 can I have your attention please I hope you're enjoying lunch I'd like to thank CACI for hosting our lunch today it was it's great to have the support of CACI for events like this and it was great to have a wonderful lunch but but it's not over yet I'd like to introduce our speakers today General Michael Hayden and and John Hamry my co-host here today for what will be a very enlightening and interactive discussion on Homeland Security and the role of intelligence just to let you know that we were at this point we'll have microphones available for those of you who have questions so just raise your hand and someone will get to you right away with the microphone once that portion of the agenda begins so Dr. Hamry. Okay thank you thank you very much and by the way while this was billed as as two speeches I ain't gonna speak I mean this is you know when you have the you know they have the head of the CIA who's with you at talking about intelligence I would be only diminishment if I were to do that so I've converted this into an interview format I hope you all don't mind. I consider it bait and switch. It is bait and switch which means he's gonna have to do the bulk of the talk. I wonder by the way if we could get anybody from the the administration here to move this thing back because we've got a whole group of people over here that can't see anything and it might be useful if we could just kind of pull that back out of the way so that they have I wanted to see General Hayden and I apologize you'll have to look at me too okay that's so I think what we would like to do is to make this more interactive and part of partly my role is really to oh great thank you thanks very much Jeff hello over there part of this is to for me to get the conversation going because I'm really counting on everyone here to bring quality to this discussion General Hayden's wealth of experience and knowledge and we want to draw on that but I also want to draw on your questions to make it the best use of our time together all of us so let me start a little bit and and obviously it's a it's there are many multiple ways to begin a conversation with General Mike Hayden but let me begin with this and this is a this is a man in his service to the country when he was at the top of positions was at the NSA head of the national security agency then went to become the deputy director of the DNI operation and then went to the CIA this is a guy who was really touched more disciplines in the intelligence community than most and so let's let's begin exploring that Mikey we have seen remarkable success really in the global campaign against against suicide terrorists and it has required a way a new way of thinking could you just share with us from the inside you're in the boiler room here I mean what did it take to pull together all of the all of the disparate disciplines and expertise is in this community into a cohesive whole why don't you start with okay well I think the first thought I share with you it's a metaphor from baseball I think is you're never as bad as you look when you're on a losing streak and you're never as good as you look when on the winning streak so you shouldn't look upon this as two binary universes in which everything over here is unsuccessful and everything over here is successful there's there's an arc but it's not split in the in the highway I think a couple things change one is George tenant declared war on al Qaeda in 1999 there's a difference between George tenant declaring war in al Qaeda in the United States of America declaring war on al Qaeda so the most fundamental change was the change in national attitude national focus and resource allocation to an intelligence community and and I would add as a subset a corollary of that was the decision that we would not play just defense but we would play offense we play offense in terms of killing or capturing terrorists we play offense in interrogating terrorists and build up our knowledge so those are those are really important changes now within the community we benefited from additional resources we benefited from focus I mean I I knew George declared war 99 when I was director at NSA but we had a lot of priorities and terrorism got its share but after 9-11 it got more than its share almost to the point now where one has to begin to worry about the things to the left and to the right and I guess a third point I'd make besides the focus and the national shift is we became better at our trade it's hard to share information it doesn't require some sort of intellectual or moral ineptitude to make this a difficult problem I don't claim that we didn't have occasional moral or intellectual ineptitude but we didn't need that to make it hard to share look look at the here's here's the ultimate challenge you need individual disciplines in order to create the information you then want to analyze and share and so down here you need specialists in order to have anything worthwhile to talk about I mean go back to the NSA job how difficult is it to be party to a communication for which you are not the intended recipient listen to it in one if not multiple foreign languages none of which are your own between two communicants whose vision of reality and hope is different than your cultures and then turn that into actionable intelligence that's a specialist that that you have to be very specialized to create that information and then when you get it here you want them to turn on a dime and and share it left and right as if that culture that created it is no longer important well that's the demand and it's correct and that's what we have to do but what you have here are a clash of imperatives of one font one final point the American intelligence or the community as you've I'm sure you've seen today is very large and very complex all large complex organizations have to balance two virtues and they're both virtues unity of effort for the whole and autonomy of action for the parts it was decided after 2001 particularly in 2004 with the legislation we didn't have enough unity