 Okay, so, all right, so, am I starting? Great, so I'm John Kelsey, I'm from NIST. I didn't actually make these slides, so I hope there are no big surprises here. So I'm gonna talk about some announcements from NIST. So the first big thing you may have heard about it is that we have a post-quantum cryptography standardization project. We are in a superposition of too early and too late. We will find out later when we take the measurement how it works out. And so there are like 100 days left for the submission. This is roughly the timetable, and if you send it by September 30th, we'll look it over and say if you've missed something. This is your submissions for the post-quantum. Really, I can't really tell you a whole lot. This is not primarily my project, but you can go to the website and you can learn a lot. And there are also several people here like Ray Perlner who can tell you a great deal about this. I think there's been one. Two. I think there's been more than one. Okay, next thing, we've been working on a lightweight crypto project. So the idea here is to have a portfolio of lightweight crypto algorithms that are intended for limited use. We're kind of trying to nail down exactly how we will restrict these things because they don't wind up being the thing that everybody uses for TLS. So we've got these draft profiles, and you can see, and we've asked for more, we've asked for the community to propose profiles. These are the two that we're looking at right now, AAD and hashing for constrained environments. So if you're interested, there is a website, yeah, there's a website so you can see the page where this project is going on. And there's also the report on lightweight crypto and there's a draft white paper on profiles. So if you're interested in this stuff, you know, what's the saying, if you like this stuff, this is the sort of stuff you'll like. So here you go. So this thing, and this is kind of, this ties in with John Jock's comment before, right, about triple DES and having been around for so long. So we're kind of trying to drive a stake in the heart of DES now, and say that DES is gonna, we're gonna try to get rid of it as much as we can. This could be hard because there's stuff out in the field that's really hard to swap out like bank machines. But we are trying to deprecate the use of triple DES, limit the amount of data that can be used, and start down a timeline where we will eventually make it go away. Now that's really, really optimistic that we'll ever go away. There will be like nano computers running, orbiting in Mars, they're still using triple DES and doing their payroll programs in COBOL, right? But this is what we've got. So there's some stuff here. You can find the publication on the website once again. And also if you have comments, which probably are like, oh my God, you're gonna destroy all my ATMs or something. Send them here to this address, and we will read them. And maybe we should like go get some drinks before we start reading, because it'll probably be sad, but we have these other documents, 856A and 56C, these are all documents that we are looking for comments on. Here's the comments and the deadlines. This is for key derivation and also key derivation functions and stuff. So please look at these and give us comments. And the last thing I want to talk about is the NIST beacon. This is kind of fun. So the idea of a beacon is really, goes back like 30, 40 years, I think. So it's basically a source of random numbers. Every random number is timestamped and digitally signed. They're all hash chain together. So even we can't change the past. So it's like a blockchain, but without the consensus stuff. It's just a consensus of one. So we have developed a new API, a new protocol for the beacon, a new format. The API supports combining beacons. It has a pre-commitment field so that you can combine beacon pulses. The University of Chile and IBM are planning to implement their own beacons. So the goal is that there will be at least three sources of beacons running with this protocol. So if you want to do, there are a lot of applications for beacons, for these signed random numbers where you don't really have a big security issue and it's not a lot of money or anything. You can just use one. If you feel like you can't trust just a single beacon, you can use this format and do a simple protocol and combine beacons from three different sources. And this becomes a lot more secure. So that's the big picture. Let's see if I've, that's it. So I think I've done. Thank you.