 Thank you very much. Let me commend the three presenters for the insightful presentation. And listening and also reading the presentation takes me back to the 90s, first year university. The question is growth necessary condition for development. And I realize that we're still going back to development economics. That is the basis that we learned in high school and secondary school. And I think I will take my response from Andes World to New Medals that tries to talk about countries moving from LIC to MIC and putting them into four different groups. And coming from Africa, I think I may want to go a bit back home and then try to dig deep into what those MIC mean to some countries. Of course, growth has been quite strong in all these countries including those in SSA and poverty has also been reduced. So it's quite difficult to disagree with the fact that these countries have moved from LIC to MIC especially when we are using per capita income as the base. However, many of these countries cannot be seen as getting closer to development. We talk about China, we talk about South Korea. You look at their movement, it's not quite different from what OECD countries are having but if you go back to SSA, you realize that these countries are MIC you can call it lower middle income or CEDO MIC, YASIL MIC. However, do they have characteristics that can make them qualify to be countries classified as MIC strictly in that sense. Now, you look at some of these countries and they moved from LIC to MIC overnight. And I will give you Nigeria's example. Nigeria rebased and now it's supposed to be the biggest economy in Africa. And you compare Nigeria, the characteristics of the economy, the features of the labour market and so on, you compare to Africa, you see that they are totally different. So we look at Nigeria as the biggest economy but do we consider Nigeria as MIC in its present? Ghana, the same way, 2006 we rebased and then we moved to MIC and politicians were duplicating. However, we go deep into the citizens and then you see that we are still where we were 30 years back. So we look at how we measure the MIC to be able to know whether we are talking about development. Now, most of these countries too have also transformed in some sense because the backbone of these countries were agriculture but now we've moved to service. And somebody can say, well, we've transformed. However, there's also a missing middle and that must also be looked at as we move on because I always say the service sector is supposed to support the productive sectors. So if these countries are having the service sector being bigger than the productive sector then perhaps these countries are suffering from a disease called elephantiatis where they have parts, maybe the lower part of their leg being bigger than the upper part. Which is a problem which needs to be looked at as we try to look at developing these countries and of course the SDGs as Amelia also talked about. Now, most of these countries have also, the growth have also been driven by minerals. You talk about Zambia, you talk about Ghana, you talk about Nigeria and these countries are able to move faster to cross the thousand dollar per capita because of oil. Of course Ghana was supposed to be one of the fastest growing economies in 2011 of 15% because the oil entered the national account and you can see that well per capita income is very high but it has been driven by this. However, manufacturing which is supposed to create that kind of employment is not there. Manufacturing continues to go down and you can talk about Nigeria, you can talk about Zambia, you can talk about all these countries and we need to interrogate this as well. Indeed poverty has declined and we don't have any problem to doubt that somebody will say well growth is inclusive. However, we have a number of challenges in these countries that are supposed to be SIDU, MIC. Employment is quite vulnerable. Wage employment in manufacturing is going down. We have informality being high. Inequality is something that we are battling with. We're talking about problem with urbanization and housing problem. Many people are having a problem with housing, access to sanitation. We're talking about weak infrastructure as well. So just talking about MIC of these countries we need to go deeper into it. Especially when you graduate from LIC to MIC you have a challenge of getting it and therefore you have to go to the Eurobond market to be able to get some kind of support and I was thinking that is where these countries need some kind of support to be able to improve their infrastructure. In answering Andrew's hypothesis that there's export led growth determining everything and from a minute's conclusion of trade as catalyst to long-term development I would say the answer depends. I would say it depends because some countries are doing well and if I take it from Vladimir's argument that countries are doing well but there are some kind of stress that comes out of mortality through unemployment and so on then we need to look at it as important issues to interrogate. I would say that what are the institutional arrangements that will enforce the laws to be able to make these countries also push? Lessons for development economics. I have just about three or four questions that I'm posing. So are we saying that we are repackaging the old kind of development theory and calling it inclusive growth? So we have to see whether the old thing that we are doing however we are calling it inclusive growth these days. What's the role of institutions? What is the role of culture and religion in our discourse? Because many people are stressed out in terms of inequality and poverty so they resort to