of effort and we needed to kind of tighten the formation but you overdo that you then begin to eat in to the autonomy of action for the parts and that carries its own cost so sorry it's a random answer but there but there are a lot of factors bearing on this but let me pull out yeah a couple of things in that because I think they're very interesting what you said I mean and part of it is culture and obviously culture is powerful it's dominating it lasts so long it's very powerful but also part of it is just structural you know we organized the government around certain ways periodically over time added on to it you know these become these institutions shape perceptions as well over time and so government is really about the barriers that we have by the organizations and the bridges we try to create that cross over these barriers how well did we do with IRTPA in bridging across these structures how do you feel we've got birth defects in IRTPA how do you feel about that it's a work in progress a longer answer would be better here's the history I'll try to be very efficient IRTPA was based a bit on misdiagnosis it goes back it goes back to this competing virtues unit of effort autonomy of action and the judgment was made that we didn't have enough community of effort the judgment was made that the DCI George tenant at the time didn't have enough control over the community I actually think that that's the misdiagnosis I actually think George did on a routine week at NSA George call me eight to ten times so there's a fair amount of stick and rudder control coming from Langley for me out of for me but George got his power not from that a couple hundred person DCI community management staff down the hall George got his power because he was a director of the Central Intelligence Agency and that first word meant what native English speakers think it means it was central I mean George would begin the conversation routinely he would say Mike my guys were just in here and would carry on an operational chat never was the antecedent of my guys the community management staff it was CIA this guy's all right so now again we got a tight in the formation we got a strength in the center this DCI just isn't strong enough right and we pass the legislation and the one thing that made the DCI strong we actually articulated in legislation that he the DNI could not be the DNI could not be the head of CI it went to such an extreme that the DNI couldn't have his office at CIA headquarters so now you've taken an effort to strengthen it up tighten the formation you've actually removed the one thing that was being used at the center now you're really responsible for putting a lot of bricks in the backpack legislatively because you've just removed his informal powers to put bricks in the backpack legislatively to actually tighten the formation and as you suggest more than a brick shot alone yep now while you were at the agency Mike McConnell was trying to correct some of these birth defects through through a rewrite one two triple three yeah that's that ever seemed to me to get strong enough where it identified the problems but didn't solve any of them there's a there's a morality play inside the larger plot line yeah when we had the first meeting for 12th triple field only 12 triple three Reagan era executive order this is one of the few audiences that does in the first draft tabled it had a sentence really early page two or three that referred to section 1008 of the IRTPA at the 11th hour remember I said it's a brick shive more than a brick shy below at the 11th hour the armed services committees put language in the intelligence reform act that essentially said nothing in whatever it is we're given to the DNI to do none of it will be interpreted to infringe upon the authorities of cabinet level officers in whose departments the intelligence organizations are located we have 16 intelligence organizations 15 of them are in somebody else's cabinet department and the only one that isn't his CIA so that created a dilemma in the first draft of 12 triple three that was tabled Mike was trying to get it revised and desperately needed revision the reference to 1008 was that in carrying out his responsibilities under this executive order and under law the DNI shall be presumed not to be interfering with the authority of cabinet level officials and so on the final version of 12 triple three same point of the text same sentence in carrying out his duties under this executive order and under the law the DNI will not impinge upon the authorities and responsibilities of cabinet level departments so so in essence we've handicapped the DNI now whether that's a good idea a bad idea whether that's wrong or right is a separate discussion for our purposes it just is yeah it is no how it happened and if you're if you're trying to if your theory is I want to strengthen the center you've really made this hard no I should add I think this current system can work I really do and boy I'm looking around here I've seen a lot of intelligence veterans I don't think one of us would actually support a movement why don't we have Congress look under the hood again okay well let's take that though I mean let's let's just assume that Congress disappeared momentarily don't no applause please no applause but let's just assume that it disappeared and you got to redesign IRTPA what what would it do you know I kind of already set the groundwork to dodge the question because I don't whether it's good or bad because man there's a reason the Secretary of Defense is seriously concerned about whether or not the National Security Agency is going to be responsive to his needs let me give you an additional additional fact see a past IRTPA 2004 right it's not in a vacuum right look what's going on we're more global look look at we're commemorating this this week this nation has been at war for 10 years it just take NSA I'm most familiar with it it has a dual personality it's not schizophrenic but it has a dual personality it is the National Security Agency and it is