 Hello. Good afternoon. Welcome. My name is George Perkovich. I'm a Vice President for Studies here at the Carnegie Endowment. It's my pleasure to welcome all of you and equally as much, maybe even a little more, to welcome Ambassador Rafael Grossi, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He needs no introduction. We have paper that has his introduction. I would just say that over time we've had the honor of working with him on a number of issues, and he's both exceptionally informed in all of the nuance of the various issues that people here are concerned about, and exceptionally diplomatic and addressing those hard issues. He will need both skills, obviously, going forward. He would have needed them if he was remaining in charge of the NPT review conference next spring, but he got out of that very difficult and important job to get into this even more difficult and important job. But I'm sure in the discussion period he would be happy and entertain questions about that issue as well, the NPT review conference, as well as his current remit now with the IAEA. So I'm going to get out of the way. I'm going to invite Ambassador Grossi up here. Then he and I will have a very brief conversation and we'll turn it open to questions and dialogue with all of you. But thank you again for joining us. Thank you very much, George. Thank you for the nice introduction. It's so nice to be back here. As he was saying a minute ago, I've been having the pleasure of working with Carnegie on so many issues in connection with different responsibilities and jobs and tasks I had in the past years, most recently, for example, as president, designated president to be or never to be of the NPT review conference last year before that as chair of the nuclear suppliers group for two consecutive terms and on nuclear safety as well. I mean, during the years I've been having the privilege of having certain responsibilities on this issue area that is of interest for all of you. Now I'm standing here in front of you as director general of the IEA, an institution you all know very well and an institution I'm going to try to guide to the best of my abilities for the next few years. So perhaps by way of an introduction, I could very briefly outline the issues in front of us, the ideas I have on how to tackle the problems we have, but I would really be more interested in the kind of conversation that is so typical to Carnegie where you can tell me what you think of what I said or what you think in general of the issues having to do with this fascinating and so ever so necessary indispensable business of nonproliferation that we all share. Well, a change at the helm of any international institution is, of course, quite obvious, but it's an opportunity. It's an opportunity after considerable time of my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Amano, at the helm. It is a good opportunity that is given to us to recalibrate the work that the agency is doing to think about it together with the staff and also with the member states to think about the priorities and the problems that the agency is having and how to face them in a more effective way. It is clear that the scene and the international situation when it comes to nonproliferation presents both continuities, but also new issues. And even on the continuity column, I would say, same problems present themselves in a different way. So the big chapters we have, the big issues we have in front of us are the known ones and I'm sure that you will be interested in getting a bit of an exchange with me on issues like the evolution of the situation in Iran, of course, not only with regards to the JCPOA, but also on our normal safeguards work with Iran that exceeds the remit of the JCPOA. What can we expect about North Korea and other places? But there are also very, very important matters that go to the heart of the work of the agency that need also to be discussed. Let me start with chronologically because it's easier, perhaps, with what's coming up in Vienna next week. And this is something on which I see around the room many champions, Basil Hauge and others here have been working on nuclear security for many years. And nuclear security is something that has not gotten any easier as time goes by. We had for a number of years a high visibility political process with summits in different parts of the world. But this came to an end as it was logical. And ever since this process of big summits stopped, we, and when I say we, I say we as a community of people dealing with these issues have been trying to bring this issue forward, mainstreaming it, including all those who were not part of those summits, the participants in the summits, and many others, because the issue, the nuclear security issue requires constant care. Having meetings like this and conferences is fine. It's necessary. It creates public opinion and awareness. But the reality is that somebody has to do the job. Somebody has to be checking that nuclear material is physically protected. And this is no easy job, no easy task. And as for any other relevant thing in the nuclear industry when it comes to the normative side of things, the IAEA is the indispensable place to do this. It's only through the IAEA that you will get the scale and the scope that you need to do the things that are required to be done. We are going to have a conference next week, an international conference. They could call it ICONS, International Conference on Nuclear Security. Having a few before, we are having a new edition of this. It's encouraging. We are, I think, breaking the records in terms of ministerial presence. We are, we've gone beyond the line of 50, 50-something. Normally, we're hovering around 40, 35, 40. So there's a bit of more of an interest in what is going to be done there. But apart from the conference and the relatively bureaucratic issue of a conference, which is absolutely irrelevant for people on the street, what's important is what's going on with international security. And there, I think we do have a few deficits that we need to be addressing quite urgently. And this conference will be part of an effort to do just that. The deficits we have have to do with the fact that the norms we have in nuclear security do not have the density that we do have, for example, in areas like nuclear safety. So we need to make these norms mature. We need to be bolder in our efforts in this area. And this is necessary everywhere. We see new countries exceeding to nuclear energy, which is good as far as the IAEA is concerned. We see countries in regions that were