take, the problem with the unity government is the following. The Palestinians are put in a position either they do unity government and then the United States and Israel stop talking to them and delivering policy and money, or they do not form a unity government, in which case the Arabs including the Egyptians and the Saudis and others will not deliver anything to them. So it's done if you do and done if you don't. Ziad has put his finger on a point I think does deserve looking at. I don't quite agree, Jonathan, that we've been encouraging a unity government through all sorts of other channels. We and the Israelis have both taken the position publicly. No unity government until they meet three very rigid conditions. And I don't think you can say, we've been encouraging up to this point even indirectly. Tony, wait just a minute, let's take Tony a chance. Sam, I agree with you. I also think it's important to reflect on the fact that Hamas is not a monolith and you've got a multiplicity of voices within the Hamas factions. And so when you speak of Hamas, who are we reaching out to? I think that the concept of trying to create a political construct is very important and we, as Ziad references, we are talking through intermediaries with Hamas. I think it's important also, and I'd like us to probe on this issue of partner, we need to be much more practical as we move in these next steps taking into account the very robust, proactive nature of U.S. leadership at the moment. And we need to look at the practicalities on the ground and play out in a very clear timeline what needs to happen on the ground and get into this issue of Palestinian partner. Okay, but you would not talk directly to Hamas now either. Not at this point, no I would not. Thirty seconds. Well, just to address your point, the United States has been actively working with Egypt to help create a unity government. And it's not as if Israel and the United States don't want to see a unity government. They're actually, I would say, both governments have tried to step back to not exacerbate the problems that have essentially come to characterize the Hamas-Fatah conflict. Not wanting to engage directly has been a wise thing to have the United States step in and try to say, well, this is what a unity government should look like, would be rejected by the Palestinians outright. So the U.S. has been taking a hands-off approach, asking other Arab leaders to step in to try to create this unity government. So I think it's an unfair characterization to say that we're not trying to get there. I think we very much are, but understand the trickiness involved in reaching that point. Okay, well, we can debate that off camera sometime a little bit. Tony, you get the second question. Brent Scowcroft among actually all of them, one way or another, indicated they think everybody knows what the outcome is going to be. It's all been discussed in the Taba Accords at the end of the Clinton administration. They reached essentially agreement on the four major problems. First, the Taba Accords were never either authorized or accepted, but nonetheless. Is the Palestinian-Israeli deal that people say we all know what it is, all we have to do is get leaders who will be courageous and sign it, and that you hear on all fronts, not just from these four gentlemen. Is that really the case? Is the deal really so easily translated into just a leadership signature problem? Interesting question. I think it is more than not. And the reality, we are all working around the margins of what Brent refers to in terms of Taba. It's how you go about negotiating those details of the June 467 borders, the land swaps, how you deal with settlement blocks, which settlements, how you create compensation packages and the sequencing. Your question also only speaks to the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian deal. The reality is, if you're looking at a more comprehensive nature with introducing Syria and Lebanon, you've got a lot more flexibility and influence because you are also getting to the heart of some, what I call, deposits that might be effective when you discuss the issue of Syria's influence with regard to terror. Let me drill down a little bit more on what you said, though. You didn't mention Jerusalem. The deal on Jerusalem, something everybody understands and is ready to swallow? That is a little more nebulous. I think that yes, but is what I would say. It needs a little bit more education, but I would like to reference the Arab Peace Initiative in bringing Saudi Arabia into the mix, makes a Jerusalem deal, and the details on Jerusalem that much easier for a Palestinian-Israeli agreement. Jonathan, how about Jerusalem? Do you think the Israelis are understanding what the deal is and are ready to sign it if they just had a strong leader? Well, I think there was what Ehud Barak put forward at Camp David II in Ataba, and then, of course, we have a new Prime Minister in Israel right now who may or may not be as willing to see territory within Jerusalem. But broadly speaking, looking at what was on the table at Camp David II in Ataba, we know how that ended, and the Palestinians flatly rejected the offer without a counter-offer, and this is something that