 This is Just Asking Questions, a show for inquiring minds on reason. Today, Liz Wolf and I are talking with Kurt Mills, a foreign policy reporter and executive editor of the American Conservatives, which speaks for the kinds of conservatives who don't believe America's military should be in the business of nation building or spreading democracy or really any of the other tasks beyond providing collective self-defense for this country. We wanted to bring him on to discuss President Biden's open-ended military engagement with the Houthis in Yemen, as well as the $95 billion foreign aid package that just passed the Senate that will be spread between Ukraine, Israel, Gaza, and the Indo-Pacific. Also to reflect a bit on some of Putin's recent comments in an interview with Tucker Carlson and what they might reveal about the Russia-Ukraine war. Kurt, thank you for joining us. Thanks for having me. You've written that on the topic of Ukraine-Russia. You've written that in an article titled How the Ukraine Delusion May End that Putin is likely to sue for a temporary shock piece in the middle of 2024. I'm curious what you think about his recent comments on that topic in his interview with Tucker Carlson, which Carlson published last week. Let's roll that clip to kick us off and then I'd love to get your thoughts. Do the United States need this? What for? Thousands of miles away from your national territory. Don't you have anything better to do? You have issues on the border, issues with migration, issues with the national debt, more than $33 trillion. You have nothing better to do, so you should fight in Ukraine. Wouldn't it be better to negotiate with Russia, make an agreement already understanding the situation that is developing today? So what do you make of what Putin is saying there? Well, it's obviously he's been briefed on a lot of these sort of lines of argument that will be palatable to the American audience, because I think the number of people that holds such a perspective is reaching crescendo as we get into the presidential election year. I think the things that are anchoring 24 are first, there's a Russian presidential election in March of 2024. And so while sort of cartoonish take on Russian politics is that it's a feta comply and it is a feta comply. Putin's going to win. The reality is it's a massive country 11 times famously and dictatorship itself is complex. And there are nuances on what exactly the terms of Putin's victory will be and what exactly that will do to serve as a launchpad for his approach going forward in 24. Additionally, there's the huge X factor of whether or not Trump will win and then also the Russian appraisal of whether or not Trump will be a more reliable partner than Biden. I think that the case, I don't have a quite radio likely, but the case is certainly super underrated in the sense of it's a reasonable bet that the Russian calculus for a deal this year some sort of ceasefire or even a more formal armistice could be on the table. And I think the rationale makes makes sense for both the Putin and the Biden administration side the Putin side. You know, obviously the 2022 campaign did not go well. So this war, although the momentum is in the Russian position has still been a mess. It gives the Russians the chance to consolidate its gains. It's not going to get, you know, recognition, it's not going to get a treaty. And it gives Biden a chance to remove a major political issue from the conversation heading into the general election. Now, I think polling is pretty evenly divided on the subject. I think if you look at it, probably a net number of Americans still have a favorable disposition towards financing the war effort on Ukraine. But that number is radically down from where it was 24 months ago. And additionally, quite similar to maybe where the Democratic base was the capital, the Democratic base was in 2004 with the rock. It's becoming a highly motivating issue for Republicans to turn out. So, you know, 55% of Americans supporting Ukraine and 40% wanting to negotiate those numbers aren't necessarily equal if it drives a Republican turnout. How do you think Putin is looking at the pretty stunning congressional dysfunction we've had on this? I mean, just today and yesterday in the news, you know, we saw, I guess last night, today we're recording this on Tuesday, February 13th. You know, yesterday in the Senate, 17 Republicans broke with their party in order to get an aid package devoted to Ukraine and to Israel over a procedural hurdle. But then today news broke early this morning that another five Republicans had also broke with their party. So now we have 22 Republicans joining with Democrats in the Senate getting it through. Now there's the question of what will be happening in the House. But I imagine Putin is watching the sort of fracturing of the GOP specifically on this issue of Ukraine aid. How do you think that factors into his equation? Oh, I mean, I think it factors in rather large because I think even if the numbers are relatively evenly divided on the Republican elected official side, right now, clearly the sort of celebrity spirit of the party is with realism and restraint and kind of making some sort of deal with the Russians. So the Senate leadership and part of the House leadership is in favor of some sort of Ukraine aid package. But a lot of times these Senate chairmen were House chairmen that nobody's ever heard of. Meanwhile, the sort of VIPs, Trump, Carlson, Bannon, Matt Gaetz, even the Speaker of the House, they're all clearly on another side. And I just don't see how the momentum reverses. I mean, even if they were able to get something like this again, this is going to be like the last package. And then to an extent that undermines the rationale for this package, like how many more packages will this take that there is this there is this sort of creeping logic that is redolent of past conflicts, both your war on terror, which is, you know, we can't cut and run because we've already, you know, put so much investment in into the theater, which is, you know, I'm not an econ person per se, but that seems like a pretty clear sunk cost fallacy. And then secondly, you know, this is the kind of rationale that kept World War One going for years and years and more must die because so many have died. But isn't this different than war on terror related logic, right? I mean, if the US fails to support Ukraine in this way, if, you know, the spending bill falls through and falls through in the house or gets tied up specifically with all of these border stipulations that Republicans are trying to get through, Ukraine no longer has much of a fighting chance, right? Like how does how does that play out? It's a different situation in a sense. Well, we don't actually know. I mean, like if the European rhetoric really is at all rooted in reality, you would think that some of these European powers could up their military spending beyond 3% of GDP. Yeah, if the US actually does pull out. The most likely candidate is Britain, which has been the most hawkish country in the west on this subject. But the Schultz government in Germany has also been quite hawkish and Poland has been quite hawkish. I mean, you could see some kind of piecemeal package come in to keep this war going. But the reality is that the US has been the major benefactor from start to finish on this so far. You know, Liz mentioned the way that this has been tied to domestic issues like border security. Senator Rand Paul spearheaded a filibuster against this bill in the Senate. And I pulled just a minute or so of that, you know, I think 20 something hour filibuster that I want to play. So let's roll that. And I'd like to ask you about the connection between foreign aid and border security and whether there is one. But let's hear from Rand Paul. What we have here is a Ukraine first bill. This bill was never really about securing our border, but about securing another's country border. What we have here is a failure of the elites of Washington on both sides of the aisle, the leadership in the Democrat Party, the leadership in the Republican Party. What we have here is a failure of these elites to understand that the American people want to put America first. 