a combat support agency well well John what do you think which of its two identities do you think is becoming more prominent more marked in the last 10 years with the nation in conflict consistently over that 10-year period so you've got this legislative fix I need the National Director to have more authority and yet in reality the departmental roles of some of these agencies has become very very dominant and so you've got this broad trend which by the way is good you would not want the National Security Agency doing anything but being obsessed with protecting young American men and women in Iraq Afghanistan and elsewhere but ultimately it makes it less a national agency it makes it a more military or combat support agency the trick right you're asking my question the trick is as we come out of constant combat whenever that is we do not assume that which has developed is normal and that we allow it to swing back towards this national den let me give you a sense I was named director the National Security I was confirmed as Dernse in March of 2000 and I'm sorry March of 1999 there you all got that date March of 1999 the first syllable I exchanged with a secretary of defense was in March of 2001 when I said good morning to Don Rumsfeld after he summoned me down to his office in the Pentagon that's two years two years were all the direction I was taking was coming out of the DCI now and that probably not a healthy circumstance either but there there I was the deputy at the time you were taking no direction for me I know that I could because the DCI was strong let's just not go there where we we've expended that line of inquiry so yes but I would do yeah it's it's hard for the DNI to exercise authorities that are already in the law and to first order I would happen just go do some of that stuff I mean I this is almost an apocryphal story but it's not I'm the PDD and I I'm John Negropani's deputy I think I went in there one day and said miss secretary your ambassador you got to move $20 million oh okay we got a problem nope I just want you to move $20 million okay I want you to reach in to somebody's program and grab $20 million and move it somewhere else now he's much more mature man than I okay and he recognized that would do nothing but pick a fight but you get you understand the meaning that you kind of don't exercise the muscles and they're not going to be there when you when you want to rely on them so I would I would try to make that happen but he will get pushed back from the cabinet level officials let me just to develop again I'll be very briefed on the current system can work if you get three things right number one is the personality of the DNI it's really critical it just can't be good at his job he's got to be great because it's because it's incredibly demanding job he's got to be really agile in all meanings of that word that's one number two he and the president got to be like that everyone's got to believe that he is the president's senior intelligence adviser it's just not written in a lot and when the president's got a question he says get me the DNI and the third thing is that he and the DCIA have to be good friends they have got to have the transparency that some of you all of you may have had between you and a putative subordinate who is almost your equal bureaucratically but whom you know really well and trust implicitly because it's set up to be confrontational between the DCIA and the DNI I recall one incident with Mike McConnell had to do with the had to do with the issue that ultimately led to the demise of Denny Blair who gets to pick DNI reps and foreign capitals and I think I actually said to Mike at one point I'm gonna fight you to the death on this one and when I die expect you to do the right thing it's not a bad general need that kind of relationship between the two if you get those three this one here yeah it can work it can work out let me just take a little excursion detour here Mike because you were Dernse and of course we now have Dernse wearing another hat cybersecurity what has that done to NSA NSA was already on it by the way everything went to come in on all right I take personal ownership over it didn't begin with Keith it began with me I was I was the first commander of Joint Functional Component Command Net Warfare which is kind of the ancestor to today's soccer command so it's all I'm here first of all with with NSA's military identity trend that began while as director we became infinitely more interested in metadata just fact of call pattern of call identity of instrument and geolocation metadata who's calling geolocation where's the instrument which I would suggest you is a wonderful set of skills if your purpose in life is to kill the communicant not so good if you just want to listen and so you see NSA shifting its weight to a battlefield value as opposed to the national intelligence value which is that traditional what's the content of the communication what are they saying which kind of tends towards national intelligence priorities not battlefield intelligence so that's one that's a reality that's already going on that art that trajectory is already in the intel space now you layer on it a title 10 function a combatant command function and you reinforce that trend so so I am Keith is gonna as did I he's gonna have to be very careful that he is not consumed by the attractiveness of the new mission that he doesn't abandon traditional signals pass that still you know and I was hopeful in 1999 I could get rid of HF collection and that's not happening and that he stays on top of that and and gives fair weight to the pure intelligence mission as opposed to the new exciting I can affect events mission and let me give you one additional five Keith is now a four-star because he's the commander of US Cyber Command he's also the director of NSA which in its own right is a three-star position I will offer you a hypothesis Keith Alexander is the last intelligence officer to be the director of the national security agency they will fill the position