 Okay, today, we're looking at John Sel's cluster theory of meaning for proper names. A the thing about this theory, this cluster theory for proper names, is it raises very sharply and it raises in a very simple, exact way, questions about the relation between language as the property of an individual speaker ac mae'r cymdeithasol ymlaen i'r ffordd i'r cymunith. Yn hyn yn eich bod angen i'r gwaith, y dyfodol yw cael ei wneud ar yr oedd ymddangos a'r ddweud ymddangos o ddwylaeth informatib yng nghymoedd yw'n ei ddweud. Ymddangos o ddweud ymddangos o ddwylaeth informatib a mae'n gweld i'w ddweud yw ymddangos i'r ddweud, mae'n hynny'n ysgrifennu hynny yw'n ddweud. Ond yna'n meddwl i'r eich ei oedd o'r peidiol language as the property of a society Dortynau L advertisanok. Well, English of something to do with the individual, when you watch a child. Learning, language is very natural to think what's going on here is that the child is taking on board something that exists The child is taking on board something that is a joint social construction The product of many generations of work and the way the child takes on board that language is giving it the capacity to think at all. You only have capacity to think at all because you've taken on board some of the shared language. That's what thinking is, so it's essentially an individual participating in a collective enterprise. A bit like having an economy and having money, it's not as if each of us can individually have money and then we kind of think well wouldn't it be good to get together and swap our money and things around. Money is essentially something social unless you have a society that all are using money. You can't do it, you can't do money on your own. Robots and crews who own a desert island has no use for money. You can't have money, it makes no sense. And it's natural to think languages like that. You come to have a mind only by taking on board some portion of the shared language. And if you think of it like that then thought is the interiorisation of language. Thought is just what you do when you take on board a bit of this ongoing social institution. I mean of course you can juggle with your thoughts in private without letting anyone know what's going on. And similarly you can juggle with your money in private without letting anyone else know what's going on. But you might not tell anyone about your tax returns for example. But still in all what you're doing there is doing something private, non-viewable, that is essentially involving some public commodity. Alternatively though, although I say that's a natural and very powerful perspective to have on language, is not actually the standard view in cognitive science and linguistics today. An alternative and natural view is that you should think also a natural view is that you should think of language as essentially an individual matter. After all when you think what are the drivers of language, well it's got to be the individual brains. I mean each individual brain has to be playing its role in driving the social construct of language. So each of us has on their own to have their own individual grasp of the language. You and I can understand the language in different ways. If you come from somewhere different to what I do, your language may be quite different. It may be more or less different and we may have to negotiate a bit or by this you mean that. We may have to talk around a bit what we mean by individual words. And then when you think of it like that, the shared language, the language that say all English speakers have in common from New Zealand to Scotland, that's really just a matter of overlapping individual ways of talking. That isn't really a prior constructor. What always happens is that we aim to have reasonable conformity with each other in the way we talk. An extreme version of this view was given by Lewis Carroll in Alice in Wonderland. Is that Alice in Wonderland? Is that Alice in the Looking Glass? Look? I will look up the reference. When I use a word Humpty Dumpty said in a rather... It's through the Looking Glass. When I use a word Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, it means just what I use it to mean neither more, nor less, you get to decide what your words mean. The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many different things. And Humpty Dumpty replied, the question is which is to be master and that's all. And that's really a basic question. Can you really have that individual authority over the meanings of all the words you use? There's one perspective in which you do. It's only that for practical purposes is useful to bring that into line with what everybody else says. On the other hand, the alternative perspective is, you no more have authority over what all the individual words you use mean than you do over what the individual pieces of money you use are worth. That's not in your own individual control. You just have to go along with what everyone else in society is doing on that. Now, where Frege stands in this issue is kind of interesting and difficult to pin down. Frege says, on the face of it, Frege spends a lot of time emphasising the objectivity, the communicability of language. He's really separating language from anything to do with ideas or the stream of individual experience as we were talking about last time. Here. Sorry about that. Someone told me I should just fold this. Well. Sorry? Okay. Cautiously. Well, we'll try it. Okay. The science sense may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or mode of the individual mind. That's Frege. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another. Okay, that looks like he's stating a version of the strong social view of language. What he's talking about when he's talking about sense and informativeness. Well, at first sight, you might think, this notion of sense, your way of being given the object, your take on the object, that's going to be one-sided and dependent on the standpoint of observation. But Frege is still saying there's a sense in which that's objective. Although it's a perspective on the object, it's a perspective that can in principle be occupied by anyone like that analogy of the telescope with the object glass in the middle of the telescope, which is giving you just one perspective in the object that still is a perspective that anyone can use. Still, then when you look in detail what he says about the sense of a name like Aristotle, in the case of an actual proper name such as Aristotle, opinions as to the sense might be different, might differ. So you might associate a different sense for the term than I do. The sense might, for example, be taken to be the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Gret, and anybody who does this, so this is still Frege, will attach another sense to the sentence, if Aristotle was born in Stigera, then will a man who takes the sense of the name the teacher of Alexander the Gret who was born in Stigera. So now it looks as if each of us is individually assigning senses to the name. So we're each, how should I say, breathing life into the system of signs on our own. It's just that there is this practical responsibility on us to bring our uses of language into alignment with one another. Then there's that remark I quoted last time. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although there to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science, and ought not to occur in a perfect language. Well, okay. And how deep a commitment is there here really to the social character of language? It looks like, he's just saying, we should each just bring our individual languages into line with one another, and it's not clear what perfect means. And perfect looks like it just means well it will maximise communication, something like that, minimise the danger of misunderstanding one another. That's all it means, and he doesn't actually have any deep commitment to the social character of language. He just wants us to bring our individual languages into line with one another. Okay, so that's the background issue here. Is language essentially social, or is language essentially individual, and there are just practical advantages to bringing our individual dialects into line with one another? Do you have any immediate hunches on that? Okay, well, Serle on the face of it takes quite a strong line in this. Serle says, alright, let's suppose that names are associated with descriptions. Let's suppose there is right to say that a name like Aristotle, or Bill Clinton, or Mitt Romney is associated with a description. Who does the associating? Who does the lifting here? Who ties up the name to the description? Is it something you do as an individual, or is it something you do only as a society? Freger seems to be suggesting it's something done by the individual. Serle is giving up that. Freger seems to be saying it's something done by the individual. You look at Serle, he's saying quite clearly it's something done by society. Freger is saying in a perfect language each of us is going to have associated with each name exactly one description, and it'll be the same for everyone. But if you do it like that, if that's the right picture of what's going on, then why would you bother having names at all? Why not just use descriptions? There's one seat over there. Is that one right in the corner? If all you're going to do in a perfect language is for each description you have, tie it up to a name. Now there doesn't seem to be any need for names. I mean it would be better just to use the descriptions. Admittedly some descriptions might be a bit long, so you might have a name with a short form, but that would be it. There will be no more basic distinction between names and descriptions than that. This is not how Searle proceeds. Searle says, suppose we ask users of a name, Aristotle, to say what they regard as certain essential and established facts about him, their answers would be a set of uniquely referring descriptive statements. So you're looking at what the users, plural, are doing here. And that's how you get the cluster of descriptions associated with Aristotle. I mean you might not ask just anyone. You might say, well let's ask regular people, but you might think well there's some special way it goes and what experts say about who the name Aristotle, what descriptions you associate with the name Aristotle. I mean most of us would say well I don't know that much about Aristotle. You should ask, really ask someone in classics. That's where you'll find out. And with most names you might say well really, I know a little bit about Mitt Romney, but for a full description you should really ask some politics junkie. With most names you'd want to say everyone in the community gets a vote, but not all votes are equal as to what descriptions we associate with the name. And Aristotle says however exactly this goes you'd draw on the whole community and giving duet to the fact that some people are regarded as experts and you'd get that cluster of descriptions associated with the name from the whole community and that's what fixes the reference of the name. So there might be some room for negotiation here, some indeterminacy about which descriptions are in this cluster if you say, if some people say well Aristotle was Roman, should that go in? Do you just say well what do they know? They get outvoted by everyone else. There might be some indeterminacy as to who you call an expert, who you count as an expert in Mitt Romney for example and how many of those descriptions an object has to match. I mean could it turn out that Aristotle was after all