61% of Americans live from paycheck to paycheck, and they want to put Ukraine first. I want you to talk to your constituents at home, the ones who live paycheck to paycheck and tell them why you're shipping $60 billion to Ukraine. So what could just talk reflect a little bit on, you know, this shift that has happened within the GOP and, you know, what is it? You know, there there's some some different foreign policy factions right now, both in the Republican on the Republican side and on the Democratic side. What are the major fractions and who do you think is winning the argument right now? Um, on both sides? Yes. Yeah, I mean, so I think it's what my my sort of guide posted this always is that the greatest risk of a Republican administration is a war with Iran and the greatest risk of a Democratic administration is a war with Russia. And I think if you look at how the Trump and Biden administrations have played out, we obviously got way closer to a war with Russia and got way closer to a war with Iran during the past, you know, Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively. So Russia exists, especially in the Democratic establishment mind space, as this kind of great boogeyman, right? And I don't think this is expressed so much in the elected official level, but you don't have to go very far. MSNBC, a lot of the center left press, you know, sort of sees Putin as the head of the global right for lack of a better term, right? He's a gangster, white Christian murderer, heterosexual, whatever, like, and so, you know, and versus Iran is the same thing. It's it's it's the big, you know, it's the big Muslim power. And so I think you see a lot of motivation on the center left Democratic side for this war. I think you see some dissent. I mean, I think on the vote last night, Senator Sanders and Senator Merkley from Oregon, you know, the sort of traditional super kind of like progressive, you know, Eugene McCarthy kind of wing. It opposed some of this. But you know, even Sanders's office has been has been pretty hawkish on Russia, I think really since the 2016 bit. I mean, Sanders was a complete Russia gate believer, unfortunately, in my view. And so I think you see a rather unicameral response or a united response for the Democrats. There's behind the scenes realities of the fissures before the 2022 election, the House of Progressive Caucus considered some sort of, you know, more moderate language resolution on Ukraine. But Jayapal, the Congresswoman from Washington State, I believe, nixed it or was was controlled and the nixing it. So I think, you know, I think you see pretty much democratic unity on the war, of course, is, you know, not at the elected level. There is the sort of Glenn Greenwald, Noam Chomsky, sort of left libertarian thing with that. I don't think they're super represented in the elected level, especially with a democratic president. On the Republican side, I think you see a residual hawkish conservative establishment, which is weak. So contrary to the democratic establishment, which still controls the Democratic Party. So that's why Biden and Clinton have been the nominees of the party the last 10 years. The Republican establishment is weaker. So that's why Trump has been the nominee of the party the last 10 years. And the Republican establishment view, of course, these people like Mitch McConnell, Romney, representative like voices by like the Wall Street Journal editorial board, National Review, it's very what I would call, they would probably call it themselves, you know, Neo Reaganite, right, which is like Reagan wouldn't abandon the Ukrainians, even though it's like, I think a tendentious counterfactual line of argument, they make it. And they still have sort of a default support in elected races that are super high profile, right? Like, you know, if like the Congressional Committee of the Republicans with the Senatorial Committee of the Republicans wants to back somebody in the state and spend a lot of money. I mean, for instance, the Montana race is actually the Senate race this year between Mr. Sheehy and Mr. Rosendale is actually pretty emblematic. It's something that nobody's paying attention to. There's not even a million people in Montana, I believe. And, you know, like Sheehy is the sort of like classic military that, you know, will be pretty hawkish, I think, at least at least in his default rhetoric, unless he's sort of pushed in a direction versus someone like Rosendale who has more bespoke politics, you know, and even Trump, you know, himself can sort of savagely skirt some of these wings, but it's clear that the Trump's own biases are clearly with the anti-assalture and his own views. And then on the other side, I think you see a lot of rising stars in the party on the Republican side, really just sort of jumping the line and fighting each other to be the vanguard of this stuff. So I think on the Senate side, or even the congressional side, the most important elected official on this stuff is now JD Advanced. I think the most long-standing articulator of this perspective has been Rand Paul, although obviously Rand Paul, there's some differences between his sort of libertarian wing of conservatism and the sort of nationalist wing that came with Trump's election. Matt Gaetz has mentioned, Josh Hawley has had a certain perspective. I think it's a little bit different than these guys. And then there's also people, of course, who argue that they are furthering the Trump mission by supporting Ukraine, which I think is not so much an argument you can make, but they're making it. This is people like Pompeo, Mike Pompeo, the former Secretary of State, and probably more quietly someone like Tom Cotton. But again, I just think that Tide has super churned. I mean, if the Ukrainians had done as well, as they had done in 2022 over a series of months of 2023 and 24, perhaps we were having a different discussion, but the reality is that the war is not going well with unprecedented support from the West. And then I think a lot of ways we've just sort of bounced back to where we were in the late 2010s where the Republican Party is just really skeptical with stuff. Is there a difference between, you mentioned Rand Paul's long been this libertarian, non-interventionist in the Senate, and then you've got the rising sort of nationalist America-first ism of J.D. Vance, who is opposed to Ukraine, but it's not clear to me how that translates to any other, like I can kind of predict where Rand Paul's going to fall on any given foreign intervention. J.D. Vance, not so much. Would you be able to clarify that for me a little bit? Are they, they're allied on this issue, but would we expect that coalition to hold for other major foreign policy issues? What's an example where you think you could fall apart? Well, I mean, you mentioned Iran is a big, you know, that's kind of like the bogeyman of the Republican Party. Trump obviously assassinated one of their top generals. Is that something where, you know, you would see a Rand Paul and a J.D. Vance coming together, let's say, things in the Middle East start, you know, this starts turning into a bigger and bigger regional war. Would you see it likely that they would be on the same side in that type of scenario? I think you're basically intuiting a dispositional difference between Paul and Vance on the Middle East. I think it's a reasonable intuition. However, I think on the functional major issues and votes that we have records on, Paul also opposed the Iran deal. No Republican in Congress supported the Iran deal, so there's no distinction between Vance's public statements and Paul's votes on that. And then it's hard to imagine that Vance wouldn't have been in the contingent of people that were around Tucker Carlson during the Soleimani strike that you mentioned, the kind of people lobbying Trump not to escalate further. So while there may be some philosophical framework distinctions between the two, as