has been attested to by the likes of Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk and President Clinton. So we know that the Palestinians were not eager to engage in this sort of package deal, the same one that we heard about during this discussion during this DVD, and now things have actually gotten much more complex. You had Hamas actually win an election in January of 2006, testing to the fact that the Palestinians overwhelmingly support an organization that made its name through suicide bombings and attacks against Israeli civilians, and then add to that the question of Palestinian leadership. I know it's an uncomfortable question, Ziad, but it is one that needs to be dealt with, the fact that we still don't know who would actually sign that agreement. My argument is that even if Israel tomorrow decided that it wanted to cede every settlement in the West Bank, remove all the strictures around the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, hand over every part of Jerusalem, and even allow a nominal number of Palestinian refugees to live inside Israel proper, there would be nobody on the other side to ratify that agreement. In other words, if Fatah got involved and signed that agreement, Hamas would reject it outright, and there is no way that Hamas would accept it. Whereas you would argue that there is an Israeli leader who would sign that same agreement? I'm not saying that they would sign the exact agreement that we saw back in Tava and Camp David, but if any agreement was to be made, at least we would know who would sign it on the Israeli side. We all know where Netanyahu's, well, at least we think where Netanyahu stands on some of these issues, and I'm not expecting him to run back to the negotiating table, but if there was an agreement to be made, and if compromises were to be struck, at least we know who would sign it on the Israeli side. Sam, I have two points. Can I get two fingers? Because I won Ziyad, and I know he will offer just quickly on Camp David. I too was at Camp David. It was not that simple. We did not do some of our homework as well. And on Jerusalem, Ehud Barak tabled a number of proposals. We didn't know, going into Camp David, where the Israelis were going to be on the issue of proposals on Jerusalem. So we couldn't even engage the other interested parties. So some of that, I'm not absolving the Palestinians of their willingness to embrace right then and there, but we didn't do enough preparation either, so it wasn't that simple. Ziyad, you're on the phone. So many points have been raised. Pick out the easy one. Jerusalem, of course. No, Jerusalem, yeah, it should be shared. And at some point in time, people will come to that conclusion because of so many complications. On the issue of the status quo, the status quo has steadily been a declining curve. 40 years ago, we had 16,000 settlers or so. Now we have almost half a million, 450,000. And that is why the question of freezing the settlements is so crucial. You cannot go on negotiating a two-state solution while somebody is munching on that piece of bread. It just cannot be done. So that is why it's significant. It also is significant because of the issue of the credibility of the people who are actually negotiating. Now, who would negotiate? I think it's very clear the PLO would negotiate as long as it is actually the one that is authorized to negotiate. And Abu Mazin is the one who's the head of the PLO, whether he is the head of the PA authority or not. The PA is the creature of the PLO. So it is possible to negotiate, and it is also very important to know at some point in time that Palestinians will subject that agreement that they come up with to a referendum. The Palestinians between now and then, when that negotiation is concluded, have to go through elections. So that reflects on the Hamas issue. Hamas is an un-state actor. The settlers are a non-state actor, too. In part, they also do some state business, but they are also a non-state actor. I haven't heard too many people talking about the settlers external to Israel and say, should we negotiate with them a deal? So these issues have to be worked out seriously, not without the question of the Jerusalem component to this, whether there's an agreement to it or not. Well, Jerusalem is beyond the Israelis and the Palestinians. It's just bigger than these two people. There is a whole world of religious people globally who would be interested in that solution. And no one can stand with an exclusive commitment to run Jerusalem. That is why if the Israelis make a religious claim on Jerusalem and the West Bank, they should not be surprised if others will make a counter-religious claim. And that will be a non-solution. So we're talking about a solution. Let me just point this point that the essence of my question on Jerusalem is, has anybody actually come up with a solution that would work? Now there is a non-governmental organization designing a formula, quite an interesting formula for the old city. But it's non-governmental. It's a good idea. Maybe someday it'll be part of the deal. The Clinton parameters at the end of the Clinton administration describe the Jerusalem in which Israel has sovereignty in Jewish areas. Palestinians