 Well, I think the conference was very important in the sense that we wanted to get the nuclear safety community in general, you know, regulators and some other actors, around the theme of Fukushima, but not in a perspective of, you know, going through the accident again. We've done that, you know, many times, and as you know, the IAEA has published volumes of, you know, documents and analysis and assessments, but the idea was more to share what has been done in reality, and in the light of the current developments, 2021 quite evidently is not 2011 for nuclear energy. See whether we are in a good place when it comes to nuclear safety. So I've seen lots of inputs. The president of the conference has prepared a document with a call for actions in a number of areas, which, you know, is going to be shared with the membership. So I believe it was a good discussion, and we could integrate new elements to this, you know, body of conclusions and assessments that we had already. So I think it was a good conference, yes. To follow up on that subject, in your opening address, you mentioned that COP26, you know, you were having discussions again, you know, making your pitch for nuclear energy. And then the one subject, the one reply you kept hearing was, what about Fukushima? So I was just curious, so what do you say in those cases? Are you able to win anyone over in those conversations? In Glasgow? Yes, exactly. So when you're trying to appease people's fears about the kind of accident like Fukushima or Chernobyl, is there anything particularly convincing that you're able to put forward, or do you just kind of look at each other? I think the, thank you. No, I think the arguments are out there. It's more about sharing light on these arguments and the facts, because what you see more than having to convince people is that there is still, these days, there is widespread, I would say, perceptions that do not correspond to facts. So the effort there is to try to reconcile, you know, these perceptions with the real facts. Of course, people will have positions on nuclear energy. So it was more, my feeling was that it was more that than anything else. I think that there are two levels here. I think setting aside those who can, who may have very strong ideological convictions against nuclear energy, there is a widespread recognition that nuclear will have a place and is having a place in the solution to global warming. So many say, okay, we see this happening. So what are the implications or how are we going to be sure that nuclear is going to be safety remembering what happened back at the time of Fukushima? So this was more the kind of dialogue we were having at different quarters. That's what I was getting at. So the last part you're saying is there's a worries about nuclear safety. So what specifically can you say to those people to win them over? Well, I think there are a number of things one could say. One is that nuclear is basically a very safe activity and that there is a track record. It's not the director general to utter his likeness or preference for nuclear. So it's simply look at the record. We are here to help you in that effort if you want to. We do have a system, a permanent system of follow-up in terms of what the nuclear industry does, perhaps second to none in terms of other industries when it comes to having regulators that are looking at it intently that there is a constant process that we have treaties and conventions and meetings constantly. It's like a permanent activity, which frankly, perhaps I'm not such an expert in other areas, but to the best of my knowledge, I don't see elsewhere. So the message is a positive message. It's a message in the sense that one can trust nuclear. But of course, this also requires from the nuclear community extreme determination and extreme zeal because the accident took place. And I always say we are not in the banalizing or downplaying of what the accident was and the fact that this accident should have never occurred. And it occurred because the safety standards and regulations were not being followed appropriately as every actor starting with the Japanese have recognized. So I think that 10 years have passed. In those 10 years, there has also been a very clear strengthening of nuclear safety practice all over the world and reconformation in the cases that needed so that the fleet as it stands is a sound one. One more question on that topic. Can you give some concrete examples how nuclear safety has has improved since Fukushima and maybe some areas where you think there is still more need for improvement? Well, there are different phases to what was done. There's a first phase where the nuclear fleet underwent stress tests. There were efforts to review as we did the whole body, the core of safety standards and comparing the actual operation of all nuclear power plants all over the world against them. There were also lots of physical improvements made and introduced and shared in the communities through different instances. Here, for example, within the context of the convention on nuclear safety where countries report regularly on what they do. So that was an area where we could discuss and compare notes about that. I wouldn't say there are technical things that are still pending as such. But as I said, there is no when it comes to nuclear safety, you never have a point of arrival