expressed in any meaningful way, I think they would pretty much be on the same side. Who knows what that was going to have in the future, but it's hard to imagine Vance at the vanguard of supporting war with Iran. No. Go ahead, Liz. Well, I was curious, Kurt, whether you are now in charge of the American conservative, which has a very long history of supporting and taking seriously the non-interventionist cause, but I'm curious because it feels like we've seen this huge, this sea change, this huge shift over the last few years in particular, where we have these pretty provocative, pretty inflammatory sort of contingent of frequently newly elected Republicans, where the rhetoric is almost populist on a whole bunch of domestic policy issues and then pretty staunchly non-interventionist. To me, it feels like there's almost this like ascendant wing and I can't quite put my finger on how it emerged. Do you agree with that characterization and can you trace me through the sort of lineage of what we're seeing today? You mean like how do you square a disposition that is both upset with the excesses of American Empire, but also thinks that basically Americans are getting a raw deal at home? Yeah, and it feels particularly, the thing that I'm most interested in is that it feels like this, there have been people with perhaps these inklings before, but it feels like a creature of the last five years in particular. It feels like 10 years ago or 15 years ago, this particular sort of type of politician didn't exist in numbers. Am I wrong there? No, no, no, I think that's all right. I mean, look, there were antecedents or predecessors to Trump, right? I mean, Buchanan, the co-founder of this magazine, Ross Perot, you know, and then... But Ross Perot is a more marginal figure and now we're talking about a substantial enough wing of the Republican Party for them to actually be able to have influence and affect what type of legislation gets passed. I mean, we have enough people who share this sort of loose collection of beliefs to be able to actually fracture the Republican Party in a really significant way. I'm even thinking of just like the types of things that have been in the headlines over the last three years, this has become a really salient current political phenomenon in a way that it wasn't 10 years ago. I agree with you. I think the country's mood is dark and considerably. My only point with the Perot thing is though, I mean, he ran an independent candidate and he got 20%, which is, I believe, one of the first or second greatest performance of an independent candidate in American history. And I mean, you can imagine that Perot had tried to contest the nomination of a party like Trump did. Like Trump ran a third party in 2000, didn't go anywhere. He like withdrew, he ran against Buchanan. So, you know, I think there's clearly, this is all serving in service of the argument that there has been great disquiet and lack of consensus about what this country is about and what it should be doing after the Cold War. And so I think from this wing you are sort of scratching at, I would say a couple of things happened. I think there is a unconscious consensus in the country that the U.S. economy never really bounced back in a way that was equitable from 2008, right? So like, we go back to 2012, the Romney Obama election. I mean, it's sort of like two competing, very optimistic visions of America, right? So like the center-left Obama pitch is like, okay, we just like do a little bit more of a social safety net. And like even himself, he's the avatar of a certain type of thing, right? He's the biracial future. He's the law professor, right? Versus Romney is the devout Christian, the family man, the management consultant. It's like literally an MBA versus a JD, even though Romney is a JD. Like, and it's like, it's just competing about like how to speed up the car that we already have more. Trump's page is completely different. And, you know, the Hillary Clinton thing by 2016 is, it had become a machine politics thing in which the essential appeal was her, the essential state of the appeal was her gender, right? You know, and with her. It is what they led with their argument. Shattering the glass ceiling of the Javits Center, right? Versus, you know. Like, a more courageous cat suit empire. Right. Yeah. And so I think, I mean, I'm just sort of biased. Like, I remember I graduated college in 13, you know, I think there had been sort of just a view that like, you know, of course the US, it was taking a long time. Unemployment was sticky, but it was going to be fine by like 15, 16. And I think, you know, a lot of the candidates who ran against Trump ran as if that was the case. I remember when I moved back here in spring of 15, it's like a lot of debates about the biggest things in this town before Trump were like, whether or not to extend the export import bank or like give trade protection authority, right? Like, like, like Paul Ryan, who become the secret of the house later that year, was jumping over hoops to give Obama, you know, expedited trade. These are the biggest issues, right? Versus like Trump comes up two months later. And it's like, I remember distinctly in May 15, he goes, this country is a hellhole, right? And like, it's this incendiary, caustic, negative rhetoric, very pessimistic on the state of affairs of the country, super resonated and resonated on the other side too, right? Sanders is not a communist, but like, I mean, you know, it's clearly quite hostile to the market. And has been saying the same socialist for 70 years. And so these guys wouldn't have been successful in 2008, I submit, right before the crisis. I don't think they would have been successful without the war on terror and us effectively losing that. So the Trump pitch, I think, you know, a lot of times people sort of clawing their own message onto it. I think Trump himself, you know, he's not, you know, he's not a political philosopher per se, he's not going to sit down and write all this stuff. But I think his inclinations are pretty clear, which is that the US is over committed overseas. And meanwhile, the economy doesn't work for the average American. And so that's the essential pitch. And I think the Republican Party is the weaker party. And so Trump was able to take it over more easily than Sanders was able to take over the Democrats. And I think to an extent, you know, the Trump's message is more radical, right? He's not an anti-capitalist versus Sanders is. And that's kind of where we are. I don't mean to keep roping on like Sanders, like the guy lost twice, like he cares. But like a lot of these people who voted for Sanders, I think ended up, we're a meaningful number ended up in the Trump camp. I mean, you could have imagined another future in which the sort of like corporate capitalist, you know, status quo party was the Jeb Bush Party and the Clintons had lost and Sanders had been the non-interventionist question everything guy or Sanders is successor or AOC, whatever. Like that's a different vibe versus the Dems are clearly the party of the American establishment now for better or worse. And the Republicans are clearly the party of the American anti-establishment. You can say, Oh, well, I'm going to wash my hands of both these guys. That's fine. That's fine. But like as manifest in like real politics, like those are your options. Where does Biden fit in that story? Because he is obviously the figurehead of the Democratic party. But as an individual, he is he seems to me a little more unpredictable than other these other Democrats, Obama and Clinton that you mentioned, you know, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, which he took a lot of heat for for how that was executed. He will talk about Yemen in a minute, but he, you know, he stopped funding the Yemen war before getting re-involved with Yemen. And, you know, it seems to me that his approach has been, you know, a little more hesitancy to get US troops directly involved in things, but a willingness to, you know, send lots of money places. So how do you evaluate Biden