 We're going to start with Assistant Secretary Rose. Well, Tom, thanks very much for that kind introduction. And it's actually good to be back here in Washington. By the way of introduction, my name is Frank Rose. I'm the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. And my work at the State Department is focused on enhancing strategic stability around the world. Arms Control, Verification, Compliance are some of the tools that we use to enhance strategic stability and reassure our allies and partners that we will meet our security commitments. Missile Defense is another tool to do just that. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world. In this capacity, I serve as the lead U.S. negotiator for the Missile Defense Basing Agreements in Romania, Turkey, and Poland. So I am pleased to be here today to discuss our efforts at enhancing missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners, one of the key goals from the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, or BMDR. Now you have already heard from Elaine Bunn and General Todorov about our missile defense policy and operations. So instead, let me focus my remarks on three areas. One, the significant progress we have made in implementing the European Phase Adaptive Approach and NATO Missile Defense, two, cooperation on missile defense with allies outside of Europe, and three, I'll conclude with a few points on Russia and missile defense. Before I do that, I do want to reiterate one point that you undoubtedly heard from Elaine and Ken. The President's fiscal year 2016 budget protects and enhances our important missile defense priorities, such as the European Phase Adaptive Approach, and reflects the high priority we place on these efforts. As such, the U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense in the sites in Romania and Poland remains as former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said, quote, ironclad. With that, let me take a few moments to discuss where we are with regards to overall implementation of the President's European Phase Adaptive Approach, or EPAA, and the United States' national contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty's organization's missile defense system. In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would, quote, provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces in America's allies, while relying on, quote, capabilities that are proven and cost-effective. Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision and have made great strides in recent years. I just returned from Turkey and Romania last week and had the opportunity to discuss our progress with these two key partners. Turkey was the first country to receive EPAA elements in Phase I, with the deployment of an ANTPY2 radar to that country in 2011. At the same time, we began the start of a sustained deployment of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or Aegis BMD, capable ships in the Mediterranean. With the declaration of interim ballistic missile defense, or BMD capability, at the NATO Chicago Summit in May 2012, the radar in Turkey was transitioned to NATO operational control. Additionally, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense. In February of last year, the first of four missile defense-capable ships USS Donald Cook arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, the USS Ross, joined her last June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS Porter and USS Carney, will forward deploy to Rota. These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including missile defense. Currently, we are focused on completing the deployment of an Aegis Assure site in Romania as part of Phase II of the EPAA. Romania's strong support for the timely completion of the arrangements needed to implement this deployment in Romania's provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb. In October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the missile defense facility at Devasulu Air Base in Romania. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. Currently, this site is on schedule to be completed by the end of this year, and when operational, the site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short and medium-range ballistic missiles from the Middle East. And finally, there is Phase III. This phase includes an Aegis Assure site in Poland equipped with a new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. The site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 timeframe. For example, the President's FY16 budget includes approximately $200 million for the establishment of this site. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA. When combined with other EPAA assets, a Phase III will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO-European territory in the 2018 timeframe. So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President's vision for stronger, smarter, and swifter missile defenses in Europe. I would also like to highlight the efforts of our NATO allies to develop and deploy their own national contributions for missile defense. A great example is that, today, Patriot batteries from three NATO countries are deployed in Turkey under NATO command and control to augment Turkey's air defense capabilities in response to the crisis on Turkey's southeasten border. Voluntary national contributions are the foundation of the NATO missile defense system, and there are several approaches allies can take to make important and valuable contributions in this