Roman? It's just that we'd all along been making a mistake as to when he lived or would that show that there was no such person as Aristotle? I mean it might not be quite definite which way it goes but anyway what's going on is that if you want to understand how the name works what you do is this social exercise, you draw on what everyone in the society thinks and you get your bag, your dossier of descriptions from that. And the point of this cell says this is when you realise what's going on with names is that each name is being associated in the society with a kind of loose bag of descriptions and no one individual is authoritative as to which descriptions are in the bag is when you understand that that's what's going on that you see why we have names at all. Names are not functioning as descriptions. They are loose pegs on which to hang descriptions. You have your big loose bag of descriptions drawn from everyone in the society. No one individual needs to know all of them but what we do is we peg that with a single name, the same for everyone. So that looseness of the criteria for proper names that looseness in which descriptions are in the bag is actually what makes names such a good thing is what makes names so valuable to our use of language. It means that you just don't have to have decided right at the start well, is Aristotle definitely Greek or could it turn out that he was Roman? That's what isolates the referring function from the describing function of language. If you describe someone as a Greek, well to meet that description they have to be Greek. Just describing someone as Aristotle doesn't give you any commitment like that. So this is a very simple way in which in your individual use of language you can be essentially drawing on the resources of the whole society. This is a very simple example of the kind of view that says the social language comes first and the individual mind just takes advantage of what is going on in that whole group. On a view like this Humpty Dumpty is just wrong. You don't get to decide for yourself what the name Aristotle stands for. In understanding the name Aristotle, the whole way a name works is as a peg for a socially generated dossier of descriptions to be associated with it. Here's that again. The uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lies precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects that first two I think I just typed mistakenly, lies precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. I'm a hardline Republican. I associate a quite different set of descriptions with the name Mitt Romney than someone who's a hardline Democrat. This is fine. It doesn't really matter that we individually associate different descriptions with the name. The great thing is that the society is generating the same bag of descriptions across the society and each of us can just tag that bag of descriptions with the same name. Is that cell theory? That's a cluster theory. Are the descriptions completely arbitrary or is there some public agreement of what they are? If each individual just arbitrarily attaches a whole bunch of descriptions to a name, then they should not be public. I think that's right. It's very weird if you associate your descriptions with the name Romney, I associate my descriptions with the name Romney, and gee whiz it turns out that there's some congruence between them. There must be more to it than that. Something bringing us into harmony. What about this kind of picture? Each of us as we go through life, if you just take names of people to start out with, each of us as we go through life is radiating information about ourselves into the community. Some of us generate more than others, but most of us, if you're well-known enough to have a name, then you must have generated a little bit of interest, you must have generated a little bit of information into the community. You might think of the descriptions you're getting as the product of that kind of information generation by a single individual. Presumably that's what actually goes on. That's my main point today, how this ties into informativeness, but just not to make a mystery of what I'll tell you right now, I hope my main point is that informativeness seems to be an individual matter. If you take as basic the social use of language, it's actually very difficult to see what characterisation you can give of this distinction between informative and uninformative identities, because informative versus uninformativeness, that's not a distinction that's drawn at the level of the society, that's drawn at the level of the individual, but how then, well, the point was, if you've got another informative identity, the point I was making, I can't remember now if it was last time or the time before last, was if you have an uninformative identity, if sameness of sense is enough to guarantee sameness of reference, then the sense that the individual is grasping must be enough to guarantee sameness of reference. But in this social picture, how can that be? Because nothing at the level of the individual is what fixes reference at all. References be fixed at the level of society. Is that addressing, Chris? I'll try and say more about that. Can different individuals get the same sense with the same name? Yeah. We're actually going to spend a little time on questions in just that area today and next week. Today I'm on Wednesday. Assuming today is Monday. I'm sorry, some questions I know the answer to some. I'm not so sure about that. Well, yeah. Yeah. He didn't put it quite like that, of course. I mean, this is 1959 or something. But that's actually not a bad way of putting it, that if you want to know the cluster of descriptions associated with a name, Wikipedia would not be a bad place to start. I mean, you wouldn't want to stop there, of