 Well, let me begin by saying good morning, and on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Polish Institute for International Affairs in partnership with the Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, and the Bertelsmann Foundation. We are delighted to welcome you here to CSIS on a very cold morning. It's wonderful to see so many smiling faces. Probably most of those smiles are frozen in place from when you walked to the Metro, but we are indeed very glad that you are here. My name is Heather Conley. I'm director and senior fellow of the Europe Program. And before we begin our program, I wanted to take a moment, if I could, to pause and reflect on the life of one of America's most distinguished diplomats and statesmen who touched many people in this room personally and professionally. Ambassador Holbrook was an amazing figure for European security, serving as U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and certainly 15 years ago today, his historical role in the Dayton Peace Accord. And I think we all join in sharing our condolences with Ambassador Holbrook's family, his larger family at the State Department, many of whom are here this morning, as well as our broader U.S. government family. And we certainly are very saddened by this loss. The idea behind this morning's conversation, this trilateral conversation, we've really looked back over the last year and a half and have seen significant policy movement within the space of the transatlantic relationship with Russia. As we near the two-year anniversary, Vice President Biden went to Munich to announce the U.S.-Russia reset policy. We've seen extensive engagement with the German leadership, certainly under Chancellor Merkel's leadership, extensive engagement with the leadership of Russia that touches upon the economic sphere and the security sphere of relations. And clearly, Poland probably has had the most dramatic change in its relationship and its policy towards Russia. In part, as President Medvedev said last week in Moscow because of Russia's cleaning up of its historical debris. But I think also this enormous policy shift has occurred because of, quite frankly, I think we, someone has a microphone, do you have a microphone on? Sure, I'm sure. And certainly because of stemming from enormous tragedy following the wake of the tragic loss of President Mrs. Kaczynski and over 100 Polish senior officials and dignitaries. So this morning's conversation, and that's very much the idea to have a conversation, which is why we're around the table and not behind a panel table is to capture this extraordinary progress in all three of our government's approach to Russia. But more importantly, to get a sense of what lies ahead. We, and really seeing the incredible progress from the NATO-Russia summit, we're entering a historic moment. And I think the three gentlemen I have with me are certainly incredibly well placed to begin our conversation. And I'm joined here this morning by Ambassador Sandy Wershbaw, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. I think Ambassador Wershbaw is probably one of the most unique senior U.S. officials placed because he's dealt with U.S. Russia policy from the State Department, the National Security Council, and now the Defense Department. And I think he will provide a very unique perspective on the U.S. Russia reset policy. Obviously this is a very important week, potentially, if the Senate begins to consider the New START Treaty. So we're looking forward to Ambassador Wershbaw giving his sense of the reset and certainly the policy moving forward. We're also joined by Ambassador Klaus Schariot, a very distinguished German ambassador here in Washington, known to so many. Another person who has touched European Security and Defense policy, German Security and Defense policy for his professional life, serving as State Secretary, Political Director, head of the Security and Policy Department, and Chef de Cabernet, the three NATO Secretary-General. So we're looking forward, Ambassador Schariot, to your comments. And finally, we are delighted to welcome Ambassador Heinrich Littwin, Undersecretary of State in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsibility for Eastern and Consular Affairs. Ambassador Littwin has served as Polish Ambassador to Minsk and has served as well in the Polish Embassy in Moscow as Deputy Chief of Mission. So he has certainly seen the implementation of Polish policy directly in Moscow. So our format is to begin the conversation with Ambassador Wershbaw, turned to Ambassador Schariot, turned to Ambassador Littwin, very distinguished three ambassadors. I'm going to pose a question to sort of get the conversation started, and then we welcome you to join us. So with that, again, welcome to CSIS. We're glad you're warming up, starting to thaw. And we look forward to a wonderful conversation with that. I'm going to turn my mic off, and Sandy, turn yours on, and we're ready to get started. OK, well, thank you very much, Heather. Thanks for the invitation. It's an honor to be here today. It's also been an honor to work, again, on European security affairs and the Russia relationship during the Obama administration. And I do remember finally my days working with Dick Holbrook on many of these issues during the Clinton administration. And indeed, a really towering figure has been lost to all of