religion to be able to get some kind of comfort. So what role does religion and of course culture play in this discourse as well? Governance system. Democracy versus authoritarian system. Economic system too must also be looked at. Conflict or control economic system versus market system. And may I pose this question? That's location matter. If you're talking about those pseudo kind of MICs most of them are in SSE. And if these countries are quite far from the developed world one can say that South Korea, China, they are quite close to Japan and therefore that can also be one of the facts that move them quite faster. Then we need to look at location as well. Thank you. Thank you very much William. Also congratulations for staying on time. We have now time for questions. Please indicate your name and the institutions you are whether you address your question to Amelie, Vladimir and Lee. I think also William because he made also a number of substantive questions. You may want to sit here behind the table because the PowerPoint is finished. So just grab a chair over there and join us at the table. So I look at the room. I see one hand over there. My name is Mansub Moshev. Yes, for the camera. I can't outdo the performances we had. My name is Mansub Moshev from the Institute of Social Studies part of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have three sort of many questions to the three presenters. The first one is instead of going back to the future if we went forward to the past, I mean 50 years ago many of these countries which have acquired middle income status have actually gone back to the past because at the time of particularly the countries in transition are either from sub-Saharan Africa or from Asia. And 50 years ago a lot of these sub-Saharan African countries would have been the counterpart of middle income countries. The trouble is in many cases they declined because of 25 years of low or negative growth. So they had made a transition. They had made an earlier downward transition and now they have gone back up. This is not true I think for the South Asian countries in the sample. And to Amelia I just wondered, I always am confused about the least developed country definition but it seems to me a little bit clearer now that it sort of overlaps with the low income countries to a certain extent. So how do we, is it per capita income how do we arrive at that? And for Vladimir could you please just a little bit expand upon the last point you made which was about the institutional differences between Russia and China. And your concluding remark was there's something Latin America about Russian institutions that I was totally confused I would like you to expand on that. Thank you. On the last point I was in the seminary in Russia just after the fall of the building wall and I presented some of the adjustment experiences in Latin America and my counterparts didn't want to listen to me because he said you cannot compare Russia to Latin America it would be much better. So why you come up with all these countries? I wanted to explain what they could have done better taking into account some good questions. You were, yeah? And then the gentleman there. Thank you. Back by? I don't have to stand. I'm at the front, right? Yeah, you can. Well, you can stand. Then that's always a little bit cameraman. Thank you, thank you. Okay, so my name is Alyssa DiCaprio I'm from Asian Development Bank and my question is actually to everybody but it comes from a point that Emilia brought up which is the role of ICT. And so you know this is something that we've been thinking about is the role of e-commerce and ICT infrastructure for pushing development forward in a sort of non-traditional way, right? Because we've always focused on infrastructure but what about information infrastructure? This matters particularly for trade costs in distant countries, small islands, landlocked states. We think it can have a huge impact but I was just wondering what the opinion was with the different panelists. Thank you. I'm Mikko Berger from the University of Tampere, Finland. I address my question to Professor Poppo. It's a quite a broad one. Going back to late 1980s or early 1990s so I want to ask it touches about the institutional differences between Russia and China. Why China? I wonder if you can find some key differences between China and Russia. Why China managed to remain its stability and started to reform its governance and why Russia ended to the shocking collapse of its state capacity? Quite a broad one, but just to touch. I'm Ita Manatoko from Botswana. My question really relates to the fact that a lot of us in Africa are really looking for ideas on how to map things going forward. Mapping the way forward for Africa is of interest to us. There was a relation to trade and aid issues. The playing field has changed with the global crisis. A lot of resources which would have gone to development aid are now financing EU and IMF bailouts. On the trade side, we are now in a scenario where in the West, agricultural subsidies and non-tariff barriers are going up. So where Africa some years back might have thought that a way forward to have equitable growth would be through promoting agriculture, there are now barriers coming up in that arena. Community prices are going down. So it's really a challenging phase going forward. So if there are any ideas, even on how science technology innovations could be used to help Africa find new paths, that would be great. Hi, my name is Kristina Karinlahti. I'm from the Central Bank of Finland. And my question is to all of you on an issue that wasn't mentioned today, which is of interest, is the demographic shifts in the global economy and