in that kind of these kind of like shift this like shifting ideology that's happening in both parties? Yeah, I mean, look, this is the long standing position. I think Biden's pretty underrated as as a like political figure. Like I don't think like he became president by accident. I think he he has cobbled together a sort of distinct appeal that was right for the moment and potentially, I mean, I still think he's the Democrat strongest possible candidate this year. I think there's something wrong. I mean, is that an indictment of the Democratic Party, right? Like, like, what does that say about them? What are they going to replace him with? Yeah, I mean, they're going to replace him with Harris. They're going to replace him with Newsome. They're going to replace him with Gresham Whitmer. The good word above might replace him with Harris, right? Like, sorry? The good word above might infect him with Harris. Yeah. Okay. I mean, so like, I'm just not just ducking your question, but like, very quickly, like, those are the three names I hear the most Whitmer Newsome and Harris. So like, you know, Harris, I don't think anyone's making the argument that Harris is more potent general election candidates. Let's just take her off the map right now and do respect her. Whitmer is the governor of Michigan. This is completely untested. He passed on making her VP for a reason last year. We know nothing about her. Like that just strikes me. It could work. The honeymoon could work at exactly the right time, but it's a major gamble, right? Like I think people underrate like how difficult it is to just come out of nowhere and, you know, be very, very, very, very, very good on the stump, right? George W. Bush was from a family had done this forever. Even Clinton had been governor of Arkansas for like six terms. And Trump had been a mega celebrity for half a century. You know, there's an ease, there's an ease in the public eye that's hard to teach Whitmer will be really coming from small ball. And then Newsome, like I get it, I get the appeal, but I would say two things. One, is it suddenly become a referendum on California and his management of California, right? This is something that I think conservatives often get wrong. California is a great place. It's just being run into the ground by the current governor, in my view. And then secondly, does he just look a lot smaller compared to Trump, right? Like we have a former president of the United States against a sort of controversial governor. And then third, you know, this is a completely neglected piece of the Newsome puzzle. The one thing that, you know, I just moved back from California. The one thing you notice about California is it's just really not that African American. I think it's, I think it's 8% of the state. And so like is Newsome going to be able to turn out the black vote in Milwaukee, Phoenix, Detroit, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Atlanta, Vegas? That's really how this election is going to turn. Is he going to be better than that than Biden? So to answer your question, I think Biden had a few things going for him. One, I think in a democratic party that is this aligned on pretty radical identity politics, it is absolutely necessary to have an old white man in charge of it, because there are just enough swing voters that are going to think, oh, look at this. It's like 1994 still, like he's Biden, whatever. It's not that scary versus like if they actually have like the governor of California or Harris, like that's a lot more visceral, right? Additionally, you know, like, I don't think he's, he's an all-time speaker, like I always kind of contrast it. So Obama and Trump were all-time stadium speakers, right? Like, they could fill up these enormous things and, you know, that they're like incredible stage performers. And then Clinton, Bill Clinton, you know, you hear, you know, like everybody who's ever met him, it's like, he could talk to you like you're the only person in the room. There's a very, there's a sort of glad-handing intimacy to dealing with Clinton. He's sort of the tiny desk concert president. Yeah, exactly. Amanda of that, but maybe not your stadium show, right? Like, okay. No, no, no, I co-signed that. No, but it's, it's, but like, I mean, I think Biden's pretty good, right? Like, I think- What about Biden in musical terms? Like, are we talking, you know, he's selling out like smaller indie venues? Like- What is Biden in terms of musical terms? I mean, I mean, we've probably become the presence. He's gonna be, he's gonna be someone like very famous, right? Yeah. Like, it's- Biden strikes me as like a sort of medium-energy Billy Joel Madison Square Garden concert where it's like, you know exactly what you're getting. It's not going to be anything groundbreaking, but you know what? A lot of people like fucking Billy Joel. Yeah. I don't know. He's like, he's like the Eagles. He's been like around forever. Yeah, it's fine. It's been since the 70s. It's fine. I don't, it's like, you know, it's, it's pretty good, right? Yeah. And like, like going up, you know, in a crowd of people and talking with like Uber confidence is actually pretty hard to do. And then additionally, I think there's something I sort of refer to with Newsom. I think having an ease of black people, if you're an old white guy is also pretty hard to do. And like he, like that's why he won the South Carolina primary. Delaware is actually a very African American state. And I think African, poor African Americans are the base of the Democratic Party, much like poor whites are the base of the Republican Party. We just call them something else. We call them evangelicals. And so like, I think this is, this is, this is key. And like, I mean, any Republican that did not have a strong relationship with evangelicals struggled actually, right? McCain and Romney, they had turnout problems, in my view, versus Bush, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump actually had pretty separate, strong relationships with him. You could meet the exact same argument about the Democrats, which is like, what are the years they lost? Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, these are like not, these are not noted connectors with black America versus obviously Clinton, the first black president, Obama, and now Biden. So anyways, like, I think, I think, subbing him out, if you can put two words together, which is increasingly a question, but if he's able to do it, I think, I think it is not the move and I'm pretty, I'm pretty bearish on that happening. In terms of like, what his views are, I mean, he's always had this sort of, again, I don't think he's this, I hate to hear you determine like he's not a grand philosophical thinker, that implies that I think I'm smarter than him. I'm sure like there's all kinds of things that he knows that, that we don't know, this is a talented individual, right? I mean, like, I think people, it's always, it's sort of cliche that this sort of Richard Ben Cramer book, what it takes, you know, it covers the 88 presidential campaign, Biden is a major fixture of this. This is like, kind of when we wanted to be the president when he was like 48, I suppose, like 108. And like it talks about like, you know, it's 88, it's like the most boring presidential year ever, right? Like, where at least is on the surface boring? It's like Al Gore, Bob Dole, George H. W. Bush, Dukakis, like, it's not box office, at least, you know, in the grand sweep of history. But Ben Cramer makes this point that like, pretty much any major presidential candidate is going to be like the guy who could, you know, talk to any girl in any part of the country. There's like, there's a real confidence to them. Like, in person, there's a real, there's a real charisma there. Like, I remember, I went to, my brother is completely different than me, a complete, normie, non political person lives in Ohio. And we went to a, I had to go for work, I went to a Ted Cruz, Josh Mandel rally in May, oh yeah, in May of 22. And like, he like really didn't want to go and it's like an Ohio