us. Let me say a few words about our Russia policy and the implications for the broader transatlantic approach to Russia. At the risk of stating what you've heard before, let me summarize some of the key aspects of the reset. I think I've often said that the previous administration didn't really have a Russia policy as such. It treated Russia more as a function of other issues. And I think that a lot of opportunities were missed as a result. So a key objective of this administration has been to establish a more coherent Russia policy that aims to look for ways to work together on areas of common interest, to try to improve the quality of our dialogue on the most sensitive issues so that we can cooperate wherever we can, but also push back when we must. We've also worked to integrate Russia more closely into the fabric of the international community to try to thicken the relationship, to make it more multi-dimensional, and thereby to ensure that parties on all sides have more of a stake in keeping the relationship on a positive track. We think this approach has been useful, and it's been fairly successful to date because it helps to better demonstrate our real intentions, to counteract narratives of zero-sum competition, to better delineate areas of agreement and disagreement, to create more of an infrastructure for collaboration on a wider range of issues. And also we've sought to reform existing structures such as the NATO-Russia Council, OSCE, that one's not going as well as the former, so that we can address new security challenges. Our approach is based on a sense of confidence that we can cooperate with the Russian government without checking our values at the door and without compromising our relationships with countries that have had or continue to have difficult relationships with Russia, countries such as Georgia, to name just one particular example. Clearly we came into office with a very toxic relationship, particularly after the events of August 2008. But I think we have done a lot to detoxify a very challenging relationship, and we've had a positive impact on a number of key areas. Most obvious examples are Afghanistan, strategic arms control, and Iran. But we don't want to rest on our laurels. These are all important issues, but we want to continue to broaden the areas of cooperation. With missile defense, an area we think of tremendous opportunity, conventional arms control, both of which are very important for the future European security agenda. Clearly one of the key outcomes of the reset was the new START treaty. You know what it contains in terms of significant reductions, a comprehensive verification regime, at the same time giving both sides flexibility to protect their security, including for us and for the Russians, the freedom to deploy ballistic missile defenses. We're very pleased that the Lisbon Summit above and beyond the impressive array of deliverables that we achieved there. We're also pleased by the strong support for new START by our European allies, and especially the Central European allies. Foreign Minister Shikorsky probably had the most heavily praised op-ed in the history of transatlantic relationship. But it was a strong and timely message about how the new START treaty was very much in the interest of Central Europe countering narratives here that the reset and the new START treaty in particular were somehow being pursued at the expense of our allies in Europe. Au contraire was the message not only from Minister Shikorsky but from many other leaders during the summit and afterwards. So we are hopeful that within the coming days the treaty will be ratified. And soon thereafter, we want to pursue follow-on talks aimed at further reductions. And we want to bring in non-strategic weapons as well as non-deployed weapons into the discussion. And I think this is going to be an important subject for NATO to take up following up on the tasking at the other summit for a posture review that's supposed to address both the right mix of conventional missile defense and nuclear forces and also the arms control dimension of alliance strategy. On Afghanistan, also an impressive record of progress with the Russians since the reset at Lisbon, some important decisions were taken including the Russian agreement to help us help the Afghans build their helicopter fleet, which is heavily dependent on the Russian MI-17. The Russians agreed to contribute spare parts and training maintenance. There'll be a trust fund set up to this end. We expanded on ongoing counter-narcotics cooperation programs. And perhaps most importantly, the Russians agreed to further expansion of the northern distribution network, which, as you know, offers us alternatives to the more vulnerable routes through Pakistan. Iran is perhaps the most dramatic area where we've seen progress under the reset. And we've been working closely with the Russians and with European allies, trying to achieve the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The Russians, of course, worked closely with us on the original Tehran research reactor proposal, which could have at least created greater confidence until the Iranians walked away from it. As it became clear, we needed to move to the pressure track. The Russians worked closely with us on resolution 1929, which imposed the strictest sanctions yet on Iran. And I think going beyond what they needed