 Hello, my name is Nicola Rosenblum and I am the Deputy Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University. I acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which the college is located, the Ngunnawal and Nambri people, and pay my respects to their elders past, present and emerging. In September 2021, the European Union launched its EU Indo-Pacific strategy as an acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region to global affairs. On 25 May 2022, the National Security College, in partnership with the European delegation of the European Union and the Embassy of France in Canberra, hosted the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy Forum. The event explored the rationale behind the strategy, how the EU has gone about implementing the strategy and what more is still to come, and some responses from the region, from within Australia and beyond. In this video, we provide highlights from the forum, including remarks from High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr. Josep Borrell-Fontels, a keynote speech by Mr. Gabriel Vasenten, the European Union's Special Envoy for Indo-Pacific, and a question and answer session with Mr. Vasenten, led by Professor Rory Mandkaaf, Head of the National Security College. I hope you enjoyed the video. Welcome to the Indo-Pacific Conference, organized by the National Security College at the Australian National University, together with the French Embassy and the European Union delegation to Australia. I've been told that this conference is being held on the traditional lens of the Nunagual people of the Canberra region, and I wish to pay my respect to the elders past, to their present and to their future, as well to all other Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people being represented here today. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific region is of key strategic importance, both in geoeconomic and geopolitical terms. Our engagement here is not new. In addition to being present with our outer reservations and countries, the European Union is also the top investor, the leading development corporation provider, and one of the biggest trading partners in the Indo-Pacific. Together, the Indo-Pacific and Europe hold over 70% of the global trade and over 60% of foreign direct investment flows. Europe's own future is closely linked to a stable and secure Indo-Pacific. The increasing tensions in the South and East China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait all have an impact on European security and prosperity. For all these reasons, the European Union step up its strategic engagement with the region last year, with the option of the Indo-Pacific strategy elevating it to the top priorities of Europe's foreign and security policy. Through this strategy, the European Union aims to contribute to the stability, to the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region by promoting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and international law. These are part of our ADN. This characterizes European identity. And this commitment is inclusive for all partners, for all of them who wish to cooperate with us based on shared principles, values, or mutual interests. Yes, values and interests, both have to be taken into consideration. I am often asked, the European Union can handle the war in Ukraine and focus on the Indo-Pacific at the same time. And my answer is yes, yes. In the wake of the war in our borders, our strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific is still more relevant, more relevant than ever. It is in our interest to maintain a free, open Pacific for all. And vice versa. Australia and other line-minded partners in the region are standing up together with us all together in the defense of international law with the United Nations Charter at its core, while contributing to the efforts to support Ukraine and bring this war to an end. The current environment sends a strong signal that we need to do more for peace and stability. Peace and stability are being threatened today more than ever since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, alongside the strategy, the European Union has also endorsed the common strategic course of action for security and defense, known as the strategic compass, signaling our ambition to become a more active security actor. One example includes the launching of a coordinated European maritime presence to the northwest Indian Ocean. At the same time, we aim to diversify our trade and investment ties, not just our trade and investment, but when trade and investment links our ties on the economic field, accelerating the green and digital transition and spur innovation and connectivity. We will engage with the Indo-Pacific partners to build a more resilient and sustainable global value chains. The pandemic has shown that these global value chains are too weak and too long, maybe. This entails concluding trade talks in the region and expanding the network of digital partnership. Our global gateway strategy, adopted last year, will feed into these priorities, boosting green, modern and resilient investments for sustainable connectivity from infrastructure to regulatory frameworks. Finally, we all must fight, mitigate and adapt to climate change, counter that biodiversity losses and environmental