 Good afternoon, everyone. Ooh, that's a booming microphone. Good afternoon, my name is Heather Conley. I'm Senior Vice President here at CSIS for Europe Eurasia in the Arctic. And we are delighted that you could be with us to talk about an issue that is of a critical nature to obviously US national security, European transatlantic security. I have to tell you a little story before we begin. And talk about wonderful happenstance. A few weeks ago, we were contacted by Nils at an office saying, hey, in Washington, we've hosted Nils before many times with many thoughtful discussions. And we were getting ourselves queued up to have a good discussion on Russia and Ukraine. And then I get another wonderful email from my good colleagues at Chatham Housegoing. We would love to come and talk about our new book, The Russia Challenge, and talk about Russia. And I said, we have a perfect occurrence. The stars of a line, we are going to have a great transatlantic discussion about Russia from the German perspective, a British perspective. So I cannot be more delighted that we have three spectacular panelists to help us work through the challenge. Certainly, today's headlines continue to underscore the challenge, at least as CNN is reporting. There has been a leaked copy of the Dutch Safety Board's review of the cause of the downing of MH17, which we honor that horrific tragedy's one-year anniversary on Friday. And then, of course, the last 24 hours, we've seen the greatest amount of violence since the signing of Minsk-2 ceasefire agreement, eight Ukrainian soldiers killed, 16 wounded, and the last 24 hours. So we're reminded that this crisis is very much at the forefront of the challenges that we face. So with that, let me begin by introducing our three panelists. They're going to give a quick overview of their perspective. Neil Zannin has just written a very good report. Russia, the awkward partner, short brief. And then our Chatham House colleagues have produced a fantastic report called The Russian Challenge, which I certainly commend to you. We'll have a little Q&A up here. I've got a list of questions. And then I will unleash this great audience on our panelists to ask the toughest questions. So let me begin by introducing Neil Zannin, a member of the German Bundestag. Neil's is the spokesman for Foreign Affairs of the Social Democratic Party's Parliamentarian Group. He's been a member of the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee since 2005. Neil's is so well known to Washington. He served as a fellow at the German Marshall Fund. And we've known his international work extremely busy, very thoughtful. And we are very delighted that you could be here with us, Neil's. After Neil's provides his presentation, we'll then move, as if this is the German side, this is my British side. We turn to Sir Andrew Wood, who is associate fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House. Prior to his work at Chatham House, he served as British ambassador to Russia from 1995 to 2000 and served previously as British ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1985 to 1989. They gave you the easy assignments, clearly, Sir Wood. I just love to break up countries. You like to break up countries. That was, that is in your resume, exactly. And then after Sir Wood does a brief presentation, we turn to Kier Giles, who's associate fellow of both the International Security Department and the Russian Eurasia program at Chatham House and serves as the director of the Conflict Studies Research Center. Kier has spent also some quality time in Moscow in the 90s serving BBC monitoring service. And Moscow has also served with Ernst and Young in Moscow as well. So lots of experience, lots of thoughtfulness. And my job is to get out of the way and let the conversation begin. So thank you all for coming. Welcome. And Niels, the floor is yours. Thank you. Thank you very much for that very nice introduction. I will do my best to keep up with the expectations that you raised. I'm happy to see so many people here turning out. And let me say maybe because we will come, I guess, to a lot of also controversial issues during our conversation, which I'm looking forward to. Maybe let me start with Europe and not that much with Russia and Ukraine. Because keeping the European Union united and together is, for us, the number one priority. And I don't say this only because I have to catch a flight back home tonight a little earlier than anticipated because we have assume we will have a vote on Friday. It depends all on the parliament in essence. If they don't pass the package, we won't have a vote on Friday. But I hope we will have a vote on Friday. But so it's about Greece. It's about keeping the European Union together not only in an economic sense. We need to solve our problems for very obvious reasons. This is not today's topic. But what the German approach to the crisis made very clear. And I believe, in a way, also surprised President Putin and his policy team in the Kremlin was that we did not, I would say, answer to that or followed the path that some parts also within the German domestic debate parts, and I say only parts, but significant parts of the business community and maybe also parts of the Russian government expected us to do. That would have been very easy for us to condemn the annexation of Crimea, to condemn what is happening in Donbas, and then more or less do what Europe has so many times practices before that the major players in Europe all pursue their own strategy and foreign policy. We did not do this. We decided, first of all, to do everything, as I said, to keep Europe together. Our foreign minister in the initial phase of the crisis, also the chancellor, traveled to the Baltic countries. We are to this day in constant contact with all our European allies, especially those in the East. We created, I would say, a united position to confront the outrageous breach of international law by Russia. And we did not only condemn, but we underlight our dedication and decisive policy stand by sanctions that I think are significant in their political message, but also in their economic effect. But at the same time, tried what we are trying to do to this day and what we are prepared to do as long as it takes, we also kept open the dialogue and the avenues for dialogue with Russia. Because I really believe, and this is not that much of a partisan dispute in Germany, unfortunately, that there can only be a political solution. Will it be a solution within the next weeks or months? I don't think so. So what I came here to talk to today, but that has been also an issue of my conversations with the administration on Capitol Hill, with think tank experts here, is that we believe that's probably a conflict that will keep us busy over the next years if Putin is not changing course. So what we need is to keep that unity, which also includes the American administration, which I found remarkable. It's not always, if you listen to the rhetoric, there are differences. And what I'm hearing from Capitol Hill differs from what I'm hearing from the administration. There are slightly different nuances. But in substance, we have been able to keep that unity. But are we prepared on both sides of the Atlantic to keep that position of a long-term period of conflict? I'm not so sure. And I think what we saw, and I may be concluding here because I don't want to speak too long, which is always very tempting for a politician to address such a huge crowd. And if you have control over your microphone. But what we saw at the last Munich Security Conference was troubling me a little bit. Because what we presented to the world public was a kind of transatlantic divide on this. This is not in itself a problem to have discussions, even heated discussions among friends. That's what we are. That's part of our democracy and political tradition. But I think we should not underestimate these systematic efforts by the Kremlin to support those political forces that are trying to widen that possibility divide. And the political forces within Europe who are working against the idea of European integration. So the problem that we are dealing with is very complex in itself. Because not only Russia, but also the Ukrainian partner is a complex and complicated partner. Not always an easy partner. But it has a long-term strategic effect on the overall strategy of our European neighborhood policy. And that means translated in plain English on the concept of keeping that unique sphere of prosperity, peace, and stability alive. And that's why I want to conclude with saying it is about solving the conflict in Ukraine, stopping the killing of, I think we are lamenting, about 7,000 people who lost their lives in the middle of Europe, which is unbelievable, incredible, and unacceptable. But it is also about keeping the European ideas alive. And that's why I think the stakes are high. We have no reason to be pessimistic if we stay united, but that is the precondition I think we have to work on. Thank you so much in that very important message of unity. Before I turn to Sir Andrew, I thought