area. First, allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter, and command and control capabilities. Second, allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key ballistic missile defense capability. Finally, allies can contribute to NATO's ballistic missile defense capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have already agreed to do. In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability. Yes, acquiring a ballistic missile defense capability is, of course, good in and of itself, but if that capability is not interoperable with the alliance, then its value as a contribution to alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished. It is only through interoperability that the alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation and enhance NATO BMD through shared battle space awareness and reduce interceptor wastage. Let me now turn to some of the other regions of the world. The United States, in cooperation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia Pacific in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through such four as the recently established U.S. Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, Strategic Cooperation Forum. At the September 26, 2013 Strategic Cooperation Forum, Secretary Kerry and his foreign ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012 Strategic Cooperation Forum to, quote, work towards enhanced U.S. GCC coordination on ballistic missile defense. Both of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the United Arab Emirates, or UAE, has contracted to buy two terminal high-altitude area defense or THAAD batteries when operational will enhance the UAE's national security as well as regional stability. The UAE has also taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower tier point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the coming months and years ahead. Additionally and separately, the United States maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture for Israel. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David Slang Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Turning to the Asia-Pacific region, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships. For example, the United States and Japan are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA Interceptor, which will make a key contribution to our European phase adaptive approach, as well as being deployed in other regions of the world. We also recently completed the deployment of a second ANTP-Y2 radar to Japan, which will enhance the defense of both the United States and Japan. And finally, we are continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces, which will be aided by recent changes to the U.S.-Japan defense cooperation guidelines, which we expect to be completed soon. We also continue to consult closely with our allies in Australia. For example, as a result of U.S.-Australia foreign and defense ministerial level consultations over the past year, the United States and Australia have established a bilateral missile defense working group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to ballistic missile defense. Additionally, we are also consulting closely with the Republic of Korea as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense System, which is designed to defend the Republic of Korea against air and missile threats from North Korea. The Republic of Korea recently announced it plans to purchase Patriot PAC-3 missiles, which will enhance its capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat. Finally, let me say a few things about missile defense in Russia. Prior to the suspension of our dialogue on missile defense as a result of Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it, quote, legally binding guarantees that our missile defenses will not harm or diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent. These guarantees would have been based on a criteria that would have limited our missile defenses and undermined our ability to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat. The ballistic missile defense review is quite clear on our policy. U.S. missile defense is not designed nor directed against Russia and China's strategic nuclear forces. However, at the same time, we have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. The security of the United States, its allies and partners, is our first and foremost solemn responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats free from obligations or constraints that limit our BMD capabilities. Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense cooperation with our allies and partners around the world over the past several years. This was a key goal of the 2010 ballistic missile defense review. In Europe, implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, the missile defense radar in Turkey has been operating since 2011, and the Aegis Assure site in Romania is scheduled to become operational later this year. In the Middle East, we are continuing to work bilaterally and multilaterally with our partners in the GCC to deploy effective missile defenses. For example, later this year, the United Arab Emirates will take delivery of its first FAD battery. Furthermore, we continue to work with Israel to expand its multi-layered architecture to protect it from missile threats. In the Asia Pacific, we are working actively with our allies to enhance our missile defense capabilities in the region. On that note, we recently completed deployment of a second missile defense radar in Japan, which will enhance both the defense of the United States and Japan. Finally, we continue to oppose Russia's attempts to impose limitations on our missile defenses that would limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners. Suffice to say, defense of our allies and partners through assistance on missile defense cooperation is and will remain a key priority for the U.S. Government. Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. Great. Well, first of all, let me thank CSS for being on this panel today. It is a pleasure and honor for me to follow in Frank's footsteps here. He talked a lot about cooperation in the missile defense area between the United States, Europe, and Asia. I will talk a little bit about potential cooperation that might have worked out, but so far has not, and I'll pick up then on his last remarks about the United States, NATO, and Russia. If you look back over the last 10 years, missile defense has been one of the truly contentious issues on the U.S.-Russia relationship, and there have been attempts to explore the possibility to resolve the issue, to look at the possibility for cooperation either between the United States and Russia, or NATO and Russia, thus far without success. So if you go back to 2007, a conversation even between President Bush and President Putin about could there be a cooperative effort between Washington and Moscow when the George W. Bush Administration plan was to deploy 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, variants of the missiles that are now deployed in Alaska, accompanied by a supporting radar in the Czech Republic. The Russians were opposed to this plan, and what you had was an offer from the Russian side to make available to the United States radar data from the Russian radar at Garball, actually now in Azerbaijan, and I think has been since closed down, and also a radar that was under construction at Armavir, both of these radars having very good views of Iran. But the problem, the nub of the issue was the U.S. government was interested in that idea in addition to American plans. The Russian proposal was providing the radar data in place of the plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe, so that never really got started. The second attempt came up at the end of 2010 at a NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon, where the summit concluded with a meeting between the leaders of NATO and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, where they agreed to explore the possibility for NATO-Russia cooperation on a missile defense arrangement to defend Europe. And in early 2011, you actually had quite active dialogue, including between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, but also dialogues in track two. The U.S. Security Initiative had a dialogue going on. At Brookings, we were running a conversation led by former Secretary Albright and former Foreign Minister Ivanov, the peer senator in Moscow was talking about this, and a lot of these ideas seemed to complement each other. And by, I'd say, the spring of 2011, there was actually a fairly rich menu of ideas out there as to what a NATO-Russia cooperative arrangement on missile defense would look like. And it included four or five central elements, which it seemed that most of these dialogues were talking about in one form or another. One was the importance of transparency, and that proceeds from a logical point that each side had to understand the capabilities and the plans of the other if you were in fact going to have a cooperative missile defense system. Second, the advantage of joint exercises, an area where there was actually U.S.-Russian experience going back to the late 1990s and even some NATO-Russian experience, joined exercises as a way to develop that cooperation. Third, sort of a sense on both sides that you couldn't have a single combined system, because Russia was not prepared to work for a NATO commander, and NATO was not prepared to work for a Russian commander. So the ideas seemed to evolve around two independent systems that would interact at key points. But with NATO retaining the control over a decision to launch a NATO interceptor, and Russia retaining control over a Russian decision to launch a Russian interceptor. But they would interact through jointly manned centers, manned by NATO and Russian military personnel. One was a data fusion center, which would take data information from satellites, radars on the NATO side, take information from the Russian side, bring it to a single point, combine it to generate a common operational picture. And then that picture would then be shared with both the NATO and the Russian missile defense headquarters, and give them presumably a better sense of what was happening in the missile defense environment around Europe. A second center also jointly manned would be a planning and operation center, where NATO and Russian officers would talk about things like threat scenarios. What sorts of attack scenarios that they worried about, and what would there be the rules of engagement? In the extreme, you wanted to have a situation where if there was a ballistic missile attack coming towards Europe, and both NATO and Russia chose to engage that target, you wanted to know enough about what the other guy was going to do so that your interceptors engaged the ballistic missile target, and not each other. But the official dialogue in 2011 bogged down. And then you had, as Frank mentioned, this Russian insistence on a legal guarantee that American missile defenses not be oriented against Russian strategic ballistic missiles. And