have sovereignty in Palestinian areas. And they left kind of vague what happens in the middle. But the point is, if you look at Jerusalem today, you cannot imagine dividing East Jerusalem that way because there are large enclaves of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. You can't have separate police forces interacting. So the formula for Jerusalem isn't there at this stage that would be viable. And so that's a lot of negotiating to do. That's really my point. It's not something that is awaiting only decisions by governments. There are three levels for Jerusalem. Every one of them is very relevant. One is the political arrangement. Two is the municipal arrangement. Three is the religious arrangement. All of these have to be genuinely negotiated. But the principle has to be established. And I think this is where there cannot be a serious disagreement on part of people who want to negotiate that they will have an exclusive ownership of Jerusalem. Nothing will continue beyond that. It's Sam to drill down on the Jerusalem. Wait a minute. Let me give Jonathan a chance. Do you want to comment on this last one? Well, yeah. And I think Ziad has an excellent point. I mean, there are those three levels, and they're going to be exceedingly difficult to reach an agreement, I would say on each one of them. I think that there are no easy solutions. But what it comes down to in my mind is that, you know, if you're dealing with people who truly want peace, you begin to make compromises. And I don't know if we're really there yet. I mean, I think we're looking at several entrenched positions and not really moving towards the center and anything. And that was, you know, if you were there, then you'd know. But, you know, that was not the atmosphere. This is our red line. We're not stepping past that. And that's been the problem with Jerusalem all along. And there's a reason why you deal with Jerusalem last. It's the hardest question, and it will always be the hardest question. It evokes tremendous emotion. And, you know, I wouldn't expect it to be any different the next time around whenever that happens. I think on Jerusalem, and Sam, your points well taken in terms of the details. But in the intervening years, post Camp David, and you referenced the Windsor study, a lot of work is being done on different models. Those are going to be referenced by the negotiators. And, but I think Ziad and Jonathan's absolutely correct. If you have a political will, then there's more willingness. And you've got a recognition of the parties will come together to deal with these details. On the municipal level, that's the day-to-day. And if you go back to where we were, unfortunately, in the last eight years, we got away from the trilateral arrangements that we had in the Clinton administration. What was effective in those trilateral arrangements, we had Americans, Israelis, and Palestinians working in a number of different venues all the time. They became very used to working through issues constantly. Now that needs to be reinvented again and to start drilling down into those details. There is, there... Negotiators tend to get very heavily engaged in the political side of this issue. You're absolutely right. But as somebody has already pointed out, the religious issue has become more and more and more central over the last decades. Interfaith talks, everybody's in favor of. Some take place. But the basic formula for persuading Israelis that their religious centrality of the western wall and the old city, particularly the western wall, is something that can be negotiated about or that the al-Aqsa mosque and Who Runs It is a negotiating issue rather than an issue of religious sovereignty. And that you've got to have Saudi Arabia bless everything on behalf of the Muslim world. All of these things are really central to reaching a final Jerusalem formula. And I don't think we've ever found a way well to mesh our political negotiations, style and approaches any of us with the religious side of the problem. Does that make sense to you, Walt? Yeah, sure. I think the issue of religion can possibly be handled on this earth in the following fashion. You're entitled to your religion and you're entitled to your beliefs whatever it is that you think of land and space and metaphysical things. But here we have to deal with specifics and practicalities. So you can always have the faith that you want about the attachment to the land but you cannot apply it your way exclusive of other people's metaphysical affiliations. Well, there's one last question that's supposed to go to Ziad. I'm still ready. This is easy, Ziad. I think you can handle this. You noted that all four of our speakers in the DVD essentially agreed with Spig and Brent. Spig made the point first. Brent seconded it. I think both Carter and Baker basically agreed. What's lacking in even the current Obama much more energetic interventionist approach is a clear statement by the American president that these are the key principles on which we believe and it's our policy to see they come about, we can get a deal. Not every detail, but a lot of detail. A lot of principles that get to the heart of all of the arguments. Now, if the American president, the current