where you say, well, now this is safe. You know, everything is in place. There is a safe operation and it's a constant effort. So we are by and large satisfied. But as I say, we don't like to and I don't like to say that we are absolutely okay because this is an ongoing activity, an ongoing activity that requires a lot of zeal, a lot of care. And this is what we do. But I should say that after Fukushima, the dialogue, the interaction among regulators, the industry increased a lot. Not that it did not exist before, but it increased quite considerably. So I would say, yeah, this is a fair, more or less, synthesis of where we are. Marcus is still with Kyoto News. I have a kind of a follow-up question to the first one. You mentioned on Monday that many people at the COP26 in Glasgow approached you and said that they think nuclear power should have place at the table to combat climate change, but Fukushima. So I was wondering, now 10 years after this accident, is it maybe possible for you to have a different angle, a different perspective on this and can say because of Fukushima, because of the accident and the reaction to it and the improvements in nuclear safety that were achieved so far, it's actually much better and it's safer. Does the accident actually help you in the argumentation for nuclear energy? I see your angle. It's an interesting one, but I wouldn't agree. You know why? Because it's not that because of Fukushima and the improvements thereafter that nuclear industry redeemed itself. It would be a wrong interpretation of what Fukushima was. Since Fukushima happened not because of any technological problem, it happened because certain things that needed to be done were not done. We're not done. So it's not that we had to rewrite the book and now we have a good book. So that being said, it is not a case of no improvements being made as I was responding right now. I think any accident, of course, forces you to go back to the drawing room and then look at what has been done and if you remember here, the IEA approved a nuclear safety action plan with specific areas to look at and so many things were reinforced. What I would join you is what I would say, yeah, the accident enhanced things and made it extremely difficult that an accident of this magnitude would happen again because of the same reasons. But of course, if what people are looking is for us or somebody else to say nothing will ever happen, it would be a laughable statement for nuclear or for any activity. But as I say, I'm very comfortable in the sense that we have an extremely regulated activity, an activity that is subject to, and rightly so, and we are part of that because, you know, we are not in the business of commercial promotion of nuclear energy. We're looking at it from a different angle, energy and safety. So, yeah. Hi, Jordi from Agency F. I want to ask something more commercial maybe. Is this alliance of European countries like Portugal, Austria, Germany, Denmark who are in COP26 presented a declaration. One of the arguments is as well an economic argument saying that it takes too many years to build a nuclear plant. It takes way too expensive. It would be much better to invest money in alternative. So is there any way in your opinion, is it possible to make it cheaper at the same time, keep the safety standards or is that a discussion you don't even want to talk about? No, no, no. I don't think there's any taboo, Jordi. I think everything must be answered. The political alignments of countries we know and we are not surprised by that. Same time as I always say, nuclear energy makes, you know, more than one third or even more of the clean energy in Europe. That is a fact and more than half of the countries of the European Union are using nuclear energy and are planning to use more. So that is the trend. Of course there are some that are against it and I don't have issues with political positions by countries, of course, naturally. So in terms of the other objections that are commonly raised, I think that when it comes to price, as you can see, this is a fluctuating argument because now with the skyrocketing prices of gas and other sources, all of a sudden the price equation has changed, proving not that this equation will stay there forever but rather that it's incorrect to say that the price equation is going to be permanently against nuclear energy. Prices are a function of something or a number of factors in nuclear and in any other activity. For those who studied some economy like myself, well, price formation is a variable, is a function of a number of factors. Subsidies, taxonomies, taxations, political decisions that make something that make an activity, you know, more expensive or less. So there is a human factor there. In terms of making it more affordable or less affordable, then again, it depends on which countries you are talking about. There are a number of countries, including some new exceeding countries to nuclear energy, for which the activity is not so expensive. I think that argument is more applicable perhaps for Western Europe to a certain extent to United States or North America. But then again, it's something, as I said, which is a relative argument. Then in terms of the future, of course, everybody is talking about small and modular reactors. This is the big theme in the nuclear discussion all over the world with great determination