that demand was accompanied by what the Russians called objective criteria, which when you asked for explanations, it meant limits on the numbers, velocity, and locations of missile interceptors, and effect a resurrection of the anti-ballistic missile treaty. Make a couple of comments on this. First, I think in 2010, 2011, I actually, it might not have been hard to work out an arrangement of 10 years duration, 10 years duration, that would do two things. That would limit missile defenses in a way that would address stated Russian concerns, even if we did not think there was much basis to those concerns, but would still allow the U.S. over the succeeding 10 years to do everything it wanted to do in terms of addressing a roguelistic missile threat posed by a North Korea or Iran. But I think that agreement, which might have been possible, was simply not doable here in the United States for political reasons. The second observation I would make is that looking towards the future, if at some point we reach a point where there's some greater degree of equivalence between missile defense capabilities and strategic offensive forces, we may face a decision where we have to look at a missile defense treaty in parallel with a treaty that reduces and limits strategic offensive arms. But the point I would make is that that area or that time of equivalence is not now we are far from it. In fact, there's a huge gap now between offense and defense. In February of 2018, when the new start limits take full effect, Russia will have on order of about 1,500 deployed ballistic missile warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles and its submarine launch ballistic missiles. And a rate against that will be at most 44 American interceptors with the capability with the velocity to attack strategic ballistic targets. So I'd argue at this point in time a missile defense treaty is not necessary. There was an offer in 2013 from the United States government as a replacement to look at an executive agreement that would provide transparency on the two sides missile defense forces on current programs, but also looking at 10 years. And the essential philosophy behind that was to give each side so much information that the Russian military could look down and say, well, here's where the Americans are going to be on missile defense in 2021. Here's where we'll be. Is that a threat? My own view is that they would conclude that should looking at that objectively, they would include it's not a threat. But if a threat were to emerge, they would have ample time to react in advance. But at this point, there's been no sign of Russian interest in that idea. So the question is, where do you go next? It seems to me that arms control, particularly regarding further nuclear reductions and missile defense was fairly stuck already in 2013. And since then, you've had the crisis over Ukraine, the broader deterioration in relations between the West and Russia, and that's only going to make the atmospherics more difficult. The question is, at what point would the Russians be interested in any more serious dialogue on arms control? And there may be some possibilities there if the financial burdens, the financial difficulties in Russians continue. And at some point, perhaps, as you get closer to 2021, which is when the New START Treaty would lapse on its own terms, perhaps the Russians will then wish to explore a successor to New START. And then the question is, if you get to that point, will the Russians be prepared for a more serious discussion, a more successful discussion on missile defense, that perhaps could get back to an idea of NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation? Much is going to depend, first of all, on the Russian attitudes. And at this point, it's probably not easy to be optimistic. I try to understand where Russia is going on missile defense, and it seems to me that there are maybe two or three reasons that explain their reluctance to engage in a more cooperative approach, quite apart from the general deterioration in political rations. One is, I think the Russians have a certain fear about American missile defense capabilities and the potential. Even if they understand some of the limits of current American missile defense programs, the Russians give great credit to American technical proudness and our ability to do things. When I was assigned to American Embassy Moscow in 1986 and had the arms control portfolio in the embassy, I think it's fair to say the Soviets at that point were still somewhat panicked that the strategic defense initiative was going to put them out of the ballistic missile business. And there are still that lingers that the Americans can do a lot if they put their minds to it. I think a second point is also that there are bureaucratic reasons in Russia that argue against cooperation. I think there are some in the Ministry of Defense who don't want to cooperate because they can hold up an opposing American missile defense program as a vehicle to secure more resources for the Russian S300, S400 and S500 programs. And then finally an additional impediment to talking to the Russians about cooperation in Europe is that at one level that's going to mean the Russians having to accept that there will be American military infrastructure in Romania and Poland. And that's something that in general they've opposed since NATO enlargement began 20 years ago. But also the ability to reach some kind of a get back to a more cooperative discussion with Russia is going to depend on how far and how fast the U.S. proceeds