 Mark, you've got a new paper out today on trade and the G20. I'm just wondering if you can give us a bit of a status update on what's going on with trade at the moment and particularly the multilateral system that's, I guess, governing trade around the world. Sure. I mean, it's a real mixed story. So on the one hand, if you sort of look at what's happening with world trade growth, it's pretty disappointing. I mean, last year it was about 2%, which is well below trend, sluggish this year too. WTO economists, when they look at this, say, actually there may be a break that we're now growing at a much slower pace than we're used to in world trade. So that's kind of the bad news. The good news, though, is that it's growing, that you have this sort of inbuilt robustness in world trade. So it keeps on going. At the height of the global financial crisis, we saw trade falling in a rate that was bigger even than in the 1930s Great Depression. And at that point, you might have got really pessimistic about globalization, about where trade was going. But it's bounced back. And we're sort of back on that long run story of global integration. So on the trade story itself, glass half full, glass half empty, when you get to the multilateral system, though, the story starts to get less half full and a bit more depressing actually. What about the rules that govern trade? We used to read about it all the time in the headlines, lots of protesters talking about the trade negotiations that were happening. Why don't we hear about that anymore? Yeah, you're right. I mean, once upon a time, the WTO is the great Satan of globalization. You could mobilize thousands of people onto the streets in protest. Now you mentioned the WTO or the Doha round. You probably get a yawn if you're lucky. What's gone wrong? I mean, a bunch of things. Doha itself is part of the problem. You know, this is a trade round that was launched back in 2001 and that has gone nowhere since. You know, we've had these periodic times where we thought we were going to get a breakthrough where maybe the trade round was going to get completed and it's kind of lapsed back into nothing. And each time that the policymakers promise, you know, we're going to do it this year, it's going to be completed. And then they fail to deliver. You know, the level of expectation goes down, the cynicism goes up. So Doha is a big part of the problem. So in your paper, you talk about specifically what the G20 should be doing something about Doha. What is that? Well, it's a tough one. I mean, what I've said in the paper is that, you know, it's almost time for a kilo-cure moment. And this is sort of a, you know, it's a pretty bold call because no one wants to sort of draw an end to Doha, if you like. No one wants to have the blood of a trade round on their hands. So the idea is that we have this process where it kind of keeps rolling forward and we dumb down the ambition, we define down what a success is. We say, well, we'll try and get something out of Doha. But we've been doing that for several years, too. And the sort of, even the definition of success has got really small. And we still can't get a deal. So one of the things that the paper suggests that we should do is we should say, right, we'll look at what happens in the next WTO ministerial, which is in Bali in December this year, and we'll make an assessment. Are we actually ever going to get a deal? Even a really small deal? Are we going to get one? Or if not, then for goodness sake, call an end to the farce and we'll just say, we'll admit to the world it's just not doable. We're not going to get one. And G20 as a group will say, this is bad. We should have got a deal. But we can't. It's time for us to move on and look for something else. We set a kill or complete deadline. If we're not going to do it by a certain date, we move on. Otherwise, you have this situation that we've had in the past. The WTO sort of trundles on trying to do Doha and what he sort of waits for it to happen. Nothing really comes along. The G20 each year makes a sort of a promise which gets vaguer every year saying, yeah, we'll try. We'll try. And after a while, as we found, people stopped listening. And that's bad for the credibility of the WTO, bad for the credibility of the G20, and bad for the global training system. And why do you sort of put so much emphasis in your paper on that trade should be at the center of the G20's agenda? Well, the G20 has this commitment to delivering strong, sustainable, balanced growth. Basically, if you think about what the G20 needs to do, it needs to get the global economy growing. It needs to generate growth, and it needs to generate jobs and employment for the people in G20 member economies. To do that, it's very hard to see how you do that without a successful trading system. I mean, trade is sort of the heart of the development process, at the heart of the growth process. Trade gives you productivity gains. It gives you stimulus. It keeps economies integrated and working together. Look, you might get all of that without a working multinatural system. You might get that without a successful WTO, but it's that much harder without it. In a sense, if you decide that you're going to go ahead and sort of push on with the G20 objectives and say, but we'll sort of let the trading system take care of itself, you're taking a very big, very risky bet. And it's the kind of big and risky bet that an organization like G20 should be set up to avoid taking. Great. Mark, thanks for talking with me. Thank you.