pollution and strengthen ocean governance, all distinct and particularly important in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, our agenda is broad, ambitious and forward-looking, and we look forward to working with Australia to advance our joint objectives of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. That is why I wish this conference in Canberra every success and we would like a lot to be there with you, but today the plasma and the telecommunications allow us to be together even if we are very far away. Thanks to all of you. Good work. And now we have with us all the way from Brussels, Mr Gabriel Vincentin, the European Union's special envoy for the Indo-Pacific. He took up this role in September last year with the announcement of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Mr Vincentin. Thank you very much. It's always risky to talk about the big boss, but I hope I can manage. Anyhow, so thanks a lot for being here today. And before I get started with my speech, I want to acknowledge that this conference is being held on the traditional lands of the Nowal people of the Canberra region and pay my respect to their elders past, present and emerging. So I am honored to take part in today's conference to present the EU's strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. And it is a huge privilege to do this at the world-renowned National Security College of the Australian National University. I would particularly like to thank His Excellency, the Ambassador of France, Jean-Pierre Thibault, for organizing this event together with the EU delegation. And of course, Professor Rory McDolph for providing this prestigious platform. Your outstanding research on the rise and evolution of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic space continues to inspire debate within and without Europe among experts, academics and policymakers alike. This meaningful event, however, takes place amid somber circumstances unraveling at Europe's doorsteps. Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the blatant violation of the principles and rules enshrined in the UN Charter deeply affect Europe and the world. The EU is grateful for the diplomatic and political support offered by Australia in joining the condemnation of Russia's aggressions at the UN General Assembly, the sanctioned coalition against Moscow, and for the overall support offered to Ukraine. Russia's attack to the core of the rules-based multinational order underlines how this glaring unlawful violation of a country's sovereignty requires increasing efforts to sustain the rules and principles of the rules-based multinational order. Even before the war in Ukraine, our stakes in the Indo-Pacific were as high as ever. This is the region that produces 60% of global GDP and two-thirds of the pre-pandemic growth. This is the region where demand for green and digital infrastructure is growing exponentially. This is the region where peace, stability, and freedom of navigation are threatened by a host of flashpoints from the East and South China Seas to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The EU plays a prominent role in the region. It is the largest global investor with a total stock of $11.6 trillion compared to US $6.8 trillion, China $1.9 trillion, and Japan $1.5 trillion in terms of FDIs, of course. And we should not forget that the EU is also a resident actor in the Indo-Pacific region with more than 1.6 million EU resident citizens on EU soil. And I'm sure that you, Mr Ambassador, will allow to consider the French citizens as European citizens. Thank you. Thank you. Which, by the way, makes the EU and Australia direct neighbors. So, it is in this context that we have, the EU has launched its Indo-Pacific strategy in September 2021. But I would like to remind you that this is the end of a process which has started with the three member states' engagement in the Indo-Pacific and publication of their national strategies for the Indo-Pacific, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. These three countries, through their work, put on the table the issue of the overall EU's engagement in the Indo-Pacific, which then provoked the adoption of conclusions on the Indo-Pacific by the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU in April 2021, which also tasked the commission and the high representative to issue a comprehensive policy towards the Indo-Pacific. And this is the joint communication we are talking about when we talk about the adoption of the strategy of September. So, I would like to underline that the September communication is the end of a process which has been started by member states, some member states, but which has been then adopted by all 27 member states. And as Ambassador Dottoboeu said it, it was then endorsed by the level of heads of government and state. So, I would like to underline that EU is totally united and committed to this policy towards the Indo-Pacific. So, why have we adopted this new political framework? Because, of course, due to its growing interest and stakes in the Indo-Pacific and having crucial geopolitical and economic interest in the stability and security of the region, the EU has reaffirmed its commitment to promote, as the high representative said, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and international