on missile defense. I would argue that missile defense against a limited ICBM attack against the United States, such as might be mounted in the future by a North Korea-Iran is a sensible part of an overall American force mix. But it seems to be that when you look at dealing with a larger scale attack such as might be mounted by either Russia or China, offense still has the advantage over defense. And as one example, I would note that the plan to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska is going to cost roughly $1 billion. My guess is either Russia or China could add 14 additional offensive missile warheads for significantly less. But at least until at some point there may be a technological breakthrough that changes that equation, but it's not immediately evident now. And therefore it seems to me that if you want to get back to something like a more cooperative discussion with the Russians on this, which is going to require moving past the very difficult point we find in the broader relationship, reassuring the Russians that our intention is not aimed at blunting a Russian missile attack is going to be key to a more productive discussion. Thanks very much. So we'll keep the conversation going. I think I'll kick it off actually with a comment about an article that you wrote this past, I think it was maybe 10 days ago or so, on the limits of missile defense, it was kind of the anniversary of the 32nd anniversary of STI. And you gave a history of, in a way, how the expectations are relatively modest for missile defense in the big scheme of things, the offense, defense, trade-off, and that sort of thing. Reminded to me of a comment by Condi Rice during the Bush administration where she said, you know, what we're pursuing is not, it's not Star Wars. It's not the Sun of Star Wars. It's not even the Grand Sun of Star Wars. It's so different. And so in a way, I'm struck by, you know, why is it that the Russia thing keeps recurring? Why do we need to worry about reassuring Russia when it is so limited after all? So let me throw that to you first of all. And should we be, should we in a way should we be even having that conversation? Like I guess I would say, I mean, you don't want to reassure Russia for the reason it would be to try to reassure Russia is to enable you to achieve other things. If you could find a way to diffuse missile defense as a problem, does that make it easier for Russia to address issues such as further nuclear reductions? You've had over the last three years, I think the Russians, in my view, have for whatever reason concluded they don't want to proceed beyond the New START Treaty at this point in time in terms of nuclear reductions. So they've linked missile defense, they've linked prompt global strike, they've linked third com-tree nuclear forces, three or four others probably, but they have these linkages and they haven't moved to solve any one of those problems. So it seems to be aimed at providing a pretext for why they shouldn't do more on nuclear reductions. And so if you could get this to a more serious discussion, could you find a way to remove missile defense as a problem? And I think that would be one reason for assurance. And again, there might be advantages that you could get back to a cooperative made of Russia. I mean, you could take an issue which has been contentious and as difficult as it would appear now, perhaps make it a cooperative element in the West Russia relationship. Yeah, I don't have anything too much to add to what Steve had to say. I think he's essentially right. But let me go back to a point that Steve mentioned in his remarks about Russian concerns. I would say that the Russians aren't especially concerned about the current level of US missile defense capabilities. They know that 44 long range interceptors are not going to negate their strategic deterrent. What they are really concerned about is what comes next and the fact that there are no legally binding limitations on numbers and more importantly, the potential for US technology to leap ahead. I remember an interaction I had with a very senior Russian general and he was giving a briefing showing US Aegis ships in the Baltic shooting down Russian strategic missiles. And I looked at him and I said, general, that's a very interesting slide. Can I ask you a question? And the question is this, how fast are you attributing that sea-based missile defense interceptor? And he looked at me in all seriousness and he said, well, I believe it has a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers per second. Now, there has never been a missile defense or any rocket that has a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers a second. And I said, well, general, if you can find me a sea-based missile defense interceptor that has a velocity burnout of 10 kilometers a second, please let me know because I want to buy stock in that company. And his response was very telling. He goes, you may not be there today, but you'll eventually get there. And that's really the driver of their concern because quite frankly, the Russians are much more dependent on nuclear weapons and their strategy and doctrine than we are in the United States. If you look at the history of US nuclear policy and doctrine over the last 25 years through Democrat and Republican presidents, the objective has been to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy. It's been the exact opposite with regards to Russia. And from the Russian point of view, missile defenses and the potential for even more advanced missile defenses call into