course, because Wikipedia could be hygiac. Can't it? They check it a lot. So it's not that exactly the Wikipedia is definitive, but that catches the spirit of the idea. The sense is something at the level of Wikipedia. And of course, the whole thing about Wikipedia is the whole is greater than any of the parts. The whole idea is that no one user is authoritative about what's the entry. That's what's catching. OK. Well, one thing that's great about Selv's approach is whenever you've got a proper name, let me just stick with that example of Mitt Romney. If you say Mitt Romney, tell me something about Mitt Romney. I don't wish to be making political remarks the whole time either, because I don't want to be using well-known names. Mitt Romney said corporations are people. OK. Sorry, I'm just looking for a chair. OK. So Mitt Romney said corporations are people. Now, the thing is that might well be a description, one of the descriptions that helps fix the reference of the term. That might be one of the descriptions we associate with a name, but it's not a priori that Mitt Romney said that corporations are people. So that just by understanding the name, and it might turn out not to be true. I mean, it might turn out that's just not so at all. I mean, I don't mean to undermine your credibility, but that could happen. You can make sense of that finding out that it was some aid who said it, and the remark was mistakenly attributed to him. That really could, in principle, happen for any description you associate with a name. He might turn out never to have really registered as a Republican. I mean, of course, this kind of stuff gets a little bit implausible, but it's not a priori false. It's not like saying two plus two is five. So any description that you associate with a name, it might turn out that that description did not apply to the thing you were talking about. I mean, intuitively it feels like the name just tags the object. The name doesn't say anything about the object. The name is just a tad for that thing. So any descriptive material that you associate with the object, it might turn out that that's not true of the object. Whereas, in Fragu's picture, if you associate with a name, Aristotle, the sense, the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Staggira, then you can't be wrong about that. That's a priori on Fragu's picture. But, of course, once you think about really how we use names, the name, Aristotle, is just a tad for this guy. It might turn out that description is not true of Aristotle. There's no one privileged description that's true of Aristotle at all. And several pictures get that, because all you've got associated with the name is this loose rag bag of descriptions. So if a name is getting tied up to an object by being associated with a sense, and the sense just is a description, then the description can't be false of the object. That doesn't make any sense. If that's a description that's fixing the reference of Aristotle, whereas a priori of Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Staggira, that's all right. But that seems to be a mistake. Fragu's account implies that this is a priori. Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Staggira, but it's not a priori. It might turn out to be a mistake. What's settled's catching there is that idea that names are just tags. They don't really describe to re-identify the object. So if you take this approach, Aristotle says you can explain why Tullius Tullius is a priori in analytic, but Tullius is not. You can explain Fragu's puzzle of uninformative and informative identities. That's how it's been. It's not quite obvious how that goes. Oh, yes, right. I'm sorry, I misspoke. Fragu's approach explains why Tullius Tullius is uninformative and Tullius Cicero is not. Because you're the same description associated fixing the reference of Tullius here and the same description associated with Tullius in the right. You're the same description fixing the reference of both times. Therefore, the identity is going to be uninformative. If you yourself associate different descriptions with Tullius and Cicero, you're going to be uninformative. Well, that's Fragu's approach. Isn't that what I said? Oh, okay. I'm glad someone's following this. Let me take this from the top. If you as an individual speaker associate one description with Tullius in the left there and the same description with Tullius in the right, then that is uninformative. Fydo gyhoeddych chi'n sy'n uninformative. Yes, thank you. Okay. With you as an individual speaker associate a different description with Tullius than you do with Cicero, then the identity is... Fydo gyhoeddych chi'n sy'n uninformative. Unformative? Thank you. Okay. That's Fragu's picture. The great advantage of that approach is that it can't explain why A is a priori and I don't think B is not. Yes? Now, the drawback is the thing that's getting you that advantage there also is implying that remarks like this are certainly the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born as the gyro is also implying that that kind of remark is a priori and analytic and what I've just been suggesting and what Cerdl is saying is remarks like that are never a priori and analytic. They could always turn out that you were wrong about that kind of thing just as it could turn out that you were wrong in thinking that Mitt Romney said that corporations are people. You might just make a mistake. You're still tagging the object all right. So on Cerdl's picture looking up the name to the object is this loose indeterminate socially generated cluster is a big bag of descriptions generated by the society as a whole and any one description in the bag could be dropped. No one description in the bag has a privileged position. All you say is the name refers to whatever meets