perhaps not considered to be inclined to go for nuclear energy, like the Gulf countries. So it's quite, I would say, a change of paradigm in terms of who is doing nuclear. We see, of course, in the global south a lot of activity. We even see it in Europe. And we will see it in the United States. So all of this, of course, mathematically means more nuclear material, more facilities, more places that need to be checked. So this is one big challenge I would like to draw your attention to and perhaps discuss a little bit more with you. Nuclear safety continues to be as essential as always. The challenges are there. Fukushima was not the swan song of nuclear energy, as many expected. But that brought a new awareness. Unfortunately, perhaps this is human nature. We need a big problem sometimes to focus on what needs to be done to take necessary action. And this was the case after Fukushima. And we could see a renewed strengthened commitment to do more in nuclear safety. But we're still struggling with a few areas there. I will try, as Director General, to pay much more attention to that. As you know, some of you may know, the agency is also the hub for the creation establishment of safety standards. As you know, the nuclear industry, for example, the United States might not require the IAEA to set standards. But of course, when it comes to safety, what you need to look at is the countries that do not have the capacities to set the standards. And on top of that, are keen on need the IAEA to set the standards for them to be able to apply them without any pushback or resistance. So the work is frankly indispensable. We are approaching incredible, isn't it? 10th anniversary after Fukushima. 10 years have gone by since that moment. And I'm in discussion with our Japanese friends, of course, on how to reflect upon this and how to use this opportunity to refresh, reinforce our mandate for nuclear safety. Nuclear energy, as I was just indicating, is an area where there is growth. Unlike some perspectives and perceptions that people may have, especially where I live in Austria, nuclear is growing everywhere. Nuclear is growing. You may like it or dislike it. It's a reality. Take the Global South, as I was saying, take India, China, even Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, where countries are very, very keen on going for more nuclear. Take Latin America, my own region. Of course, the Gulf, Egypt moving forward with a very, I was with President Sisi a few weeks ago with a very ambitious nuclear power program, Bangladesh. I mean, many places where we see all this interest to include nuclear in the mix, which will mean, of course, more activity. And this is also connected with what I just mentioned about nuclear security and nuclear safety and our budget and our ability to do all of these things. And this is also connected with something else about which the agency was not very keen on being seen talking, but I'm not. And this is climate change. My first trip as Director General was not a state visit, was a visit to the COP25 in Madrid, to the conference of the parties, to the Convention on Climate Change. Some people were saying the agency, no, no, no, your first trip, this, no, forget it. It's just dangerous. You're going to have pushback. The agency has never done that before. You see, we were there and we were so well received, so well received. That doesn't mean that people were giving me standing ovations now, but it meant that they understand that nuclear must have a place at the table. That is illogical and scientific to be worried about climate change discarding clean energy, low emitting energy as nuclear energy. It's all we're saying. Let's discuss facts and science. Then people will decide what they want to do. And I think this has been well received. We need nuclear to be part of that discussion. And I'm already working with the United Kingdom government because I will be in Glasgow and the conversation will continue. Of course, we are not at the center of that debate, but we will be part of that debate. Undoubtedly, this will happen. So beyond that, I would invite you and perhaps Washington is not the ideal place for that, not because you will not be responsive or welcoming, simply because it's not your priority, but I would invite you to not to forget that for many countries, what drives them to the IAEA is our technical cooperation work. Countries need what we give them in terms of human health and cancer therapy. It's World Cancer Day. And we are going to be working on that because there is an enormous need for that. 28 African countries do not have one single radiotherapy unit. It's a scandal. The IAEA can do a lot in this respect. And I don't say this as a missionary. Countries are expecting that from us. Countries are asking us, please help us in this area. So we need to do that. Countries are very keen on seeing us work on water management. For example, in areas of the world where water is a security geostrategic issue, the agency through radio isotopic techniques is able to help countries administer, analyze, evaluate their aquifers and the reserves they have. Food security. With irradiation, we prevent crops going bought. So these things go to the essence of the economy and the preoccupation of many countries. So perhaps an issue for the high-level carrying-edge political debate that we have at the capital of the leading nation in the world, that's very necessary when it comes to the work of the IAEA. Of course, these all of these things need an institution. An institution that is well-run. An institution that has the resources that it needs. But of course, we are not naive and we know that we live in times of enormous financial austerity. And it would be utopian or naive for me as director general to come with a request for more resources when countries are struggling with their own national budgets in many cases. So under my directorship, the IAEA will be opening up to partnerships of different sorts. We are for the first time talking seriously to regional development banks. We are talking to private sector. We are soliciting funds wherever they can be found for the mission that we have. We are not going to stop because there is limitation in terms of funding. So this is one thing that you are going to see more. The other thing that you are going to see more is an agency that is going to be visible and present. We live at a time where communication is as important as the substance of your mission because people need to understand, need to give you the social acceptability, if not support for what you are