their effects, especially for Asian countries, European countries, developed countries and then to Africa. If you could please comment on that. Thanks. Thank you. My name is Tru Shedvin. I'm from CEDA, the Swedish International Development Corporation Agency. I just had two questions. One on structural transformation. And I was happy, William, that you brought up the service sector and the increasing service sector and also linking it to the rest of the economy and the patterns that we're seeing. And I hear during these days that we say that there is no structural transformation, but is there no structural transformation? Is it just following another pattern than what it did before and that we need to recognize and that we need to understand better? That was question number one. And then the other one, of course, we are looking at GDP and we are still categorizing countries according to the size of GDP in low income and middle income, et cetera. But given the size of the informal economies in these economies and countries, is this still such a relevant measurement? And how can we capture the informal economy better to understand the actual size of these economies? Thanks. Okay, thank you very much. Given the time I've closed now the questions, we had a number of very relevant and interesting questions, questions relating to the decline rather than some middle income countries, LDC differentiation, difference between Russia and China in institutions, two people asked about technological differentiation and technological progress. Then the question on the global crisis and the trade relates to agricultural subsidies, demographic shifts, and then the important question also, what is actually structural transformation about it? Is it a Lewisian thing, activity going from agriculture to manufacturing to services? Or if the economy shifts to services, could we also label that as structural transformation given that the nature of service is so wide and going from very low quality services to very high-quality service. And then also a question about the GDP and the informal economy, and I know William has done a lot of work with that, so I think this question will not fall flat here. I'm looking at time. Can I ask you to answer the questions very briefly? Two, two and a half minutes maximum. And I think we go in the same order as the presentations. Can I show a slide? Yes, maybe, because... If you have access to it easily, because otherwise... Otherwise I ask maybe Andy already to answer the question and then Poppo first time to find his slide. Lots of good points. The thing I've noticed, as I get older, I seem to read older books, and there seems to be a direct relationship between the more you... But it's not just books, it's papers and you go back into archives and all sorts of things. And actually a lot of the issues we're talking about were the things exactly that Arthur Lewis duddley sears especially, and even Simon Kuznetz and others were talking about, you know, just before, the 10 or 20 years before Wyden was established. So I think, I mean, in terms of these issues, there's a lot to go back to, the difference being for most developing countries, aid is far less important than it was 30 years ago. The countries are at much higher levels of income, which is not a good measure of development, but it does... It is a proxy for... It's some kind of proxy for more domestic resources being available. I think in terms of... I mean, just to respond to some other points, on the issues of the bounce backs, you're entirely right. I mean, a lot of countries don't... You know, growth periods go in spurts. Countries grow through it, grow for a bit, and then something happens and grow for another bit, and we know relatively little about, you know, why that is even. We certainly can identify after the event things that have happened, but we can also look at countries that weren't expected to grow and then suddenly grow. So, I mean, you're entirely right in one sense that it's not sort of linear, but hopefully, certainly for the big and populous countries, it seems to have been an upward turn. I think there's... I mean, on the ICTs, I think there's an interesting point here that even for the better off developing countries, commercial lending rates on 10-year treasury bonds are still around 10%, whereas the EU or, you know, World Bank can borrow whatever, 0.2% on something. There's a very interesting argument for long-run commercial lending, I think. I mean, you're talking about infrastructure and infrastructure around an ICTs, and it may be quite difficult for even better off developing countries to find the fiscal space when they have a multitude of demands to put money into things that may not seem so urgent, but actually today or even in five years' time will be very urgent. So, I think that the case for more long-run infrastructure type lending is very significant. On the different kinds of structural transformation, again, you know, going back to Sears and the limitations of the special case, the ways we could look at this. I mean, it really comes down to almost, I mean, as Sears said elsewhere, not looking at one indicator, like GDP per capita, but looking at a range of indicators of what's happening to poverty and employment, although, you know, some of those figures can be contentious. I think if anything, something like the proportion of the labour force in agriculture gives you a pretty good sense of what the country, the level of development, or the tax revenues over GDP gives you a sense of the strength of the state. So, it might depend. The kind of indicator you want to look at might depend on what you're looking for. If you're trying to say something