based upon the combatant command needs of the four-star cybercom commander and the terms of position will be the additional duties as assigned that it that has long-term meaning yes it does yeah and that is a concern I hear I hear echoing around the community and it's one that's probably not the voices on behalf of the traditional SIGINT mission community is probably under undervalued in this dynamic as we race our way towards cybersecurity let me Mike let me just go back you earlier talked about you said maybe we've taken it a little too far down just one path in organizing ourselves on this threat it's it it's typical organizations focus on you know the the last war and they structure themselves to prevent it again we've done a fabulous job in my view in in going after the perpetrators this last one but it could also be a set of blinders on what we think is out there what if you if you were back now what would you be telling your community both you know all all the positions you're in what would you be telling your community on how to anticipate what we are not anticipating isn't more about self-discipline than is lecturing the community when I was director people would ask me to CIA director people say what are your priorities I gave him a Washington alphabet soup thing CTC PROW counterterrorism kind of proliferation rest of the world and that's not an inaccurate description of what we're doing the story I'm going to tell you now is apocryphal it's a really good story so I'm gonna tell it anyway so Russia invades Georgia in August 2008 we're focused on this I'm starting getting phone calls and emails are coming in I know Steve how he's gonna call me so I walk out of my office out in the outer office and Mary Jane and Mary are there I said get the Georgian analyst up here right away that's all true that's fact the apocryphal story is what I didn't say out loud but I said to myself privately we've got Georgian analysts right we had them I mean you understand what I'm trying to predict and the fact is we did and they were really good and they filled my office in about 10 minutes and they had maps and charts and order a battle and predictive intelligence it was great but John the director wasn't looking at that neither was the deputy director and the other parts of the senior leadership I had to do this for me I know Dave is gonna have to do it for him let me offer you an hypothesis here the central intelligence agency which is still the nation's premier intelligence service the central intelligence agency has never looked more like its direct ancestor OSS than it does this afternoon today and that's a good thing it's made all of us much safer but what I had to remind myself and what I would suggest general Petraeus remind himself is but you're not OSS you're a global intelligence service and you've got to embrace that function as well let me having a conversation with brother pistol here and of course he's he's just trying to introduce a kind of version 2.0 you know for for TSA and try to get out of a brute force you know muscle-based approach to aviation security to more of a brain-based approach you know but it seems to me that that depends on a very deep collaboration with intelligence community how good is that relationship now do we have what it takes to support John with what he's trying to do well this is an imperfect world and you're always chasing the next fact and and so I mean it is imperfect and we get some things right you get some things wrong that's the nature of the business but frankly I think that's the that's a wonderful approach it's gonna be a little hard not just in our intelligence culture it's gonna be hard in our political culture oh yes okay you know we all kind of default to okay we're all taking everything off so no one's being discriminated against and now you switch it over to judgment in the TSA line and that opens up to a whole variety of accusations that our political culture has almost hypersensitivity to so that's really gonna rely on very good intelligence that leads me to something I should mentioned earlier and that's the NCTC which which I think is an unqualified success also created by the art IRTPA and you talked about the houses DNI thing going let me add an additional thought you don't get the NCTC word is today without the DNI and I'm not talking about this tight chain of command which may or may not exist depends on the personalities involved I'm talking about the broad political culture that the essence of the NCTC is the blending of foreign and domestic the blending of intelligence based and law enforcement based information and you get this in the launch out of which John now gets the kind of tip-offs that he needs can you imagine our political culture allowing that organization foreign domestic intel law enforcement to mix all that data if it were under the direct supervision of the nation's espionage chief there is no way that that can happen so that in one instance separating the DCIA from the DNI has been a real opener of these kinds of possibilities so I'm optimistic that the structure we now have NCTC supported by the collection agencies can actually provide John very useful information as long as we all recognize you know this hard work and you tend to get surprised every now again earlier conversation this morning with Ambassador Prince Turkey and it reminded me again of how central the role of liaison arrangements with other intelligence services has been in this effort could you could you describe what this was like especially in your role sure um really important really valuable makes Americans safe um we've been the press has been rolling out stories kind of revelatory things with their view of cooperation between the CIA and the Libyan intelligence service another set of stories only slightly different CIA and NYPD and and what we're doing in New York we viewed in senior leadership viewed that cooperation to be absolutely priceless and let me talk from for a minute about that here's the macro deal CIA is rich global it's big and