 Let's get some questions from the audience. What I love, I'm sure we have microphones around. I see some hands, but I can't really see faces. So there's a gentleman with his hand up in the second row. Is there a microphone? Keep going, the second row, le deuxième, là. And then there's someone who looks like a yellow sweater. OK, OK, please. Thank you very much, Mr. Laichoubi. I've already come in. I wanted to ask you a question that seems essential to me. That was what I knew, but shouldn't we be concerned about the fact that Trump is also the product of the failure of previous approaches? And so he plays this role of rupture. From there, should the analysis on these failures and these approaches not be more in-depth? First question, I would like my panelists to come back. And beyond Trump, what would be the revolutions? Because it is a failure in relation to the previous approaches. The previous approaches have been announced and are ineffective. I would like an eye, I would like an analysis on this question. And how do you imagine the new revolutions to the light of this contradiction? Thank you. OK, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Laichoubi. Yes, Mr. Mariton. First of all, I hear that Algeria, to prove the question of our Algerian friend, which on the first point seems very important, the failures that we have carried out. But I would put two quick points. First, how is it that Trump still has a very large popular support? Are there that many idiots in the states? Or is it that Trump bashing, as we've heard from part of the panel this morning, as exactly the reverse effect? Second point, Trump has probably the useful policy and that was part of the final analysis from our moderator to exert and try and exert some influence towards and in a way against Chinese expansionism today from its near vicinity, Hong Kong, Taiwan and extended to Africa, indeed here in Morocco and many countries on the planet. So if Trump does not do that, who else? And in a way, a question, maybe two, Mr. Vidrin and others on the panel, would it be immanageable that other parties on the planet, if not Trump, somebody else, some other country, takes that sort of responsibility, or is the world totally to the idea that there's one type of expansionism that has no answer, no reaction and maybe a final conclusion, we may express many criticisms towards Trump. It's not my cup of tea, but on freedom of speech, human rights, I'd still rather live in the states than in China. Okay, very good. Could you pass the microphone behind you to your right? And then, are there any questions over on this side? I can't see. Okay, anyway, please. And if I could just ask you, I should have done before, just please identify yourself. Would you mind, terribly, everything? Ria Tabet-Ulibo. Ma question, est-ce que l'unilatéralisme américain et la guerre commerciale menée n'affaiblit pas le dollar comme monnaie d'échange dans le commerce international? Merci. Okay, merci monsieur. Let's take a couple more, there's right down in front, Madame Voila, and then there's a gentleman on the aisle there. Can I go ahead please? Okay, I'm Jean-Pierre Cavesson from Hong Kong Baptist University. All right, yes, general remark, it looks like Europeans believe more in Trump's worlds and less in his actions than the Asians. It looks like the Asians are more cautious and more concentrated in the actions of the Trump administration beyond the words it has uttered. So that's a general remark. Now, I have a specific question to Wong-Ti Su, anyone who is based in the Asia Pacific region is regarding the US-China confrontation. Now, in China in the last few years, there was a lot of debate about the US decline. It looks like today this debate has been forgotten because maybe the US has come back to Asia. And the Trump administration in many ways has developed some kind of super-rebalancing policy towards China. And I'm happy that you have mentioned the South China Sea because I would like to have Wong-Ti Su with another Asian representative on the panel on the risks of crisis in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait. I think Taiwan was just mentioned very briefly, but that's another hotspot we should look at. Now, the question is whether there is a chance for such a crisis. And the other issue is whether the core war, the trade war between China and the US, as you sort of alluded to, is going to put enough pressure on the Chinese leadership to reform. And I would like to have your own view on that. It seems to me that it's unlikely, but maybe you have another view. Thank you very, very much, and I'll just be here. Do you think Trump has an African policy? Or does it interest him? Absolutely not. That's my first question. The second is about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump is going beyond all the previous presidents by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. By ignoring all the help given by the US and the Palestinians, and even ignoring the Palestinian representation in Washington. We're talking about a Trump plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And my question to Mr. Bedrin, is this plan really going to exist? And what would be its contours? Thank you. Thank you, Mr. OK, let's come back here. Let's try to first answer the questions about Asia, Pacific, and worries about the South China Sea. Mr. Wang, would you like to start? Yes. First, I'm very much in agreement with Michael's point that the United States is changing, but not changing totally. I think some people say Trump is some kind of abrogation in world politics and US politics. I don't totally agree, but I think he represents, as I said earlier, the divisiveness in world politics. And the divisiveness is caused by increased economic inequality among many countries, and also the