about governance, then I'd probably look at tax data because of the relationship between the type of tax base a country has. I think Louis, sorry, I think Dudley Sears made, you know, in the limitations of the special case, there's a whole, there's 15 or 20 things that he suggested around structural change, which obviously, you know, same time that Arthur Lewis was writing. And then I think the only other point I'd probably make is about the world's poorest countries. There are surprising amounts of resources locked up in fossil fuel subsidies. And when I looked, I did the data in a new book, I actually found that even at $2.50, if you reallocated the resources that are currently locked in fossil fuel subsidies into poverty transfers, cash transfers to the poor, you'd actually cover three-quarters of the world's poor. Now obviously for developing countries the reallocation of a subsidy benefit that benefits car drivers and the urban elites towards the rural poor is really tough. So there's an interesting argument there about how you help governments reallocate resources. We included in the calculation actually a complete compensation for the poor because the poor benefit from kerosene subsidies. So we actually, it's largely based on petroleum, take a country like Sudan, 80% of Sudan's poverty, 80% of Sudan's poverty at $2.50 is technically coverable in Sudan's fossil fuel subsidies. And that probably brings you back to issues around governance and democracy. Okay, thank you for cutting your short, but there are other people later in the day. Vladimir, you slide it up, so thank you so much. Yes, I put the slide on the screen because I'm afraid I won't be able to make all the arguments so maybe it will be helpful to follow. Now answering Mansrub's question, the reason, if you take developing countries today, there are two groups of developing countries looking at indicators of the state institutional capacity such as murder rate, shadow economy, and you know there are indices of institutional capacity by the World Bank, there are six of them, I can go deeper into it, but basically they show you the same picture. The picture is this one, there is Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and former Soviet Union, at least part of the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, Russia, Baltic states, Kazakhstan. Then you have murder rates of 10, 20, 30, per 100,000 of inhabitants, like in Latin America, like in Sub-Saharan Africa. You take South Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and many countries, Middle East and North Africa, one, two, three, it's not, you know, 10% difference, it's times, order, the order of magnitude, one, two, three murders per 100,000 of inhabitants, right? Why it is the case? The institutional routes are different, since the 16th century. The 16th century, the West starts to get rich, gets out of the Malthusian trap. Developing countries imitate some of them, imitate the development of the West, Latin America, Russia, westernization, either conscious westernization, or because of colonialism, forced colonization, right? When they imitate the exit from the Malthusian trap, the inequality increases, right? They get all the results of the enclosure policy with the vagabonds and the, you know, poverty and mass, deprivation of the masses, but the savings rate rises and they start to develop faster. Latin America develops, MENA and East Asia and South Asia are at the same level, $500 per capita, right? They did this level until 1950, right? Now, in 1950, there are small changes in productivity going on and savings rate gradually increases. Once they start to increase, they have low inequality and with low inequality, they don't undermine institutions. They retain collectivist institutions, which prohibit the increase, high increasing in quality. So the institutions, judging by the indicators like moderate and shadow economy, remain pretty strong and they have the advantage and that's why they take off. They were behind Latin America and behind Russia, but now they take off and get caught. So this is a general scheme, yes, that why you compare Russia with Latin America? Well, what else? It's very close comparison, very close, yes? I think Latin America and Russia are very close together. GDP per capita is the same. High income inequality, if you look at Russia before revolution and today after the revolution, the inequalities are pretty much comparable. Russia has a genie of over 40 and it doesn't take into account all the inequality because if you look at the billionaires, there is a chart on the billionaires. Can I show you? I'll say it in words. The billionaire intensity of the Russian GDP, the oligarch intensity as we call it, the wealth of the billionaires divided by GDP is the highest in the world, right? If you count the billionaires from the Forbes list, China is below the regression line. Russia is way higher than the regression line. And if I can briefly answer the question from the gentleman from the University of Helsinki, there are three reasons, I would say, China and Russia. The first one is that centrally planned economy works worse than the market economy, but it works for 25 years. Why for 25 years? I'll explain it in a moment if I'll have time. The second reason, I don't explain it, I don't explain it, I go to the second reason. I do it, because you told me. The second reason is that it was a choice of policy. Gorbachev tried to do gradual reforms, he had. So China started transition after 25 years of centrally planned economy. Russia should have started transition in 1960 during crucial. And if Russia would make this transition, the highest point of Russian GDP to western GDP was 