to do, the Russians not only suspended the delivery of the S-300, but actually, in a very public and demonstrative way, canceled the contract, I think, to send a clear message to Tehran that Russia was fully aligned with the rest of the P5 plus 1 and insisting that Iran take the steps necessary to reassure the international community that it was going to keep its nuclear program strictly peaceful. I mentioned some future areas for cooperation. Conventional arms control is one where we're hoping to, in the coming months, to reach agreement on a framework for negotiations aimed at resuscitating conventional arms control, modernizing the CFE regime. And any such framework has to be consistent with certain key principles, including principles of reciprocity when it comes to transparency and reductions. We want to seek reciprocal restraints on concentrations of heavy forces and permanent basing in sensitive regions. And we will insist on a renewed commitment to respecting key international principles such as respect for internationally recognized borders and the principle of host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces on anybody's territory. Finally, I mentioned missile defense as an area where we saw important progress at Lisbon, not only in NATO's, very important decision to adopt territorial missile defense as a mission for the alliance, but also positive signals from President Medvedev of an interest in collaborating with NATO on missile defense and agreement to a resumption of theater missile defense cooperation, further discussions to look at broader issues, including territorial missile defense, ways we can link up NATO's developing system and Russia's missile defense assets in a way that could enhance both of our security. So we're not there yet on missile defense. There's still a lot of Russian skepticism about our phased adaptive approach and about the degree to which we're ready to engage in cooperation. But I'm optimistic that this could become not only a fruitful area of cooperation, but even a potential game changer in the US-Russian and the NATO-Russian relationships. So to conclude, we've made a lot of progress on the reset, still some sensitive issues to tackle, still a lot of suspicions and misconceptions about US intentions and US goals on the Russian side that we need to dispel. But I think we have a very positive dynamic and a very constructive framework for dialogue on even the most difficult issues. And I think the support for this approach that we saw at Lisbon in terms of the allies call for a true strategic partnership with Russia, which is now reflected in the new strategic concept, suggests that, at least on the transatlantic side, we're very much in alignment in terms of what we want to achieve. And I think by working together, we're more likely to succeed. Thank you very much for having me. And I also think this is a very innovative format. So I appreciate that. I think if the US, Poland, and Germany work together on Russia, we can achieve quite a lot. Now, John Maynard Keynes has once said, the difficulty is not really developing new ideas. The difficulty is escaping old ones. And I half agree. I think, really, that is the biggest challenge is to get away from old stereotypes. But of course, we also need new concepts. So it's only half right. I don't think we need any WikiLeaks to prove that, in the past, we did not always agree on Russia. But I think that time is over. I really believe that since the reset policy of the Obama administration, our three countries are really pushing for the same thing. And I believe that the reset policy, which we have supported Germany from the very beginning, is having great results. Sandy mentioned already a new start. You mentioned already transit to Afghanistan. But especially, I think Iran should not be underestimated. I think without the reset policy, we would not have had a change position. We would not have had strong sanctions in the UN Security Council. So I think that shouldn't be overlooked. Now, you will allow me to say a word for new start. We in Germany really believe this needs to be ratified. It is a very good treaty. I think it has verification. It has cuts. I think it played a huge role in creating a different mood. And therefore, I think, if that would not be ratified, that would be a setback, I believe, for the relationship between the West and Russia. And therefore, I very much hope that this does not take place. Because if it would not be ratified, we would have probably obstacles to much of what you said, to CFE negotiations, to talks with the Russians about further cuts, also talks about non-substitutive nuclear weapons. We would have problems with Iran. We would have problems with transit to Afghanistan, maybe even in the Middle East. I mean, you would see quite a few problems. And I think you would also weaken the forces of change in Russia. And that, I think, is a very, very important point, which we shouldn't overlook. Because let's not forget, in Russia, there is a situation where you have different forces. Some have realized that the future of Russia could only be in a kind of a very close relationship with the West, where they also get something from us. We, of course, would get something from them. I come to that in a minute. But I believe that this is interesting music. So I think this would be very important. I really