church and like 1130 in the morning on a Saturday. And like, he like, met Ted Cruz in the bathroom. And it was like, he met Mick Jagger. It was like Ted Cruz. And like, it's like, and then like, you know, you see, like Ted Cruz walks into the room and like, it's hammy, you know, like it's whatever. But like, he's really good. Like, you know, and it doesn't translate so much like on the phone, he just looks like a joke or whatever. It looks like probably to like millennial people, like, you know, like, it's not who we're talking to. Not he was talking to. And I have my own critiques of Cruz, whatever. But like, you forget the star power these people have, especially, you know, not on YouTube. And I was stunned by this because I a few years back when it was Ted Cruz running against Beto O'Rourke, I was in San Antonio to cover one of the debates between the two. And it was interesting because Beto O'Rourke had attracted that flashy vanity fair cover and an awful lot of mainstream press fawning. And I thought the phenomenon was kind of interesting, especially because O'Rourke, I mean, he's married into basically El Paso royalty, this like, you know, West Texas heiress and West Texas politics are just kind of interesting. Somebody who's, you know, very soft and sort of pro immigration in a bunch of ways. But coming from a place where he actually has a lot of experience, you know, being on, I guess, El Paso City Council and dealing with border issues. So Beto was an interesting candidate to me. But the thing that was just so stunning watching this debate and Cruz and O'Rourke facing each other was just the degree to your point that Cruz just has this sort of like, he's not a jock, he's not a cool kid, but he has a certain amount of like, almost high school bravado, like wittiness that can just kind of, it feels like he can just kind of push a Beto O'Rourke type person around Beto O'Rourke just likes like the flailing art student. He just looks pathetic in comparison to Cruz, whatever you think of their policies. And I think that that's a testament to the fact that Cruz just had an awful lot of experience. And as the Gen Zs would say, like he has risk in a way that O'Rourke just frankly doesn't, you know, I love a skateboarder, but like I cannot in any, you know, in any sort of good faith justify the fact that Beto O'Rourke is charismatic to the vast majority of American voters. It's just not true. I have nothing to add. So I mean, yeah, so I think that's how we got, I think that we got Biden and then like just to completely close out the differences. Like, I think he seems to really, he seems to really believe his oldest son, Beau, died because of these things called burn pits in Iraq, which is like, it's like basically US military personnel and assorted allies allegedly burning military equipment, probably not as dangerous as it sounds, or at least to us now. And, you know, I think he does have an underrated rivalry with Obama, which is like, so everyone loops on Trump doing the opposite of Obama's done. But in some ways, Biden has done the opposite of Obama did too, which is he got out of Afghanistan by Obama didn't get out of Afghanistan. Obama was very dovish in Iran. Biden has been more hawkish on Iran. Obama was seen as dovish on Russia. Biden's been hawkish on Russia. So to what degree is so much of his, to what degree are his current policy preferences and the agenda that he's pursuing, just him expressing this giant ship on his shoulder? I think he has a ship on his shoulder. I mean, so like, I mean, we just did a bunch of arguments, which I guess is just completely out of vote about why Biden's impressive. But the reality is, I think you see a clear demonstrated history of him having, of him being insecure, like, you know, not having this school credentials that a lot of his, especially the Democratic Party, which worships school, he doesn't have those credentials. And, you know, especially being an old white guy who kind of, he's kind of a bs-er, right? And like a party that's like super doesn't like that kind of thing, right? Like in a lot of ways, like, you're very good Republican. So like, I mean, so like, he has to, he has to, you know, it has to operate in that environment. And I think you have seen his insecurity expressed a number of times. Yeah, it's a party right now that seems kind of captivated by Ernesty. And, you know, there's a lot of people who believe in this sort of self aggrandizing sense that they have the moral high ground. So there's something very funny about watching them tie themselves into knots to try to justify Biden, who is fundamentally either extraordinary, extraordinarily forgetful or constantly playing very fast and loose with the facts. There's like a little bit of a dissonance there. But, you know, at the end of the day, what Biden's doing plays well to some degree. No, no, I mean, I think it's just like, this is why people think this is like unimaginable. I think it's like, they're going to put them up and it's going to be pretty good. And they're going to get pretty close. And I think he's probably favorite to lose. But like, I think subbing him out, the chances of getting destroyed are way higher. Let's talk about what Biden has been doing in Yemen. He announced these US led airstrikes against Yemen, not in a press conference or anything, but in very Biden fashion in just a press release, where he said, you know, they're a direct response to the unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea, including the use of anti ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history. January 9th, the Houthis launched their largest attack to date directly targeting American ships. And last week, together with 13 allies and partners, we issued an unequivocal warning that they would bear the consequences if their attacks did not seize. And these targeted strikes are a clear message that the US and our partners will not tolerate attacks on our personnel or allow hostile actors to imperil the freedom of navigation in one of the world's most critical commercial routes. So I mean, the rationale he's laying out there is that they were warned, they kept striking commercial ships. That's one of the legitimate purposes of our Navy is to protect commercial shipping lanes. Before we get into the process of that, could you just weigh in, Kurt, on the rationale? Do you think his rationale for the strikes is sound? I think he's in a position where he doesn't want to get into a war of Iran. I think there's a position where he doesn't want to completely abandon the Israelis. And he's in a position where he can't throw in with his party's left wing, which is exceedingly pro-Palestinian and believes that Israel is an apartheid state. So I think the Houthis are like, I know this isn't directly related to what that message just said, but the Houthis are pretty low hanging fruit. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world, if not the poorest. The Houthis are allies of Iran, but they're not really Iran. There's differences between them more than I think the press likes to emphasize. What do you mean by that? Well, Yemen had a civil war in the early 2010s, exceedingly complex and really sad. The Houthi rebels have effectively won, which meant that the coalition run by Saudi Arabia in the Emiratis lost or close to it. So Yemen borders Saudi Arabia, right? Ben Laden's father was from Yemen, so there's close ties here. I mean, there are religious ties. I think a lot of the Houthis are Zadis, which are sort of a sect of Shia Islam, and obviously Iran is a Shia Islamic democracy. But I'm a subscriber to the view that the Iranians don't incrementally call the shots with the Houthis quite in the same way that they do with Lebanese Hezbollah, which I think is a fairly direct proxy of Iran. And so this is a long way of saying that I think these do stuff all the time that isn't like cleared with Tehran in a James Bond fashion. There's a little bit of sort of different foreign policy heft, you would say, to Hezbollah's actions compared to Houthi actions. But that's something that a lot