 In the past few sessions, we have been talking about convergence of corporate governance and again looking at the different factors. In the last session, we talked about a very important factor which is culture and how we basically see an iceberg effect that what is visible is only one-tenth while the rest of it is under the water, just like in iceberg. Today, we are going to talk about another very important factor and those are institutional complementarities. Now, when we are looking at institutional complementarities, then transporting some of the formal elements without regard for the institutional complements may lead to serious problems, optimal corporate governance, mechanisms are contextual and may vary by industries and activities. So, just like I was mentioning right now that there is a great synchronization and a great bridge between culture and institutional complementarities. Now, when we are talking about culture or institutional complementarities, then we must understand the iceberg effect in which they are the formal structure, they are the laws, they are policies, they are the strategies, there is the organogram, there is the structure, they are the job descriptions, they are the performance matrixes. There are different rules and regulations and there are different frameworks and different monitoring mechanisms. There are different plans, there are different annual development plans and there are different contextualizations. Now, that basically only constitutes the tip of the iceberg. The rest of the organization is below that. Many of the macro factors are visible and they are very evident. However, the micro factors are below the water or are invisible to the common eye and many a times are not given their due consideration which can then lead to different complications and also can lead to the elimination of an organization such as what we see Xerox, we see Kodak, we see just recently Nokia, we look at different organizations which are mammoth organizations like we have been talking about earlier, we have been talking about how different organizations basically were evaporated from the corporate scene because of bad global practices or bad corporate practices and again Enron, we see 3M communication, we see various global organizations being knocked out of the New York stock exchange or through the Nasdaq and their existence is no more over here. So, all of these things are happening because of institutional complementarities and not understanding them which then leads to serious problems and also different complications and sometimes the eradication of the whole organization. Again, optimal corporate governance mechanisms are contextual and therefore understanding them from industry to industry and sector to sector and country to country, there are differences and again understanding all of those are very important and then molding the corporate governance framework to those unique perspectives also becomes very important and to ensure again that we are upholding the values of equity participation and trust and again a merit based decision making are very very important. Now, ladies and gentlemen in Germany and Japan, the corporation's long-term relations with banks, customers and suppliers facilitates long-term commitments to employees, we talk about lifelong employment in Japan even in this modern 21st century in Japan and also in Germany to a certain extent there are lifelong relationships and person joins at the age of 20 and retires at the age of 60 or 65 and that again is a very fascinating relationship because they basically believe in long-term commitments. The commitment to permanency promotes extensive firm specific training and therefore that also enables the firm to invest in the individual, extensively invest in the individual and upgrade their skills, upgrade their careers and see that there is a trajectory in which the individual and the organization grow together. There is also the option of having a shareholding and stock options and all of these things to basically motivate and promote and make the every employee of the organization an owner of the organization in a broader context so that all of them strive for the betterment of the organization and that is what we see in the European and also the Japanese model. In the US however, employees are more mobile and there is less firm specific skill development and the US fluid managerial labour markets make it easier for ousted managers to find new jobs after hostile takeovers. So this concept of hostile takeovers, this concept of mergers, this concept of firing complete teams, of hiring completely new teams can create its own implications and its own complications but because there is a different culture and there is a different mindset therefore employees can switch jobs relatively easily and in case that there has been a hostile takeover or there has been a merger then the employees can get golden handshakes and also move forward in their own carries and it is more you can say more facilitatory in the US. It is difficult to disentangle the exogenous initial conditions that established a path from the exposed adaptations despite numerous calls for the Japanese to do more in the way of venture capital the factors that Japan lacks the fluid labour market. So again what we see is that if we are looking at the Japanese market then it becomes very difficult to disentangle their culture from the American culture or the global culture. Venture capitalism is very less over there because there is very less movement of employees and there is more permanency of employees, more permanency of policy, more permanency of strategy and more permanency of implementation and therefore they do not require those capital swings to propel the progress forward and we have seen that in the case of Toyota and also in the case of Mitsubishi Bank and also what we see in Nissan and all of these different examples are benchmarks and hallmarks of the Japanese model when we are talking about all of these things. The Japanese nevertheless do have high rates of innovation but they achieve it via corporate spin-offs and big company funding in Germany and in Japan there is less vertical integration of industry companies. So we are not looking at the vertical integration but actually we are looking at a more horizontal approach over there which tends to facilitate and promote and motivate the different stakeholders of the organization and in turn tend to benefit all of the shareholders of the organization and that is the beauty of institutional complementarities in the context of convergence of corporate governance. Thank you so much.