hope that a new start would be ratified. I think, and here I come to you, I think that also Germany and Poland have done in the last few years many good things together. I think of the visit, of the common visit, of our two foreign ministers to Ukraine in June 2009. I think of the visit to Belarus just a few weeks ago. But I also think of initiatives like, for instance, the seminars done together by our two policy planning staffs and the Russian policy planning staff, where they talked about World War II views of history. And I think, really, that this reset policy has set off also a totally different mood. I find it not only cartoon, what happened there. I find very positive. I also find it positive that now the president of Latvia will go to Russia for three days for a very long visit. All this is new. And let's not forget that. Now, the future. I believe in the future, we have particularly four areas where I see huge potential. And Sandy has already touched on three of them. The first, of course, is the NATO-Russia Council. And I'm very happy with the result in Lisbon. I think it was a very good summit. And we got this language in the security in the new strategic concept that the security of NATO and Russia intertwined. I think it's a very important formulation. And I believe that the biggest of all the good results of Lisbon, good strategic concept, good thing on Afghanistan, many, many good results, but the best might be the relaunching of the NATO-Russia Council. Because the NATO-Russia Council, in my view, is an instrument which is very, very good, but has not been fully used yet. And I think Lisbon opens the door to a full use of the NATO-Russia Council. That's my first point, NATO-Russia Council. My second point, and you touched on that already, Sandy, is missile defense. I believe that this could really, as you said, a game changer. Why a game changer? Because it could mean that we have a common security space in a very important area. And it could mean that we get into a totally different paradigm on security with Russia. And therefore, I think of all the things this is, I think, very, very, very important and a huge possibility. I'm very happy that we do this common threat analysis. I'm very happy about the work we are doing these days. Of course, there are difficulties. There are major difficulties. I'm fully aware of that. It will not be easy. But I think we are well advised if we would put a lot of concentration on that. My third point is conventional arms control, CFE. I think we need to talk about that. It is huge positive, I think, for everyone. It is a potential win-win. It's not easy. Again, I know that there are difficulties. But I think with the reset policy, and if we get a ratification of new start, I believe there is a chance to get that. My last and maybe the most important point of all is modernization. Why do I say that? Because that, again, I think could make all the difference. Let me just go back. This is a German invention. We invented some 2 and 1 half years ago, what we called at the time a modernization partnership with Russia. Now, why did we do that? We did it because we believed the only change you can get in a country is from within. You can't ever change a country from the outside. You can only change it from the inside. And therefore, if we want to have different forces in being powerful in Russia, we need to give those forces who want to change, who want reform. We have to empower them. And how can we do that by training, by education, by also things like rule of law, training? I mean, there are many, many things. Energy security, I mean, there are many, many issues. And we introduced this idea some 2 and 1 half years ago. And I believe that it really strengthens also the hands of Medvedev, who is maybe a little bit more leaning towards reform than others. That's one thing. And we are very happy that the EU, then 1 and 1 half years later, embraced that idea, too. And I think that in addition to these three other things, which I mentioned, NATO-Russia Council, missile defense, and CFE, this modernization partnership with Russia could be a game changer. And again, I believe it would be great if especially the United States, Poland, and Germany would work together on that. Thank you. Thank you, Heather. Ladies and gentlemen, it's, of course, a great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to present you Polish perspective, not only in NATO-Russia cooperation, but also European Union-Russia cooperation. It won't be, of course, a general Polish vision. I'm only, let's say, a bilateral diplomat of a medium-sized European country. And I would only mention maybe three elements of these relations, which I consider important, and which from our Polish maybe very particular point of view are interesting. Let's start with so-called Polish-Russian historical dialogue. We should underscore that Russian gestures linked with the December visit of President Medvedev are very important. First is handling over a significant number of Katyn's crime investigation files. The second is the State Duma Declaration on Katyn's massacre, condemning explicitly and clearly Stalinist totalitarianism as a criminal system. Public opinion in Poland mostly appreciates these gestures. We perceive it as a symbol of the new Russian approach to both dramatic history of Polish-Russian relations and the Russian attempt