all or most or a weighted most of all those descriptions any one of them might turn out to be wrong. So Cerdl gets it right that is not a priori or analytic that Aristotle is a teacher of Alexander the Great who was born as the gyro. Cerdl nails that explains why that's not a priori. And Cerdl's approach also has an advantage that it can explain how anything that meets most of the cluster of descriptions how they could turn out that you could say such a thing as Homer doesn't exist or Aristotle doesn't exist there's no such person because it might turn out that there was nothing that met all or most of that cluster of descriptions. It just turned out there was no such thing meeting that. So the name would still have meaning but it wouldn't be referring to anything. So those are two advantages of Cerdl's theory. Yup. Uh huh. That's an interesting issue. Can Cerdl move backwards from the name to the descriptions? Well, I mean I guess my first feeling is that that would mean that the miller's daughter if she just read Cerdl she'd have been able to figure out his name. But I can't be right. Is that a soundtrack? You see what I mean? The thing is that the bag of descriptions might be pretty big. That's the bag of descriptions. Look at all those descriptions. It's got all those descriptions in it. But they may not be, I mean they typically won't be exhaustive. I mean Mitt Romney may have all kinds of hidden lives, hidden secrets that are not in this bag. So there may be the Mitt Romney known only to his family and closest friends. Quite different bag of descriptions over here. Just from the object just from the object you can't work back to which bag of descriptions it is. So I think, I mean it's an interesting question and I see why you say it because I said the individual was just generating all those descriptions. But any of us who has a hidden life that many people don't know about I said family and closest friends that maybe even they don't know that no one in the society is a knowledge of that collection of descriptions. But they still may be true of you. See you can't tell just by looking at the object which bag of descriptions are going to be radiating in the community. I think that's what he's thinking. I think it really is an interesting and difficult question though whether that really makes sense because what matters for informativeness is what's going on in the head of the individual. There might be a different bag I mean if I can now use this as the bag of descriptions associated with Tully and the bag of descriptions associated with Cicero these are both socially generated. They might be different that's what you began by saying and that's what Seville would say they are different bags of descriptions different dossiers but that doesn't seem to me to tell you anything about what's going to be informative or uninformative at the level of the individual because you don't know which descriptions the individual knows to be true of Tully or knows to be true of Cicero. You see what I mean? It's a puzzle how you would get from that remark about what's going on in the social language as a whole to the psychology of the individual because informative and uninformative seem to have to do with the psychology of the individual. Are you still? What was the first one? Good question. I said Seville's account had two advantages I think I was only saying it had one advantage I may have found another two advantages. One is why this kind of remark isn't a priori or analytic. That's all right. It's not. Seville explains that and Freggy doesn't. If that's not plain as day I haven't explained it correctly. Is that plain as day? It's plain but not as day. Come back to that in a minute. Let me take it and come back to that if you can tell me what's problematic about that. It's only analytic conditionally on that being the description you associate with the name Aristotle. If the description you're using to fix the reference of the name is the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born as Tagira then it's a priori that Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born as Tagira. You might need to add if such a person exists but given that it has to be a priori. I think this is fair. You should look at the text and check that I'm right about this but I think it is fair to say that the way Seville is trying to account for that is to say it's the same bag of descriptions that is associated with two uses of the name Tully in the society. That's what explains why that's uninformative and it's a different bag of descriptions as someone said, associated with the name Tully as is associated with the name Cicero. That's what explains why this is informative that Tully is Cicero. That Tully is Tully. Well it's the same bag of descriptions. I see what you mean. It's not that any one description is fixing the reference but that this bag of descriptions that's the only mechanism there is for fixing the reference is whatever meets a good majority of this lot whichever one it is and so it's the same mechanism fixing the reference of Tully both times. He would say it is not informative that Tully is Tully. He would agree with Frega on that. Yeah. Yeah, one, two. That's right. I mean for Frega, if you associate the description, the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born as Tagira with the name Aristotle then this will be analytic. You just read that off from the meaning of the name. If I associate the last great philosopher of antiquity as my description that fixes the reference of Aristotle then this will not be analytic because it could be the last great philosopher of antiquity was not the teacher of Alexander the Great in Born as Tagira. He is okay with that. That's what he says about variations in sense can happen but he says sternly it wouldn't