trying to do for them. And the agency has a spokesperson and this is the director general. He has been elected for that. We need to go out and explain and take time and reach out and say why we are doing what we are doing and try to get support for the mission. We need to do this also bearing in mind the societal demands of the times. And this is why I have committed to achieve gender parity in my agency in 2025. It's an extremely ambitious task. I don't know if I'm going to get it, but I will try hard. I decided already that the recruitment policies of the agency will be 50-50 and line managers are going to be assessed against this. It's not impossible. It's not utopian. Of course, member states need to help me. They need to let women candidates be in their lists. You will find it amazing, but sometimes it so happens that countries that support gender parity come to me with three male candidates. So there is a bit of a disconnect sometimes. And we are going to try to address that very seriously as much as we can. The problem I know does not end in appointing a few women, especially at high places, to make believe that you are addressing the issue. It includes that. Of course, it does. But at the same time, we need to recognize that there is a problem, a structural problem, which is conflated with a bigger issue that has to do with women in not only nuclear in STEM. I intend to do my part in that. We don't have the solution to the problem, but we are going to be working with educational institutions around the world to provide for more opportunities to women in nuclear. I will be announcing to the Board of Governors in two weeks the establishment of the IAEA Maricuri Fellowship for Women in Nuclear, where we are going to give funds for women working in these areas with an angle for nuclear, and they will have opportunities for internships at the agency at the end of their programs. So, George, these are just a few of the issues I wanted to indicate as markers of what I will try to be doing. And now let's move to the more interesting part, which is listening to your questions and the exchanges. I'm very grateful to be here. I hope to be seeing you again here very soon. Thank you very much, and thanks for coming. Thank you. Thanks, Rafael. That was great. I only have two questions, I think, because we already have people raising their hands to ask questions, so I'm going to try to get out of the way, and there are people much better versed on all these issues than I. But the first question I wanted to draw you out on more was when you were talking about, in a sense, growth or the health of the civil nuclear industry. Yes. I'm thinking of electricity production more than in the kind of health and agricultural spaces, because obviously that's always been the basis of both the agency's work, but also the logic of the non-proliferation system was the motivation or a motivation of states not to acquire nuclear weapons was that civilian nuclear energy was so valuable, and you would get that much better if you didn't. And so when the man seemed to be going down and there were more doubts about civilian nuclear energy, you do worry about the motivation of the whole system. Say more about why you think the demand actually is rising or is at least healthy, because I think about South Korea or Japan or this country, even in India, it's by and large in the doldrum. So say more about why you think actually there is. Well, it's a fascinating point. I'm not an energy expert. I'm a nuclear diplomat, non-proliferation diplomat, but I know enough to understand what the trends are. And I've been having very interesting discussions with people who know really about these things, like the director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, who's a good friend, and we were discussing different scenarios. And what you see is two things. One, in terms of the climate change challenges, is that it is in any scenario, it is practically impossible to get anywhere near the targets agreed by all of our nations in Paris a few years ago without nuclear. It's mathematically quite difficult, if not impossible. Then you have the inherent advantages of nuclear energy in terms of providing a very stable baseline source of energy, which you can combine in your mix with renewables and other sources. I've been saying as well that we don't compete with renewables. We see renewable energy as incredibly important and needed. I was meeting with the director-general of Irina as well in Madrid. So we don't see any competition here. What we try to highlight, because we are not nuclear lobbyists either. I'm not in a business. And so what we are trying to highlight is the possibility that this offers, which as you rightly pointed out, the curve has been a bit unstable. There has been, you remember in the early 2000s, there was talk about the nuclear renaissance. Then people forgot about that. Then Fukushima came and people said, well, is the end? But it's not the end. It's clear. I mean, it's not an issue. It's not an ideological issue. It's just looking at the facts. Facts of the matter are that this is the kind of evolution we have. And people have huge investment already. One aspect that is frequently overlooked is that above and beyond new build, many countries are going for life extension, which is a very interesting aspect of this issue. Because what you see is MPPs approaching 100 years. You will see that. We are already at 60, 70 in many cases. And we will see this. So it's also a matter of investment that has been done in many places. So I think there that we need to have a less, the ideologicized debate on these issues. Look at what's out there. Look at what the market is offering. Look at the possibilities that countries may have. It might be, of course, extremely difficult for some countries to get into the investment. And of course, I'm sure there will be questions about small and medium size and the future of the industry through this alternative, which is also far more affordable for medium and even small and poor countries, to be honest, in terms of with weak or power or poorly organized grids, as you know. So it is also an area that needs to be looked at with great focus, I would say. I know we're going to have lots of questions about Iran. And so I'm not going to go there. But I'm going to ask you about Saudi Arabia because it fits into the category of states that are interested in expanding and producing nuclear energy. It's also had a leadership that has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons in certain contexts. And it has, as I