identity politics that is exacerbated by the economic inequality. So if we come to US-China relations, I think the relationship is influenced by their domestic politics. In the United States, the criticisms of China are rising up, not only in the Trump administration, but in the political community as a whole. So I don't think this is a short-term phenomenon because Trump is surrounded by people who have hostile or strong reservations about China. With regard to the South China Sea and the Taiwan question, the two sides do not want to fight a war over these islands or over Taiwan, but the tensions are rising up because people in China hold nationalistic feelings, sentiments about the United States, and people in the United States are saying China is trying to replace the United States domination in East Asia. But I think in the practical terms, the two sides are very cautious not to be engaged in an actual military conflict. The two militaries are talking to each other, and I think there will be somewhat reserved in making some skirmishes. So I'm moderately optimistic about the South China Sea and Taiwan, regardless of the rhetoric. Can I ask you, there may be a slightly difficult question. I mean, China has joined much of the world order and has asked everyone to obey the rules, and yet the decision of the court about these islands has been totally ignored by China. And I wonder how that fits with the Chinese view that everyone should obey the rules except themselves. I think China says that it buys by international law and it is a contributor to current world order. Of course, their behavior has generated some concerns over the South China Sea and elsewhere. But I think the preoccupation of China today is still a domestic economy. So I don't think China will be engaging in adventurous things abroad. Going back to the question about China's reform, I think it is expected that the Communist Party will hold another plenum after the party congress. And I hope these people have some expectations of economic reform. But I think economic reform may be restored. But I think the political situation may remain unchanged. There's still a great deal of effort to consolidate the power base of the Communist Party. Yes, that's precisely it. Mr. Fujisaki and then Mike. Very shortly, our relations with China are improving. So I have to be rather cautious. But my personal view, I have two concerns. One about the South China Sea and other issues. Feta Complee, or you do things first and then extending smiling hands afterwards. I think that's a little consent to us. Second is an idea like AIIB or OBOR on Belt and Road, which we will discuss later. Great ideas maybe. But it doesn't come this way that, hey, I have a good idea. Let's discuss to make it. It comes like, I have a good idea. Those who want to join, come on the board. I think these are the two small concerns I have on China's diplomacy. OK, Mike, this is not aimed at you, but let's try to keep our responses short so we have time to go to the audience one more time, please. I'm going to respond to the gentleman in the yellow sweater who made the argument that Mr. Trump is confronting an expansionist China. I don't really see it that way. I don't recognize that in Mr. Trump's policies. The truth is he's been very inconsistent on China. During the campaign, he was very tough. During the first 18 months in office, he coddled China. He didn't confront China. You remember the Mar-a-Lago summit, all the early love affair with Xi Jinping. Now US policy on China has toughened up, for sure. The Pence speech, very tough, reminiscent of a sort of Cold War rollback approach to China. Why has that changed? I think trade is Mr. Trump's red line, and I think he's angry about that. Secondly, he's pushing on an open door. The truth is that everybody in Washington has toughened on China. Democrats and Republicans are getting sick of Chinese foreign policy, and it's very easy for Mr. Trump to make this argument. And also, I think there's a distraction element. While he's being attacked on Russia, he can give a big speech on China and say, look over there. There's nothing happening here. Look over at China. I think Mr. Trump will be tough, will continue to be tough on China's economic approach. But it's not clear to me to come to the South China Sea issue that he's going to take risks on really hard security issues, because he hasn't done that to date, and he doesn't care really about alliance guarantees. The idea that Donald Trump is going to take big risks on the grounds of half-submerged water features in a waterway on the other side of the world seems very unlikely to me. The second point, just very quickly, Stephen. You also made the point, sir, about Trump bashing. And I think that's a fair point. I think Mr. Trump has had successes in his foreign policy. The two points I would make is, first of all, the scale of the successes are not what he says they are, and he doesn't care too much about the scale of the successes. So we have to be very careful in interrogating what those successes are. The second question I'd put to you, at what price do these successes come? Yes, the stronger party in a negotiation can always wring concessions out of the weaker party, but in the long term, that will tend to undercut your reliability, your reputation, and your prestige. And the genius of the US-led order after the Second World War was what the great American historian John Lewis Gattis described as hegemony by consent. America achieved hegemony over much of the world by consent. The world consented in America's hegemony. But if you misuse your power, if you're too strong, if you take every advantage you have, then that consent will go away. Thank you very, very much. Not you. That's great. Mr. Roy, did you want to speak? I just want to say