law in the region, while building strong and lasting partnerships. And Anand Devo, which in the last weeks has acquired increased urgency. It is important to stress that the EU's approach to the Indo-Pacific region is one of cooperation and not confrontation. Our commitment to engage is indeed inclusive of all partners who wish to cooperate with us. Our cooperation will be based on shared values and principles, as well as our interests, as Borrell said. This was also reiterated at the Indo-Pacific Ministerial Forum of February 2022 in Paris. The forum was the first ever which was held in person and focused on the EU Indo-Pacific strategy, co-hosted by H.R.B.P. Borrell and French Foreign Minister Le Drian, representing the European Union's presidency. This event testified the huge interest by partners to the EU's involvement in the region. And the Paris forum showed a clear support from Indo-Pacific partners in the region to the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy. Over 60 participants traveled to Paris and reiterated their common commitment to work together, amongst themselves and with the EU, for the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. And I would like to underline how the EU sees this as a possible, as Minister Le Drian said, method the work in method for the EU to engage with its Indo-Pacific partners. So we foresee to have other ministerial fora in the future along the various precedences succeeding. And in this regard, I would like also to underline how the EU genuinely welcomed the participation of the Australian Foreign Minister Payne at the Paris forum. The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific plays to the strengths of the EU and highlights seven priority areas for action. Sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defense, and human security. Don't be afraid, I will not spell all them out, I will just highlight the main avenues for cooperation. So on sustainable and inclusive priority, the EU of course promotes free access to open markets and a sustainable trading environment. At the same time, it seeks to diversify its trade and investment ties by finalizing trade negotiations with partners in the region. New Zealand, Indonesia are obvious examples with the relaunch of negotiations with India as it was announced during President von der Leyen's visit to Delhi last month. So we will engage with Indo-Pacific partners to build more resilient and sustainable global value chains by diversifying our trade and economic relations and by developing technological standards and regulations that are in line with our values and principle. Of course, I talk about FTA and in this regard, we aim to complete the free trade negotiations with Australia, not least because the EU represented Australia's second largest trading partner in 2020 and total trading goods accounted for 36 billion while trading services added another 26 billion in the year before. The EU was also Australia's second largest source of foreign direct investment in 2020 and we in the EU were the third largest market for Australian investment abroad. So these numbers speak for themselves. Building on the existing trade links will benefit us all and we will be looking forward to engaging with a new Australian government ahead of the next 13th round of negotiations on the FTA to be held in Brussels later this year. But of course, that is not the only FTA on the EU's wish list in the Indo-Pacific as you can read in the Indo-Pacific strategy. We are equally committed to completing the negotiations with New Zealand and Indonesia. We will also resume trade negotiations and starting investment negotiations with India and we will assess the possible resumption of trade negotiations when conditions allow or should conditions allow with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. On green transition ocean governance, one could say that as a global leader in climate action, the EU will continue to lead international efforts to address environmental challenges and will sustain partners in the adoption of more sustainable development pathways. At the Paris Ministerial Forum, once again, we announced a number of concrete initiatives that will keep us busy in the coming months. The Green-Blue Alliance for the Pacific, a team-Europe initiative with huge transformational potential towards a low-carbon future by 2050, which covers 18 Pacific countries and territories. The ASEAN Green-Team-Europe initiative, which tackles the climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss. The addition of 6 million euros to the European contribution to the Kiwa initiative for climate change adaptation and biodiversity conservation in the Pacific. And the EU membership to the North Pacific Fisheries Commission to promote the sustainable management of fish stocks and combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. On digital governance and partnership, the EU is seeking to weave a network of digital partnerships to advance digital connectivity and promote technological standards that reflect our democratic and human-centered values. At an initial stage, the EU proposes to explore the launch of negotiations with Japan, South Korea and Singapore. On 12th May, the EU and Japan leaders launched the EU-Japan digital partnership to advance cooperation on a wide