I'd just read a sentence or two from the first recommendation that comes out of the Chatham House report. Western policymakers will continue to differ in their assessments of the extent of the Russian challenge and the best ways to respond to it. But the consensus is emerging that Russia cannot be integrated into the sort of rules-based international order in Europe that all European states subscribe to unless and until there's a fundamental change of direction in Moscow. It is a change that must come from within. Sir Andrew. Well, first of all, thank you for asking us to be with you. It's very good to be with CSIS and to be with at least some people that I recognize from a good past. My essential task is to introduce our leaflet, our book or whatever you want to call it. But I would like to thank Mr. Allen for his excellent introduction. I may have different embassies, but I do think that one of the most interesting and as he rightly said, surprising to the Russian, Russian's change has been the way that so many European attitudes have converged. And in particular, the German attitude, I think, has changed. It's not for me to say, but it seems to me that it's been sometime in the making and the Germans have been remarkably patient in maintaining a degree of hope about Russia, that the Russians did their best to disappoint. But I think we are now pretty much on the same boat. I was recently in a more detailed discussion with the French and the Germans in Paris, and it was to me refreshing the degree to which we and the Germans were at one. That said, about our report, we all subscribe to the summary recommendations, therefore we would all be bound by the terms of that treaty read out, and I wouldn't disagree with any of it, but the individual contributions are just that. They're individual. I don't agree with some of them, and some of them I'm sure would not agree with mine. But what we had in common was the fact that it is the evolution of Russia towards an authoritarian state under a small group determined to play by its own arbitrary rules that's the root cause of Russia's internal and external difficulties, and in consequence, the violence in Ukraine. Our problem is Russia. We must not get seduced into the view that somehow Ukraine is the object of an east-west struggle, as it might have been once in the Cold War days. This is something different. It's about the evolution of Ukraine, and it's about the evolution of Russia, and that's its central importance. In May 2012, when Putin came back, he made an essential choice. First, he rejected the possibilities that had been discussed under Medvedev of economic, and therefore by implication, political change. He said, no, we're not going to change. Second, as a direct consequence of that, he greatly increased the repression in Russia of his own people. Those two processes have a dynamic of their own which feed into his third objective, which is to restore Russia as a great power. Being a great power has no real meaning, but it does convey a wish and an attitude, in this case, to dominate the space between Russia and the rest of the world. And that choice, too, had its own momentum, which has, of course, been accelerated by Ukraine. That's why when we were discussing among ourselves, because we thought we would look for a new strategy towards Russia, and strategy is always a good word, in fact it isn't. We like it. But it's a concept which is, in this case, necessarily, I think, limited. Because it is the nature of Putin and Putinism that things like a new European security structure, or Helsinki too, or Yalta too, or something like that, isn't going to work. Because even if we could agree frameworks to cover these things with the Russians, Putin's Russia regards all agreements as expendable, and they would depend on Western countries in effecting, respecting, recognizing a Russian claim to a defined area of privileged interest. The reasons we came up, therefore, in our report, which is summarized on the last page, which is convenient, are necessarily restricted. Their aim is not to prevent, or rather to try and promote, in some case, in some, probably, future time, Russia to reintegrate itself with the wider world. They're not meant to introduce the idea of containment, but to reestablish, if we can, some of the rules that kept Europe and therefore the wider world more secure than it is today. And while we recognize this might be difficult, and perhaps even impossible, while the Putin system remains what it now is, or at risk of becoming worse, we still think that is the right principle to be guided by. So helping Ukraine, improving Western security, reinventing the EU's Eastern partnership, making ways to communicate with the Russian people separate from the way we treat the Russian regime, and reinforcing channels with other former Soviet states will all have their difficulties, but again they're necessary. As Nils has correctly said, cohesion within the EU has been far better than the Russians had expected, and Germany has played an essential role in bringing that about. We'll still need effort, and we'll start to all the distractions within that community. We're pretty skeptical as to Minsk 2 being effective in the longer run, but it's there, and in our different ways we must try and make it work. Lastly, given not least Putin's absolute obsession with the United States, as in some divine sense the analog to Russia, which makes it very important we maintain a transatlantic dialogue and an effective alignment of policies towards Russia. We've done quite well in recent times. We have some differences over, and I think this is also the truth within the United States, over when and whether we will be forced or compelled to offer direct military assistance of nature to the Ukrainians. Personally, I think we are being forced down that road because the Russians are seeking a military solution. It's all very well for us to say no military solution is available, and that is true, but the Russians are forcing that or trying to force that on Ukraine. So I think we can't rule that out. Our report is by name is the first to recognize that collective judgment is variable and that we need constant re-examination of our understandings of where Russia is going. Moscow is at a point where it faces choices as to how to advance or readjust its policies towards Ukraine. I personally believe that they've badly overstrained themselves in Ukraine and they've now put themselves in a position where reaching a proper accommodation between those two countries will be extraordinarily difficult. How to manage their economy. Their economy was going in a pretty poor shape. Beforehand, it's pretty stagnant now if there are to be the sort of country of prosperity and justice that their people deserve. They need to make reforms, but Putin is frightened to make reforms and has no evident intention of doing that. How far and in what way to pursue their defense strategy. They had a certain need and a case for modernizing their army but whether they were right to use it in the first instance the way they have is another question. And above all, how Russia is to relate to the government of its own people. The society has a strained social fabric. Its bureaucracy is not just incompetent but deeply corrupted. The top of the administration is extremely small. It's a mystery to me and I think to many people who really advise Putin on whether political decisions are taken in a coherent way. The question whether Putin can change I think is more or less proved itself that he probably cannot. So lastly we face the question of what next for Russia. The problem of succession as we again refer to in our report is by no means settled or secure. I believe that personally the idea that there can be if Putin goes more or less a continuous continuum of his term of office under someone else is perhaps a comforting illusion and that change will be risk of being far more difficult and dangerous than that implies. So we do face an uncertain world where Russia is concerned but I'm sure like most people in this room I absolutely refuse to believe that the Russian people are an enemy or that the Russian people themselves wish for that sort of world. I believe that we have a duty towards them to take a realistic view of what their government is up to and to take full account of that in acting towards it. We must not be deluded by the idea that being nice, being polite is the best policy. The best policy is to talk the truth. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you Heather. It's a great pleasure to be here and especially to see some old distinguished colleagues are very long standing on their home turf for a change. It won't surprise you ladies and gentlemen to hear me echo that call for unity as the sine qua non for coping with Russia at the moment, unity within the EU and also crucially of course let's not forget within NATO because yes it is true that a long term period of confrontation that Nils Anand was referring to is inevitable if we decide to continue to support the frontline states in their aspirations for unconditional sovereignty without being dominated by Russia. Because Russia's reaction with its neighbors has now reverted to its default settings. 