that. And then we'll go to Mr. When Kim Jong-un was shooting those missiles, China, instead of trying to calm down the North Koreans, they punished South Korea when we put that anti-missile system. So how can you, and it's for our own protection, it's a defense mechanism. So for China to punish penalized South Korea, we're putting this system to defend ourselves. And Korea, we've been bullied by the Chinese for 5,000 years, so it's in the DNA of the Chinese to bully you, threaten you. So I rather have some kind of a US presence for trying to prevent some kind of inveturism from China. It's my personal opinion. Thank you. Mr. Fadrin, there are a number of questions addressed to you, so please, please. Yes, Steve, I'll answer very quickly the two questions of our Moroccan friend. I have a global remark to finish. On Africa, Trump has no African-German policy, but in fact, no one has African-German policy. He can have policies in Africa, on such a particular point that can interest him. It wasn't the case for the moment, and it wasn't major in the exchange that we had. Secondly, the plan on Israel-Palestine, it's a plan all the time, that's all. He says that the coup won, and basically that the Arab countries of the region have other suicides, that no one else supports the policy of two states, except the Europeans, and especially France, with a certain verbal courage. So they're going to abuse this situation to say whether to take it or leave it, in my opinion. On the whole, what I wanted to say is that the Westerners will not find the global control of the global system. There is no global system, there is what Guterres calls the chaos. The Westerners will not come, the United States will not come, even with Trump's brutality. The Westerners, in addition, don't agree with them on these questions. I think that China will not come either. I don't think it's the Chinese project, and even if it was a new project, it wouldn't come, because there will be systems of a big deal about China, confused, but still. Emergencies, in general, don't have unity between them. Look at Han, China, for example. So we're in a chaotic system, chaotic, it doesn't mean war, but a sustainable, unstable chaos. What makes me think, there is a meeting in front of us between the powers that have been established for three centuries, which are still relatively defensive, and the power that is rising, that is rising in the disorder. There is a meeting, either it will take place through dozens of dangerous and painful battles on all the political, monetary, military, etc. Either, at some point, will organize a sort of general discussion that didn't take place after the end of the Soviet Union, that took place after the end of the First World War, not very well, after the end of the Second World War, rather well, and that didn't take place. So my only simple idea is that this meeting is not behind us. It's not just about making sure that the worst that are lemon, contestant, synthesizer, the system that has already been organized and that is magnificent, I think the meeting is in front of us. And it raises very, very, very complicated questions to the powers that were, the dominant powers of advance, it's more complicated than for the others. So, for Europeans. Thank you. Igor, I don't want to put you on the spot, but one of the things Mr. Vadrin just said, which is always intriguing me, is we have traditional powers, we have rising powers, there's clearly a change, there's a... Where does Russia see itself in this? I mean, does it see itself part of the future or hanging on to the past? By the course of events, our politics were reactive because we do not represent the power and potential economic and military one of the Soviet Union, but we still thought of ourselves as the adversary of the United States and in this bipolar competition. The Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian crisis were the reaction to this. At the moment it's obvious that we cannot take this burden upon ourselves alone, but through dual containment of the United States, of China and of Russia, we are organizing counter-dual containment of the United States, so we can be allies of China at the moment. Hypothetically, if something goes very well beyond Putin, then we can go back to the Western world, but at the moment, until 2024 at least, I don't think it will happen. I mean, in a way, some people, maybe it's a joke, but they suggest that Putin is doing the United States what Nixon did to the Soviet Union by moving toward China. Something like that, and he's a very good player in this, and tactically, I think that we made a lot of successes, we are back in the Middle East and we can bargain our Palestinian-Arab-Turkish-Iranian connections, and we can be a player and we can't pretend to go back on the top table, but the weakness is economy, demography, and other things, and in the long run, we cannot play this role anymore. Okay, thanks. We have eight minutes, so I'd like to take a couple more questions. I don't know if Jim Loewenstein's out there. We had talked about a question, so if Jim, you're out there somewhere, stand up. Where? Okay. Okay, could you give him a microphone, please? Thank you, Jeff. Jim, thank you. Thank you, I'm a retired American diplomat, so of course, what I worry about is the image of the United States. To what degree do you think Europeans and Asians separate their reaction to President Trump from their opinion on the United States? Thank you. A couple more, I mean, is it Carrie I can't see? There's a woman in the front row, please. As someone who has a foot on either side of the Atlantic, I wonder if we might not also look at Trump as someone who puts his finger on the divisions as Rosalind was referring to, of the losers in the transition to a knowledge economy. The people