of the mainstream press is getting wrong right now? Sure. I mean, I think they're getting the alliance with the Iranians wrong. I'm not sure how much it matters, but they're getting it wrong. And then additionally, if the US were to bomb Lebanon, that would be a major deal versus if the US bombs the Red Sea, I think that is misguided and we shouldn't do that. And that's not in the US national interest, but it's not like the sky is going to fall. Which is why we are in this default. I don't think there should be US troops in Niger or Burkina Faso. And these troops were killed early. It's the most terrifying part of the world, the hell. Like the troops that were killed very early in Trump's term in office, like the number of senators who said, we have troops in Niger. But it doesn't matter. Nobody cares. We're not enough people. But back to when you put scattered troops all over the world, then you're laying these tripwires to allow for some sort of something to go wrong and then inviting more intervention on top of intervention. In this case, we're talking about commercial ships being attacked. I guess that's kind of the root of my question for you is you're someone who is writing from a non-interventionist standpoint, but would you agree with the general notion that that's a legitimate security function of the United States to play a role in securing shipping lanes? No, I don't. Especially shipping lanes that we don't really use. This is mostly a German problem and a Chinese problem as far as I'm aware. What do you mean shipping lanes that we don't really use? Isn't it something that the world's total commercial shipping traffic? Or are you just saying most of it? That's not American though. The world's because, okay. But supply chains are so interconnected. Can't you just make the case that it still ultimately affects us? Or not so much? I don't believe in the case. Okay, fair enough. Yeah, I mean, like so, I just, I don't think that it is, I was just getting to this. I don't think it is in the U.S. national interest to secure all the waterways of the world. I think we will be fine if we don't do that. And particularly, I don't think we should be spending a lot of resources securing the waterways that we don't currently use. Now you can say, like, maybe this is going to make, like, X thing from China more expensive. I think we roll with it. I think it's a lot better than getting a lot of people killed. I think the risk of escalation exceeds the risk of supply chain problems. Yeah, I'm also curious what you think of this statement that Biden made to a reporter. It was kind of in passing on January 18th, again, in a very Biden kind of mumbly way when he was asked whether the strikes were going to deter the Houthis from attacking more ships. This is what he said. Let's roll that clip. Are the airstrikes in Yemen working? Well, when you say working, are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue yet? Okay, so there was a lot of background noise on that. But basically, he said, are the strikes going to stop the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes. So I mean, he's plainly stating there that these strikes aren't actually a deterrent. So what do you think is going on here? He's being honest, and he's too old to forget to lie. What is the purpose, then, if they aren't actually deterring? And that's like the authority that he has is to act as a deterrent. What's the purpose of this campaign? What are the purposes of the people that are pushing these strikes? Yeah, I think they think they will be more effective than Biden does. So I think, this is just my read. I don't deny the man's head. I don't think Biden is a super believer in this. I think he is triangulated politically, and I think he's rolling with it. And I think that's what he's done. Again, to bring up Sanders, it's a lot easier to be an 80-year-old in office if you just say the same thing for the last 60 years. Biden has to do this same juggle act because he's more Machiavellian or sociopathic if you prefer. And so he literally just sometimes says the truth, which is he is skeptical of the Pentagon assessment on this. But he's doing it anyways because it seems like the least bad option. The devotees of the strike think it will do a lot, will do more. And then additionally, quite critically, they generally don't really seem like they want to stop with Yemen. There's very, very few people that are like, this is the biggest issue in the world. We need to do regime change in Yemen. You don't hear that, right? You hear what? Iran. Everybody is pulling their punches on this. What do you mean? Play that out a little bit more. What do you mean everybody's pulling their punches? I think it makes it look like Biden. Okay. I don't mean to make everything sound like it's just this cruel selfish calculus is going in. Like they're very well-meaning people. I mean, I'm a libertarian. You could convince me that politicians are involved in selfish calculuses that aren't actually for the betterment of anyone, right? Like that's not... I think Biden is in a pincer motion in the Democratic Party. If he abandons his establishment wing on Israel, he is going to fundraise poorly and risks losing like a lot of rich people to third parties not voting or even to Trump if he played his guard right. He completely stiff arms the left wing of his base, which is increasingly just openly anti-Israel, he risks turnout problems. So attacking a low-grade ally of the Palestinians in a way that probably won't result in intense escalation with Iran probably seems like the least bad option if you're just looking at the five feet in front of you on the road. Yeah. What about if you were looking at more than the five feet in front of you out on the road? Yeah. If you want regime change in Iran, then you want as much U.S. attacks on Iranian alleged proxies as possible, including it's starting with Yemen. So if you hit Yemen, then maybe Hezbollah... Okay, so like Hezbollah has been pretty careful. I hate to say this of like an Islamic militant group, but they've like not done that much, right? They have not given Netanyahu pretext to start a war with Lebanon. It's like the northern border has just been sort of simmering ever since roughly October 7th. I mean, it was obviously simmering a little bit before then, frankly, but they haven't really done anything provocative enough to warrant much other than basically what is it 100,000 or 200,000 Israelis being sort of, you know, deciding to move out of that area. But beyond that, there hasn't been like a single explosive day where it's like, oh, this is really reaching a boiling point. No, another world can change on a day like you did on October 7th. Yeah, go ahead. Well, I was gonna say that that's perhaps why there's been some backlash to what Biden is doing here, you know, without getting authorization from Congress. I think he sent them like one letter afterwards, but no signs of bothering with congressional approval for any of this. And there's been, you know, that's not surprising at this point. Yeah, I mean, when did presidents ever bother with congressional approval for war? Yeah, it's so past that. Yeah, come on. There's been, you know, some tweets from both people in his party and, you know, the Mike Lee's of the world saying, you know, you need to, you know, run this by us. There was a letter sent by four senators from different parties. But yeah, there is, to Liz's point there, it's like, will this make, I appreciate the pushback, especially when people are going against their own party, but how likely is any of this to actually amount to any action to restrain Biden or, you know, Congress reasserting some sort of primacy in this question? Yeah, not from the left wing. I mean, the, I mean, the, yeah, I mean, one could really only imagine it in a Republican context. But again, the Republicans themselves are divided. Like, you know, there's not enough Republican senators, like, it's hard to see the votes on it. But like, yeah, I mean, the asserting congressional authority stuff has been mostly from the Republicans