2014 wasn't abnormal. It's actually the previous 25 years that were out of character for Russia while the period while their resources didn't match their enduring intentions and aspirations. Now when we say things like that people habitually call us cold war nostalgists and think we want to go back to the thinking of the 1950s and 60s. Fortunately the previous Chatham House report said at length and in detail why this is not a new cold war. Instead we're talking about Russian behaviors and attitudes which go back very much further than that. President Putin is not the first Russian leader to have said that the newly independent republics are actually long standing Russian possessions which need to be returned to the fold. That came from Stalin in the 30s before him and there are historical echoes going further back as well. One of the biggest problems that EU strategy faces at the moment is the search for easy solutions and easy ways out which simply do not exist at the moment. One of those is holding Russia to observance of the Minsk to ceasefire criteria as a measure of Russian good behavior but that ceasefire agreement is so deeply flawed that it is entirely counterproductive to do so. It is just like the Georgian ceasefire in 2008. In fact it was even drafted in Moscow and facilitated by a French president in precisely the same way. It sets Moscow's terms. It rewards Russia for restarting hostilities. It sets limits on Ukrainian sovereignty and represents success for Russia even if either side were interested in implementing it which at the moment they're not. So in summary it doesn't hold Russia to account and it also does not hold Europe to account for its obligations for collective action. The sanctions remain fragile while they are tied to this Minsk agreement. It provides a get out clause from facing down Russia any further. The results will be like 2008 if the sanctions regime is relaxed it will encourage Russia to further military action as a valid foreign policy tool because it will validate the views that this is an effective tool for long term strategic results with fairly limited economic and reputational results. So what we are arguing among other things in the report is that Europe and the United States do need instead to learn to live with the fundamental incompatibility of worldview and strategic aspirations between Russia and the West which real leads to further confrontation in the frontline states. Accommodation of Russia will now as it always has done make matters worse not better. While we reset they rearm as we've already seen. And vacillation over boundaries and failing to make it clear exactly where the red lines lie mean that the West will in due course have to deal with a conventionally stronger and still more aggressive Russia and the response will have to be more forceful and expensive than it's politically palatable. Russian behaviors have not changed. What has changed is their ability to actually implement them in a way that causes the West to take notice. Alende. Fantastic. Well thank you all three and thank you for your wonderful discipline on time so we can get into a great discussion. So what I'm hearing and I think what I'd like to do is think about creating that long term strategy I'm going to call it a long term transatlantic strategy vis-a-vis Russia. And so I'm hearing obviously the unity is the center of gravity but let's take some of the elements and I think what I'm going to try to capture is where I think the German and British views may be aligned and where I think they may not be aligned. Let me begin with political dialogue. Niels in your paper you talk about the need for political dialogue referring very much historically to the Harmel report, the 1967 report that was actually commissioned by NATO and it was really the introduction of what my term is Ostpolitik. And so it seems to me that you're suggesting that we need an Ostpolitik 2.0. Another way to sort of get to this deterrence and detente phase. But I think what I'm hearing from our colleagues from Chatham House and I have to say I'm struggling with this as well to whom do we engage? Because the only person to engage in this regime is President Putin. It's difficult to create this dialogue and as Sir Andrew said the dialogue that I fear is about achieving this accommodation where we're creating a yalta to we're saying this is your sphere this is our sphere and that goes against every instinct that we have. So help me understand a little bit when you suggest the political dialogue because our political dialogue at least through the Normandy process has not achieved what we want. What does that look like? Well first of all if I would have wanted to use the term Ostpolitik or new Ostpolitik I would have used it and I did not. For a reason I still believe Ostpolitik was an extremely successful strategy and it opened the way for German unification and ultimately the unification of Europe. But we are confronted with a completely new situation and the Cold War is over what we are faced with is a new kind of conflict which I think there is to my knowledge no real description no slogan to explain what we are faced with it's maybe the drop of historians for later years so it will evolve somehow so I'm a bit hesitant this is part of the German debate to talk about new Ostpolitik but it would raise expectations in a way that I think we probably cannot live up to. One fundamental conclusion or consequence out of the analysis that we are not in the Cold War anymore is exactly heather what you said that the fate of democratic sovereign countries is not going to be decided in Washington or in Moscow or even maybe in Berlin but by those populations themselves and that logic I think is clearly understood in Berlin and that's why we made it clear from the beginning that although Germany has a specific role right now to play also because our economy is very strong in contrast to some of our friends and neighbors right now so I think everybody understood that we have to take some responsibility and that's what we are doing as Steinmeier has been doing from day one of the conflict but there's also one fundamental understanding that is not always completely understood on this side of the Atlantic and that is that we also have to be realistic and realistic does not mean that we accept or applaud what Russia is doing or that we even justify what Russia is doing but Russia is not an ordinary country it is a huge country with a huge power potential I think at least from a point of view of a Berlin politician it is also not a regional power it is a big power it's nuclear armed so like it or not we would need to take into account Russia's security interests without sacrificing our own values and ideas and the only way to do this is by dialogue and I was wondering not for the first time about in a way another lack of patience because you said and I heard this also reading the report and what my esteemed colleagues said that Minsk failed or this is a flawed concept etc etc I'm not prepared yet to give up on Minsk I mean maybe it will ultimately fail I don't know I cannot rule this out but what I know for sure is this is right now the only base that we have it is the only document that is signed by Russia and by Ukraine and it is bringing together which has been part of our leadership if you will bringing together the actors in this conflict and Ukraine is a sovereign state they have every right to defend themselves and they tried two times to solve the conflict by military means and we did not criticize this we offered advice not to do it the separatists with support of the regular Russian forces crashed that offensive and left the Ukrainian army and shambles they can try a third time and I have an idea what is going to happen and as long as we are not prepared to go to war with Russia over Ukraine and I don't know anybody who is prepared to go to war with Russia over Ukraine but this is the means that we are left with and that is diplomacy this is sanctions this is stress unity and it is patience and so I don't have a blueprint for solving the conflict but I would not be surprised that if I will come here maybe next year or in two years that we would still be talking about this conflict I don't hope so but we should not right now about what we have been built up and at least I would say there is a signed agreement and we have a conflict where the leaders can talk to each other I know this is not much but this is not nothing and we saw conflicts where it took years to bring the responsible senior political leadership to agree for a meeting even for a telephone conversation so in a way this is a character of conflict where we have fighting we have political conflict and we have a dialogue platform for example the OSCE and I think we should insist on going that path because I don't see any credible convincing alternative to do this Thank you Niels. Please and always feel free to comment on Niels' statement