range of digital issues and to help ensure a successful digital transformation able to deliver solidarity, prosperity and sustainability. In February at the Paris Forum, we announced also the adoption of a joint declaration between the EU and nine Indo-Pacific countries on privacy and the protection of personal data. We also announced the launch of negotiations of EU's digital partnerships with Japan, South Korea and Singapore. Lastly, we announced the launch of the Asia-Pacific branch of the Digital for Development Hub, a platform which brings together European and regional governments, the European Investment Bank, the private sector and the civil society. On connectivity, the EU will promote the enhancement of connectivity with partners on all levels. To this end, it launched the Global Gateway Initiative in December, past last year, which explains the EU's way to connectivity, which in one word is based on the bankability, i.e. the long-term financial sustainability of projects, which comprises a mix of grants and loans and involves the private sector in terms also of private financial institutions. So while feeding into the priorities for our Indo-Pacific strategy and with a Team Europe approach, which means EU institutions, member states, private actors and financial institutions, the Global Gateway will aim at boosting green, sustainable, transparent and high-quality infrastructure investments and regulatory frameworks. And on this, I would like to underline the work which is ongoing in the G20 and G7 frameworks, which is of high relevance. The overall envelope of Global Gateway, as the commission stated in its document, should reach the €300 billion magnitude. But it's not assigned on a regional basis. It's an overall envelope which then has to be assigned according to the projects. In addition to the Global Gateways, we will promote sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity, which includes health infrastructure and people-to-people connectivity with additional bilateral programs, which will be worth around €2.3 billion. And our regional and thematic programs will also contribute additional resources. It's important to note also that for us connectivity means also people-to-people connectivity. And again in Paris, we took note of the finalization of the comprehensive air transport agreement between the EU and Asian countries, which is very relevant and it's the first of its kind. And we laid out the implementation steps of the Cata, but we will see it depends on the Asian institutional crisis to find the way to finally assign it at ministerial level. But this will be the very first important step in people-to-people connectivity in the region. On security, the EU has an obvious, obvious crucial geopolitical and economic interest in stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region, and a clear interest that the Indo-Pacific remains free and open and maintains the current status quo. The 40%, I say 40% of the global trade towards the EU passes through the Indo-Pacific, and already this number speaks for by itself. The EU will also seek to promote a rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity building, and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific. As the high representative said, in February, it was announced the extension of the concept of a coordinated maritime presence to the northwest Indian Ocean. This extension would allow the optimization of the use of assets that EU member states are deploying in the region, while facilitating exchange of information and enhancing maritime situational awareness. The EU military naval mission, which is called Operation Atalanta, has conducted successful joint naval activities with Indo-Pacific partners, and the EU will seek to conduct more joint exercises and port calls with Indo-Pacific partners, including through multilateral exercises to fight piracy and protect freedom of navigation, while at the same time reinforcing the EU naval diplomacy in the region. And allow me to say how a joint exercise with the Australian Navy would be important in this respect and the great political impact that this would have also bearing into account what is happening in Ukraine and Russia. The EU will intensify also its dialogues with partners on security and defense, including counterterrorism and cyber security. The EU will also support Indo-Pacific partners capacity to ensure maritime security, and in the era of cyber security, the EU will strengthen capacity building for partners to tackle cyber crime. The EU will also step up activities with partners under the project EZWA, which is wide known in the region. It stands for enhancing security cooperation in and with Asia. And this project covers counterterrorism, cyber security, maritime security, and crisis management. And the pilot partners for this project are Indonesia, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. The EU will also continue to implement its program to promote regional maritime security for the partners of the West Indian Ocean, and also seek to extend its SEA awareness project, CRIMARIO, to the Pacific Ocean. And the talks with the Australian authorities on this are very well advanced. So, to conclude, our commitment, the EU's commitment to the stability, security, prosperity, status quo of the Indo-Pacific is stronger than ever. Today's challenges have given us additional strength and resolve to face future. We therefore look forward to cooperating with like-minded partners of which Australia is at the forefront. And we will work to advance our respective interests, tackle common challenges, and protect our values embedded in the rules-based multilateral order. In one word, and this will align us totally with Australia, the motto will be to cooperate whenever possible, but to protect whenever necessary. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Vicentin. And I just asked Professor Medkaf to accompany you over for a few questions. Sorry, we're going to start off with a bit of a fireside chat, and then there'll be an opportunity for the audience to ask some questions as well. I was struck in particular by the, I guess the scale of ambition and the aims there, extending beyond narrow conceptions of the region. That focus on the Indian Ocean makes a lot of sense in terms of the role that European powers have played in the region for many years now. But looking at Southeast Asia, looking at the Pacific, it's certainly a much bigger canvas. So I'll ask three or four questions, if I may, Ambassador Vicentin and the audience. First question is about geography. So the... Oh my God, you're asking me the capitals? No. So yeah, so it's about the leveraging the geography of the Indo-Pacific for, as you say, the protection and the advancement of those interests and values. It's a big place. And one of the criticisms, certainly, that we've had in this country of our own Indo-Pacific strategy and outlook, and I think others have had it, was we can't do everything. Will we see more EU in the Pacific, for example? And how might you prioritize partnerships within those subregions? Yeah. And the capitals you can name later, if you really want to. Sorry? You can name the capitals afterwards, if you'd like. No, but then you are the professor. You have to ask me and see if I'm able to answer. No, thanks a lot. First of all, it's indeed true that the current tensions are, let's say, have a global impact. And that by definition resources are scarce. But if you allow me to be a little bit self-congratulatory, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the EU is a geopolitical actor, is the biggest and the richest trading block in the world. And therefore, it has the capacities, not only the political will, but the capacities to address global challenges, global issues on the global stage. For example, the morning of the 22nd of February, we had the Paris Indo-Pacific Forum in the morning. And we addressed, and it was a big success. We talked for the first time about all of our Indo-Pacific partners on global issues. But then in the afternoon, there was an extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU to address the Ukrainian crisis. So I say it's more visual than tangible, but it already gives you the idea on how the EU addresses its interest. It's able to do it, it's willing to do it, it has the resources to do it. Now, how to promote partnerships. First of all, our strategy is, allow me to say, a love letter to the region. It says that we want to do more, we want to deepen our relations. It's an offer. It's really an offer. It's a love letter. We love you. And we mean it. You see the various political avenues for cooperation. You see where we want to do more. And I think that it's already the right posturing that the EU has to have for the region and for the partners. But it also takes to tango. This means that we attach great importance to the wills and needs and commitments that come from the Indo-Pacific partners themselves. I mean, our commitments, our lines of actions, our priorities, our budgetary lines are there, are clear. So in my trips around the Indo-Pacific, I am engaging with the local authorities, with the national governments to seek where they see their interest in cooperating with us. Our capacity is to do all of the seven priorities with all our partners. We have also to allow me to use a big word, ownership also from the partners to engage with us. So, yes, the implementation requires efforts from our side. We are very aware of this, bringing together the European institutions and the member states. But then the other side is our partners themselves, who have also to come out. So our talks, for example, with the Australian authorities yesterday were adamantly clear. We met the Foreigner and Trade Affairs Minister. Then we met the Home Affairs. Today I will see the defense. So we will identify avenues for cooperation, but it's not just for the EU. It's also an evolve for the local partners to come out with their wishes. So, thank you. I think I'm reading into that that there's not going to be some kind of strict hierarchy of sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific, where the EU will focus more on the Indian Ocean and less on the Pacific or more on Southeast Asia and less on North Asia. On the contrary, it's an open offer. No, no, it's an open offer, but it's not just a marketing. There is a clear political vision and a geopolitical will. And this is why we don't say that one region is more important than the others. All are different, but all are important in their own kind. And we have a comprehensive strategy for the Indo-Pacific. And this means that