so far. Although I mean, like, you know, like, the only, I mean, if you believe this, you know, advanced argument we put up on the site yesterday, like, we actually did have an assertion of a congressional authority in embryonic form, which is this supplemental, which looks DOA in the House, but, you know, he's probably poised to go out of the Senate is would make it, you know, impossible for Trump to leave or any future president to leave NATO. So that is actually an escalation of congressional authority is just to keep the global system going for you. It's the opposite of the spirit of what you're doing. Right, right. I mean, how much credence do you give to that JD Vance argument? I saw him circulating that and Rand Paul also circulating it saying my understand my interpretation of it was there saying that it's it's committing, let's say Trump wins in 2024, because the funding for Ukraine is scheduled to go through 2025. Then if Trump were to broker some kind of end to the Ukraine, Russia war and and the funding that that would somehow be illegal or impeachment or they didn't quite add up to me. But I like is is there anything of substance there in your opinion? Yeah, there is. I mean, like, I think it like if Trump were to try to negotiate or to try to change the US relationship with NATO, then it would be lawsuits and probably a Supreme Court case number one, if this pass, which I might will, but if it does. And then secondly, it doesn't really matter if we think any of this is silly. If the Democrats have the house, they're probably going to peace Trump again, if he's the president. And it's not, I mean, it's not unimaginable that Trump can win the presidency and the Democrats take the house that the Republican margin is like three house seats. And like, people forget where these house seats came from, like they won like in like New York State, the Santos seat Southern California, right? Like, I actually think that's like the story. Well, the thing that many people have talked about is like that it's the states that are a little bit more embattled. But then a lot of things that are sort of just regarded states that are regarded as these, you know, just solid Democrats strongholds, they're sort of the ones that the modern Democratic Party has really neglected. And so like, you know, I live in New York, there's not very much focus on New York and bolstering sort of like Democratic support here. And so to some degree, it's like, well, you know, you're really seeing this sort of slow, steady trickling off of some of these congressional seats. Is that correct? No, I think for sure. I mean, it's sort of a different topic. What I'll say about it is that I think that's a very, very real dynamic. I'm not sure with the Trump focus of this year, that it's going to be a big deal. Although who knows, 2022 was it was a surprising election. I mean, my basic view is my cut is everybody thinks that 2022 election was was the Trump election. And he lost. And so he's a loser. My view is actually that it was it was the census election. And by the way, the Republicans won the popular vote in 2022. It was just it was that that was the anti woke election. It's just that the popular vote was poorly distributed. So where did the Republican message that the US culture is off the rails resonate more? Actually, it had some sympathy in Southern California and New York state. And then in these purple states where things are perhaps more moderate, Arizona, Virginia, they try to win three congressional seats, Georgia, it's like, what are you talking about? Woke, woke, woke, woke, woke, woke. Well, woke, woke, woke, woke, woke, woke is not so much a joke on Long Island. But it sounded insane in Northern Virginia. You know, on that issue on the NATO issue, this I'm curious where you what you think let's say things do head in that direction, and that there's a sort of re balancing of responsibilities within NATO. Maybe I don't know that the US is going to be leaving NATO, but maybe, you know, not kicking in so much anymore. I mean, it's indisputable that like, like here's a graph of the defense expenditure, a share of GDP among the NATO countries, way over there on the left, you've got the US and recently Greece contributing above the recommended 2% of their share of GDP. And everyone out, you know, most of the other countries are well below what NATO says they should be kicking in for their own self defense. In Greece, it's not monopoly money anyway. So it's not like it's actually. Yeah, unfortunately, the Greek contribution is going to be not kind of interesting story. I'd actually like to read about that, but it's not going to make a break it. And then the other ones you it's not to make you I don't know if you can go back, but the other ones are the UK and the Baltics. So this is what I was talking about in terms of like what what kind of cold. Yeah, so like Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, these are the uber Russia hawks in the UK. So like, that's basically it. And then once you get into the under like, okay, Croatia Balkans were always ambiguous a little bit on Russia, depending assuming you have Bosnia, you know, France, they're like, you know, always can go either way. You get the point. Yep, exactly. And then this is, you know, showing the this is just another way to visualize that the share of the Alliance defense expenditure on the right there, the US 70%. So I mean, there's, you know, if this were to change, what do you think that would mean for the world? Like how would what would be some of the major shifts that you would expect to see? Because I assume it's something you you would like to see. If the US amends his relationship or if the US US says we're not going to we're not going to be covering 70% of the bill anymore. Then I think that it won't be as radical as people think. I think that the NATO will be less financed that other countries will actually step up. I actually do think Trump sort of, you know, New York Mafia so ways on this like are actually pretty effective, like at least they're more effective than the status Guanty. And then I think the major contribution of NATO is Article 5. So who will be stepping up? I presume it's not Latvia, right? Who are the people who can step up? Yeah, I mean, we have UK, we have Germany, but like realistically, how will that gap be made up for? Well, I don't know if the gap will be made up for in terms of all the money. My view is that why is NATO important? NATO is important because of Article 5. The US is treaty bound to defend any NATO member from an invasion. Everything else is conversation. Like in my view is NATO could be halved and there wouldn't be a functional distinction. Now, people who don't have that view would say that means Ukraine is doomed, but Ukraine is not a NATO. And so for the NATO parties, it is the US guarantor. That's it. In terms of like who could make up some of the gap in my truncated NATO in terms of the financing, clearly the Germans, clearly the French, clearly the Italians. Are you concerned about, like play it out for me, a Biden reelection and what this means for NATO and what this means for Ukraine funding and or, you know, the war effort there versus a Trump election? Like play it out for me in the shortest possible version of it. The Biden reelection somehow feels like less fathomable than the Trump reelection. Yeah, right. It feels weirder, right? Like it's just, it's like, what are we going to do? But I think if Biden is reelected, I think it's possible that, as mentioned, the Democrats will take the House. I think the Republicans are going to take the Senate, potentially by a lot, actually. Who knows? They have a quite a travel record of not delivering on that. But, and I think they'll take it as this, you know, grand moral indication. And I think that they'll get another eight packers through. And but who knows, that also assumes that my armistice doesn't happen and doesn't keep. Yeah. So. But then what about the Trump, like alternate reality? What about the events? Oh, I mean, I plead game changer. I mean, I