question, not just from a technical perspective but a political perspective, the viability of their deterrent. And that's fundamentally what the Russian concern is. I wonder if you might speak a little bit more in a way what, okay, put aside for a moment, where the technology might leapfrog to 10 years from now in that kind of world. But what more ought we be doing in Europe, in the Middle East and Asia? You alluded to some of that in a way, the activities. How much more can we work with allies in a way to alleviate our own burdens? We're putting a good part of our own budget towards regional missile defenses, potentially one might say the expensive homeland. What can we do to boost up our allies further? Well, I would say there are a couple of things. First and foremost, interoperability. I talked about this in my opening statement. It's one thing to have a missile defense system. It's another to ensure that we can share information amongst our systems and with our allies. So I think that has got to be a number one priority. And we're actually making a good deal of progress in that area. Second, we can encourage our allies to develop their own and purchase capabilities. I understand that we are in tight budgetary times, but I think there are useful things that we can do with our allies to leverage existing capabilities. For example, the Netherlands has what on their air defense frigate radar called the smart L. And they have announced a decision to invest several hundred million euros to upgrade that radar. So fundamentally, the more information we can share and take advantage of existing capabilities, I think that is really where the focus needs to be. All right, any comments on that? Why don't we open it up to the floor and please state your affiliation and ask in the interrogative sense. Well, I'm a retired DOD, former missile defense agency employee, but I have been working the last few years exploring this concept of interoperability. And you know, even in the DOD, interoperability is defined as more than just exchange or sharing of information. It's the ability to use that information for operational effectiveness. So since you mentioned it a number of times and you've alluded to it when you talk about things we've tried to do and even when missile defense, we've done a little bit in the C in the command and control area with Russia, as you know. Where is the champion or the center of gravity or the interagency effort that's looking at interoperability from the point of view of say, policy of processes, as well as the IT where you exchange and share information. And I might add an FMS to that as well. Yeah, you know, fundamentally, I think it's a partnership between DOD and state. I think there is a general recognition across most senior level folks who work these issues both in DOD and state that this is where we need to do a better job. And I think we have made some progress over the past couple of years. That said, is there a lot more work to do to make us effective in this area? Absolutely. But are we doing things to ensure that we can share more information? Number one and two, effectively use that information. I think the answer is yes. I talked in my remarks about the US Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. We hope to finalize that soon. And one of the key elements in there, we hope, is increased ways that we can work together effectively in the area of missile defense. Over here in the back. It's coming, just one second. James Kiesling, US AT&L and CAPE. I have a fundamental question. Is either the ambassadors aware that the Putin 2007 offer was actually a re-up of a US offer put together by Dr. Bill Frederick working for BMDO in 1997 and provided over to the Russians in 1998, specifically one major motivation on the part of the Russians maybe, that they felt that we disowned our own offer? Well, I have worked missile defense cooperation between the US and Russia in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. And quite frankly, despite a lot of politics, there's a certain amount of continuity in US offers to the Russians. I'm not specifically aware of that specific proposal that you mentioned back in 1997. But what I would say is that across the spectrum of administrations on the US side, there have been very similar proposals to work with the Russians on missile defense cooperation. Unfortunately, none have worked because we always, at the end, come to the challenge of Russia wants guarantees in limitations on US missile defenses. And I think that makes cooperation very, very difficult. And I think that goes back to the problem that you had in 2007 was the Russian offer of data from both Darbala and Armageddon I think was very attractive. But the price of getting access to that Russian radar data would be foregoing the planned deployments of interceptors in Poland. And so you have to ask the question. And if you have the data that shows the missiles coming, but you've given up the interceptors, you really, I think, have negated the plan, which was to provide some missile defense capability. Richard, in front. And suddenly a microphone appears. Thank you. So I want to bridge between the points you were making and ask about the potential effect of having the EPAA deployments take place at the end of this year and then again in 2018 timeframe. And if we remain consistent with our principle of transparency and we say, hey, this is what we told you we're going to do. This is what we're doing. This is as far as we're going. Obviously, it's threat dependent. And over time, and I'm