it's got technology to beat everything the local service is local agile culturally agile linguistically agile knows the local situation you can enrich their local data by putting it into a broad global context and the reverse is is equally true and so we spent a lot of time to the two of us Steve Capples and I visited about 55 countries in a 30 month period and a number larger than that came to CIA headquarters to talk to us now challenge John is even when you're talking with good friends your interests your view of the world your legal structures are never like that with theirs there is always difference and I've been in conversations where it's almost like that but your professional and ethical responsibility is to work in that space where you have common values common interests common dangers and to profit profit both nations we really did work very hard I'm going to ask a dangerous question I'm not sure the answer is dangerous but the question is dangerous and that is when you when you hear the concerns that other governments have with the way that our ambivalence when Mubarak was under stress and the feeling that a long-standing ally was abandoned by the government I'm just repeating what's widely discussed it sends out signals to other countries and dramatically complicates these liaison arrangements would you care to comment on sure the accusation has been made and I'm repeating whatever it's somewhat like just like my question right the accusation has been made is that the counterterrorism cooperation was so central to the relationship with these other services so important to our national security that we had a bit of binders on either analytically or even in how aggressive we would collect outside of the CT partnership and so that made us less aware of what might be going on inside some of these countries that you didn't want to jeopardize counterterrorism cooperation by being overly aggressive in some other aspects of collection that's fair question and I just put out there is a question without without any more any more comment I look I've sat across table from Musa Kusa had a Libyan service and I did that thing there you know I gave a little overlap and we're gonna work in this space and we're not gonna talk about some things this is a man who had the service who has American blood on his hands and I just swallow hard and say now here's what we're new about al Qaeda with the Egyptian service we had broad cooperative relationships I don't envy the national leadership gone through those meetings you've got the sweep of history you've got things going on you've got a long term friendship how do you balance both justice and our interests because they're both in conflict there are values in conflict both ways so I don't know what the right answers are I think a wrong answer is mubarak on a on a gurney in a cage on trowel and whatever we may agree or disagree about he had to move on that's a mistake and we may owe it as a friend to both the old and new Egypt to kind of let our thoughts be known that that's not a good thing friends I tell you General Hayden has to be in New York late afternoon and so I don't know if your blackberry said you had to be the airport or the train you have to go to the train so we're gonna get him out of here in literally in 10 minutes which means I'm not gonna give you a long time to ask questions and I apologize for asking too much but let me open up the floor do we have microphones that are ready to go around so we question right right down here this table yep stand up stand up so he can see you and know where to bring the mic and keep question short please so we can we're trying to get a few in Chris Berhaney independent consultant we have a challenging opportunity we have a unsustainable debt we have to reduce budgets across government we have a jobs unemployment problem we have an opportunity there's two trillion dollars of investment income on the sidelines let's say ten percent of that is useful to the intelligence community remote sense commercial mode sensing cyber defense things like that if the government pursues a lead system integrator approach to a government-owned and operated capability or system then industries looking for a hundred percent investment however if the government can't afford that and if they can go public-private partnership with industry for commercial mode sensing commercial cyber defense good for both you might be able to draw two hundred billion dollars out of industry which will help the Intel community help jobs and all that I appreciate you coming on sure I'll be breathing I'll quickly get beyond my personal ability to discuss this being just kind of new to the business world let me just talk about blue and green let me just talk about blue badgers and green badgers and how that worked in the IC I have always been able to believe that the contractors who work for us were part of the CIA workforce I put contractor stars on the wall when I was director of CIA I'd be briefing Congress on some particularly good thing and a question I would get is was that done by a US government employee or a contractor and I I would respond consistently I have no idea I do know it's the best American available at that point to do that job until I would be personally inclined to move in the direction that you suggested I have two experiences at NSA one was groundbreaker which was turning over our IT system to a private contractor check check check rough going hard to do got into a war made it tougher than it should have been but it worked trouble laser different thing went on to a contractor spent about a billion dollars got this big stack of view graphs really that's about it good okay not not so much as a success so there's a mixed history but I am more inclined than I see the community today being inclined to go outside for solutions rather than manpower or hours other other questions of colleagues yes right down here microphones coming just please wait a second Gordon Middleton Patrick Henry College general Hayden you made the