but I want to dig a little deeper because at least some of the recommendations in the report certainly say keep the door open re-engage but I think there was a greater reluctance to go more forcefully into a political dialogue and perhaps I'm not capturing the nuance in the report what would a political dialogue look like or what would you recommend in the future because I think you're absolutely right on the Minsk too we cling to this because it's what we have but it may not be the best thing do we need to create a different climate some of the criticism of the Normandy format quite frankly is that the United States and the EU is not a participant in that format would that strengthen it would that be able to bring more pressure to bear so feel free to take a whack at my questions or jump in where you'd like if I can jump in first turn to Keir the trouble is you've got to separate out quite a lot of strands of thought and meaning if Minsk too close the border stop the supply of arms stop the supply of men stop the supply of Russian troops into Ukraine that would be one thing it envisages that that is the main requirement Russia could stop this it would be decided straight away it would be wise to stop it because in the end it is in Russia's interest to have a stable Ukraine it is not in Russia's interest to be encouraging a state of actual anarchy in eastern Ukraine doesn't even help the Russian defense industry but in some sense it helped they've gone so far they feel they can't stop it it is the main responsibility trouble with Minsk is it gives too many excuses for them to say no no it's not we that are disobeying it it's the Ukrainians and so on and I think there is a reflection too for the nature of the EU this is an agreement which is not negotiated by the EU as such but the EU is a collective organization and like many collective organizations has a kind of mechanism towards all encompassing vagueness I'm not saying it's always vague or wrong but that is a different matter what I did not agree with Nilsa when he was talking about he began to go off on Russia's rights as a great power if all that means then of course Russia is a power of influence that is for sure true but as soon as you begin to talk about Russia's security interests that is a different matter Russia has no objective security interests in having a bankrupt anarchic upset Ukraine none at all unless you subscribe to the view that Russia as a great power has an interest in dominating its neighborhood in which case there is no into it if you dominate Ukraine you're going to miss Poland so you dominate Poland I'm just going in the logic so I think that is a very dangerous road to go down nobody is saying that we don't have a dialogue the question is a dialogue about what with whom a dialogue with Putin who is a serial liar is extraordinarily difficult thing to do you have to find areas you can talk to him in his interest and he has a long term commitment to it because it is in his interest Ukraine hasn't got to that yet it may do we must hope so but I think this is a long term policy there is also a remark to the fact that Ukraine had discovered it was not possible to deal with this by military means actually Ukraine has been rather more successful militarily than the Russians had expected and then anybody else for that matter that is true that it cannot be solved by Ukraine by military means nor actually it can be solved by Russia by military means what if Russia got to Kiev what would it do there does it really have the troops the men and the determination to rule Kiev if it does it's just making life extraordinarily difficult for itself it's true that we don't want to go to war but there are military options which if this continues I believe we will be forced somehow to condemn it supplying defensive equipment to a country that wishes to defend itself it's not aggression it's responding to aggression so it depends really on how far down the road we are forced to go mainly by Russia actions it's fine to talk about diplomacy I mean I've definitely had all my life and therefore found declining belief in diplomacy and certainly diplomacy without force moral force included or economic force included but a degree of persuasive ability is not going to succeed I would echo what Andrew said about nobody is saying that there should be no dialogue with Russia the issue is what is actually said and a lot of the things that have been said over the previous 16 months seem to betray a misunderstanding of how this conflict looks from Moscow for example offering Russia an off-ramp from confrontation while they're winning and have no possible interest in stepping back from the confrontation Neil Zannin said we have no slogan to explain what we're faced with unfortunately if I can sidestep for a moment yes we do it's been called hybrid warfare and that term has become embedded in NATO to an extent which we feel is quite unhelpful because it is not really a valid description of what we're actually facing at the moment we can follow up on that if anybody is interested later on also Andrew on the problem of respecting Russia as a great power spilling over into a temptation to respect Russia's self-defined security interests while as you said at the same time preserving our values unfortunately that's not possible because the two are entirely incompatible Russia sees its security needs as extending several hundred kilometers beyond its own borders and dominating its neighbors it is as true now as it was in 1946 when George Kennan wrote it and for centuries beforehand that any neighbor of Russia must be either an enemy or a vassal so once again if we do wish to support the frontline states there is going to be a problem with Russia's self-perceived security needs it is simply inevitable Minsk may eventually fail well it if I was reading the headlines right Minsk failed on the first day and has been consistently failing ever since the problem with clinging to a ceasefire agreement even though it is as you say all that we have got is that it is symptomatic of the asymmetry of objectives between our side and Russia put very simply we want peace they want victory and this is the reason why at the moment we are unable to offer them anything in terms of political dialogue which is meaningful from the other side yes it's true that nobody is prepared to go to war with Russia over Ukraine that has been made very clear but what also needs to be made clear is where we are prepared to go to war with Russia it does have to be put that bluntly because that is the those are the terms in which Russia is thinking at the moment with the mobilization of its society with the increasing spooling up of war rhetoric within Russia with the security calculus that is being used at the moment by Russia to assess its relationship with NATO that has to be stated very clearly I'd like to focus something both Sir Andrew mentioned on re-establishing the rules with Russia and something that you focus on in your paper which is the centrality of the OSCE and Germany assumes the chairmanship in office next year and I have to say this is where how do we get Russia to return back to the rules that they have signed on to and now have shredded which is the Helsinki final act which is the Paris Charter UN Security Council I mean I can keep going how do we return them back to the rules that they had accepted once but now don't how does the OSCE play into that the OSCE the monitoring role has been you know obviously something that's critical but has not been really efficacy is in question the monitors can't get in there there's so few to monitor the border how do we the OSCE at the center of it and bring Russia to the table rather than have them not embrace these principles well I have to admit that I'm not so happy about our upcoming presidency because it's very well prepared this is not the problem but it seems that the expectations are very high and that people are expecting that now Germany is taking over the presidency we all of a sudden would be able to solve all kinds of problems so I would have preferred to give back the presidency to Switzerland and which they did an excellent job I have to say also the Serbian colleagues did an excellent job and keep Germany in that in a supportive role that worked very well I guess but this is just a footnote we will do our best I mean the OSCE has been over the last years I don't think that I'm unnecessarily rude here not played a central role in European politics and it was one of the ideas of all for a minister and the chancellor to when so to say that organization for not only the reason that you mentioned because it's like the embodiment of what we believe in our common values and also the guardian of the treaties that you mentioned the Paris Convention but it's also an organization where Russia is a member and that I believe is very important and I don't think that NATO is an organization that can play a part in solving the problem militarily or diplomatically it has a crucial role in reassuring our neighbors and allies who are feeling threatened and they certainly have