one, by some miracle made a speech like that in the next month or two and there's been talk in the administration about trying to do something of this kind and they're still arguing, I think, how forward-leaning they should be on laying down principles instead of waiting to make bridging proposals once you get into negotiations. That's been our traditional approach. Were he to do it? Would everybody, all these 52 countries that are mentioned, the Europeans, all the Arabs, Palestinians, would everybody fall in line because of the prestige of the American position and the power of the American dictum? What do you think? No, there is no such thing. I mean, there is no such thing that the United States in a position to have some statement said whatever it is and then everybody would fall in line. But having said that, let me just say two things. One is the fact that solving this issue is a U.S. national issue. It is not, you know, it's fine, it's fine for the Palestinians and all these people in the Middle East but it is a national priority for the United States. This is the basis for the position for the United States president's speech that you're talking about. He's already said that. He's already said that and I think that is something to build on. The other is that the time will have to come and will come and it is going to come during the presidency of Mr. Obama. I do not agree with you on that. At some point in time. Where those principles will be laid down and they are close to whatever Taba was about. They're going to be close to whatever. Before that, I do not think this will be the beginning. I doubt that this will be the opening position of the United States president to say this is how it is. I think he will leave room for structures and institutions, et cetera. Essentially between the Palestinians and Israelis at first but with other players. He should do that. I think it is indispensable that the United States be ready to lay down those principles and bridge the gaps. That will carry so much authority when it is done properly with enough work internationally to line up the support for it including inside of Israel and inside of Palestine. What do you think, John? I think what we saw after Camp David and Taba was the president coming out and saying these are the principles upon which a peace agreement will have to be made and we had a rejection of that from the Palestinians. The president did not stand office to pursue it. That is true. That was to his detriment. I fully agree with the fact that you need to see engagement happen sooner. The fact is that the international community we are talking about how the world will respond. The international community left President Clinton in my opinion hanging. I don't believe that the international community rallied behind the president as he was leaving office and said we are going to keep pushing this ball forward. Things fell apart. The Intifada began and the international community essentially pulled back and let the Arab-Israeli conflict rage. This was a problem but I think it was demonstrative of how the international community particularly the Europeans and the Arab world are willing to let things go back to the status quo and it's unfortunate but I think it's essentially a fact now. You think they would still hang back at this point? I think and this is not something that I'm particularly pleased with. It falls on the shoulders of the United States to push these agreements forward and when they fail, the United States takes the brunt of it. I don't know how many of you read the statement made by the quartet in Trieste just last month. It's a rather extraordinarily forward leaning and agreed position. Russia, the European community, the UN and ourselves. We haven't gone beyond that but even that far is a pretty lively amount of unity about where one should go. Statements are wonderful. I'd like to see more engagement. Tony? I think that it's a question of timing when the President will... You think if he did it at the right time it would have the effect that they said it would have? And based upon very robust diplomatic engagement and preparation. Yes, it would have that impact but it would be based on timing and engagement. Let's say it has that impact on the world. Would it have that impact on the Israeli government and the Palestinian government? I suspect that when he takes that bold step he will have... The conditioning would have been done with both Israelis and Palestinians and it would be the right timing. Enough of the Senator Mitchell and his team would feel the timing was right to give that kind of boost. Would you get through this calendar year without doing it? That's a very interesting question. We know he's going to be pretty busy next year. I would look towards the end of this calendar year. This President does pretty bold and... Right after he passes the health reform plan. And remember, Sam, you just referenced health. The Congress is standing by him and they're willing to support him as he's going forward on the House and Senate and that's important. This political dynamic has changed. I feel a sense of restlessness to my left. So why don't we quit talking among ourselves? Paul, do you have anybody else?