to cope with their own traumatic history, traumatic past. And one should not underestimate the drama initiative. In Poland, we hope it will be a stimulus to sincere historical debate in Russia that enables this great country to reevaluate its history and establish solid moral and political foundation for further development in both internal and external dimensions. This is, of course, in the well-understood interest of Poland and its Euro-Atlantic allies for Russia to cope with that challenge successfully. In our belief in Poland, this process will be lacing and difficult. We fully understand it. And we will expect the effects with patients. But it is encouraging that the process has started. So let's underscore once again the importance of Russian official and clear condemnation of Stalinist totalitarianism without this declaration, I think, would be impossible to introduce a genuine mutual trust into Russia's relations with the transatlantic community. The second element is modernization. In my conviction, Russian leadership has definitely embarked on a difficult but promising process of modernization. However ambitious, Russian plans still require final definition. As far as its priorities are concerned, whether this will be more about technology or rather about efficient state of law. According to the transformation experience of Poland, what pays the way to the modernization success are workable institutions of the state of law. Yes, their very existence clarifies the rules of any public activity in practice, proving their relevance and necessity for everyday life of citizens. What sounds maybe a little bit trivial in the West is not very much obvious in Russia because of its very special experience from Soviet times when institutions worked against citizens. But let's talk about positive experience of Polish-Russian cooperation for modernization. In that context, we consider new Polish-Russian gas supply agreement, the first so far successful test for Russia's will of modernization. The new agreement and the new contract with Gazprom prove that energy relationships with this difficult partner, difficult till now, can be fixed as fully suitable for the provisions of the energy charter. I mean, first of all, flexibility of destination closes and take or pay principles in this agreement. This is, in fact, a new guiding precedent for another European energy partners of Russia to be followed. Another area of cooperation, hopeful area of cooperation, is Kaliningrad Oblast. Since a few months together with our Russian partners and, of course, European Commission, we are working on a prospective local border traffic agreement for Kaliningrad Oblast and corresponding territories of two Poland voivodeships, Kdańsk and Olsztyr. If we succeed in our efforts, the aforementioned region can be transformed into selected test fields for new solution in free movement of people between Russia and the EU to be pursued within the partnership for modernization framework. Our major goal in this respect is to create relevant opportunities of equal Russian citizens to learn more about the real life behind the EU border line and in the country at the stage of, we hope, successful transformation and also to acquire practical experience of personal relationships with the people of the EU and, of course, their institutions. The third element is the special role of countries from Eastern partnership zone. Development of more advanced relations between Russia and both NATO and the EU requires also new definition of Russia's attitudes towards both institutions, cooperation, with the group of states located in their common neighborhood with Russia, members of Eastern partnerships. Currently, those countries are significantly differentiated due to variety of factors such as democratic and human rights standards, economic standing, willingness and abilities to integrate into international structures. In the context of modernization, more exactly in the context of partnership for modernization, it seems to be a paradox that while some of the aforementioned countries are deeply engaged in the EU EAP programs, they subsequently drive attention of conservative circles in Russia followed by political claims of special interest or so. To my respect, it needs to be admitted that this traditional Russian approach to the European security and stability could create serious obstacles for modernization and cooperation with the West. In my opinion, both Russia's strategic partners, NATO and the EU, shall use the opportunity, facilitated by the transatlantic reset, and mastermind their common strategy with Russia to end up with this paradoxical situation rather soon than later. Otherwise, negative dynamic of common problems may undercut a still fragile positive one of common solutions. Simply speaking, if partnership for modernization with the EU is good for Russia, similar approach of Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia shouldn't be considered in Kremlin as an anti-Russian action. The processes of modernization and cooperation with the EU and NATO in whole eastern neighborhood of EU should develop parallely and harmoniously. And conclusions. Today, Russia seems to be determined to develop more pragmatic and cooperative relationships with both NATO and EU. Still one has to keep in mind that Russian military doctrine and some procedures practiced by