1965. Since Russia was catching up, catching up, the first countries were catching up together with Japan. Then there were other countries, but first it was Russia, right? And after that, it stopped catching up, it started to get behind. The second reason was the pace of transition, gradualism is better, and the third reason, ability to retain the strong state institutions. Okay, thank you. Amelia? I'll get the mic. That's a good question, Manso, because we get it all the time. It's not evident how this criteria is determined. Basically, it's a mix of three criteria. One is the income, it's gross national income. So the number for inclusion is $1,035. That's the same as the drink mic line. Exactly. So it overlaps with basically the income criteria. Then comes the human asset criteria and the economic vulnerability index. So the Committee for Development Policy of the Economic and Social Council of the UN is informed based on this composite index mixing these three categories. What happens in the long medium term is that some countries achieved, for example, the threshold to exit the category, you have Angola. Angola didn't want to graduate from the LDC category, but we are talking about $5,000 per capita income. But based on other issues, they claimed that they were not ready to graduate. But there are thresholds to graduate from the category, and it's a political process because you have to ensure a smooth transition out of the category into middle income status. So it's a composite index, but having said that, it's very heterogeneous. And when you think about policy formulation, it's very difficult to put all these countries, they're all producers in one box, with Bangladesh exporting textile and with the small islands. We have no base for diversification. We have countries like Kirivas with 1,000 people population. So to design a policy mix for these countries is very challenging. And that takes me to the point of Alisa about ICT. You have not only small islands that are LDCs, but you have landlocked countries that are LDCs. And at the same time, they are transit countries for other developing countries and lead developed countries. So when you think about infrastructure, you cannot think about only the bridge, the roads and the traditional development banks type of infrastructure, but the role that the new technologies in ICT can bring about to these countries, especially in services. And finally, about trade finance, there is a lot of discussion about this 8-4 trade, whether it's repackaging or not. It's a repackaging of official development assistance with a new name managed in Geneva. And it's based in the intersection between the trade regime because it's hosted at the WTO and the development agenda. So I think that has to be challenged and also the way, and again, Alisa is here, citing an article that she just published, the way that trade economies think about trade finance in a traditional way, linked only with ODA. But also we have to think about other commercial sources of how to fund exports in these developed countries and developing countries in general. Thank you very much. So I give you the floor. Yes, thank you. Well, I think the question about whether I move from agriculture to service is transformation. You can define transformation the way you want. But what do you want to achieve? If you are talking about transformation, that will improve livelihood of the people. Then you have to know where the livelihood improvement will come from. So if you look at most of these countries where service is now the leading, which area of service are we talking about? We're talking about telecommunication. We are talking about trade, which just create employment for the external countries. And we are talking about finance. And what kind of financial services are we talking about? Giving some kind of credit to trade and so on. So if you do this, then you neglect the productive sectors, which is manufacturing and agriculture, which is supposed to create employment for majority of the people to be able to improve their livelihood. Then your transformation will not benefit the people. So that, for me, my understanding is that to be able to... for transformation to benefit the people, it must move into areas that will give them sustainable kind of income. That is why moving from agriculture to manufacturing before you move to service is the way to go. And of course, classifying economies by per capita income. I intend to agree with people who conclude that we cannot just use the per capita income as a way of telling the country that they are MIC or LIC. For instance, you come to Africa, economic activity, the underground economic activity, which we may call the informal, is quite strong. Many people engaged in economic activity don't actually come to the market. For instance, we have a farmer who goes to the farm and gets everything and just consumes. So it's not be captured. So in that instant, you may underestimate the GDP. Apart from that, you also look at GDP coming from other areas. In Ghana, we have the oil that pushed GDP. But the benefit to the country was just about 3% or 5%. And are you saying that we are MIC and therefore it is going to benefit the people? So that is something that we need to look at. How do we measure these indicators? Even if you talk about joblessness and unemployment, you go to these countries, unemployment is sometimes about 5%. It is because of the way the concept is generated. And I think it is important that we look at some of these indicators and contextualize it within the countries. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank all the speakers, public. We stayed more or less on time. So thank you very much.