discounting the Ukraine mess right now because that's stopping everything from going forward, do you, Steve, or you, Frank, perceive the possibility that Russia's level of anxiety might diminish as they see that we are, in fact, doing what we said we're going to do and not going to 10,000 interceptors with VBOs of 10, et cetera? Or do you anticipate that the anxiety will not change despite the fact that we have been consistent and been transparent and told them exactly what we're going to do or is that a basis for maybe ratcheting down the anxiety and maybe thinking about something because this is really designed to avoid instability, miscalculation, drawing responses that we would not think are in our interest, et cetera? Well, I think the first question is do the Russians wish to have their anxieties relieved? And I think this is the distinction between the anxieties that they portray and the anxieties that they really feel. And my guess would be is that the smarter people in the Ministry of Defense who understand this have a fairly good appreciation for what our missile defenses can do and what they can't do, albeit, I think, Frank's exactly right, there is that fears, what will the Americans come up with 10, 15 years down the road? But there's that distinction between their real understanding of what we can do and what they have chosen to portray. Now, sometimes I think it's kind of interesting. I think they actually get themselves caught up a little bit where they begin to talk so much about missile defenses and then you have Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin and it comes out periodically and talks about their new ICBM which is the killer of missile defenses. So they're trying to modulate this message which is on the one hand a message, I think, targeted primarily, the Americans are doing things, they're making us concerned, it's contributing to a bad relationship and what is it really getting you in terms of missile defense protection? But then they have to go back and reassure the domestic audience that the Americans have these missile defenses and we're worried, but don't worry too much because we have the ICBMs that can penetrate it. So I think the real question comes down to is, are the Russians prepared to have those concerns allayed? And if they are, my guess is that it would not be hard to come up with ways to do it. The only thing I would add is that in addition to the technical concerns that the Russians have about the future capabilities of US missile defense systems, they're also concerned about the permanent presence of American military capabilities in Eastern Europe and a lot of their concerns are driven by this. Although what they've done over the last year I think it's pretty much they've taken care of that issue. I think the Pentagon term is that we now have, as I understand, four company size units in each of the Baltic states and Poland and the Pentagon explains it as a persistent deployment. My guess is persistent doesn't have much difference from permanent and that those deployments are going to be there until you see a fairly major change in Russia given the force that Russia has used in Ukraine, some of the rhetoric that's coming out of Moscow now and the fact that you see heightened military activities like Russian bombers flying all around NATO airspace. Let me say two things. One, I think we heard a lot this earlier this afternoon from both General Todorov and Dazdi Bun that missile defense is becoming less exotic. It's one piece of a much larger portfolio of capabilities, et cetera. It's also becoming very firmly entrenched in how we think about our national security. It's not going away. So even though it's not the silver bullet, it's key and critical. So in a way, notwithstanding the insincerity, you might say, strategic insincerity on the Russians and some of these things, what if you might speak, especially both of you, about in a way the changing perception among everybody else, among our allies, for example, about just the appetite for missile defenses. There seems to be a lot of it. In the Middle East, they're putting real dollars behind it. Certainly in Asia, NATO was part of the 2010 strategic concept. That is going to be rewritten sometime in the near future and it probably not giving me any less. So where do you see the appetite for all this going? Only up, especially as the threat continues to increase. Sometimes here in the United States, we try to separate missile defense from our larger national security strategy. And I think one of the things that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review from 2010 does a really good job at is putting missile defense at the heart of our overarching national security strategies. Quite frankly, effective missile defenses are a key enabling technology for our other defense in foreign policy goals, especially as countries try to keep and deploy capabilities to keep the United States out of regions. It is a key enabler. So I think cooperation is going to continue to expand and I also think that, again, missile defense is a key element of our overarching national security and defense strategy. Any thoughts on that? All right. Bruce, the back. Hi, again, Bruce McDonald, Federation American Scientist, Peace Institute, Johns Hopkins Science. Russia has said multiple times over the last several years that they're gonna develop more missile defense and that's of interest to us at work. We're doing on what's looking a little bit more, looking into the future is more like a multi-polar missile defense