the military forces of that country, for example, last year exercises in Belarus, keep their traditional course. Also, the way the Russian authorities responded to NATO proposal for the establishment of the missile defense system in cooperation with Russia evokes some particular concerns. So one can put the question whether exist two Russia's or dual Russia or dual nature of Russia's modernization concept. In any case, we consider that we, I mean Poland, consider that likelihood of vital compromise on many issues with Russia today is much higher than ever. And our obligation is to use this opportunity. So we remain careful, but we look for new effective areas of cooperation. Certain part of Polish public opinion remain distrustful. But we will continue Polish-Russian historical dialogue. We are attentively observing the changes in the Russian military doctrine and the military exercises near our border. But we support NATO Russia missile defense project and cooperation in the field of reduction of middle and short-range missiles in Europe. Medvedev Visevtu also has awakened certain hopes in Poland. It brought about a definitively new kind of atmosphere between Russia and Poland. President Medvedev has endorsed a modern code of bilateral communication as well. All the aforementioned gestures shall be seen as a symbol of more general tendency in Russia. We believe that the fact that Russia's president stayed in Warsaw on his way to Brussels can be perceived as a guiding line for further reset of Russia's modernization ambitions. Thank you. Thank you very much. That was a comprehensive overview. I agree, Ambassador Scherriot. I love this format, US, Poland, German conversation on many issues and certainly on this. But I think we've renamed a policy this morning, my friends. It's the transatlantic reset. And I think this is very much part of that conversation. We have about 10 or 12 minutes for some questions and some dialogue ourselves with you, the audience. I'd like to begin by posing to all three of you two questions. And I think it's incredibly impressive, the list of issues and how far we have come in the last two years on a variety of issues. Historic to arms control Iran, Afghanistan. But what concerns me and I think the Obama administration has been understandably clear that part of the success of this policy has been delinking it from more difficult issues. And Ambassador Versheba, you alluded to the unsuccessful OSCE summit, which talks about the values of the Helsinki principles. So help us understand, now that we've had wild success, and I put that in this policy, how do we turn now to the tough issues where we haven't seen progress? And I think that touches on the CFE question, host nation consent, that talks about why we haven't moved farther on Russia implementing the EU ceasefire agreements in Georgia. It's not to take away from the incredible success, but it's how do we turn that success into those issues that are also critical to values? And then my second question, and Ambassador Sherry, I think very well said that how do all of these policies help support, I think you use your words, strength in the hand of President Medvedev. And as we look at 2012, and the dynamism that will be within Russia, how does this policy, does the transatlantic reset get caught up in some struggles of the traditionalist versus perhaps the reformers? Or do we strengthen one, but to our detriment? So maybe a sense of the internal dynamics. So Ambassador Versheba, why don't I have you? And then what I'd like to do is turn this, and we'll bundle some questions, and then have the panel respond to those. So please, you have to turn on your mic. Well, we've made a conscious decision to avoid a linkage strategy. Recognize that there's always limits on how far you can go in the broader relationship if there are serious issues that energize important constituencies, whether it's human rights groups, or those who are concerned about sharp business practices in Russia making it hard to invest. So one can't completely separate issues, but we felt that under the reset tackling issues on their merits, trying to find areas of cooperation where our interests at least overlap if they don't coincide completely, can produce tangible dividends that benefit our security and contribute to more momentum on tackling the tougher issues. But the hard part lies ahead. I think the OSCE summit itself was disappointing, but I think it also set the stage for progress in the future because we stood firm on key principles, particularly the importance of OSCE continuing to be a vehicle for addressing the frozen conflicts and not sweeping those under the carpet or using such vague diplomatic language that the role of OSCE would be weakened. So we had to sacrifice an action plan that we would hope to achieve, but we're going to continue to work on that action plan after Astana and also build on the good declaration that was issued, the commemorative declaration that did reaffirm all the fundamental Helsinki principles and some key principles for the future. I think the same approach will ultimately yield dividends on CFE, where again, the aftermath of the events of 2008 makes it complicated on how to come up with a framework that is consistent with the essential principle of host nation consent with an internationally recognized borders, which is our position. But I think