understand it, anyway, a small quantities protocol, but not the comprehensive safeguards agreement. So the normal safeguards agreement if you're moving towards nuclear energy. So I expect that will be one of your early tasks. It'll come up. It's not a challenge or a problem, but this would be the normal course of business. How do you think about that? Or where does that issue stand in terms of the interactions with Saudi Arabia on safeguards as they move forward with civilian energy? Very good. Very good. I think Saudi Arabia is aware of what their obligations are. I haven't had a direct bilateral conversation on this issue, but I'm in contact, of course, with the government and with the mission in Vienna. And I don't have any reason to believe that before loading the low power reactor that, by the way, was provided by an Argentine firm. So I'm familiar in my previous capacity of this. They are going to deactivate the SPP and moving in the right direction. And on the political statements, it's political statements come and go. I keep my eye on the non-proliferation law. That's what I'm looking at. The rest is, of course, I hear. Okay. So what we're going to do is you all know the drill. You're going to raise your hands as you have. And then I'm going to call on you. And then you're going to tell us who you are. And since there are so many hands up, I'm going to do two at a time. So I'm going to start with the lady here behind Barbara Slavin, whose name is Allison. And then we're going to go to Barbara Slavin, and we'll work our way, and then we'll jump to the back. Thanks. Right to your left, Allison. Okay, great. I'm Allison McFarlane, George Washington University. Bienvenidos. Gracias. So I'd like you to say a little bit more about your ideas on your new ideas on nuclear safety and what the IAEA can do in that realm. This, for those of you who don't know, Allison was the chair of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the United States. So it was, it wasn't a loaded question. It was an informed question. And then Barbara. You started it because you mentioned it. Yeah. Barbara, and then we'll. Okay, thanks. Barbara Slavin from the Atlantic Council. Very nice to see you here in Washington again. Thank you. I wanted to get your assessment of the steps that Iran has taken out of the JCPOA. How alarm should we be? What is your sense of their intentions? They say they still want to remain within the agreement somehow. And do you take seriously the threat to leave the NPT if Europe invokes the dispute resolution mechanism of the JCPOA? Thank you. Two great questions which ought to free many of you from needing to ask the same question. So, so just I'm on, I'm on to it. Rafael. Well, thank you. Thank you. When I spoke about nuclear safety, I didn't know that the former regulator will be here. So it's good to see you. It's good to see you again. I think as you know, much better than I, nuclear safety is such a vast enterprise. And one that I think if there was one issue on which this activity could be described as depending on its nuclear safety, there's no doubt about it. And I think that, you know, my take on it is what we can do from the agency to steer and to promote certain trends that we believe that are needed. And when I'm looking at the glass, I'm looking at the parts of the world where the needs are and the deficits exist. One of my intentions will be to work much closer. And I don't think this has been a tradition with previous DGs, with the safety standards committee. I think they are, they do a tremendously important job, not only them, but the subcommittees, you know, the transport, waste, nuclear safety, trans-grask, all the, you know, in the jargon, we have a number of subcommittees that look at the more specific activities that need to be regulated. And what we see is that there are certain areas that they are starting to look at. Transport is one. I think there is a need to emphasize on that. There are still denials, there are still problems in transit that do exist. We also have a need, I would say, to work more on new build, new design, and especially as anticipating a little bit the question that might come on small and medium size, because they have different types of technical configurations that might require adapted regulatory approaches. With what you have, you know, things like new scale, to talk about the project that is close to the hearts of many here in the United States, there are important questions being put in terms of how do you regulate that, how you approach the safety. It's one unit, two units, how you multiply that. So there are very, very important new issues that are coming up technically speaking that we will need to be addressing. We will have a lot, perhaps not a priority because of the newness of the issue, but in terms of waste, we are going to be working on that. As you know, we have the traditional problems related to waste, the social acceptability, but we also have current issues, Schema derived and otherwise, that are turning the people's attention back into the waste area. So these are few of the areas where I hope to be able to be working on this. And back to gender, the standards commission is led by a woman. So another woman will replace the one that is there. So again, I show that there is this talent there that can be available for all of us for the benefit of all. So that easy question aside, then there's Iran, Barbara asked. Well, I think this is in everybody's minds. And it's been at the center of much of my discussions here in Washington. I believe that we need to recognize that the situation around the agreement that exists is a complex one. You don't need me to recognize that. I'm not a party to that agreement, but I am the agency. The agency is an actor. It's a special actor. It's the one that is there to say what's going on with all these announcements. Because announcements, you have two types of announcements. You have political announcements and then you have formal announcements that indicate the way this country is going to proceed in terms of the agreement. I as director general don't have an opinion on those. I continue as I was saying, I keep my eyes on the ball and I look at what's going on in Iran. It's a bit of a paradox because I'm verifying the noncompliance. But this is the way things are. And the ones who sit to say whether they are comfortable or not with that are those who subscribe to the agreement. And I haven't heard from them that I shouldn't be inspecting anymore. So we continue to do that. And we do it to the milligram. So for us, this is