all of the regions are integral pillars of our strategy. So we cannot say that Pacific is less important than India. But, of course, there are specificities linked to each of these regions, which then make some actions more relevant than others. For example, the actions on climate change and ocean governance are more important for the Pacific Island states than for the other parts of the Indian oceans, for example. And this is why there will be probably much more of budget on climate change in the Pacific than in the other parts of the Indian Pacific region. And it sounds to me that there's that premium on partnerships that you're emphasizing, which I think is consistent to many of the other Indo-Pacific visions. As you said, that will depend now on which partners pick up the opportunity, which partners come forward with their own engagement. Can I take that point for my second question, please? I already said it and the high rep said it, but I would like to convey once again the message. The EU strategy is open, and its key point is cooperation, not confrontation. So we don't ask our partners to take sites. And this is a really important feature of the EU's engagement in the region. And this is what makes the EU as a credible partner for all of the countries of the region. So I will take that as a cue to a second question, which is about Australia. So among the partners, and we're in Canberra, so among the partners actual or prospective for the EU in the Indo-Pacific, it would be good to hear a bit more about, I know it's early days for a new government, but you already have a sense of where they're going. So some thoughts on what are the EU expectations for Australia as a partner in the Indo-Pacific, and also what I think can be reasonable expectations from Australia on the EU? Well, of course, first of all, we have to say that the like-mindedness of Australia and the EU is practically 100 percent. So we share values which are democracy, which is a multilateral rules-based order, which is a rule of law, which is human rights. So name it. Australia is the 13th, if not the 12th, unfortunately last year, you stepped up by one person, largest economy of the world. And that cannot be forgotten. And we are the biggest economic block. These are things which make us, without saying, the most possible aligned partners. And building on this, we should acknowledge that the EU-Australia relations do not only matter bilaterally. They also matter regionally. And this is why the engagement of the EU with Australia goes well beyond our bilateral relation. I mean, Australia is the regional power. Australia has the unique feature of having both the Indian and the Pacific oceans coastlines. And actually, it's the only country, but okay, it's a bit reduced to call Australia a country. It's a, formally it's a country, but for geographical terms, it's a continent. So that makes it, that makes it adamantly clear that it's a partner, not just bilateral, but for the whole of the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy for us. It's clear. It's a vehicle for regional cooperation as well. So thank you. I think that does point to pretty, in my mind, to quite expansive opportunities in the EU-Australia relationship in the Indo-Pacific, both Australia in its own right and Australia as a partner in the region. My last two questions, I'll combine in order to give more time to maybe questions from the group, and they really turn a little bit more to that, to the challenges ahead. Please, you had an additional point to make. Yes, because I left as last, but I forgot then to mention, you mentioned the new government. Yes. I would like to stress how the engagement goes beyond governments, beyond political parties. It stays on the terms of allies, friends and partners, regardless of the government. There might be governments which bring in policies which align more Australia with the EU's vision, but obviously we are democracies where the will of the people and the results of the elections have to be fully respected. So, yes, there might be differing views amongst the governments, but this has not impeded us to work also with the coalition-led government of Australia in the last year. Of course, the signals that the current new government will put forward policies which are more aligned with the EU's visions above all on climate change. Yes, these are undeniable developments, yes. Thank you. And I think the fact that we are democracies and like-minded in that way, as you pointed out, will lead me to my final question, which goes to some of the challenges ahead. So, I'm going to talk a little bit about China and about the role of, let's say, the non-military instruments of power and leverage. I admire the intent to be focused on cooperation rather than confrontation. But of course, in between those two, there's competition and there is competition and more happening in this region and globally. I think a lot of concerns have been raised about, for example, the China-Russia relationship and how that suggests that this is not simply a relationship of convenience. It's not as if the strategic theatres in the Indo-Pacific and Europe can be quarantined from one another, which you've also pointed out. If and when, let's say, China really does not accept a more cooperative, inclusive approach to regional diplomacy