happen in a properly regulated language we should be keeping things in line but it seems like if we don't which we actually don't he says then it will be relative to an individual what's analytic and what isn't. One, two. Yes. It is Mitt Romney. He's not just anybody. That's very interesting. I agree we do use names like that. You can say but this is Shakespeare if someone says something you've ever thought. Yeah. Okay, so what do you say about that? I mean it's presumably the same bag of descriptions associated both times with Mitt and Mitt Romney. Yeah. That could happen and then in a way it would be easier because we call it Mitt when it's just family but we say Mitt Romney when we're referring to the political figure. The trouble with that is there's going to be all kinds of overlap between these two bags in that kind of situation. So it's not going to be a cleanly distinguished set of dossiers because after all you know what about your second cousin? You see what I mean where Mitt is not just family exactly because he really gets most of his information about Mitt from the papers but he's also a little bit of an insider. You see what I mean? That's right. I mean it may be that they don't really make sense it may be that they're really uninformative is rather that I mean the importance of them what they explicitly state as in you know why would you say that? You see what I mean? If I say look Shakespeare is Shakespeare or if I say total war is total war then it's not or you know victory is victory then it's not that these are informative identities exactly it's just that in my saying them I'm trying to remind you of what we're talking about here you see what I mean? It could be that stating an uninformative identity is actually having a valuable point but not because it's communicating something substantive but I think the situation is interesting and complicated with these kind of examples why things are hotting up I do want to get to the end here but can we just have one, two, three and just say this and ask you a question quickly and I'll try to give a short answer rather than going on for half an hour yeah, yeah, yeah is that notion of properly in the bag is this hard to make out and if you think about what the ground floor phenomena of language here are namely people being asked to volunteer descriptions it's a bit difficult to know what's properly in the bag and what's not you see what I mean? you might be able to draw some such distinction but it's not trivial the way I draw the picture they look very similar so this is Searle's picture this is Frager's the difference, the big difference is this is generated by an individual whereas in Searle's picture this is generated by the society that's using the name so Frager's picture is a Humpty Dumpty picture I get to decide what sense my sign has Searle's picture is the exact opposite of that you just have to hold yourself responsible to this publicly generated set of descriptions that's one a very natural idea to have if you've come across Wittgenstein's idea that what all games have in common is not any one thing you can play a game of cards you can have a swimming contest but what do they have in common do they all involve water? there's no one thing games have in common just criss-crossing resemblances so you might think that about these bags of descriptions it really is an interesting idea and worth pursuing that the only quick comment I would have on that is that when Wittgenstein was talking about family resemblances he was talking about the things we're talking about the games out there in the world that we're talking about whereas here we're not talking the thing we're talking about is Mitt Romney or whatever it is of course Mitt has family resemblances to the rest of his family but that's not what you mean you're talking about something at the level of sense so it's just different to what Wittgenstein meant Wittgenstein was talking about something at the level of reference at the level of what we're talking about that's just something to bear in mind nonetheless what you say is worth following that up I think we've only have two minutes left so I am going to just cut to the chase on my killer example here this is a remark from the great UCLA philosopher David Kaplan he says if you know Kaplan Kaplan loves a kind of vaudeville crosstalk and you can just imagine you got an insight into the home life of a great philosopher here my mother's primary care physician is Dr Shapiro he referred her to a specialist Dr Shapiro was it happened my mother reported her gratitude to Dr Shapiro for sending her to Dr Shapiro and compared the virtues of Dr Shapiro to those of Dr Shapiro in a blife piece of discourse clearly oblivious to the homonomy I was racing to keep up which I was strangely able to do now you can imagine that situation in that case the identity one Dr Shapiro seems to have a different sense to the other but actually out there in the community there might be only one Dr Shapiro maybe the mother made a mistake maybe she thought this was a specialist coming into the room and it was actually the same old Dr Shapiro without his hat that could happen I suppose that happens then I've got just a fine Dr Shapiro with just one bag of descriptions in the community being associated with it when I say Dr Shapiro is Dr Shapiro really a more empathetic human being than Dr Shapiro I say then I'm actually tapping into the same bag of descriptions twice I just don't realise that I am that could happen I will give more examples next time but for right now the point is that this account of the meaning of a name seems incapable of recognising that it could happen informatively that you suddenly say it's the same man Dr Shapiro is Dr Shapiro and that could be informative more of this on Wednesday ok thanks