by many countries, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Russia, China, Korea, Argentina to invest heavily in small modular reactors and have something on the market relatively soon. Here you see a change because these type of reactors have also been in the discussion for many years. The difference now is that we see this coming along. Investments are being made, commitments including financial commitments are there on the table. And in my conversations with many, several of these vendors, I can feel it. So I guess that it's not something for the two distant future. In the 2020s, we are going to see SMRs on the market. And of course, when you talk about price tag, you're no longer in the billion range, you are in the hundreds range, which makes it so attractive for many, especially developing countries who come frequently to us for advice about it. So it's an evolving discussion. It's a very fascinating one for those who are following this. So we will see what comes. But we are actively following it. DG, it's Friday today and your reports on Iran are most likely coming out on Monday. So I'm afraid I have to ask, has there been any progress at all on the two big issues that you've been struggling with with Iran? So the safeguards issue and your visit to Tehran and getting cameras set up in Karaj. And if not, would it be acceptable to you for there to be no resolution on Iran? Well, thank you. If we think about these outstanding issues as being resolved or not, of course I should say no, they haven't been resolved yet. Doesn't mean that we are not trying to address them. And they are closely linked at least, and I hope the issue of the restoration of our verification and monitoring capacities to my visit to Tehran. I hope to be able to have a discussion there, including this on why this is so important and I would say essential. So, you know, I keep pushing and I hope to have some solution to this in the near future. If not, well, this will be very problematic, but I hope it will not be the case. Sorry, you said before, quite recently, in fact, that you expect, well, hoped that you'd be able to go to Tehran before the board, which is next week. Is that something you've given up on? I'm still hoping that this will be the case. I'm still hoping. And on the on the board resolution, I know that, you know, you don't, you try to avoid saying anything about resolutions, but still it seems that there's the general trade-off is likely to be no resolution while the talks are, while the wider talks are likely to happen. The JCPOA talks you mean. Which puts you in a bit of a pickle because you would like there to be as much pressure as possible placed on Iran over these issues. So would, are you still, would it be acceptable to you if there were no resolution in the next board or would that be a real problem for you? Again, of course, I would emphasize what you just said. You know, I don't have any, and I shouldn't have an advice to Member States as to how to address the issue. But it will also depend how we get to the board. And this conversation, I suppose, we are going to have on that date, I'm sure, with you and others. Because by then, I hope to be able to have had a good conversation in Iran, a serious conversation. And I will have an impression, a real impression of what is wanted. You have to consider that I have not had any contact with this government, apart from the technical conversations which were cordial with Mr. Islami on a couple of occasions. But I haven't had with the government that has been there for more than five months. So this is astonishing. And I'm saying it openly because I'm telling, I'm saying it to them. I think that we should have had this contact much earlier. But, you know, I cannot come if I'm not invited. It seems that I'm invited, but even that is a bit, you know, until I go, I will not be sure. So I hope I will come, really. I do hope. And there's a long list of things we need to discuss. Sorry, but so is there anything that leads you to believe that it's actually likely to happen before the board? Or is this your general, you know, your general optimism that, you know, it's never too late? Or is there? No, no, no. I think my expectation would be that we, that when we have these conversations, we can at least understand each other on why I am requesting certain things and why I believe that certain things within a certain time frame are indispensable. And then, you know, see if we can, we can have some, some form of, of an agreement. Follow-up. What, why, why haven't you not been able to visit Tehran? I mean, you came back two months ago from Tehran saying you would go there. I think you talked about that it would be a matter of days to fix a new agreement, a new date. What are the reasons that were given to you for not being able to, to go? I guess you should ask Iran. I got an invitation and then there was, there were some problems, agenda, things like that. But still, I think we should have been there much, much earlier. But of course, you know, I'm in the hands of the, you know, of those who, who should invite us. I guess they, they continue to say that they are seeing me soon. But it's, it's, it's not done yet. And until that is done, we will have some doubts. Hopefully, I will come back. Well, thank you very much. Hope to see you soon. All right. Thank you. Have a nice weekend.