if I look at the Baltic countries a different threat perception than most of my citizens have for example sometimes saying that their rhetoric is not always helpful and sometimes inflammatory but the Russian as the German position was also very clear that you know you cannot tell somebody not to be afraid so we accept that there is a different threat perception, history with Russia and that's why by the way NATO is part of our answer to the crisis that's not always mentioned also not always mentioned by German politicians because that part of our strategy is not very popular in Germany but we do more air policing in the Baltic states we increased our patrols in the Baltic sea we are taking the lead now in that I'm not a military guy so let me see if I if I get it right it's a very high readiness joint task force and I got it very good and by the way we increased our defense budget for the first time not to an extent that would make whatever defense politician in this town happy and it's not going to happen anyway soon what we did so yes NATO has a role but more role to keep cohesion within our allies it's not an instrument because it's lacking the ability on the Russian side to play any political role in this conflict I don't believe it and I to be very frank I'm very happy that we have a new NATO Secretary General who seems to understand this and who's not adding all to the fire as the previous guy did and so the OC has a chance but the OC in itself can not you know move mountains it's not happening but the presence of the special monitoring mission in Ukraine is very crucial because we are not only observing the conflict that we have been talking about here on the podium in the military means and the political disputes we are also seeing the part that is part of a war and has always been part of a war that is the information war going on and also for me as a lawmaker sometimes it is difficult to find out what is really happening so it became customary for me to not only read the reports but to sit down face to face with OSCE observers to get an impression about what is happening and they are in the conflict regions they cannot be deployed any time because it's dangerous they need to be made arrangements but they are in the United States they have been visiting the battle fields and I just want to say here very clearly the Minsk accords are being violated constantly on a daily base by both sides and it's not ignoring or neglecting that the key to the conflict is clearly in Russia and that the responsibility getting there is clearly the Russian responsibility because they annex Crimea and they have been sending regular troops to eastern Ukraine but it doesn't make it better that the Ukrainian forces are also violating this agreement and also the military the ceasefire agreement the question of heavy weaponry and the political aspect so we are dealing with two difficult partners one equal the others because one is representing a democratically elected government but there are militias fighting in the region which are not under control of the Ukrainian government and they are paid for by oligarchs and what we are seeing is that there is a blockade of eastern Ukraine which is benefitting and creating an entire economy of bloggers and people who are benefitting from this fighting so we need to support Ukraine and those forces within the Rada and the government who want to stop this corruption in the country that is run by oligarchic interests and have an interest in stopping this self-feeding circle of violence from both sides and that's what is concerning me and sometimes it's more difficult for a politician from Berlin or wherever to say this and sometimes it's good to have a report issued by an organization that is impartial that has observers also from Russia but also from Germany from other countries and I hope that we can make a modest contribution to keep that operation up and running Thank you to Andrew and Kier I think Kier was in your chapter that you wrote you sort of question the post-1991 security order can ever be restored so do you envision that we can get Russia back to accepting security principles as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act is this possible or not under President Putin? It may not have been in my chapter but it sounds very plausible I think it's indicative when you're considering that Russia has been consistently for the last now putting forward its own alternatives to all of those documents that you were talking about the outlines of the new European Security Treaty which Russia pushes now fairly quietly but still consistently it's still there in the background it hasn't gone away remodeling Europe along the lines that Russia wants to see it decoupling the United States from European security ensuring that the unity which we were stressing in the earlier part of this discussion is not a factor which hinders Russian interests or domination of its neighbors so I think that's an indication that their interest in returning to a security system which they see as fundamentally flawed is very limited after all the post-Cold War settlement which we thought was now an ideal state of relationship between nations they see as a mistake of history which they are now very keen on correcting Sir Richard if I can ask you and I'm going to pose that to Niels this question as well and then I'm going to open up for questions the question of the Russian nuclear factor we've certainly seen over the last several weeks a very open discussion about use of Russian nuclear weapons either moving them, potentially esconders move to Crimea, Kaliningrad we've had very inflammatory op-eds and the Danish press from the Russian ambassador about the Danish government joins the missile defense architecture Russia will could potentially use nuclear weapons against ships and does this concern you and Niels I'm coming to your question because in your paper you note that the modernization of Russia's strategic weapon arsenal you're not concerned or as concerned about this I have to say I am concerned particularly on the nuclear question so I'd welcome your thoughts and Kara can send it to you and then we'll have you finish up and then let's open up to questions what's extraordinarily difficult to whether this is Vragno or Blaster on the part of the Russians or whether it's serious you meant and it's also quite extraordinarily difficult to determine what changes just to me what changes they've really made in their nuclear weaponry what is clear is that it's extraordinarily it's meant to be in trouble the idea that you would bomb the Danish fleet or something maybe theoretically you would but you'd have to be in hell of a mess before you did that and you would probably have saved your best weapons for obliterating Washington while you were at it so it's actually a very stupid way of talking and some of the things that Russian ambassadors say are just I don't know where it all comes from whether it's simply they're trying to please Putin whether they're just going hysterical they didn't read what it says so this is really stupid things when Putin himself said that he was considering getting nuclear weapons ready before he sees Crimea what the hell is the point of that what would he use them for anyway did he seriously going to think well a good idea to obliterate Kiev or something presumably not on the other hand there is the thought that with Putin he's been in power for a long time he doesn't really talk to anyone those that he does talk to are people who are bound to say you're a great guy he's suppressed all criticism as far as he's able within his own country this is a very dangerous situation and it will be dangerous, ambassadors go bonkers after three or four years anyway and become thoroughly associated with the country as opposed to be being objective about this is just an objective fact so you can imagine what's going on in his head and the Kremlin is a very isolated peculiar place which is all a way of saying I really don't know but I could just say a word in support of the OSCE and the point that Niels was making it is sometimes an error to look for a solution now if you can maybe begin a process which might begin to achieve something and there will come a time I suppose that if not Putin then the Russians as a whole will begin to question what on earth is taking parts of Crimea out of Ukraine done for us, nothing all it's done is make enemies for us everywhere including within the Eurasian Union all it's does is alarm people great Russia blood, great deal of fun but nothing else. Do we really like it when the President is talking about using nuclear weapons? Do we really? What if President Obama got out and said look I've got a lot of nuclear weapons as well I'm going to wave them about would that make everybody feel good in the United States? I don't think so Well I'm picking the nuclear rhetoric and the reasons behind it is very complicated and intricate and there are lots of different layers of subtlety and psychology in it some of the things that we hear are nonsensical to us but make perfect sense in