what matters. We obviously do not carry out our inspection activities mechanistically. So we listen to what is being said. And we prepare ourselves for every possible circumstance. But for the time being, the activities continue, which is just a fact. Let's come this way. There are two people in the back. There you go. Yeah. Hello. My name is Kyung-Goo Lee and I'm an exchange student here at GW. I'm from South Korea. Thank you for your wonderful lecture. I'm here to ask you about the IAEA's position toward North Korea. Currently, North Korea and the United States are in a standstill of the nuclearization process. But if the nuclearization process takes its trail and if for some critical like lifting up the sanctions or making security arrangements, if North Korea decides to abandon its nuclear weapons and its nuclear experiment sites, would the IAEA be willing to take part in the inspection and implementation of the process? And also, I was curious if IAEA had an independent or independent initiative for North Korea and its nuclear problems as it had in the 1990s and 2000s. Thank you. So why don't you answer that one? I won't come back to people, but the North Korea presents so many issues. Go ahead. So many issues. Yes, indeed. Well, thank you for your question. I would say I understand that the bilateral negotiation is ongoing. I had a good conversation with Secretary Pompeo about it and I know that they haven't given up. So I'm encouraged to hear that the effort is not stopping. When an agreement comes, the IAEA will be part of it. There's no other way. Unless you create another institutional international body that would be able to do what we do, it's impossible. So when an agreement is struck, and I hope this will be this year, when that happens, the IAEA would call to do what it does best, which is to be a reliable, neutral, independent, accurate partner in the effort. Of course, when this happens, this will present an enormous challenge for us. The North Korea we will return to is a far more difficult, complex place to verify than the North Korea our inspectors were kicked out of back in 2009. One needs to recognize that. Back in the day, North Korea had performed when we were expelled just one nuclear weapon test in 2006. There was a possibility that there could be some weapon here or there, but the dimension of the problem was minute compared to what we have now. Now, North Korea is an illegal nuclear power. We do not recognize it. We do not accept that it is a nuclear weapon state, legally speaking. But I think there are a couple of dozen nuclear weapons or maybe more. I don't know. I don't like to throw figures like this because it doesn't make any sense. We know that there are nuclear weapons there. We know that there are facilities beyond, young beyond, and the complex that our inspectors were familiar with. So you can imagine what the kind of effort that we will have in terms of establishing baselines, establishing initial decorations, validating those, but it will have to be done. There's no doubt about it. So one of the things, one of the first things I did when I took office was to meet with the teams inside and to tell them that they should be prepared to be deployed when the ink is still fresh on the agreement. There was an indication that we might perhaps need more time. I said, no, we're going to prepare. We need to be ready to deploy the first day, the first moment. We will adapt to whatever circumstance, but we will need a lot of support to do it simply because the agency's budget is a very small and this is another area where we might discuss if you're interested, but the reality is that we are nowhere near where we need to be if this happens. And if this happens, the effort is going to be much bigger than the one we have in Iran, much, much bigger. In a much more difficult circumstances in terms of personnel and feeding them and taking care of just the personnel who would be involved in logistics and all of that. Exactly, all of that. But it will have to be done. There's no other way and we will have to do it with confidence and giving the international community the confidence that there will be an eyes and ears of the international community to see how this goes. I'm reluctant to reward you, but I'm going to because you were the first one to raise your hand. It's like Q jumping. This guy right here, yeah. Thank you. Sir, excellent presentation. I'm Ariel Kohn also with the Atlantic Council. And to build on my colleagues' question, you mentioned Iran, what are other things that keep you awake at night? What are the pressing real and current dangers that we all need to be concerned? Is it the security of the existing reactors? Is it nuclear programs that people keep under wraps? Is it leakage of radioactive material to terrorist groups? What is it that we really need to focus, let's say, three top priorities security-wise? Thank you. Well, thank you very much. I think some of the issues I mentioned are all of, I wouldn't say equal, because equal is in the eye of the beholder. And for different audiences around the world, different things have different degrees of priority. But quite clearly, nuclear safety, nuclear security are things that I'm constantly thinking about, constantly. Of course, the non-proliferation issues are there, but on those, I'm not alone. And many others are thinking about that, and we are inspecting. But nuclear security and nuclear safety merit much more attention than they currently do. And we need, we need at the agency all the support we can get from member states, from national governments, so that they are given the priority they do have. Because it's indispensable for their own energy programs and then for so many other issues. So I wouldn't say these are things that keep me on my toes, but it's really so important and anything can happen. And as you know, in this area, it doesn't matter if you have the best normative structure in the world, the problem will not come from you. The problem will come from somewhere else. And even, and history proves it, in countries where you would not expect certain things to happen, things can happen. And I won't call Tom Hanks here. These two ladies here. Hi, Stephanie Cook. Stephanie, hello. With Nuclear Intelligence Weekly. Yes. Thank you very much for a second time. One question we didn't get to, we had a press briefing this morning, which I wanted to ask you is the decision or the apparent decision by the Japanese government to release the tritiated water from the Fukushima site into the Pacific is obviously contentious. As I understand