remark earlier that you felt one of the or at least I interpreted your comments that one of the key strategy decisions we made was to also go on the offense in the counterterrorism war could you comment have we made that same decision in the cyber war that's ongoing and to what extent do you see cultural and or legal issues to us doing so yeah we've made that decision clearly in the war on terror with I think very good results we have not made that decision in the cyber world we have capabilities that lie fallow for one of policy guidance and left and right hand policy boundaries for how we want to use our cyber capabilities I've been in meetings downtown in which we had a cyber challenge or cyber opportunity a technology that we respond to that we meet for about an hour and we'd firmly decide we needed to meet again next week at the same time and we kind of drifted forward because we would just another that this sounds very critical in a sense it is but it's really hard this is a really new stuff and we don't understand a lot of the kind of the fundamental let me give you one all right okay so I got my briefcase here somebody stops me going out here so I want to look in your briefcase probably respond with a two-word monosyllabic phrase that translates roughly into definitely not okay I go to national and go through John's line he's open your briefcase you bet sir we have established rules in physical space as to what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy I defy any of you to define for me the national consensus on what comprises a reasonable expectation of privacy on the Internet and absent that we're still back in the starting blocks in many ways yeah we just we don't have an agreement on what's need to know versus right to know we have no agreement on what what the private sector can ask of private information what the government is allowed to ask it's a it's uncharted territory and that's one of the reasons it is a hard problem really hard problem do you have a question down here yes please Craig Peresow with invertex you commented on the concern that you have about one individual wearing both the cybercom hat and the dirns ahead can you just comment briefly on the possibility of separating those two roles actually being out of government I can just stay stuff and don't have to solve them all right but I wouldn't change it I mean it's it's it's a natural given given where we are now 10 years from now 20 years from now things might be different it's okay but we don't have the war with all to recreate I'm going to use the word firepower here but kind of in a metaphorical sense we don't have the world to recreate the cyberfirepower that's at Fort Mead under NSA in a separate place and put it under a separate commander so it makes great sense to combine them so I'm not arguing against it I'm just telling you there are byproducts to that and we're now beginning to understand the byproducts and so I wouldn't change the course of action just like I wouldn't change the geolocation and metadata which I enthusiastically kick started when I was doing so but there are byproducts and you need to know that and kind of push back it to at least ameliorate the secondary and tertiary effects okay we're going to try to get two more questions in one right here Randy first with first associates general Hayden we've gone on the offensive and done it fairly successfully in dealing with the international terrorist threat the question is do we have the capability as a nation to deal with the domestic lethal extremists very briefly John asked about integration all right so you got those big three letter national agencies actually doing a pretty good job left to right okay or east-west the problem you just described which is the flavor of the month when it comes to terrorist threat lone wolf self-radicalized less complex attacks the sharing there the predominant need is not just east-west it's north-south and that's between the federal state local tribal territorial that's harder for as hard as this was to do this is much harder we are a federal system remember and and there are boundaries between different parts of government that are there are part of our DNA and but I fear now and the next challenge is I mean keep doing this now you've got a master this that's the shift in weight we need to meet the new kind of threat that actually I think ultimately going to be harder to do than it was to do I think that's absolutely right we got one last question I'm sorry I'm gonna let the general out so I'm just Romerheim Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies at the opening you said you spoke quite a lot about the importance of close relationships at the top for the system you that's now in place to work but if you relate that to the Iraq War and George Tenet and the presidency worked for there is a narrative out there that it was too close and that he wasn't able to push back when you should have can you comment on that please sure occupational hazard that that's the nature that's the nature of the job I've got this long thing I give him some public speeches is that you're the fat guy talking to the vision guy you're you're the world as it is guy talking as to the world as we want it to be guy you are inherently inductive he is inherently deductive and the trick you have to master and it's you who has to master it is not break the tether to what I just described the fat guy the inductive guy the world as it is guy not break the tether but get into the mental space of the deductive vision world as we want it to be guy and have him happy that you are there that's the art form let me just say I think one of the great benefits of this country is that even though someone leaves public life they still do public service Mike Hayden is doing public service every day let's thank him with our applause today thank you very much and let him get out he's got to get to the train station oh we're going to be reconvening at 130 back at the auditorium so wander on over there when you're done with dessert