Russia because of reasons like the very distinctive role of nuclear weapons in Russian military and strategic thinking and also because of the proceeding from a Cold War place which we've moved on from so the messaging is received but not understood on our side but it is the lack of institutional memory on our side which causes this excited reaction every time Russia makes an announcement of something which has been planned in public knowledge for a very long time for example the most recent announcement about reintroducing the latest wave of modernized ICBMs that is part of their longstanding modernization schedule which we have known about in fact there are fewer now being introduced through the course of 2015 and similarly with the Iskandas to Kaliningrad this is something which has been threatened again and again and again at every crisis point in the reaction before Iskandas it was Turchka U, S300, you name it there is a longstanding deployment program to bring these things to Kaliningrad region and every time they they mention it we jump up and down because we've forgotten that it's happened several times before so they will keep on doing it because every time they get this very satisfying excited reaction from the other side which validates that yes we are frightening the West all we need to do is actually sit down and count up how many times it's happened before to ignore it the next time I think in your report one of the authors mentions fear is equals respect and so in some ways causing the fear is treating Russia with respect that was yours, good let me just have you give a few messages on because the paper does talk about the nuclear issue just give your reflections and then everyone get your questions ready basically what I wanted to say in the papers basically the same that Kiar just mentioned so there is some modernization program ongoing and by the way there is also a lifetime extension program within the United States so we can have a debate about how much census makes on both sides to modernize nuclear weapons but this is not today's issue what is concerning me is not that much that Russia is modernizing nuclear weapons and as has been said the amount is smaller than we expected or was initially announced so that is not really new but what is concerning me is the rhetoric and the Danish incident was mentioned by Sir Andrew and I think he was right and if we look back in the Cold War history I think after Khrushchev left or was forced to leave office I think that is the correct way there are very very rare incidents where Soviet leaders were threatening to use nuclear arms I mean the threat was always there from both sides so that I need to mention this but that is really concerning me because you can scare people by using this kind of words and deliberately choosing this aggressive rhetoric and so that is in a way the rhetoric is giving me more headache than what has actually been done I think just one comment from the American side some of the rhetoric and some of the announcement has certainly caused Defense Department General Dunford who is confirmation I think in some ways we understand that Russia does have an existential challenge to us with its nuclear weapons and we have to take it seriously even though the rhetoric may be very bombastic there has to be an element that you must take this quite seriously and I think that is part of the challenge we have given you plenty of time to think of tough questions for this great audience we have some microphones if you could raise your hand identify yourself please and what I would like to do is take a few questions from our audience and bundle them a little bit and then I will allow our panelists to handle them this table looks particularly active so we will have the microphone brought up here Anna please thank you Steven Blank American Farm Policy Council my question is for Mr. Anand you have said and I think we all agree that the annexation and invasion of Crimea is unacceptable this week Russia further annexed territory in Georgia indicating that its appetite is not over so on what basis as long as Russia feels it can annex foreign territories and occupy them is there a basis for a dialogue with Russia on European security when the fundamental principle of the sovereignty and integrity of other European states is not respected at all in Moscow thank you John Harper with National Defense Magazine my question is for all of you do you think that the new threat perception about Russia will spur more NATO member countries to increase their defense spending to meet the alliance goal of 2% of GEP hi Michael Ratner with Congressional Research Service I'm an energy analyst covering oil and gas my question is I have a two-part question if that's okay just wanted to get your insight into a question that I get asked a lot which is what is the role of energy in this conflict leading up to it and potentially as part of a solution and then a specific question to Mr. Anand when it comes to the role of natural gas and the relationship between Russia and Germany the expansion potential discussion of expanding the broadstream and the lack of say LNG import terminals in Germany yes certainly let me pick up the 2% of GDP issue there yes I think it will cause more NATO nations to start observing NATO criteria more seriously I think it already has done the other question is whether it is time to move on from that criterion as a meaningful measure of defense capability I think it is a metric that was put in place before this crisis started as just some kind of basic measure of trying to get European nations to take an interest in their own defense and the time has now moved on I think to where it would be far more useful to put in place a measure of capability which is more directly related to being able to defend themselves against conventional threats because let's now forget the 2% of GDP in some cases with the respect to our central European colleagues is spent on pensions for also packed officers as opposed to buying new weaponry I think it is far more effective if you look at what is happening in the Baltic states at the moment who are struggling with the exception of Estonia to bring their spending up to that fairly arbitrary measure but what they are spending is very precisely targeted on exactly those capabilities that they feel they need in the current security situation the proportion of serviceable and I hesitate to use the word modern weaponry because it sounds like a Russian criteria but the proportion of relevant equipment that is usable in each nation's inventories I think is a far more appropriate measure for whether or not they are actually ready for current challenges I would have nothing to add for that and I have no answer to Stephen's questions since he wasn't putting it to me understandably the energy is a reality is mutual dependence and that is healthy and a good thing I think the energy companies Western energy companies in Russia have done a great deal to improve Russian capability in this area working with their Russian colleagues and I think where they have been closely involved as well they have done a great deal to make it rather more accountable and effectively managed those good things where it's been poor is when an energy monopoly has been used to put pressure and this particularly applies to gas and pipelines obviously to put pressure on individual countries which has been a repeated theme by Moscow Europe has done its best to counter that by diversifying its sources and increasing its ability to have interconnecting supplies which I think is a good thing and in the end it's a good thing for Russia too because Russia has a strong interest in being a viable part of the world energy mix it's got every right to exploit its unique advantage in this area which is about its most exploitable one what it hasn't got the right to do is to try and blackmail people into supporting things or raising prices and so on I'm glad it's finding that increasingly difficult I don't think it's a cause of the conflict no to Steve I think you know if we don't engage in a dialogue with Russia would that help those countries like Georgia or Moldova or Ukraine that are confronted with what we call the frozen conflicts well I don't know I mean the president today I listened to him addressing the nation on the Iran deal and I think he was quoting John F. Kennedy who said you don't negotiate so this is in a way that's what we're trying to do we're trying to find political solutions for the problems that we all care about and I can tell you I mean talking about Ukraine the European Union just signed an association agreement with Ukraine I'm not sometimes not sure if everybody really had a look into this agreement this is a very ambitious program to modernize Ukrainian state structures economy to make their economy more competitive and to strengthen the links with the European Union and we are committed to help them this will be a very very difficult way for Ukraine even if there would be no war in Donbass I mean this country is and for years in an extremely difficult position