it, the plan would be to do it in sort of batch release, very controlled and very supervised. Have there been any discussions between your agency in Japan about international monitoring to give the world more assurance on this point? And on the point of assurance in Japan, the second issue is the discovery of hotspots in the Olympic village, the J village. And I wonder if there's been any discussion about that between your agency and Japan and the government in Tokyo. Thanks. Well, thank you very much to very relevant questions. Of course, we are in discussion with them. I'll be in Japan soon. And we will be discussing these issues. Yes. Liz came from Voice of America. Thank you for your time today. Sorry, I don't see. Sorry, excuse me. I was so big. Yeah, Liz came with Voice of America. Yes. Follow-up question on North Korea. What is the ramification if we recognize North Korea as nuclear power? But this is a legal issue that has to do with the NPT. And if you're asking that, I would say, as you know, the NPT only recognizes a discrete number of countries as legitimate processors of nuclear weapons. So unless you have a modification of that treaty, they cannot be recognized as such. There have been subsequent United Nations Security Council resolutions confirming this. So from a legal point of view, I think there is no doubt that can't be any recognition. Maybe it's not something that pre-occupies a lot the authorities in Pyongyang. They have their nuclear weapons. So it's something that I would say the ramifications, of course, they will, this would weaken the norms that we all care for and that we need to strengthen. And I suppose this is also part of the importance of the NPT review conference. We need to strengthen this treaty. We need to care for it. And of course, any erosion of this type would be extremely bad. They walked away from the NPT to make nuclear weapons. That's very clear. Jennifer, you're on the end and then she's going to pass it to Laura. Thank you very much. Gracias. Hola. It's really nice to see you here. I'm Jennifer McPhee, Federation of American Scientists in Partnership for Secure America. I was just wondering in terms of your concerns about safety and security, if you could follow up a little bit about what you expect out of the ICONS conference next week, other than a ministerial statement, I know it's been worked on and how that might spill over into the AACP PNM amended convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials. Thank you very much. Well, indeed an excellent question. This conference, as I was saying in the beginning, it has its importance because it allows us to keep the political engagement, I would say, and as I was saying, I'm encouraged to see that a growing number of ministers or vice ministers are willing to come to Vienna to take part in the discussion. That helps a lot in terms of creating awareness so they go back home with an idea of nuclear security, what this is, what this means. So, in and by itself, this is important. The ministerial statement is being finalized in Vienna these days. Normally, you would expect these documents to be good documents, not groundbreaking sort of statements because for that you need, I suppose, a different kind of format. But I expect the document to be addressing the main issues to be sending out the necessary messages in terms of recommitting or committing to the nuclear security work that we have. The issue there, as I was saying, is to really try to in a serious way to mainstream the nuclear security message and activity to more and more countries, to be in a place where we will get less pushback for more activity at the agency. Because there are some relaxancies on it that are more politically than technically based. You will be, it's not a surprise because in the multilateral world, sometimes you have this dichotomy between countries that perhaps when taking the floor are critical of nuclear security, but then they come to the nuclear security office and they ask for support for their countries. I know it's part of that. It's part of the political discourse. It's part of the political international political debates that we have. But we need to improve on this. And I will try to, in my conversations with political leaders around the world, I'm trying and I've started that. I'm trying to make them aware of the fact that especially those who are so-called newcomers, especially those who want to have nuclear and want to play a role and want to be recognized as full-fledged members of the nuclear power owner countries, they need to understand that you cannot be in this business without paying attention to nuclear security. So, I think it's going to be an incremental process, but at least one in which they will see that they have a director general that is going to be reminded them of this. So, I hope that might help. I'm going to do a benefit because Jennifer's question caused you to say exactly what I was going to ask of you is your role individually and personally in creating more interest from the member states in both in supporting nuclear security activities at the agency and in requesting programmatic assistance for themselves. So, I will simply applaud your answer and pledge NTI support in helping you achieve that. I also just want to thank you for being so available to Civil Society during your visit this week. I know it was short and you've got a lot official on your mind. Well, if I may be able to get you to that because that allows me before I forget. Before, while you're doing that, I was going to tell people who didn't know what Laura Holgate's recent contributions to this field have been. Oh, sure. Sorry. Why don't you do that because it will mean a lot more to everybody if it comes from you. Indeed. And then you can say what you're going to say. No, no, no. I think we all know what Laura did in her previous capacity in government or in Vienna where I had the pleasure to be a fellow governor with her. So, I would say that the this work and this goes beyond nuclear security. In this work, there's so many people, including you, Karen and others that have so much at stake and so much to contribute to. So, what I pledge to do is to be open and to try to work with you on all of these issues. We cannot do it on our own. It's impossible. The agency has its role and its solemnity and will not be affected by this on the contrary, on the contrary. So, I think that we have to come together and there interesting creative ways in which oftentimes NGOs, civil society, think tanks are going to be, if you allow me to say so, strategic