and engagement, if the rules and the values that you've spoken of perhaps increasingly confronted and challenged by an actor in this region, it would be interesting to know how that could change the approach that Europe takes. And I'll connect that to a thought about really economic engagement. The scale of European investment and trade with the region is vast. It's formidable as you've quantified. It's more difficult, though, for us as democracies to direct our economic engagement towards achieving our goals as states or as institutions, to achieving a rules-based order or respect for human rights or non-coercional, whatever it may be. So to wrap all that up, can you please give us a sense of the strategic thinking that you're encountering in the EU about what happens as the strategic environment here gets tougher? What if cooperation does not work? Well, I would say it's already tough enough. But you had a key word in what you just said, which is competition. And I would like to recall what the policy is of the EU's engagements towards China. And this has not changed. First, we engage with China as a partner because it's undoubtful that you need partners to solve global issues. And I'm referring to climate change. So China sided with us on COP26 and it had a very positive spin on these global issues. Then China is a competitor. Definitely, it is a competitor. But in our view, this is not a bad thing per se. A competitor can be a fair competitor or can be an unfair competitor. So as long as China respects the rules of engagement, let's call it like this, international rules of engagement, multilateral rules of engagement, then there's no problem. Issues arise when the rules are not respected. And then finally, on China, we engage, of course, as a rival, where there is no possibility for compromise. So systemic rival means no respect of human rights, no respect of labor rights. And this meant that the EU sanctioned China's entities for what is happening in Xinjiang, in Tibet, or in Hong Kong. And China did not shy away from sanctioning back the European Parliament members of the Committee of Human Rights, as well as the EU member states ambassadors to the political and security committee of the EU, plus various other individuals and many peas. So you have to engage with China according to the themes at stake. And we continue to see the validity of this approach. And it has just been confirmed by our leaders not later than a couple of months ago. So we have to look at China with these three ideas. And of course, it also depends on China on how it acts, whether it's fair or unfair. Thank you very much, Jason Collins from the European Australian Business Council. Thanks very much. Really excellent forum this morning. My question goes to the and Gabrielle, you mentioned the quite extraordinary and stark figures in terms of the amount of investment by Europe in the region. And to your point about the co-investment opportunities for the private sector, obviously, Australia has is a very important actor in terms of the amount of investment that comes from this country into Europe and into the region. Could you perhaps talk a little bit more on the architecture and programs that have been designed and sort of the timeframes that may be involved in terms of setting up the frameworks for the private sector involvement in the sort of projects which are through the global gateway and through other parts of the strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you. Thank you, Jason. I'll take a question at the back there, I think about three rows back on the left. Thank you. Oh, we're doing that. Yes. Good morning again, Gabrielle. The situation in Ukraine... Sorry, can you identify yourself, please? Sorry, Sarah Bass, we can ask from the camera times. Great. The situation in Ukraine with Russia's aggression could be looked at as sort of an example of potentially what could happen, obviously, in the Indo-Pacific region with China and Taiwan. If that were to happen, as has been mentioned by Joe Biden recently as well, I wanted to know how do you think the EU would respond and where its support would lie and also how its relations with Australia might be shaped by an events such as that? Thank you, Sarah. We'll take one more, actually there's one at the back in the middle there and then we'll see how we go for time. Yeah, if you can get through. Thank you. Thanks very much. Thank you, Special Envoy. Jay Caldwell from the Australia Pacific Security College. I just wanted to pick up on your comments in regards to the Pacific Islands. Excuse me, can you say again your name? I did not catch it. Jay Caldwell. Jay, okay. Thank you very much. There's been some unease at times from the Pacific Islands on the idea of the Indo-Pacific partly because it's a strategic concept which there is concern that it pulls towards the security dimensions of relationships and towards that end of competition and potentially confrontation. And the second piece is that it potentially trades them out as a voice in terms of Pacific Islands having a voice into this space. It was great to hear in terms of you all thinking about your engagement and I know you've just been in Fiji so it'd be good to hear in terms of what you're hearing in the reception of the strategy in the Pacific Islands and how you intend to maintain