world, US, China, Russia, India. Of course they say that they will. So my questions to our esteemed guests here, that what have you heard Russians say about what they plan to do on missile defense and more importantly, what do you believe? What's bluster, what's beef, what are they up to? That's a good question. Maybe Steve has some more insights on that. I've been trying to ask myself this question for many years. Well, I think there's a disconnect you see between the way they talk about American missile defense and when you look at Russian missile defense programs. The S-300, the S-400, the S-500 are all basically designed to replicate capabilities that we have in PAC-3, that and the SM-3. So it's not unusual for the Russians to say one thing and do something else, but I think they're looking at these sorts of missile defense capabilities as a logical part of their force mix. In the back. Greg Tillman, Arms Control Association. Frank, you mentioned the importance of the SM-3 to A deployments in Poland by 2018 for providing territorial defense for all of Europe. There has not been yet an Iranian ICBM flight test. There's not been a North Korean ICBM flight test. That would by my calculations mean that this threat is 12 years overdue from the Rumsfeld Commission's prediction. When does the more slowly developing threat start to impact the adaptive part of the European phase adaptive approach? Well, that's a good question. I would say the SM-3 Block 2A, which will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe is not designed to deal with ICBM class threats, but medium and intermediate range threats. You may recall back in 2013, the administration just decided to restructure the SM-3 Block 2B missile for a variety of reasons. Technological challenges, financial challenges, and a number of other problems, but the bottom line is phase three of the European EPAA is designed to deal with medium and intermediate range threats. And I would note that despite the fact that Iran has not yet developed a ICBM today, they are continuing to develop medium and intermediate range class ballistic missiles. And therefore we are working with our friends and partners to deal with that threat. And presumably stay ahead of it. And presumably stay ahead of it. Gentlemen in the front. Edwardi of Georgetown University. I was the last US commissioner for the ABM Treaty, so I have mixed memories of all these issues. Let me come back to the question of why are the Russians being so obstinate here. The fundamental problem, it seems to me, is that all of the US assurances are in the present tense. We are not. But almost by definition, assurances have to be in the future tense. We will not. And that's what the Russians are asking for. And that's what we've been unable to do, find a sentence that begins with we will not and then finish it in some way that we can live with. Seems to me that really is our fundamental problem. Thank you. As you noted, it's been the administration's hard policy not to agree to any legally binding restrictions. Or other limitations. Exactly that way, yeah. Let me say a couple of things. One, we're not just looking at... Well, we're not looking at Russia when we're dealing with our missile defenses. We're looking at other capabilities. And quite frankly, sometimes we are surprised. For example, two years ago when we made the decision to deploy the additional 14 GBIs in Alaska, that was driven by the fact that North Korea had paraded a new mobile ICBM. And we had not seen that before. So I would say, number one, we need to have the flexibility to deal with surprises like North Korea's new mobile ICBM. Secondly, the US budget process is fairly transparent. You can, by reading the Missile Defense Agency's annual press release when the budget comes up, you can determine where and how many missile defense capabilities that we currently have and plan to have. And I would argue that the US missile defense levels have been very structured to the threat. You're not seeing hundreds of long range missile defense interceptors. You are seeing 44. So I think, quite frankly, we're not going to agree to limitations, but if you look at our budget projections as well as our deployments, I think it's very, very consistent with our rhetoric. Yeah, I think, I understand the dilemma as you describe it. But therefore it's a little bit surprising for me that the Russians didn't pick up more on this idea that the administration offered in 2013 a transparency, which actually would have put, at least as I understood the proposal, would have laid out here the plans looking out 10 years, here the numbers. So they would have had not limits, but they would have had a very clear picture at a time where I think the numbers of missile defense interceptors would still have been way below anything they would have posed to Russian strategic ballistic missile capabilities. And so you could have handled that problem that way. Now, later on, if you got into, defenses go up and offenses come down, then I think you may have to take a look at the question of legally binding trigger limits if you want to get further reductions. But the Russians didn't seem to pick up on that idea, at least have not so far. But we're not there yet. I think we're going to cut it off there. We're going to go in five minutes for another panel. Our final panel will be Mr. Rich Matlock. And also Admiral Archer Macy, and that'll be on future directions about technological and otherwise. So please five minutes and we'll be back for that. Thank you gentlemen, both of you. Appreciate it. Thank you.