we will succeed in the coming months in reaching agreement on the framework. Actually translating the framework into a concrete agreement is going to be the real hard part. So we know we have our work cut out for us, but I think having a common transatlantic foundation on which we're trying to build gives us at least reasonable chances for success. And I would just say on your second question, I'll leave it to others, but certainly our approach is underpinned by the notion of trying to encourage and promote forces for constructive change in Russia using the infrastructure of our binational presidential commission to engage with more elements of Russian civil society as well as with the government, and to promote more transparency and exchange of ideas and people so that over time, the modernization agenda being advanced by the Russian leadership can gain some momentum and irreversibility. I believe the policy of no linkage was correct. I believe that it's always easy to concentrate on that which separates you. And of course, with Russia, there are many issues. I mean, whenever the chancellor or the foreign minister goes to Moscow or some other place in Russia, they have, of course, talks about human rights, about the rule of law. And they meet with Memorial and others, which is not always fully appreciated by the hosts. And that, I think, of course, needs to continue. But I think the decision of the Obama administration to concentrate on what can be done on the doable first I think is absolutely right. And when you say, Heather, now, how do we get to the tough issues? My response is, already those four, which I mentioned, are tough. I think, you see, to really make the NATO-Russia Council a forum of strategic dialogue and of joint action is not easy. We tried in 1997. I still remember that. It was called at the time the Permanent Joint Council. We tried again a bit later. And all this was good. But it has not fully reached the goals yet, which we had in mind when we created it in 1997. And also on missile defense, I would warn that this is already done yet, or this is all easy. This will be exceedingly difficult. Because when you look at the details, there are quite a few differences. And I think it will need a lot of ingenuity and creativity to bridge those gaps and to get to move forward. And missile defense, you already mentioned, host nation consent will be very difficult. But even on modernization, I believe there are really, and you refer to that, there are different perceptions. Do we just exchange technology? That's not our view. Of course, we include that. But as I said before, we would like to strengthen, of course, with consent of Russia. We like to strengthen those who are forces of reform, because we believe if those forces would have a better position, a stronger position, that would be good for all of us. So my antithesis to yours is the so-called easy issues are very tough. And we don't really need to find that. But the key thing, and I repeat that again, the key thing is whatever we do, we should also always never forget what does this do internally to the situation in Russia? Does this strength forces of reform? Does it weaken it? Does it get us back to where we used to be, which I believe is neither in the Russian nor in our interest? So that, for me, is the key question. You know, it's a very, very interesting format for discussion. But we should remember that three various partners, very big, big, and medium-sized ones. So one can say that our goal, our position, our Polish goal, is not to be obstacle. But I think we can be also quite interesting instrument, how to check the Russian openness for cooperation. If we talk in general about the dialogue, I think this is our Polish experience. The very important thing is to maintain the dialogue. So no straight linkages. The most important thing is to maintain the dialogue, very open. And of course, very important is to repeat the general position concerning standards, but at the same time to be open for Russian proposals. This gives us the hope and the possibility to find out a very, very positive effect. Time of our panel. So I'd like to take absolutely one question, my apologies for that, and then allow you to answer. And then we're going to end very promptly. So Marcina, if you want to just, again, keeping it very short, short question and keeping our answer brief. Just one. Just one. Two. Well, OK, so I have two questions, indeed. I mean, first of all, OK, I just stick to one. That'll be Ambassador Werczbow and the one I will choose. We choose, I mean, we obviously, we're talking a lot about missile defense here, and we're talking about it yesterday too. And I think that we are increasingly under the impression that the future of reset will really depend on whether we get an agreement there or not. And in that context, I wanted to ask, to what extent is the US prepared to accommodate Russian perspective on the issue? Very living sentiment, Chairman Starglin, Institute. My question, a precise one, goes to Ambassador Werczbow also. I also have a favorite op-ed by Radik Sikorski, the foreign minister of the Poland. And it appeared in The Economist about two weeks ago, and he writes the following. America no longer fears that a European defense identity would undermine NATO. On the contrary, America would positively welcome a European Union with better organized