I mentioned the corruption, the structure of the economy the political mass that we are confronted with so it would to my modest expectation it would take years even without the war in Donbass to fulfill all the commitments that the Ukrainian Government signed with the association agreement but to my big surprise Ukrainian politicians are not talking about this they are talking about joining the EU or joining NATO as if that would bring relief and I can tell you joining a club is not in itself solving problems I would advise you to talk to my friends from Romania or Bulgaria so it's a long way that we have before us of course we are observing with consternation and disappointment what is happening in Russia right now by the way I think President Putin changed his policies after he got re-elected for a certain time because sometimes you created at least for me the impression as this was always the Russian policy I don't think this is correct I think they changed course for whatever reason and I'm also not always sure if there is a master plan behind what is happening we tend to believe that there is a grand strategy that the Russian leadership is following or that Putin has developed I cannot rule this out but I'm not so sure what we know for sure is that there was a military plan ready for Crimea and he implemented it and obviously with a lot of success very professional but after that happened for me I have more the impression that it was a day to day dealing and sometimes also ad hoc decisions being taken so we should not read more into it it's even without a master plan complicated enough and I mean the West was negotiating and talking to Stalin today's Russia is completely a different society I mean I'm not justifying what is happening in Russia not at all but if you see the Russian society today in a historic perspective it is a different country and there are forces who are under enormous pressure right now who have been jailed or forced out of the country or the newspapers have been locked down and so on and so forth but they are still existing there is the middle class in Moscow and St. Petersburg and other cities so we need to try to create conditions where those voices are going to be heard again the other question I can be quick I guess what is going to happen at least what Germany is concerned I completely agree that we should measure our defense spending and capabilities more in what we actually achieve there is a discussion under way and we feel more pressure to at least start what we have been deciding several times on several NATO summits and I think I was sitting on a committee of our parliament that is discussing how we can combine the rights of our parliament with the need to create more European capabilities I think we are on a good way but it is not going to happen from one day to another and the role of energy I agree with what Sir Henry said this is a mutual dependency so I am not against that energy relationship that we have with Russia it gives us an additional tool but of course we are also engaged as you may know in a very ambitious energy plan for Germany and we try to expense to Europe because we don't believe in nuclear energy and fossil energy in general and this is also reducing our dependency from Russia in a long-term perspective if we invest in clean energy and renewables and that is what we are doing LNG old discussion there is no principal objection against creating an LNG terminal but my question is as long as Rotterdam is not running on full capacity I don't know if we really need an own LNG terminal in Germany great I think we have time for one more round of questions we will end up over this wow we are going to take a lot so we are going to start over there show them right there and I just ask everyone to keep it really short and I will let everyone have the last say here thank you for producing this document very good text I wanted to ask a question regarding Russian population Russian society in the context of what is what is called information warfare that is the best term given the circumstances how do we go about and by way of the Euro-Atlantic community go about reaching Russian society reaching the Russian population in particular through media great question and then we are just going to play pass it around so one back and then we will do two up here great thank you we will come right up here to the table for Sir Henry or any of you what is the situation for Mr. Putin I understand from friends of Moscow that he is very, very popular is that true? popularity, Putin's popularity, okay right over there Mike was adding a couple of developments that don't quite fit into the narrative first of all Russia has played at least a professional role in the Iranian negotiations and secondly they had a great opportunity to really mess around with the Greek EU situation and so far have resisted at least two visits from Cyprus maybe even Russia can't afford to bail him out but nevertheless it does not fit into the overall narrative of the conduct that we have been discussing this afternoon fantastic I am just going to move quite anybody in the middle here okay we have one up here Anna we are going to get everybody I promise across the route thank you this question is for any of the panelists we saw recently about a couple weeks ago that Azerbaijan's president Ali have actually made very charged and bombastic remarks about actually invading Armenia South Republic of Armenia based on false claims of ethno historic ties to the land which mirror very similarly from what I see Putin's claims on Crimea and potentially the Donbas and any more parts of Ukraine do you think that a failure to facilitate this situation in Ukraine would set a very dangerous precedent for other situations for other political opportunities to take advantage and create more regional instability in the various regions in which they operate do you think that would be again just the precedent would be the major item of in question here great fantastic okay we have got Ken Yellowitz is right behind oh boy we like people passing by thank you so much retired State Department what about the pivot to China is this destined to be a partnership or a junior partnership which I think it will be pardon me I said no no no no Putin's pivot Russia's pivot to China yes sir right there thank you Lauren Hershey retired attorney from the Justice Department three quick questions Heather can you get together three people who are Russians that are the equivalent of these three here thank you very much for the Chatham House co-authors it's a bilingual report will you make a presentation in Moscow or St. Petersburg if somebody will fund it for you and if they'll allow you to speak out in the public and for the German parliamentarian how much is there an interface with your counterparts in Russia and last one way in the back last but not least Stanley Cobra just wanted to have an assessment of the global balance of power the question about China was asked because President Putin just hosted both the BRICS and the SEO India was elevated to full membership in the SEO so it's not just China India next to that Europe is just an appendage and that brings up Europe I'm looking at the headline in the telegraph on Greece anti-austerity protests turned violent as demonstrators hurled petrol bombs you probably saw the IMF report tens of billions of euros will have to be written off they're not going to be repaid where will that money come from will it come from the defense budgets your social security where will that money come from Wow your challenge in ten minutes is to discuss how do we effectively reach the Russian population via social media the impact of sanctions on Mr. Putin's psyche the popularity of Mr. Putin it's very high at the Lovato Center very high estimates of that Iran Greece doesn't fit into the pattern the impact of the neighborhood perhaps instability in Nagorno-Karabakh China parliamentarian exchanges are you doing this presentation in Moscow and global balance of power who wants to begin here is the bravest soul in the world go ahead no he's the one who's most willing to cherry pick perfectly allowed I'll hit the ones that are closest to my patch and also the ones which are simplest presentation in Moscow the closest we've got so far is a double act between one of our colleagues James Nixie and the Russian Embassy in Brussels which by all accounts are quite exciting I'm sorry I couldn't have been there if there is an invitation to Moscow which I rather doubt will happen then yeah of course I'd be delighted the one about Russian society and information warfare and the popularity of Putin if I can splice those together there are a lot of calls to do something about reaching the Russian population and the broadcasting border governors and equivalents overseas Deutsche Welle and now under a lot of pressure to to find some way of reaching the ordinary Russian and I don't think they're going to manage it because it is now a great deal harder than it was during the Cold War for ordinary Russians to access foreign media it is no longer the case