 Ok, Hello, Helis, I am representing work with Antonija Savoja, and this is another work on institutions. And as we will see we focus on political institution that can limit the power of the executive. Tako, imamo prezentacije, heterogenitje, da je to nekaj nekaj resorcij. Tukaj počkaj je, da je, da je reveno, za viskalna kapacitina je zelo pravdjena o politične veszmenty in infrastruktur, plus o najbranju, je največ nekaj če bo predetajne, in priču je nekaj se vseččen, da neče, kdo svih dnačej mačne traditje ima skupnju, in stimulacije začala in nekaj, da je začala, da reviewsi, in začala... Jer inami, da je zpravil kaj najbolje, izgleda je, da ta način prezervna je povedo, bilo se najbolje v ročin, kaj začal se. Petro thega, samovljala, izgleda so, nekin je zgleda, nič je, nekaj začal, nekaj ga začal, in resursje revenje in všičenja fiskala kapacitim. Malo se je naredile, kaj je danes zelo, da smo da je dobro zelo, da smo ne bojili, kjer smo ne bojili, ne ne bojili. Zato, da je inaterogenej deljenez in natroj resursje na nekaj deljenez. Skupno, da se prihredi? So we argued that a fiscal resource course may be made or not depending on whether the political institution can limit the power of the stock of the sector and on how easy it is to control or up to create natural resources. Before presenting our hypothesis more formally let me start with an example drawing on Lewis. So consider two oil-rich countries, Nigeria and Indonesia. These two countries have quite similar characteristics in terms of population in atmic fragmentation. As I said, they are both oil rich countries, so they are major oil exporters. In both countries, moreover, experience large windfall from oil in the 70s. Finally, they were both authoritarian regimes for the initial period of the resource windfall and for the subsequent period. So, despite these similar characteristics, what we can see is that they are quite different with respect to the level of no resource taxes in Indonesia, that perform consistently better than Nigeria. So, what can I explain this difference? So, a key element is that there was an important difference in the level of constraints to the executive in the two counties. Indeed, while the authoritarian regime in Indonesia faced a de facto executive constraint given by the presence of a technocratic authority that was dedicated for economic policy, de facto mechanism was not present in Nigeria. So, however, Indonesia and Nigeria are not exception. If we consider, as we also see before, a larger sample of development countries, we can see that there is a negative correlation between no resource taxes and resource wealth. However, if we split the sample considering high and low level of executive constraints, we see that there could be an intergenerous effect of natural resources on no resource taxes. So, our hypotheses are that negative effect of natural resources rent on incentive to invest in fiscal capacity depends on whether countries have political institution limiting the power of the executive. But we also argue that not all the natural resources are the same, that is, the negative effect depends also on how it is easy for the rulers to appropriate natural resources rent. So, according to the literature, governments discovering natural resources see a reduced incentive to invest in the revenue administration because natural resource endowment provides an easy to obtain source of revenue compared to tax system. So, there are few papers, empirical papers that confirm this hypothesis. At least three of them here. So, we start with NAC for the present cross-section evidence that is partially consistent with this hypothesis. And then Jensen and Boris Ekohtors used a panel analysis to provide evidence on the negative effect of resource rents in 38 carbon-rich economies. So, limiting the sample to this country. So, these papers confirm the theory. However, the empirical evidence is still limited and it's fraud with the methodological issue. So, it is important to provide other evidence on the effect of resource rents on fiscal capacity, also because it is important to consider the role of institution and I said how different resources may have different effect. So, let's start with the role of institutions, why institutions could be important. The presence of, sorry, a resource boom leads to the same incentive for all the political leaders. So, that is the leaders are incentive to use resource rent for patronage to keep him however in power. So, these reduce the incentive to invest in taxation because Ekohtors can use resource rents. So, what can do the political institution when rulers are subject to check and balance, they have rest discretion of public finance decision. So, they are moreover subject to the scrutiny of public finance institution so the political institution can avert the negative effect of natural resources and this is confirmed also from some case studies from Africa and Latin America. Concerning the type of resources, a standard argument is that the resources extracted from an outroad geographical base that are point source resources are easier to control and appropriate for political leads and so they offer a greater incentive to substitute taxation with resource revenue compared to resources extracted from a broad geographical base of the diffuse natural resources. More recently the literature has focused on not the geographical characteristics of natural resources but on the fact that the could be more or less appropriable and so they consider the appropriability of natural resources in terms of appropriability by the state. So, we test our hypothesis considering these arguments using panel analysis that cover the period of 1995-2015 and considering 62 development countries. The key element in our analysis lies in the choice of the relevant variable. So, starting from the variable of fiscal capacity we chose to measure it as a non-resourced taxis on income profit and capital gains over total non-resourced tax revenue. This is different from previous measures of fiscal capacity that focus on the denominator of our process or the focus on total tax revenue. We chose to focus on taxes on income profit and capital gains since because the standard argument is that it is more difficult to build tax system that can extract tax on income. Taxis on income requires a more structured tax system. So, this measure could help us to actually evaluate the investment in the fiscal system and to separate it from the political choice of a ruler to have a low or high level of taxation. As for the resource trends we consider the share of natural capital wealth over total wealth. These data are from the wealth accounting dataset from World Bank. I forgot to mention that we use CRD data for fiscal capacity. And finally, sorry, this is important, this measure of resource trends we think that is the closest measure to the what the theory on the fiscal resource set because it presents a measure of the present value of resource trends in each point of time. So, it gives a measure of the level of rents that accruing to the states from natural resources. And finally, as for the political institution we use the well-known variable executive constraint from policy 4. So, of course, we add also control variable and time fix effect. We will discuss the empirical strategy later if you want. Now let's see our results. What we see here in this figure is that if we consider the total amount of resource wealth we cannot find a significant effect of resource rent on fiscal capacity to different level of constraint. But this as I said, in this panel we consider all the resources. Let's see what happens if we try to go behind this result and see if there is an intelligence effect of natural resources. So, we split the sample in diffuse resources and point source resources and what we can see is that actually only point source resources have a negative significant effect on fiscal capacity considering very low level of executive constraint. So, in particular we find that the effect is negative and significant consider a level up to one of the executive constraint. And this effect is also not only statistically significant but also economically since there is for very low level of executive constraints for country like Nigeria. For example, we see a drop a level of fiscal capacity that is 0.61 below the on average below the year. We also try to disentangle the effect of of all the natural resources so consider the individual component of total natural wealth and we find that actually only oil wealth has a negative effect but this effect is vanish considering high level of executive constraint. So the effect is negative significant only up to a level of executive constraint equal to 3. So, we conduct a series of robustness checks but let me skip and present further evidence of our analysis of our hypothesis. So what we have done is to exploit the oil price boom that began in 2002 as a natural experiment so we also provide counterfactual inference based on the syntactic different diff a syntactic different diff is a new estimator that builds on inside behind the difference in the control method. So we focus on the effect on no resource tax level in Indonesia and Nigeria relative to a sample of resource for countries following consider as a treatment the oil price boom that began in 2002 and what we find is that after the oil boom the blue line are the level of non resource taxes for the syntactic counterpart so the control group while the green line is the actual level of non resource taxes for Indonesia and Nigeria. So what we can see is that after the oil boom the difference between Indonesia and its counterpart remain almost constant while it increases in Nigeria. So considering from a quantitative point of view this means that Nigeria would have had a level of non resource tax revenue that would be higher by 2.5% in the absence of the oil boom. So to conclude we find that point source resources are negative associated with physical capacity in particular oil resources while the first resources are not but political institutions placed on the secretary power can neutralize this effect so thank you very much and sorry for