and more robust defense capabilities. Indeed, given the defense cuts, which the United States most inevitably make, we should be prepared for the day when Europe has to take care of its own security, at least on its own periphery. So my precise question to you is, would the United States welcome more robust European defense community? And on the periphery, obviously, means in the eastern and central part of Europe. OK. Let me take the second question first. We certainly, I think I've gotten past our ideological hangups about the European security and defense identity of the 1990s. And we certainly do support any effort that can bring more capability, more political readiness to act on the part of our European allies. This is not so that we can hand over responsibility. I think our interests in European security are enduring. And this is a partnership definitely for the not only the near term, but for the very long term. But I think that seeing Europe take more responsibility is something that would only be healthy for the transatlantic alliance in the long term, recognizing that we all face an ever-expanding array of challenges around the globe. We look for a stronger European partner to deal with challenges outside of Europe, and not just in Europe or on the periphery of Europe. So even though we all have to deal with financial pressures, I think we need to think of how to achieve more capability with the resources we have, through more pooling arrangements, through better prioritization by retiring the forces that are really more relevant to Cold War challenges and focusing on those capabilities that deal with the future risks. And I think the NATO summit sets a framework for doing just that, including a stronger NATO-E relationship and I hope we can capitalize on that. On missile defense, I wouldn't want to say that the whole reset hinges on achieving cooperation on missile defense, but I do think that as Klaus indicated, if we can succeed in this, the implications would be quite far-reaching, because it would demonstrate to those naysayers who really believe that our interests are ultimately incompatible, that NATO and Russia, the United States and Russia, can join forces to deal with a major and growing threat, the threat of ballistic missile proliferation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That's why I think it could be a game changer, just in the sense of showing that we can move beyond modest but useful forms of cooperation to something that really affects the existential security of NATO countries and to Russia. NATO has adopted a strategy and has endorsed the U.S.-phased adaptive approach as a key U.S. contribution to a NATO-wide architecture, but that doesn't mean we have fixed ideas on how we can work together with Russia to enhance our common security. Russia has its own missile defense assets in being, as well as programs for new generations, so I think the challenge is to see how can we work together so that NATO can help Russia better defend itself against ballistic missile attack, where are the areas where Russia's capabilities could improve the effectiveness of NATO's system as it's going to develop. Can we carry out joint exercises so that we can work up common plans, rules of engagement, so that we're actually prepared to deal with an actual crisis scenario where decision-making is going to be almost instantaneous, so the more we've worked out in advance, the more likely we will be able to meet a threat to our respective security together. So, yes, we have an architecture that NATO has decided to develop, but I think that we're very open to ways that our architecture and Russia's systems, both today's and tomorrow's, can be linked together to mutual benefit. I very much agree with what Sandy just said. I think missile defense is not the only issue, but I think it's, as you said in the beginning, a game changer, because if we could really make that work, that would be terrific. And let me just recall that we did already have cooperation on theater missile defense with the Russians, and if I might just add one thought to, I subscribe to everything you said, Sandy, but I think if we could do missile defense in the NATO-Russia Council, that would be the win-win-win. If we could really give the NATO-Russia Council an operational task and do this together with Russia, I think we would have a totally different security relationship and a totally different security situation in Europe. So, I agree with that. On ESTP, I still remember the first conversations in 1997, and again, WikiLeaks will tell you later on, we were not always in full agreement, but I must say this is very heartening to see how this has changed. I think today this is no issue anymore, and I think the Europeans and the Americans are exactly on the same line. We are singing from exactly the same sheet. I think successful operations of ESTP, like Congo and others where the United States couldn't or didn't want to intervene, I think they helped, of course, and I think by now, I'm absolutely sure of that, this is no longer an issue, and I think that's very comforting. The one thing which still is an issue is the EU-NATO relationship, and there I'm less content than on ESTP for reasons which are, I mean, that's the next topic, it's really a next topic, but there I think we could really need some improvement. And thanking our colleagues.