 Now I take Akinai, you have the floor. Thank you, Moussoul president. I think I'd like to discuss three things, spending one minute for each. One is prospects for global economic growth. Second is inflation, deflation. The third is financial system. The first, growth prospect. I think average economists are very gloomy about global economic growth next year. But I'm perhaps somewhat more optimistic because at the moment there are three main elements which put downward pressures on economic growth of the world. One is, of course, U.S.-China trade disputes. They are not only reducing trade volume between the U.S. and China, but also putting a damper on business investment here and there. China is trading partner through an elevated uncertainty over business prospects. But, well, as was agreed between U.S. and China yesterday or two days ago, I think U.S.-China will strike a deal. I wouldn't call it a permanent peace treaty or something. It's just temporary truce. But I'm pretty sure Mr. Trump understands this issue's implication for economic growth in the U.S. and then presidential election. So this element will ease, in my view. I might be too optimistic, but this is the first element. Second element is rapid slowdown in China's economic growth, which is attributable, in my view, to the leveraging there. I mean, because of huge debt accumulated there, Chinese authorities are smart enough to curb that trend. And this one, too, this is a good thing, actually, for sustainability of China's economic growth long-term but putting a damper short-term. But this, again, Chinese authorities seem a little bit concerned about excessive downward pressure. And so in recent months, monetary policy has been eased and also state controls on state-owned enterprises have been eased, too. So these two negative elements tend to become weaker a little bit. The third element, I think this is most important for cyclical developments. You know, manufacturing in the world economy is in large part influenced by so-called silicon cycle. A production of IT goods and machines are governed by cyclical forces of inventory stocking and de-stocking, whose cycle consists typically two years up and two years down. And most recent expansionary phase began in early 2016 and peaked in early 2018. So if the two years rule continues to hold good, then it will be early 2020 or around the turn of the year that the cycle hits the bottom and begins to recover. So this is a good element. And if 5G and IoT development accelerates, then the economic bottom will come sooner and the ensuing recovery will gain momentum. So there's so much for economic growth perspective, low inflation. I think I did discuss this issue two years ago. You know, the painful memories of GFCs to rankle in the minds of businessmen and workers. So despite good economic performance during the past few years, workers still have some sort of sense of job insecurity and corporate businessmen are feeding some sort of liquidity shortage might break up anytime soon or something like that. And also I discussed the global competition for the damper on prices and IT, AI, revolution. And as I did discuss two years ago, I think these momentum's not losing, but slowing down. China's influence over global deflation coming to an end in my view because of high wage increases in China and also, you know, US-China disputes perhaps will limit the Chinese influence on prices in the US and elsewhere. Okay, and IT revolution too. Well, IT revolution sort of thing depends on regulation. One footnote to this is, you know, inflation, historically flared up when inflation psychology picked up and it's very difficult to analyze psychology of people, but in this regard I think 2020 presidential election may change the whole dynamics. If the election ends with a progressive president, you know, we are all familiar with how, you know, radically US politics changed in the past from Jimmy Carter to Reagan and that sort of thing. So if 2020 US presidential election proves to be the same way, then the new president will formulate, you know, left-wing policies including universal health insurance coverage, which I think is a good thing for American people. But it may change psychology of American people to be more specific, you know, psyche may become more inflation-prone. Like an episode in the mid-1960s, when the Johnson administration advocated guns and butter policy introducing Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, which invited the spike in prices in medical products actually and the triggering inflation psychology then. So much for inflation. Financial system. This is the greatest concern of mine. To be specific, a huge debt has been accumulated in the global market carrying negative interest rates. Japanese JGBs, European debts, not just short-term paper, long-term government bonds and mid-term corporate bonds. Negative interest rates are counterintuitive to me, although macroeconomists attribute them to deflationary expectations. Are they serious? I know no survey that supports the negative inflation expectations over 10 years or longer. In addition, you have to bear in mind that holding a fixed-income asset carries risks of not only inflation deflation, but also many others, like price volatility unrelated to, unrelated with inflation. Look, debtors must, you know, debtors may default. So, you know, liquidity premiums should be paid there. And also, holders may die before maturity. So negative interest rates or negative yields really defy these risks, in my view. I think investors simply hold long-term debts carrying negative interest rates for arbitrage gain. You know, they hope to earn long before maturity, wishing that, you know, they could escape scot-free from possible spikes in interest rates. Such decision-making based on, you know, Keynes' beauty context creates a bubble. If it burst, then a number of institutional investors will go under, okay? And they may entail a systemic run on asset management industry, because, you know, once investors run on bond sales, some asset managers may, will face a shortage of liquidity in bond markets, which makes them difficult to execute the sell orders, okay? Resulting into cash shortage. So, you know, and remember, some or more than a few asset management companies hold assets under management over trillions, trillions of dollars. It's a huge problem. Now, viewed from a different angle, actually I discussed this two years ago, too. Can I ask you, am I right or wrong when I say, one, on global growth, you're relatively optimistic, a little bit more optimistic than the mainstream? Second, on getting out of the very, very low inflation regime, you are reasonably optimistic, too. Of course, the bet is that the new present in the U.S. will change a little bit on the table, if I may. But, all taken into account, you see the situation different from the very, very low inflation that we have today, which is, of course, driving the central banks to be incredibly accommodating. It's what I understand from the second message. And paradoxically, on the third message, you're very pessimistic, as a number of us. And you see a dramatic crisis looming. This is what I'm getting at, actually. You know, Japanese low interest rates, negative interest, recently, who are the major investors? They are dollar-based investors, okay, particularly American institutional investors buying JGBs at negative interest rates. Why? Because of a widespread between LIBO and OIS, you know, or SOFA, whatever you call. You know, dollar liquidity shortage in the market. Why is that? Because major banks are reluctant to do market-making activities, because they really fear that doing, you know, arbitrage on LIBO and OIS, well, they have to expand their balance sheets, which requires huge capital, huge liquidity. As I said two years ago, Basel III and Dodd-Frank require too much of this kind of thing. Therefore, LIBO spread is wide there. So from the viewpoint of American investors, on a swap basis, buying JGBs will give them profits over U.S. Treasury holdings. So that's why, that's a part of the reason that American banks, I don't know, are American investors buying JGBs at deep negative interest rates. I take your point. You know, it's very interesting, the element of speculation that you have on your market. We have a lot of American citizens here. We would like very much to have their own sentiment on what's going on, on the JGB market. Very, very stimulating. But could you conclude now? Yes, yes, please. So this kind of distorted regulations. On one hand, tight regulations on banks, much less regulations on shadow banks, in particular asset management company, created or, you know, make imbalances already there, even worse. And because of a short-sighted speculation so widespread, it would unwind someday. Possibly creating a fiasco in the system. So that's my major concern. That's very important. What you said is very important. I'm afraid we will find other pockets in the world, pockets of finance, pockets of markets where we have also speculative, abnormal behavior and bubbles. But yours, of course, is gigantic and very impressive. Can I turn to, I'm sorry. Behind this, of course, you know, too much emphasis is given by the central bank to anti-deflation policy, of course. The central bank are the only game in town now in many, many countries, including, of course, Japan. It's a very abnormal, very abnormal situation. And we will discuss, but I see a connection between Jeff remarks and your own remark.