in the north of England who voted for Brexit, the people perhaps in the French countryside, that he's putting, that he's not simply an American phenomenon, perhaps in an internal or a domestic policy way. Okay, thanks. And could you just hand the microphone, yes? Go ahead, I'll see. I have also two fits on each side of the Atlantic. I have two comments remark question. One, I think beyond the trade war or so-called trade difficulties between China and the United States, it seems to me that the real issue is more market access. I would say reciprocal market access. What we've seen lately is attempts in the U.S. to block some investments by Chinese companies, particularly in certain sensitive sectors. And we have a process called Cyprus that some of you I'm sure are familiar with. We've seen it's harder for Chinese company to invest abroad at the same time. Probably the Chinese authority don't want to spend that much money outside of the country because as one of the panelists said, the issues are more on the domestic side. So this is one aspect. The other thing that I would like, there's been, I have a marathon was pointing at, some, I would say, Trump bashing. And a lot of people don't like Trump for a vital reason, which I perfectly understand. I'd like to make two remarks. One, it's been elected, it's been elected. I mean, some people say they didn't get more, but it's been elected is the president. And the second thing is elected by the Americans. Everybody has a view on who should be the president of the United States. But be aware of something, only the American votes. Thank you very much. So let's have one more question, but let's try to have a question about Trump. We've wandered around, I think, in a very interesting way. But let's get one last question about Mr. Trump. I see a gentleman with his hand up there. Please. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. That's almost from Japan. I have a question to former minister, Mr. Moshu Verlin. If you put in your shoes of historian, for example, in 1980, more than 50% of the world GDP was produced by two countries, China and India. And if history may repeat itself, and if many people predict by 2050, China will be the by far the largest country in the world in terms of military, economic, political power. Do you think this course of history could be interpreted by something happening between China and the United States now? Thank you. Great. Thanks very much. We don't have tons of time, so let's first try to have quick responses to the question about America's image abroad and Mr. Trump. Michael, go ahead. But let's just be brief if we can. Polling data gives us the answer to that. Most Western countries at the moment are distinguishing between their view of the United States and their view of Mr. Trump. And in the Australian case, for example, still seven or eight out of 10 Australians believe that the alliance is important to our security, but only 30% of Australians respect Mr. Trump. I worry, though, in the long term, if you think of the murder of Mr. Khashoggi, the disappearance of the Chinese Interpol chief, for example, these are the kinds of questions that in the past we would have relied on, expected the United States, the president of the United States to take a lead on. Now that doesn't happen. What does it mean that someone like Erdogan of Turkey is a greater advocate of press freedom and of getting to the truth of Mr. Khashoggi's murder than the president of the United States? And the final thing I'd say is, what if Mr. Trump is re-elected? It's one thing for us to suspend disbelief when America elects him once. But what if he's re-elected? Brons, do you have a thought on this? Or am I putting you in a spot? On the image abroad. I'm not sure I'm in a great position to describe that. I can talk a little bit about his image in the US. Which we'll hear a lot about mid-November, I think. Yeah, yeah, okay. Would anyone else like to... Igor, what does Trump look like? We have inferiority complex. Hello? We have inferiority complex vis-a-vis Americans, but we have a superiority complex either. So this is a dissonance cognitive, total. So the rich people in Russia would run to the United States buy properties and enjoy life. But coming back, they would bash Trump, Americans and all of that stuff. So it's very situational. And then, for example, on the 11th of November in Paris, by some miracle, Putin strikes a deal with Trump. Then six days later, the public opinion of Russia being brainwashed by television would say that 60% of the Russian population is strongly for Trump. Yeah, yeah. I'm afraid both our populations are a little bit the same way. Mr. Wang. I think Trump is difficult to separate Trump from the United States. In the sense, in China, for instance, Trump is trying, his administration is trying to drive some Chinese presence, presence from the United States. Chinese students, Chinese businesses. So that hurts the United States in Beijing, China. Basically, the United States still enjoys a lot of popularity, especially among the Chinese younger intellectuals and students. But if they are denied access to U.S. universities, they will have to go somewhere else, Australia, Great Britain and other countries. So it depends on whether that kind of policy will continue. Yes, thank you. I think you're probably gonna have the last word. So go ahead. Because Japan's relations with the United States has been so close and so strong, up till now, we were able to distinguish the two, Trump and United States. I hope this will last long. Thank you very much. Okay, well listen, we are out of time. I apologize to those who wanted to ask questions and I failed to let you do that. So my apologies, but my thanks to this panel for a really interesting discussion. All the best. Thanks. Thank you.