think I don't think it's like Trump is going to sit down and just give Ukraine away. Yeah. I mean, I think you have seen consistently that the Trump is more hawkish than people in the panic mode thought he would be. But I think, I mean, I mean, you could look my basic view is like this stuff is intractable without either a de facto or a de jure recognition that Russia is going to have control of parts of Ukraine. Like, like Russia has been in charge of Crimea for a decade. And so much of the discussion of this we are tongue tied on because we have to pretend like the Ukrainians are going to retake it. And so a president that doesn't really care about those niceties actually could go a long way to to appropriate peace. I want to ask you briefly before we wrap about Tucker Carlson's sort of interesting tour throughout, you know, Moscow and now the Middle East. He basically sat down with, you know, Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. I suppose last week. It was kind of an interesting interview in some ways, though I was somewhat disappointed. There was a lot of him, you know, talking up what an impressive journalist he is without necessarily discovering, you know, much new terrain with Putin. I mean, Putin, it's sort of clear some of his justifications for those who care to look as to, you know, why he believes it is permissible for him to be making a claim of Ukraine. I didn't feel like Carlson really got to a new place in that interview. But then the thing that has been interesting to me is Carlson's sort of fawning comments about Moscow and Putin's leadership and the quality of these these vast cities that he has now spent some time in. He was making comments in a speech in Dubai with an Egyptian journalist and, you know, lots of people. It's it's sort of an interesting moment because it's almost like Carlson is using his interaction with Putin in his experience in Moscow to make the case of American cities are total shitholes and it's, you know, really via, you know, these authoritarians have an awful lot to be proud of. I'm surprised by the reception. This is getting on a lot of the right. I see these tradeoffs as totally impermissible, right? Like I don't want Lee Kuan Yew in charge. I don't want Vladimir Putin in charge. What do you make of this ascendant view on the right? Is this just a reaction to liking that Tucker Carlson sat down with Putin at all? What does this mean? I'm not sure Carlson is advocating for authoritarianism. So I'm not sure he's making the the Lee Kuan Yew argument. I think what he's arguing is is that is that Russia invests in its own country. And if the US invested in his own country and didn't have, I think he goes back to the clip. So he's saying like we need more public works projects like what exactly I think this is part of the problem with Carlson is that it feels like a war shock where it's kind of like you can see what you want to see, but there's a he's wholly imprecise in his comments and the specific thing that he wants changed about American cities. Well, I mean, he's a journalist, not a politician at least yet. So I mean, I think these are these are observations and gripes more than a platform. But I think based on what he said and based my understanding of his of his views, like you don't need public works projects to not have crime. Like I think we had cleaner subways in New York in the 90s. And the if the US political capital was focused on that and not on Yemeni pirates, we might get somewhere. This is the argument. This is the fundamental argument that Rand Paul was making in that clip we played at the beginning, where, you know, that you're hearing more and more from the the Rand Paul's and the JD Vance's that why are we sending all this money to Ukraine when we have all these problems on the border, people are living paycheck to paycheck. Do you think that is an effective message? And like are these things necessarily like how how linked are they in actuality like border security and whatever, you know, how much how many millions of dollars we give to Ukraine? Yeah, I think it's very effective. And I think I think it's way more linked than people like to think. I mean, the US could militarize the border. I mean, I mean, look, I'm not it is a 2000 mile long border. It is not a joke to secure it. But I don't think it is beyond US capability. And you certainly can't make the case that the US has tried as hard as it can, while maintaining this global empire of dubious utility to the average American. I think part of my frustration or concern is that I see the connection between quality of life issues in American cities and, you know, federal government authorizing foreign expenditures like, you know, aid abroad as I mean, these are just kind of entirely different levels of government, right? Like to some degree, you're attempting to say, you know, the US needs to Congress needs to rein in, you know, its authorization of, you know, aid packages directed toward Ukraine or Israel or what have you. And you're also saying Eric Adams needs to do something specific in terms of like, you know, improving NYPD patrol of subways, right? We're just talking about entirely different levels of government and different voters, different politicians, like it feels a little bit like these aren't apples to apples comparisons to me. Well, yeah, okay, I think that's fair. But I think Carlson is somebody who comes from the, you know, the media business. And I think what he would see is that it matters what Americans are talking about. And so yeah, we don't want to be embarrassed of our country. We don't want to be embarrassed and then be traveling abroad and fuel a sense of like, wow, do they have a set an almost like pride of ownership type thing? The US is spending 30 years talking about the conditions that we have to improve abroad. Meanwhile, the amount of aerospace that is given to the shape of Ohio, or the Bronx, is pretty limited nationally or national space. I think that's really what he's kind of talking about. I'm not sure he's recommending a works projects, progress administration for for for for Brooklyn. But like, you know, I'm, I hope that's not the case. I do sometimes worry the way that I hear some of the national conservatives talking about this stuff that there is a, you know, even your your comments about, you know, militarizing the border, it's always like, okay, we can't use our personnel and our toys are all our military toys overseas. So we're going to somehow like turn all that stuff internal. And we have to like spend all this money on infrastructure here. I don't know, like, I guess that's the, you know, where the libertarians bristle against the national conservatives, even if we ultimately agree that our our global military presence is way overextended and inappropriately used. Yeah, but I mean, I do think that functionally, though, this is due respect to a lot of people that we all know. It's a little pie in the sky. Like, what like, what is the next Republican administration going to do? Like, what is like the what is like the most guaranteed piece of legislation that Trump's going to get through? What is it? I don't know. What is it? You see a J extension, they're going to extend the Trump tax cuts. Yeah, this is the one thing they're for sure going to do. Right. And then if they like it, and if they executive action, the border, like, I mean, you have to make a libertarian case for open borders effectively. And I know you probably have people in your Milu that will make the case. But I don't think that's going to be like, you know, a watchman episode or whatever. I think we should have you back on sometime in the future to argue about open borders and border processing capacity. Kurt Mills, it has been an absolute delight. Thank you so much for speaking with reason. Great. Yeah. Thank you. Thanks for listening to Just Asking Questions. These conversations appear on Reason's YouTube channel and the Just Asking Questions podcast feed every Thursday. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts and please rate and review the show.