allies of the work of the mission of the IEA. The work is so vast in all these areas that I was mentioning, nuclear security, nuclear safety, that I cannot pretend to cover all the bases on my own. So, one of the things I intend to have is an agency that is embracing all these efforts and in a very egoistic way, use your networks, your capacity to reach out on behalf of our mission. Nuclear security is a typical area where we've seen over the past few years lots of efforts, lots of efforts, many of which I would say most of which very commendable efforts, but sometimes there is duplication, sometimes there is exhaustion in the part of member states that are solicited by different groups that come and it has happened to be that some believe that they are doing official things with unofficial entities in some developing countries, honestly. So, I think we need to put some order in our discussion, let's work together, there's enough space for all of us on the country, there's a need for all of us to work together and see how best we can put our activities and our work in action. I was talking about this fellowship that I'm going to be announcing, so I will need institutions, educational institutions, think tanks to be spreading the message, to be reaching out, to be suggesting to me areas where we can work, institutions where there are good groups that have been focusing on nuclear safety, on new build, on new generation design, et cetera, et cetera. So, Laura's comment gave me the opportunity to say this because this is valid not only for nuclear security, but for safety, for nuclear energy, of course for technical cooperation, this is quite obvious in the area of cancer treatment, we are working with a number of institutions, we had a discussion the other day about this and I'm going to try to do more in this regard. I think it could be more efficient and more effective. I was thinking about the question of what keeps you up at night, I just realized the whole agenda, you're not going to have time to sleep, whether you're worried about anything or not, in any case. There's gentlemen here and then Daryl, can I get back to you? Yeah, please. Hello, thank you very much for your excellent presentation. I'm Carleton Stoiber, I chair now the Nuclear Security and Unproliferation Group of the International Nuclear Law Association. And my question for you is basically one you'd expect from a lawyer, and that is what emphasis is the agency placing on legal training in the areas of safety, security, and the rest. Because you mentioned previously that at least in one government they didn't understand what their legal obligations were. And so what perspective does the agency have on improving the level of nuclear law understanding among member states, and do you have the resources that you need to do that? Before you answer that, Daryl, you take the mic too, because we have so many, I'm going to try to double up again to get some. Ambassador Groza, good to see you, Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association. I wanted to come back to Iran briefly. You described that the agency's role is that of an actor, an important actor. And obviously the agency's safeguards work in Iran right now is very important. You said in an interview a couple days ago, your news, I think it was, that despite the disputes between the JCPOA parties, the agency's safeguards work continues uninterrupted. I wanted to ask you to offer your thoughts, your advice perhaps is a better word for it, to the parties about what they need to be thinking about in the months ahead so that you can and the agency can continue its important work to ensure that the world has insights as to what Iran's program is or is not doing. I would just respectfully say that yes, the agency is an important actor, but it has important advice to give to its directors. The legal question and of course there is a very important remark. On the legal aspect I would say of course this is one of the key aspects where capacity building when capacity building is concerned. You know capacity building is one of the areas where we have to work the most and it covers all the areas. It covers safety, security, we are in high demand to give this kind of advice in all areas, even nuclear energy and of course legal as well. You know our agency with all the work it has has just 21 lawyers and this 21 and this includes general legal, I mean the contracts, the procurement, whether I have eight or nine working safety on that, it's a big organization so you should you should subtract these lawyers that are saving my life every day because they are making care that the procurement is done in a correct way, that there are no problems, that we do not get more cases than we need to the administrative tribunal of the international labor organization. So if you think that it's about a dozen, you can see how clearly we do as much as we can, but we train trainers a lot. This is an obvious easy way to multiply the bread. Number one and this is another typical area for partnering where I've already been talking to our very capable legal advisor, Dr. Perry Johnson from the United States on partnering and looking into possibilities to expand the kind of advice, legal advice that we are giving on all these areas including nuclear security. It was a reference to the CPP and I'm sorry now I remember that I forgot to mention that. All these instruments, these I call them the satellite instruments that they are a bit the Cinderella's that people don't think much about they are so important, the convention on nuclear safety, the convention, the joint convention on nuclear waste and spent management of nuclear fuel, the convention of the physical protection of nuclear material. All these sort of forgotten treaties that only practitioners pay attention to. It's also a very important part of our legal work where we intend to do to do much more, but thank you for reminding us of that important part of the work. But one which is typically suited and well suited for good work and partnering with other institutions around the world. So of course on the JCPOA, I have a mandate. The mandate is discrete and well defined and I need to comply with that mandate without looking at the surrounding circumstances that we have. Of course my preoccupation there is to make sure that I have all the conditions to do my job. So one thing I need not only from Iran of course, but from all the others is that they support me when I request Iran to work with us. So people should, I hope that countries will give me the necessary support that I will