that you have a shortwave radio in your kitchen that you can subtly tune into the BBC World Service on now you can only do it through the internet and then most of the time through the filter of the Russian service which tends to present the picture of foreign media and what they're saying about the world but in fact gives a very distorted and skewed view a lot of reliance is placed on the internet as a way of reaching ordinary Russians let's not forget and this is where the Putin popularity comes in that you cannot in Russia use the internet without the authorities being aware of exactly what it is that you are looking for so in order to access foreign media you have to not only step out of your own information comfort space you also have to be brave enough to do something which is socially frowned upon now similarly 86 88% popularity ratings for President Putin at the moment if somebody phones you up at your house and says do you approve of President Putin I think there are enough people in Russia with long enough memories to give the right answer most of the time finally just one point on coming back to what Nils Anand said was for whatever reason was unclear in our view and this is a point which we try to get across in several chapters in the report he has not changed course he just got started on the course that was in mind from the beginning and the whatever reason is because now Russia's capabilities and its perception of its own strength and influence in the world had developed to match its long standing intentions now I'm talking about not only in the purely military terms that we saw deployed in Crimea in 2014 vastly different from what we saw in Georgia in 2008 but also their relative weight and influence as proved for example in as they see it diverting US attempt to influence the serious situation over the chemical chemical warfare problem that we see as a particular turning point in Russian foreign policy and something which bolsters their readiness to take direct action using means that they've already proved through a long standing process of trial and error adopting and adapting measures against their western neighbors I'll have a good some of the other ones does Russia and understand economic realities I think very imperfectly is he affected by sanctions yes I think that he is the long term effect of sanctions is felt and the political effect of sanctions having been inserted in the first place is also exerts pressure on him is he going to leave Ukraine straight away because of sanctions obviously not but he would like them lifted including because he would see that as a defeat for unity in the west the question of Nagorno-Karabakh is essentially different from the question of Donbass and I think that the parallel is a bit strained but you're quite right that spreading the message of the right value in international affairs is that might is right is dangerous for many places including that particular one on China this is not a partnership in the sense of two equal powers Russia is pretty expendable from China's point of view it is a humiliation for many Russians to see themselves turning to China and becoming in some way apparently dependent on China all that said there is a natural interest for China for Russia in depending developing China as a as a market including for its energy and other natural resources it was always a big surprise the reason that BP got involved and I used to work for BP with Russia in the first place was because they acquired a major interest in a huge gas field just north of Yakutsk whose obvious market is China the Chinese sorry the Russians were never willing to accept that logic because they didn't want Chinese to have a handle over them or something like that but anyway they're now being forced down that route a little bit I think it's something we should not exaggerate as as a major shift it's only natural and right and I don't think we need to be particularly concerned about it I do not think that the expansion of the Shanghai Corporation organization to include India matters a button and I don't think because this puts the rest of us somehow in the shade nor do I think it's likely to become a terrifically major force in world affairs does Russian cooperation with us over Iran and refraining from doing anything constructive about Greece to disrupt the EU show that the narrative is flawed no I don't think so those are different matters I do not think our narratives are one of total conflict our narrative is essentially about the nature of society in Ukraine the global reach of Russia within Europe and those have huge implications for the way that we wish the world to be conducted including the idea that might is right we believe in legal obligations and moral obligations the Russians under Putin believe in contingent liabilities if a promise is good you keep it if it's not so good that day you break it most marriages don't really work on that basis and I know time is short but I will give you as we say the benediction thank you I will try to answer the question about Russia's behavior that is not fitting into the narrative that's true I mean they have been very constructive in concluding a historic Iran deal they have been helpful in bringing out most at least most of the chemical chemical weapons out of Syria and I think that in a way it's underlining what in Germany many believe and I am among those who believe that whatever disappointment opposition rejection of Russian behavior we are agreeing upon and I think there are some nuances but in the general assessment we don't have major disagreements Russia is a neighbor of Europe and Russia is the big power Russia has a lot of possibilities to act as a spoiler and they are showing us that they are capable of doing it so we need to come to an arrangement with Russia not at the expense of sovereign state or our own values but we need to find a way to live together it's maybe not the idea of having Russia completely integrated into our structures it's certainly right now not about a friendship relationship but I believe what has been said in the beginning by Sir Andrew that the Russian population really is a population that wants to have an ordinary life with freedom, with access to resources to wealth and that we should not close the door so we should use every opportunity where also Russian interests are coincidenting with our interests like we did on the Iran deal and try to use this as a confidence building measure Mr. Tsipras is concerned that's very interesting I mean he was travelling several times to Russia and apparently trying to use this as a bargaining ship to get a better deal I think while we are speaking my colleagues in the Greek parliament are debating whether this is a good deal or not but there are certainly no real financial incentives from Russia they are not willing to bail Greece out if any of you would like to do this it would be most welcome but the truth of the matter is that the existing frozen conflicts and now the situation in Donbas also annex Crimea is not cheap it is very costly for Russia and if you look at the western Balkans the Chancellor made a very important trip to the western Balkans the country that is closely linked and considered to be Russia's best friend is Serbia they were selling their gas company below market price to get a feed into South Stream they did not even get a prior warning when the project was cancelled guess who is paying one of the highest gas prices in the western Balkans it's Serbia so being a friend of Russia is not always a very attractive concept I think to tackle the last question about parliamentarian contacts yes, we have contacts with our colleagues in the Duma both in the upper and in the lower house but it has been very difficult over the last period of time and I think both sides contributed to this I was against putting members of parliament on a non-travel list there has been a discussion in our parliament as well this is a decision by Brussels and I think it should have been a decision, a debate in elected parliament so now the Russian reciprocated and a colleague of mine was denied entrance to the Russian Federation this is all very unfortunate in the hand of those forces who have no interest in inter-parliamentary contact so we are meeting our colleagues but it is not an easy endeavour and on both sides there are forces who don't like to see this kind of engagement but that's where members of parliament afford to talk with each other not necessarily to agree even democratically elected MPs do not always agree but it's necessary and we will continue to talk to each other thank you very much thank you so much, a big shout out of thanks to the Friedrich Ebert Stiften for joining us in partnership, thank you fabulous fabulous, please read the Russian challenge, the Chatham House report it's fantastic, Nilsen and thank you for spending some time with us, thank you Sir Wood here it's been fantastic we look forward to great debates and have a great day, I think the skies are cold, you're going to get out here before it rains so have a great night, thank you