 Dr. Singer, we'll start with you. Chairman Thornberry and ranking member Smith, members of the committee, it's an honor to speak at this important discussion today designed to reboot the cybersecurity conversation. It's all the more needed as the United States was recently the victim of what was arguably the most important cyber attack campaign in history. Hackers reported as working on behalf of the Russian government have attacked a wide variety of American citizens and institutions. They include political organizations of both parties, the Republican National Committee and the Democrat National Committee, as well as prominent Democrat and Republican leaders, as well as civil society groups like various American universities and academic research programs. These attacks started years back, but have continued after the 2016 election. They've been reported as hitting clearly government sites like the Pentagon's email system, as well as clearly private networks like U.S. banks. They've also been reported as targeting a wide variety of American allies ranging from government, military and civilian targets in states that range from Norway to the United Kingdom, as well as now trying to influence upcoming elections in Germany, France and the Netherlands. While Vladimir Putin has denied the existence of this campaign, its activities have been identified by groups that include all the different agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, the FBI, and in statements by both the prior and present U.S. president. This campaign has also been well-established by the marketplace. Five different well-regarded cybersecurity firms have identified it. This campaign is not a cyber war of the kind that's often envisioned, with power grids going down and fiery cyber pearl harbors. Instead, it's a competition more akin to the Cold War's pre-digital battles that crossed influence operations with espionage and subversion. However, while Russia's attacks are the most notable events in cybersecurity in the last year, unlike in the Cold War, our strategy must recognize they are only one aspect of a larger threat landscape. In cyberspace, the malevolent actors presently engage in attacks on U.S. persons and institutions range from criminals who are stealing personal information or holding ransom valuable corporate data, although here, too, there is a prominent Russian link with reportedly 75% of ransomware coming from Russian-speaking parts of the online criminal underground, to governments like China, which have been accused of large-scale intellectual property theft, as well as breaking into government databases like the OPM and the cyber version of traditional espionage. And finally, our strategy must face that all of this ongoing activity must account for the risk of an actual cyber war, the activities that would occur in outright conflict, including cyber attacks to cause physical damage. So what can be done to defend America in this challenging realm? In my written testimony, I submitted a series of 30 actions that can be taken by the Congress to raise cybersecurity, notably in reflecting the nature of this nonpartisan realm, the overall strategy, and each of the proposed 30 measures are designed to be amenable to and implementable by the leaders of both parties. I've submitted this strategy for the record, which I hope will be a useful resource to you and your staff in your important work ahead. Rather than restating it in detail, I would note that it involves three core elements. First, activities that can be taken to restore deterrence from making key new investments in training, cutting-edge technology like artificial intelligence, and organizational changes in our Defense Department approach, including disentangling cybercom and the NSA, to utilizing all our tools of power to better influence current and future adversary thinking in the wake of Russia's attack, most especially by turning sanctions into law and strengthening them. Second, actions to raise resilience, our ability to shake off attacks and thus create what is known as deterrence by denial, where we are not only better protected, but adversaries gain less and are thus less incentivized to attack. Importantly, a strategic effort to raise U.S. resilience would be a useful investment against any type of attack or attacker. The steps that can be taken by Congress here range from measures to better utilize Pentagon buying power to oversight on the implementation of industry best practices into government. They also include innovative means to deal with our cybersecurity human resource challenge from supporting better pipelines into government and the military and better organizing the wealth of talent that lies outside of government and the military reserves, such as through the creation of a program akin to Estonia's world-respected approaches to societal resilience. The final track looks at the broader challenge we face in a world of social media and online influence operations. Here, too, there are a range of suggested congressional actions, including enhancing cybersecurity information sharing among likely U.S. political targets, raising the ability of the U.S. military to better utilize social media and integrate it into our own training environments and supporting the recreation of the Active Measures Working Group, an interagency Cold War program designed to debunk foreign propaganda and limit the impact of lies spread by what the Soviets aptly called useful idiots. In conclusion, we must recognize that for as long as we use the Internet, adversaries like Putin's Russia and many others will seek to exploit this technology and our dependence on it, and realms that range from politics to business to warfare itself. In response, the United States can build a new set of approaches to deliver true cybersecurity, aiming to better protect ourselves while reshaping adversary attitudes and options, or we can continue to be a victim. Thank you. Thank you.