need when moments of difficulty will come. When I will have to, if this happens, when I may have to ask Iran to do the right thing, we are at a complex juncture as you know. So I hope and I don't get into the political realm because I shouldn't. I hope the political dialogue that is taking place now is going to bear fruit. As I said, I have to be extremely circumspect in what I say and not exceed my remit and my jurisdiction, but I would say there will be a time when I will come constructively, respectfully, to Iran asking them to do the right thing, to work with the agency. And at that moment, not only those subscribers, many others, especially the countries at the board of governors will have to stand with the agency. And this is what I hope. This gentleman back here and then this lady here in the red sweatshirt. Hi, Luke Radis here with NTI. And I was just wondering if you could say a couple of words on your forecast for the 2020 NPT review conference, the likelihood of reaching a consensus and the implications if they aren't able to reach a consensus. Thank you. And then before you do that, I'm glad for the NPT question. Yes, ma'am. I'm Sister Ardith Plattie. I'm part of ICANN. I realize that there are 191 nations that signed the NPT treaty. Presently, there are 35 nations that have ratified the TPNW. That's the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons for those two people who don't know that yet. Thank you. My question is, do you have enough staff to monitor the nations presently in NPT? And also, are you getting ready for the 50 ratifications where there can be no possession of nuclear weapons? And my question is, what kind of staffing will you need to prepare for the disarmament process that has to go on throughout the world? It's key because the young people at the ICANN gatherings and the assembly stated they will not live in a world with nuclear weapons any longer because of the ongoing proliferation, nuclear power, and plutonium, et cetera. So I'm questioning you, what do you need to prepare for the total disarmament of nuclear weapons? Well, two easy questions. So, NPT review conference. As you know, until I was elected to be the director general of the IEA, I was the president designate of the NPT review conference, and I worked very hard for almost three years in that capacity, preparing the ground for the conference. I did so with a slightly different approach than had been the case in the past, trying without in any way sidelining any of the important factors that are part of the discussion, disarmament, proliferation, and peaceful uses, trying to have a more integrated, integrated discussion. My impression, this is, I'm talking about, I'm talking, you know, from a personal perspective, not as director general of the IEA because it's a different responsibility, but since you're asking me and I was the president designate, I will give you my personal impression. So I was working because in the conviction that you needed a comprehensive approach. In the conviction that the way in which the discussion was being conducted was, I would say, was not functional to a successful outcome because the compartmentalization of it allowed at certain points for a concentration of the attention on one or two single issues, obscuring two thirds or four fifths of the rest of what has to do with the NPT. So I proposed and I got a lot of support for a program of taking the discussion, first of all, out of Vienna, New York, and Geneva and go out and start talking to people in regions and to do that in also integrating in that debate and inviting to the table the practitioners, the operators, the regulators, people that were incredibly absent from NPT discussions before. So that wasn't a magic one that will not turn things around, that will not make anybody forget about some of the political issues that are out there in the Middle East or the disarmament thing that you madam are referring to and I will get to your question in a second. So my impression is that this kind of comprehensive approach is what is needed. To have an outcome, I don't know if you want to call it successful or not. I think this outcome should be an outcome that will at the end of the day strengthen the NPT and I believe that even among those who have points to criticize about the observance of the NPT by some state parties to the agreement to declare that they continue to believe that the NPT is important, it has to be strengthened and it has to be protected. So I don't think it is a good idea to make an NPT conference sink because of that, because the end result is that you are eroding a norm that you continue to believe is important. So that was my conviction, it's still my conviction. I think it is possible to have a good outcome. There is an excellent president who I know very well so I hope he will be successful in that regard. Madam your question, of course you are talking about an instrument to which the IAA is not connected with but of course this is an open discussion, a frank discussion. I must say you have to also bear in mind that the instrument in consideration does not include necessarily the IAA, it talks about some authority or some international authority so perhaps that would be a question to the whatever authority they might have in mind to see what role they could have. Apparently that was not the idea, I don't know I was not part of the drafting exercise at that time but they were referring to some authority which is not the IAA. So but I don't want to skirt the question, I think the issue of disarmament has always been there as one of the important indispensable aspects of our collective thinking. My mission is about preventing more countries to have nuclear weapons that's my mission and I will do my best to see to it that no other countries are added to the list that is behind I suppose the spirit that brought about ETP and W. You're doing so many other jobs I want to ask you on what time is it because I don't have a clock and I want to make sure we I have a flight to catch it. Oh you know that's why I but you've got the watch and I don't so Aaron's telling me that we got to wrap up so um I see this thing I used to have a watch but then you have a phone with a clock on it but you have to turn off the phone when you come up with the microphone so then you don't know what time I yes right there so people don't realize that you should be in charge here too so look um I want to thank all of you there are great questions you're a great group and I especially want to ask you to join me in thanking Ambassador Grosser for a great talk.