the engagement and voice from the Pacific Islands region. Thank you. Thank you, Jay. Let's take those three. So we've got Jason on the private sector, we've got Sarah on Taiwan from New Ukraine and then Jay on Pacific Islands. Good. So first things first, Justin, thanks a lot. Indeed, the architecture is quite a complex matrix but which differentiates us very much from, for example, bets and rolls. So we also are in, have started an exercise of consultations with the US which comprises as well a chapter on connectivity. So practically the idea is to not to enter in competition with BuildBetBetter or BlueDot but to have a complementary approach to that. Why? Because those two, let's say, or three, BlueDot, B3 and Global Gateways, have the same philosophy, namely involvement of the private sector thanks to the mix of loans and grants. So basically the grants are supposed to chip in these metrics in order to reduce the cost of the loans and to guarantee the investment so that the private sector is encouraged to step in. I make it a little bit, not as sophisticated as I should but it explains a little bit the metrics and the philosophy which is shared also by our American partners and by our Australian partners that I had the occasion to see yesterday with our counterparts here. So it's really a philosophy which inspires the market economies or the social market economies in the case of the EU. But that's exactly the key difference than other schemes for cooperation. So the private sector should be encouraged to participate, guaranteed of its investments and of course in its profits. I want a Ukraine crisis. What happens? Sarah, well, here I have to be diplomatic. I cannot be political as President Biden. So let me say that the EU, again, does not have a federal structure and surely does not have military capacities on its own. The military capacities and assets belong to the member states and the EU is able to deploy military assets, military operation or also civilian operations only if all the member states agree and only if member states contribute with personnel and equipment to those missions. So having said this, of course, I cannot prejudge the future. I cannot say what will happen and I cannot say, let's say we cannot completely say what will happen or which will be the forms under which China might decide to coerce on Taiwan. It's not necessarily an open war. There can be other means for doing it. So this will require an answer which has to be commensurated to the kind of threat or to the kind of negative actions undertaken by China. Of course, what is happening now in response to the Russian aggression shows how the Western liberal democracies or the countries which care for the, allow me to call it multilateral international order react. So it's not necessarily military. It's sanctions. It's humanitarian. It's economic. But there has been a united front to answer to this. So personally, I would see the EU aligning on this as, for example, New Zealand or Australia have done now with the Ukraine crisis. Thank you. And I think it's really useful to bring those non-military dimensions into the crisis, into the hypothetical conversation because a lot of us have been, I think, really struck by the way that Europe has built solidarity, international solidarity on Ukraine and how economic responses have been so important. The last question, Jay, you had a question on the Pacific. So any reflections on how the EU strategy is being received in the Pacific and what we can do to bring Pacific Island countries on this journey? No, actually, it has been obviously very well received because it's a sign of attention to the Pacific Islands and all the chapters of the strategy which talk about ocean governance and climate change are absolutely very, very close to the heart of the Pacific Island states. I visited Fiji, so I had the bilateral talks with the Fijian government, but above all, I visited the multilateral organization which are based in Fiji, so the PIF and the SPC. So the real vehicle is, of course, bilaterally with each of these states, but the greatest opportunity for engaging with all of them is through their multinational organizations. And, of course, we see them as key partners for us, PIF in its own good. For example, I would like to underline, maybe you might recall the opening speech of the Fijian Prime Minister at COP26 in Edinburgh where he acknowledged, as he was talking also as peace president, he was acknowledging the great investment and great support that the Pacific Island state had received from the EU to counter the climate change and to fight the rise of the oceans. It was already a knowledge from the opening of COP26 and, of course, we will continue in the preparation of COP27. But, yes, I had just a positive reaction. Of course, I also had to reassure, as it happened also here, that Indo-Pacific does not mean that there is more for the Indo and less for the Pacific. I explained that both equally matter to us. And, of course, that the line of actions and the line of attention that the EU has towards the Pacific and the Pacific Island states remain unchanged. Thank you. Maybe there are moments when we can call it Pacific Indo, but I think that's a really useful message about the role of the EU in building that sense of inclusion with our Pacific friends. Thank you.